

According to intelligence data, which are currently being verified by the investigation, similar groups were organized by the British at Dneprostroy, Azneft, MOGES, at the enterprises of the NKPS, etc.

Among the British engineers working in the USSR from Metro-Vickers, the investigation revealed as representatives of Intelligence Service - engineer TERL, who worked at a metal plant in Leningrad, installation engineer NOEL, who worked at the Krasny Oktyabr power plant in Leningrad, engineers LII and JOKSON, who worked in Grozneft.

The agents established that, in addition to these persons, the representatives of Intelligence Service are also the engineer THORNTON, the engineer KOKS, and the fitter BURK (Leningrad).

All the listed British are former officers of the English army.

These same British, through their network, collected information of a military and political nature.

The organization of economic espionage and the recruitment of the network for this purpose were carried out by Metro-Vickers engineers - SIMON (Head of the Department for Trade with Russia), MONGAUZ (Head of the Leningrad Representative Office) and MACDONALD (engineer for the installation of turbines at the Krasny Oktyabr power plant ").

The recruitment of the network by these persons was carried out both on the territory of the USSR and in England during the stay of our engineers on business trips.

The investigation established that the British recruited and worked for them engineers STYRIKOVICH (Member of the Board and Technical Director of Len MashTrest), BOBROVSHCHIKOV (Head of the Turbine Department of the Metal Plant in Leningrad), GORDON (Head of the Department of Turbines and Boilers of Electroimport in Moscow), BRILLIANT ( member of the Board of Electroimport - brother of SOKOLNIKOV) and others.

According to undercover materials, the following people were involved in this network: VAGNER (Head of the electrical department of Dneprostroy), KOTOMIN (technical director of Elektrotok in Leningrad), SIZOV (engineer of Azneft), POLUBOYARINOV (engineer of SNKh), ALEKSEEV-POPOV (engineer electrician of Kuznetskstroy) and others.

This network, in addition to collecting espionage information of an economic nature, was used by the British to primarily obtain orders for England, to oust competing firms in other countries, and in almost all cases our Union suffered material damage from this, paying increased prices to British firms.

Attached are the testimonies.\*

CHAIRMAN OF THE OGPU Menzhinsky  
POM. BEGINNING ECU OGPU Molochnikov

APRF. f. 3. Op. 58. D. 240. L. 96-98. Script. Typescript.

\* Published without testimony

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 240

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE PUBLICATION IN THE NEWSPAPERS OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE ARREST OF  
MEMBERS OF THE "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY" ORGANIZATION (79)

September 5, 1930

No. 6, item 37/37 - Issue of OGLU.

Publish the following report in the newspapers on September 3 in the chronicle: "OGLU arrested: Kondratiev Nikolai Dmitrievich, Groman Vladimir Gustavovich, Sadyrin Pavel Alexandrovich, Chayanov Alexander Vasilyevich, Yurovsky Leonty Naumovich, Sukhanov (Gimmer) Nikolai Nikolaevich, Makarov Nikolai Pavlovich; Ramzin Leonid Konstantinovich, Bazarov Vladimir Alexandrovich and others as participants and leaders of counter-revolutionary organizations that set themselves the goal of overthrowing Soviet power and restoring the power of the landowners and capitalists.

The arrested persons acknowledged their leading role in these counter-revolutionary organizations and their connection with the wrecking organizations of specialists, including the Shakhty people.

The investigation is ongoing."

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 9. L. 22. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on September 2, 1930.

\*\* There is a typewritten note in the text: "Extracts sent to t.t. Menzhinsky and Do Letsky".

No. 241

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT MAYKOP" (80)

September 15, 1930

No. 8, item 10/12. - About Maykop (PB dated 6.9.30, pr. No. 1, item 8) (t. Akulov).

Approve the draft proposals of the NC RCT of the USSR with the amendments and additions. (See Attachment).

APPENDIX to  
clause 10/12c, etc. PB No. 8

ABOUT MAIKOP

2. Propose to the OGPU to take the necessary measures to eliminate the remnants of the k.-r. wrecking organization, instructing the OGPU to conduct a further investigation into the fire.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 9. L. 31, 33. Original. Typescript.

The resolution was adopted by the decision of the members of the Politburo on 10.9.30.

## DOCUMENTS \_253

No. 242

MESSAGE FROM WILLIAM STRANG TO LONDON ON  
THE WORK OF JSC "METROPOLITAN VICKERS" IN THE USSR,  
INTERCEPTED BY THE OGPU

b October 1930

part 1

No. 740485

Owls. secret

Sir!

Today I was visited by Mr. Richards, the chief director of the joint-stock company Metropolitan Vickers Electric Export, who came to Russia in connection with the work being carried out by his firm in the installation of hydroelectric stations in various parts of the Union. Beginning in 1923, Metropolitan Vickers supplied Russia with electric cars. He managed to win himself a strong position in the market, 95% of which was in the hands of Germany before the war. It now handles more electric machine sales than any single German firm, and nearly as many transactions as Siemens and AEG combined. \*3 Last year he installed machines worth approximately £1,000,000, a figure he hopes to maintain in the future. Metropolitan Vickers works on the following terms: 10% of the total amount it receives when loading cars, and the rest is laid out for 5 years, from which it receives interest at a rate of 7% per annum\*. It could expand its operations considerably if it were able to provide more credit. Even the one-year export credit scheme is a great opportunity for him. Extending this period to 2-3 years would give him the opportunity to take also those orders from which he was forced to refuse under the present circumstances.

2. Mr. Richards further told me that his firm never regretted having entered into trade relations with Russia. The firm was a pioneer in this business and exposed itself to great risk, but the results justified the entire policy.

Since orders are large, payments are made accurately, overheads are kept to a minimum, prices are decent. \*The firm's large bill was paid on the very day the Arcos was raided, not

despite the fact that the payment of this account could well have been refused for technical reasons, since all documents related to this account were seized during the raid \*. The company is on excellent terms with the Soviet authorities, who openly admitted that in the entire Union there are no better electrical machines than the turbines installed by Vickers at the Krasny Oktyabr plant in Leningrad.

Several pages of each edition of the official electrical engineering magazine are devoted to the work carried out by Vickers throughout the Union, which is a voluntary and free advertising of the company \*. Of course, when concluding transactions with the Soviet government, there were special kinds of difficulties, and the company was exposed to such risks that no insurance company would take upon itself to cover. But so far, this risk has proven to be profitable. The firm had \*thirty-six engineers\*. Scattered throughout the Union and working at various factories under construction.

254

LUBYANKA. Yanaar 1922 - December 1936

She gave her strict instructions to her employees to deal exclusively with the resolution of technical problems and to avoid any contact with political affairs. For example, the chief representative of a firm in the Union, Mr. Mongauz, who lives in Moscow, visits our embassy only on exceptionally urgent and important matters so as not to incur the slightest suspicion of "economic espionage" \*. The firm has hitherto had no trouble with its English staff, but several Russian engineers have recently been arrested. Therefore, the company decided to count the entire Russian technical staff and employ only the British.

3. In addition to supplying the \*Union with electric machines, the company recently concluded several contracts with the Soviet government to provide technical\* assistance to Soviet factories. For this purpose, engineers are sent to organize the management of the production of electrical machines at Soviet factories. Although such contracts bring little direct profit to the firm, they help to consolidate ties, and providing British engineers with large salaries brings some influx of money into our country.

4. Mr. Richards declared that his firm was the only one doing a great deal of constructive work in Russia. She tried to interest other firms in parallel branches of trade, but without success: the public in England, due to lack of enterprise or because of political prejudices, is stubbornly afraid to risk entering into trade relations with the Soviet Union. \*The Times uses all the power of its authority to create a false opinion about the Soviet Union. Large banking enterprises do not believe in the stability of the Soviet regime \*, therefore they do not want to provide support. He himself tried to persuade Mr. Macken to send someone to the Soviet Union specifically to make sure of the true state of things, but this was not successful either. Therefore, it is extremely interesting for him to hear that the representative of an English bank, Mr. Hubbard, is currently undertaking an enormous tour of the Soviet

niya.

5. Assessment of the present situation, \*given by Mr. Richards\* and based on



based on the information he receives from all over the Soviet Union, \*is not at odds with my conclusions expressed to him. The Russians carried out much more of their industrialization plan than he expected\*. In the field of heavy industry they have achieved much more success than in light industry, much more in the production of grain than in animal husbandry. \*It is harder for the people now than it was a year ago, and they will probably have to endure a very difficult winter\*. The government may very well have to come up with something to alleviate the hunger for manufactures and fat, even if it has to make some changes to the five-year plan to do this. \*\* In some respects, many now live better than they did before the revolution, or at least have an idea of a better life. Whereas before the revolution their table consisted mainly of black bread, cabbage and cucumbers, now they consider themselves entitled to eat meat and butter and get these products as far as possible. Many now wear leather shoes, which was not the case before. The authorities are literally flooding the village with posters depicting American tractors. Peasants in collectives demand not only a tractor, but also the same collars and ties as American tractor drivers wear. Along with the increase in production, the demand also increases. It will take a lot to meet the needs

#### DOCUMENTATION

255

150 million population. Therefore, he is inclined to think that at the present time there is hardly any danger of "dumping" of industrial products by the Soviet Union\*\*.

\*\*6. It does not seem that the five-year plan will collapse, although on the basis of information from the Soviet press itself, one can paint the saddest picture of its implementation. If the plan is not fulfilled in five years, then it will be fulfilled in six or seven. Of course, something always went wrong somewhere due to the high pace at which the plan is being carried out. But usually, in the end, mistakes are corrected. There is a lot of confusion, but, on the other hand, there are a lot of achievements.

The Russians have a knack for achieving the realization of huge plans solely due to their perseverance. He recalled that back in 1920, Lenin was informed that in order to restore the railway. transport would require a £100 million loan. No loans were received, however, the railway transport was put in order and operates with a load exceeding the pre-war.

True, transport has been working worse lately, but the reason is its excessive load \*\*.

7. I thought it necessary to communicate to you the views expressed by Mr. Richards. His opinion seems to me exceptionally valuable, since it is the opinion of a representative of the only firm that had the courage and enterprise over the past 6-7 years to create a strong position in the Russian market and the prudence to properly conduct their commercial affairs.

A copy of this report has been sent by me to His Majesty's envoys in Berlin and Warsaw and to the Department of Foreign Trade.

I have the honor to stay, etc.

William Strang

RGASPI. F. 558. Op.11. D. 184. L. 101-105. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "Comrade. Stalin"; "Personal archive Comrade Stalin".

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

\*\*—\*\* In the margins it was crossed out by Stalin with two lines and the signs "YV" were put.

No. 243

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"REPORT OF THE OGPU ON THE MEMBERS OF THE INDUSTRIAL PARTY Central Committee"

October 25, 1930

No. 13, item 2/7. - Report of the OGPU on the testimony of members of the Central Committee of the Industrial Party (Comrades Agranov, Menzhinsky, Yagoda).

a) The report of the OGPU on the latest testimony of members of the Central Committee of the Industrial Party about terrorist activities should be taken into account and proposed to continue further investigation.

b) To propose to the OGPU that questions about the necessary arrests be coordinated with the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Saboteur groups should be arrested immediately.

c) To oblige Comrade Stalin to immediately stop walking around the city on foot.

256

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

d) Recognize it as necessary to transfer the secret department of the Central Committee from Staraya Square to the Kremlin as soon as possible.

e) Instruct Comrade Voroshilov to speed up the further cleaning of the Kremlin from a number of not entirely reliable tenants living there.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 9. L. 54. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 20.X.30.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: comrade Menzhinskoy — everything; comrade Postyshev - everything; comrade Voroshilov - d, e; Comrade Yenukidze - Mr.

No. 244

LETTER I.V. STALIN V.R. MENZHINSKY ON THE  
DIRECTIONS OF THE FUTURE TESTIMONIES OF THE  
MEMBERS OF THE LABOR PEASANT PARTY AND THE INDUSTRIAL PARTY (81)

October 1930

Tov. Menzhinsky!

Letter dated 2.X. and received materials. Ramzin's testimony is very interesting. In my opinion, the most interesting thing in his testimony is the question of intervention in general, and especially the question of the duration of the intervention. It turns out that the intition was supposed in 1930, but postponed until 1931 or even 1932. This is very likely and important. This is all the more important because it comes from the original source, i.e. from the group of Ryabushinsky, Gukasov, Denisov, Nobel, representing the strongest both in terms of capital and in terms of connection with French and English governments. It might seem that the TKP, or the Prom Party, or Milyukov's "party" represent the main force. But this is not true. The main force is the group of Ryabushinsky, Denisov, Nobel, etc., i.e. "Torgprom". TKP, "Industrial Party", "party" Milyukov - errand boys at "Torgprom". All the more interesting is the information about the period of intervention coming from Torgprom. And the question of intervention in general, and the duration of intervention in particular, is, as we know, of paramount interest to us.

Hence my suggestions.

a) Make one of the most important key points of the new (future) testimony of the leaders of the TCH, the Industrial Party, and especially RAMZIN, the question of intervention and the period of intervention (1. Why was the intervention postponed in 1930? 2. Not because is it possible that Poland is not yet ready? 3. Perhaps because Rumania is not ready? 4. Perhaps because the limitrophes have not yet closed with Poland? 5. Why was the intervention postponed until 1931? 6. Why "can" be postponed until 1932? 7. Etc., etc.)

b) Involve LARICHEV and other members of the Central Committee of the Industrial Party in the case and interrogate them most rigorously about the same, letting them read RAMZIN's testimony.

c) Strictly interrogate GROMAN, who, according to RAMZIN, once stated in the "United Center" that "intervention has been postponed until 1932."

d) Carry through the system y.g. KONDRATIEVA, YUROVSKII, CHAYANOV, etc., who cunningly elude the "tendency towards intervention", but are (undoubtedly!) interventionists, and interrogate them most rigorously about the timing of intervention. (KONDRATEV, YUROVSKII, and CHAYANOV must know about this just as MILYUKOV knows about it, to whom they went to talk.

DOCUMENTS \_257

If RAMZIN's testimony is confirmed and specified in the testimony of other accused (GROMAN, LARICHEV, KONDRATEV and Ke, etc.), then this will be a serious success for the OGPU, since we will make the material obtained in this way in one form or another the property of the sections of the Communist Party and workers of all countries, let us wage the most extensive campaign against the interventionists and achieve that we paralyze, undermine attempts at intervention

for the next 1-2 years, which is important for us.

It's clear?

Hello. I. Stalin

CA FSB RF. F. 2. Op. 9. D. 388. L. 270-271. Copy. Typescript.

Published by Kommunist. 1990. No. 11. S. 99-100.

No. 245

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE USE OF THE INDICATIONS OF PERSONS,

ACCUSED OF PREPARING THE INTERVENTION

October 25, 1930

No. 13, pp. 17-06 using the testimony of pests along the line of intervention (Comrade Stalin).

a) Recognize it as necessary to immediately bring the counter-revolutionary united center to justice, raising the central question at the trial of the testimony of wreckers about the preparation of intervention.

b) Establish a commission consisting of t.t. Litvinov, Voroshilov, Stalin, Menzhinsky and Krylenko in order to view, as soon as possible, the testimony of pests about the intervention with the aim of publishing it in the press.

Convening a commission for Comrade Litvinov.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 9. L. 53. Original. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: comrade Krylenko, comrade Menzhinsky - everything, comrade Litvinov, comrade Voroshilov, comrade Stalin - p. b.

No. 246

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"TRANSPORT ISSUES" (82)

November 5, 1930

No. 14, item 9/11. – Transport issues:

c) On the purge of personnel at border railways. roads and roads of the first Category, (comrades Menzhinsky. Ordzhonikidze, Rukhimovich. Amosov. Weinberg, Pavlunovsky, Shushkov).

f) Instruct t.t. Rukhimovich, Menzhinsky, Amosov, together with Comrade Blagonravov, within a two-day period, work out specific measures in secret order to clear the border western railroads. roads from the Poles and anti-Soviet elements.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 9. L. 58. Original. Typescript.

hÿ \* Number 7 in the text there is a typewritten note about the mailing: "The extracts were sent: comrade Rukhimov C U" to comrade Menzhinsky, comrade Amosov, comrade Blagonravov.

258

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 247

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE PROCESS OF THE INDUSTRIAL PARTY"

November 25, 1930

N° 16, item 48/48 - On the process of the industrial party

To manage the course of affairs at the trial of the industrial party, create a commission consisting of comrades. Litvinov (replaced by Krestinsky), Molotov, Stalin, Voroshilov, Menzhinsky, Janson and Krylenko.

Convocation for Comrade Molotov.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 9. L. 81. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on November 21, 1930.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Litvinov, Krestinsky, Molotov, Stalin, Voroshilov, Menzhinsky, Janson, Krylenko.

No. 248

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL  
OF THE COMMISSION ON THE CASE OF THE INDUSTRIAL PARTY (83)

November 25, 1930

No. 16, paragraph 53/53 - Proposal of the commission on the case of the industrial party.

Accept the commission's proposal to send nat. The Central Committee of the Communist Parties, the regional committees (regional committees) of the CPSU (b) of the following directive:

"In connection with the beginning of the 25.XI trial in the case of wreckers and agents of foreign intervention, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks proposes to launch explanatory work among the broad working masses and in the Red Army to expose the interventionist plans of the imperialists and especially France, white émigrés and their bourgeois- wrecking agents in the USSR. At the same time, the focus should be on the mobilization of the masses against the war.

noah intervention and to strengthen the country's defense capability. This explanatory work should expose the counter-revolutionary wrecking work of some elements from the top of the old bourgeois engineering and proprietors, while not allowing persecution and sweeping accusations against the engineering masses in general.

In this regard, the Central Committee of the CPSU decides:

- a) Put in the press a broad coverage of the process and tasks of the Party and the working class in the fight against pests and interventionists, for strengthening the defense of the country.
- b) On the first day of the process, to organize large-scale demonstrations in all towns and factory centers, with the involvement, if possible, of the collective farmers.
- c) The main slogans should be the following:
  1. We will respond to attacks by class enemies, foreign interventionists, white émigrés, wreckers and kulaks with merciless reprisals against agents of military intervention and a full-scale socialist offensive along the entire front of our economic development.
  2. We will respond to the threat of intervention by strengthening the country's defense capability.
  3. We will develop the military training of the broad masses more widely, we will strengthen the defense of the USSR, we will strengthen the Red Army.

#### DOCUMENTATION

259

4. Our answer to the class enemy is millions of workers in the ranks of shock workers and militant unity of the working people around the Bolshevik Party.
5. The proletarian dictatorship in the USSR, together with the international revolutionary proletariat, will smash to smithereens any and all attempts by the interventionists and their internal counter-revolutionary agents.
6. Down with warmongers! Long live the Red Army, the bulwark of peace and the faithful sentinel of the Soviet state!"

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 9. L. 81, 82. Original. Typescript.

Ÿ The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 22.XI.30.

No. 249

PROTOCOL OF INTERROGATION OF A MEMBER OF THE  
BOARD OF THE STATE BANK OF THE USSR V.V. SHERA (84)

November 30, 1930

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

November 30, 1930, interrogated p / head of the IV department of the ECU Apresyan and Art. authorized ECU OGPU Yakubovsky gr. Vasily Vladimirovich SHER, a former member of the Board of the State Bank of the USSR, testified:

My connection with a member of the foreign Central Committee of the RSDLP.

In the course of my wrecking activity, I had the opportunity to once again check whether the work I was carrying out coincided with the directives of the Menshevik Central Committee. \*I met Abramovich, member of the Central Committee, three times during his stay in the USSR\*. Abramovich called me on the phone and with a conditional password ("Baron has arrived") let me know about his arrival. I immediately agreed to meet him at the Bryansk railway station, from where we went by train to my dacha, where we had a lengthy conversation. \* The second time we met there, moreover, Abramovich, for the sake of secrecy, came from the Aleksandrovsky railway station, and he sent a horse to the station. Golitsino\*. The third conversation was before his departure at my apartment in the city. At this conversation of mine with Abramovich, it seems that Zalkind was present. \*During these conversations, I was able to ascertain\*:

1) \*\*That the Central Committee has entirely taken the path of sabotage in the struggle against the Soviet authorities 2) That the Central Committee has been blocking itself with engineering and industrial circles (a commercial industrial party) 3) That the Central Committee positively takes into account the possibility of intervention 4) That the Central Committee enjoys the due support of pending interventions Group Venice\*\*. All three meetings with Abramovich took place in the summer of 1928 during his stay in the USSR. The last meeting was before his departure abroad. Before that, Abramovich was in the south in Kharkov and Rostov. In a conversation with me, he pointed out that, in his opinion, the work there was proceeding sluggishly, was built using the old methods, and that the question of going over to sabotage activities in the localities should be raised.

Written down from my words correctly: Read by V. Sher

Interrogated: p. 4 sec. ECU OGPU Apresyan

Art. authorized Yakubovsky

AP RF. f.z. Op. 59. D. 4. L. 67. Original. Typescript.

f ~\* Underlined in pencil, there is Stalin's handwritten note in the margin: "In what year?". Ÿ""Underlined in pencil, underlined in the margins with two lines.

260

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 250

NOTE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN ON THE  
VALUES SUPPLIED TO THE STATE BANK AND SOYUZZOLOTO

January 7, 1931

No. 40018

Owls. secret

For the year 1930 (since 1.-30 to 1.1.-31) the OGPU handed over to the State Bank and Soyuzzoloto 10172289 rubles. 23 kopecks in gold rubles, of which:

a) full foreign currency

in banknotes 5890377 r. 72 k.

b) gold in coins and ingots 3888676 r. 04 k.

c) different silver (products, scrap,  
bars and coins) 393 235 rubles. 47 k. (85)

Deputy before the OGPU Yagoda

APRF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 170. L. 62. Original. Typescript.

\*

In the upper left corner there is a handwritten note: "My archive. Stalin."

It is written by hand: "10 million plus."

No. 251

STATEMENT OF THE COMMANDER OF THE  
RESERVE COMPANY A.F. Andreeva I.V. STALIN

February 2, 1931

Secretary of the Central Committee of the AUCP(b)

Tov. Stalin

The commander of the reserve company Andreev Andrey Filippovich from the  
village. Healthy, Livensky district of the Central Chernobyl region

Statement

On October 1, 1918, I voluntarily entered the Red Army, where I remained until 1923. All this time he was at the fronts, holding command posts up to and including regiment commander, was wounded and presented for awarding the Order of the Red Banner. Having returned home and living in a poor household, I am exempt from agricultural tax. All the time I waged a decisive struggle against the kulaks, the White Guards and the crimes of individual workers, exposing their actions through the press of regional newspapers, of which I have been a rural correspondent until now. My notes were always confirmed, which is why a whole persecution was opened up on me on the applications I filed for the wrong actions of the workers of the Zdorovets village council to the local prosecutor of the Livensky district, the latter did not take any measures, fell under the influence of criminal workers, the White Guards, which is why a lot of outrages were going on in front of the public with impunity. The White Guard officers crept into the institutions, were even in the election commission at the Zdorovets village council and did their job. I, who nevertheless gave everything for the revolution, was not afraid of any persecution and never ceased to be a village correspondent and a public worker. On the basis of the personal accounts of the kulaks, the White



DOCUMENTATION

261

I was expelled from the collective farm last year, they wanted to deprive me of voting rights only because my peasant father died 17 years ago, he once sold tobacco and matches - at that time there was a White Guard officer Kozhukhov Ivan Iva in the election commission newbie I appealed to all district authorities with complaints, but I could not achieve anything. Now all these criminals, whose work I have exposed through the press, have succeeded in getting me arrested on December 1, 1930, and are being held under arrest without any interrogation, without even showing the reasons for my arrest. I applied with statements to the local prosecutor and to the representative of the GPU for the Livensky district, but no attention has been paid so far. All statements are hushed up, and the prosecutor even warned me not to disturb me with my statements. I led companies, battalions and regiments into battle with the White Guards, not in order now to sit under arrest and endure undeserved mockery through these same White Guards. I gave everything for the revolution and can still be a good commander and worker. Addressing you, comrade. Stalin, please pay attention to my statement and provide assistance to get out of this situation. Revolutionary legitimacy must prevail, those responsible for my unreasonable arrest must be punished. The material against me is in the Livensky GPU - I confirm everything I have stated with the documentary data that I have.

APRF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 171. L. 2-3. Script. Typescript.

Published: Heinrich Yagoda. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. General Commissioner of State Security. Collection of documents. Kazan, 1997, pp. 351-353.

\*

The text contains Stalin's resolution: "Comrade. Yagoda. Please move someone immediately

more than one of your people (completely reliable) and in the Bolshevik way - honestly, quickly and impartially sort out the case and "regardless of faces." 2.II-31. Stalin."

No. 252

FROM SPECIAL COMMUNICATION V.R. Menzhinsky I.V. TO STALIN  
ABOUT CHELYABTRAKTOROSTROE

February 14, 1931

No. 40140

The construction of Chelyabtraktorstroy is now in the following state

research institute

Extensive housing construction is being carried out, completely unrelated to the timing of the plant's commissioning, while only preparatory work has been carried out for the construction of industrial workshops and not a single workshop will be ready during the year.

In addition to the arrests made, 40 people were purged from the apparatus of the Construction Administration. and measures were taken to remove the rest of the unusable element from the construction.

There is no fully developed Chelyabtraktorostroy project. CA FSB. F. 2. Op. 9. D. 18. L. 162-163. Copy. Typescript.

262

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 253

TELEGRAM V.A. Balitsky I.V. TO STALIN ON THE CONSPIRACY OF THE MILITARY (86)

February 15, 1931

No. 617

Ivanovsky gives detailed testimony about the activities of the Kharkov military counter-revolutionary organization, names Bezhanov, Misyurevich, early. communications UVO Bogdanov, former early. BOSO UVO Sergeeva, pom. early eng. UVO Zhitkov, a number of other employees of the headquarters, military instructors of universities and other military personnel. The organization carried out work in the units of the Kharkov garrison through its special commissioners attached to the units. According to the plan of action, the city of Kharkov is divided into sections, the seizure of the most important institutions is envisaged. Ivanovsky speaks of the existence of a general operational plan for the uprising in the Ukraine, in the development of which he personally participated, and dwells on the details of this plan. The plan was put on a map, which Ivanovsky destroyed during the process of the Industrial Party. The direct leadership of the Kharkov organization was carried out by the Moscow Center. From Moscow, Ivanovsky personally received directives and instructions on the work of the organization from Novitsky, both during personal meetings and through correspondence at agreed addresses. Ivanovsky burned the correspondence when he received an order to be sent to Moscow, as he expected to be arrested. The connection between the Moscow center and the Kharkov center, according to the testimony of Ivanovsky, was also maintained through Vysotsky, who, as we had already established, kept in touch with the Dnepropetrovsk organization. Arrested chief. eng. UVO Misurevich confessed to participation in the organization, which he was recruited in 1927 by the instructor of the Red Army engineers Malevsky Arseny Dmitrievich, his assistant Gnedich Sergey Vasilyevich. Misyurevich points to the existence in Moscow of the engineering section of the All-Union Military Center. The engineering section, according to Gnedich, includes instructors of engineers of the Red Army Malevsky, Gnedich, Lavrentyev, Sverchevsky Georgy Andreevich, Kartashov Andrey Aleksandrovich, an engineering school teacher and consultant of the technical committee of the VTU of the Red Army Nikulichev Anton, chairman of the technical committee of the VTU of the Red Army Chistyakov and the former manager of the technical committee of the VTU of the Red Army Khomutov Vladimir Nikolaevich, now demobilized. The engineering section directs all the wrecking work of the engineer troops throughout the Union. Misyurevich sets out in detail the methods and forms of sabotage that he carried out at the headquarters of the UVO. Misyurevich names Ivanovsky, Bezhanov, Sergeev as members of the organization, early. communications UVO Bogdanov and early. WTO UVO Hetman, assistant chief. engineer, services of the UVO Garkhova, early. chem. services of the UVO Adrianov and others. Personally, Misyurevich recruited a number of command personnel of engineers

nuclear units, including the current divisional engineer of the 23rd Kakurina, commander of the 3rd pontoon regiment Goldman (arrested, confessed), commander of the 1st pontoon battalion Razvozov and others. Arrested in Kharkov, division engineer 23 Kakurin, the military leaders of the universities Vedenyaev, Chintulov, Zharov confessed and point to a number of military and civilians.

Balitsky

APRF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 171. L. 4-5. Script. Typescript.

\* The text contains handwritten notes: "T. Stalin. G. Yagoda. 11/16/31"; "Archive comrade Stalin.

263

DOCUMENTATION \_

No. 254

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE DEVICE OF KULAK SETTLEMENTS  
IN KAZAKHSTAN

February 25, 1931

No. 27, p. 4/20-rs. About kulaks (comrades Stalin, Menzhinsky, Yagoda).

a) Propose to the OGPU to determine and prepare within 6 months areas for the establishment of kulak settlements of thousands of 200-300 families under the control of specially appointed commandants, referring primarily to the regions of Kazakhstan - south of Karaganda.

b) Assign the supervision of the ongoing eviction and resettlement of dispossessed kulaks to Comrade Andreev, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Propose to the OGPU to coordinate with Comrade Andreev all questions connected with the eviction and resettlement of kulaks, and in the absence of Comrade Andreev, with Comrade Molotov.

c) Satisfy Comrade Zhdanov's request for the resettlement of kulaks.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 149. L. 51. Copy. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on November 20, 1931.

No. 255

CIPPHROTELEGRAM M.M. MALINOVA I.V. TO STALIN ON  
THE MASS OUTPUTS OF THE PEASANTS

March 1, 1931

No. 7s

In the village of Zmeintsy, Shchigrovsky district, on the basis of the seizure of two wealthy middle-class cattle for meat procurement, a mass demonstration took place. The court and prosecutor's office that had gone there were expelled from the village. The surrounding villages of Chizhovka and Konoplyanka joined the Zmeins.

District workers sent out for mass work were beaten, and the crowd fought off the arrested instigators. Yesterday the task force of the GPU was met with shots in the villages of Chizhovka and Konoplyanka, and the task force retreated. Today, a commission of the regional executive committee and a group of workers have been sent to the place for mass work, depending on the results of their work, further measures will be taken and the protests will be eliminated.

Secretary of the Central Chernozem Malinov

AL RF. f.z. Op. 58. D. 200. L. 132. Original. Typescript.

The text contains a resolution: "To the members of the PB. I. Stalin.

264

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 256

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE CREATION OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE EVICTION  
AND RESETTLEMENT OF THE KULAKS

March 15, 1931

No. 29, p. 2/6-re - Issues of the OGPU (comrades Menzhinsky, Yagoda, Prokofiev, Evdokimov).

c) On the question of the kulaks: entrust the supervision and direction of the work of evicting and resettling kulaks to a special commission from the comrades. Andreev, Yagoda and Postyshev, inviting them to submit a plan of specific measures to the PB within ten days.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 193. L. 94. Copy. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted at a meeting of the Politburo on March 11, 1931.

No. 257

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON APPROVAL OF THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION  
FOR THE RESETTLEMENT OF THE KULAKS TO SIBERIA AND KAZAKHSTAN

March 25, 1931

No. 30, p. 31/44.—On kulaks (PB dated 11.Sh.31, pr. No. 29, p. 2/6-c) (comrades Andreev, Yagoda, Postyshev).

Accept the proposal of Comrade Andreev's commission (see appendix).

APPENDIX to  
clause 31/44-rs (o.p.) pr. PB No. 30

ABOUT FISTS

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE COMMISSION comrade.  
ANDREEVA mountains. Moscow, 18.Sh.31

ATTENDED: members of the commission comrade t. Andreev, Yagoda.

There are t.t. Evdokimov, Zakovsky, Zaporozhets,  
Olshansky

1. LISTENED:

On the resettlement of kulak farms in the West. Siberian Territory (speaker comrade Zakovsky).

RESOLVED:

1. Accept the proposal of Comrade Zakovsky on resettlement in the Northern regions of Zap. Sib. region during May-June-July 1931 40,000 kulak farms.

2. Settlement of kulak farms to the following areas Zap. Sib. krais: Kargasovsky, Parabelsky, Kalpashevsky, Chainsky, Krivosheinsky, Baksinsky, Novo-Kuskovsky. Zyryansky and others.

3. Offer Sib. the regional committee to begin immediate preparations for the eviction of the kulaks. Eviction management and responsibility

DOCUMENTATION \_ 265

the operation itself to assign to the Plenipotentiary Representative of the OGPU Zap. Sib. the edge of Comrade Zakovsky.

4. The evicted kulak farms should be used for the development of black earth massifs in the above areas (point 2) for agriculture, as well as as a labor force for forest development by the corresponding households. organizations.

5. Permit the kulak farms to take with them the necessary minimum of agricultural implements, draft power, and other implements of production (axes, pitchforks, shovels, etc.).

6. To oblige evicted kulak farms to take with them, when moving to places of resettlement, the necessary supply of food, establishing on the spot the dimensions necessary for transportation.

7. Suggest Zap. Sib. to the regional committee and comrade Zakovsky, when expanding logging in the areas of the settlement, to create minimum reserves for supplying kulaks used at work.

8. Instruct the OGPU to organize a state farm in the Chainsky district.

9. To propose to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to release the OGPU 3,000,000 rubles. for the costs associated with the resettlement of kulak farms within the Sibkrai.

10. Take note of Comrade Zakovsky's statement that all rear militias Zap. Sib. edge in the amount of 3650 people. mobilized and transferred to Vostugl. To consider it necessary for Soyuzzoloto to replace the rear militias with able-bodied kulak families.

11. LISTENED:

On the eviction of kulak farms in Eastern Siberia.

RESOLVED:

To propose to Comrade Yagoda, within a decade and a half, to submit for consideration by the commission a plan for the resettlement of the kulak farms of Eastern Siberia, similar to the plan for Western Siberia.

III. LISTENED:

On the settlement of kulak farms in the former. Akmola and Karkaraly districts of the Kazakh ASSR (speaker comrade Evdokimov).

RESOLVED:

1. To accept the total contingent of evicted kulak households in 1931 in Kazakhstan in the amount of 150,000 households, resettling them in the areas of the former. Akmola and Karkaralinsky districts, using for this purpose the land along the Tokrau River (to the South to Lake Balkhash).

. 2. The settled kulak farms should be used in the following main areas: a) coal mining; b) copper business; c) iron ore; d) railway construction; and e) agriculture.

3. To oblige the OGPU to send not less than 10,000 singles (heads of families) to the areas of settlement no later than April 15 to use them in the preparation of the Conditions (housing construction and other preparatory work) - to receive the rest of the contingent.

4. For the entire preparation of resettlement sites, as well as the establishment of resettlement points for kulak farms, send a commission to the areas of future settlements (Akmolinsk-Karaganda) consisting of: comrade Olshansky (chairman) and members of comrade t. Berman and Gorshkov, as well as representatives of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR,

266

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

4 decades.

5. To propose to the OGPU within a month and a half to submit for consideration by the commission a plan for financing the operation for the resettlement and development of 150,000 kulak farms moved into Kazakhstan.

IV. LISTENED:

On the course of current operations for the eviction of 25,000 kulak farms (speakers Comrades Yagoda and Evdokimov).

RESOLVED:

1. Approve the plan developed by the OGPU for the resettlement of 25,000 kulak households.

2. Propose to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to expedite the issuance of the OGPU from the reserve fund of 6,000,000 rubles. for the costs of resettlement of 25,000 kulak farms.

V. LISTENED:

On the course of intra-regional evictions of kulak families (speaker comrade Evdokimov).

RESOLVED:

To take note of Comrade Evdokimov's report on the course of the eviction of kulak farms in the North Caucasian Territory, the Leningrad Region, Western Siberia, the East Siberian Territory, the Transcaucasus, the Far East, and Nizhkrai. Propose to the OGPU to oblige the local bodies of the OGPU to carry out the further resettlement of kulak farms only after the sanction of this resettlement by the commission of the Central Committee.

VI. LISTENED:

On the supply of kulak settlements.

RESOLVED:

Propose to the OGPU to develop a plan for the temporary minimum necessary supply of kulak settlements, coordinating the whole issue as a whole with comrade t. Mikoyan and Zelensky.

VII. LISTENED:

About maintenance of places of kulak settlements.

RESOLVED:

Recognize the need to transfer all maintenance of the areas where the kulaks settled (kulak settlements and commandant's offices) to the OGPU with all property and funds.

ANDREEV

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 9. L. 174, 176-178. Script. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted at a meeting of the Politburo on March 20, 31.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol.

Andreev,

Menzhinsky - all; § 1 - Eikhe, copy to Zakovsky, § 1-10 - Serebrovsky; III - Goloshchekin; II-1 - Yagoda; 1-9 - Kerzhentsev; GV-2 - Kerzhentsev; Sh-4 - Olshansky, Berman, Gorshkov, Ordzhonikidze, Yakovlev; VI - Mikoyan, Zelensky.

DOCUMENTATION

267

No. 258

SPECIAL MESSAGE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN ON  
THE COMPLETION OF THE  
OPERATION TO EVITATE THE KULAKS

October 15, 1931

No. 40796

OWL. SECRET

The eviction of the kulaks from areas of complete collectivization, carried out from March 20 to April 25 of this year. and from May 10 to September 13, finished.

During this time, 162,962 families (787,341 people) were transported.  
of them:

men - 242,776 women  
- 223,834 children -  
320,731

In 1930, only 77,795 families (371,645 people) were transported, of which: men - 123,807 women -  
113,653 children -  
134,185

Thus, a total of 240,757 families (1,158,986 people) were transported.

At the same time transported: horses  
- 15 355 carts - 7488  
plows - 8958  
harrows - 9528

All transportations were carried out by 715 echelons in 37897 wagons.

ZAM. PREV. OGPU Yagoda  
APRF. F.Z. Op. 30. D. 195. L. 163. Original. Typescript.

\*

There is a handwritten note in the text: "To Molotov, Kaganovich. I. Stalin.



No. 259

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE USE OF SPECIALISTS,

CONVINCED FOR VASTING

April 10-13, 1931

No. 33, p. 26/31 - Issues of the OGPU (comrades Stalin, Yagoda).

To accept Comrade Yagoda's proposal regarding the procedure for using part of the specialists convicted of wrecking, instructing Comrade Ordzhonikidze and Yagoda to agree on this issue.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 7. Original. Typescript.

\*\* The decision was adopted at a meeting of the Politburo on 10.08.31. Yagoda, Ordzhonikidze.

268

LUBYAN KA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 260

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE CASE R."

April 10-13, 1931

No. 33, item 28/33. - About R.

a) Send R. to Saratov for three years, allowing his wife to leave with him.

b) The issue of fees, reporting and the library to instruct the GPU to report separately.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 7. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted at a meeting of the Politburo on April 10, 1931.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "The extract was sent to Comrade Yagoda."

No. 261

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE DEPARTURE OF THE DUKHOBORS ABROAD"

May 10, 1931

No. 37, item 19/32. - On the departure of the Dukhobors abroad (comrades Kalinin, Litvinov, Yagoda)

Do not let Dukhobors go abroad.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 34. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Kalinin, Yagoda.

No. 262

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE BALANCE OF BREAD"

May 10, 1931

N° 37, item 43/63. - On the balance of bread (PB of 20.IV.31, pr. No. 35, p. 4/9). (vol. Rudzutak, Stalin, Lobov, Lobachev, Postyshev)

10. To instruct the OGPU to conduct a random check of the available stocks of grain in kind in the warehouses of Soyuzkhleb and cooperatives (consumer and agricultural).

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 35. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Yagoda, Zelensky, Sarkis, Lobov, Lobachev.

No. 263

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT WORKING WITH SPECIAL SETTLERS

May 20, 1931

No. 39, paragraph 35/38. - About the fists (comrades Andreev, Postyshev, Yagoda).

a) Accept the proposal of Comrade Andreev's commission (see appendix).

b) Instruct the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to establish sources for covering loans from the Fish Union to Balkhash-Rybtrest in the amount of 5,500 thousand rubles.

269

DOCUMENTATION \_

APPENDIX

To clause 35/38 (o.p.) pr. PB No. 39

## PROTOCOL

meeting of the Comrade Andreev Commission dated May 15, 1931,  
approved by the Politburo on May 20, 1931

Chairman - Comrade Andreev

Members: Comrade Postyshev

- Comrade Yagoda

Present: t.t. Evdokimov, Nikolaev, Olshansky and Berman

### I. On the organization of the Administration and the productive use of special settlers

1. In view of the ugly use of the labor force of special settlers and the disorder in their maintenance by economic agencies, to transfer entirely to the OGPU the economic, administrative and organizational management for special settlers, as well as all material and monetary funds allocated for special resettlement. Propose to the OGPU for this purpose to organize a special apparatus of the Office under the OGPU and regional PPs (Siberia, the Urals, the North Territory and Kazakhstan).

2. The productive use of special settlers by this Directorate is carried out both by concluding special agreements with individual economic agencies, and directly by organizing various economic enterprises.

3. Economic organizations that have concluded agreements on special settlers are obliged to allocate one of the members of the board responsible for the expedient use of the labor force of the settlers and for the full fulfillment of the obligations of the agreement.

4. Oblige economic organizations not to reduce the wages of migrants in comparison with the wages of seasonal workers.

5. To consider it necessary to introduce into the treaties a special clause on the encouragement and bonuses for those migrants who work diligently and exceed the given norm.

6. Special settlers employed for living. construction should be equated in terms of supply with special, migrants employed in logging.

7. The entire fund for the supply of special settlers by the People's Commissariat for Supply is allocated as a centralized one and transferred to the disposal of the Directorate for Special Resettlement under the OGPU. The allocation of supply funds is carried out similarly to the funds for the camps of the OGPU.

8. Oblige Narkomzdrav, Narkompros, together with the OGPU, to develop a plan for medical and cultural services for special settlements and migrants.

9. To propose to the organs of the OGPU, in view of the unacceptable use of special settlers so far, to continue to bring the relevant persons for violation of contracts to the strictest responsibility.

### II. On the plan for the resettlement of kulak families in 1931.

1. Due to the technical impossibility of resettling 150,000 kulak families in the regions of Kazakhstan, it is possible to recognize resettlement in the current

year, first of all, in the regions of Kazakhstan, 56,000 and in the Urals, 55,000 kulak families.

12,000 kulak families (of which 7,000 have already been resettled) from the southern border regions to the northern ones along Eastern Siberia and the Urals.

270 \_ LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

3. The indicated number of kulak farms for Kazakhstan should be settled on the following funds of Kazakhstan:

Kronidovo-Kronstadt - 10000

Kargalino-Ishimsky - 10000

Akilinsky - 10000

Bayan-Akulsky - 15000

Dur-Sortsky - 15000

4. To ensure the priority needs of industry and housing construction, the delivery of special settlers to North-East Kazakhstan should be carried out within the following terms:

May-June 20-25000 singles with subsequent transfer of their families.

July and August - the remaining 35,000 farms.

5. To oblige all economic organizations of the Supreme Council of National Economy, the People's Commissariat of National Economy and the People's Commissariat for Supply to immediately transfer to the OGPU the part in which it is necessary to provide housing for the labor force from the special settlers.

6. Oblige Soyuzlesprom and prev. Kazles comrade Belyakov to provide all housing construction with timber within the time frame stipulated by the resettlement plan. Soyuzlesprom to provide logging with the necessary tools and draft power. The labor force is provided to the OGPU camps on contractual terms to Kazles from the contingents of special settlers.

Consider it necessary for the timely removal of timber to the railway. stations and construction sites to oblige Kazkraikom to take measures to mobilize the transport of the local population and relevant transport organizations.

7. Oblige the Supreme Economic Council to provide housing construction with all the necessary building materials (iron, glass, nails) in accordance with the applications submitted by the OGPU.

8. Offer the People's Commissariat of the Union to release loans within 3 days and provide those. personnel for the People's Commissariat of Kazakhstan to carry out urgent unscheduled work on land designation, hydraulic engineering work and the determination of points for the construction of kulak settlements on allotted funds, so that these works were basically completed by June 15 of this year.

9. To oblige the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and the People's Commissariat of Supply of the Union to organize additional sowing of late and spring crops on the arable lands of the state farms of Kazakhstan with the forces and means of the latter in the amount of at least 10,000 hectares within a day,

providing this additional sowing with seeds from the elevators closest to the state farms, booking the harvest of this sowing at the expense of the food fund of special settlers.

10. Oblige Soyuzryba to issue loans to Balkhash-Rybtrest in the amount of 5,500,000 rubles. so that in 1931 the extraction and processing of at least 130,000 centners of fish, and in 1932 at least 300,000 centners, would be ensured. The required number of labor force - 1,000 people in 1931 and 4,500 people in 1932 - to be covered by special settlers.

11. To oblige the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the RSFSR and the OGPU to develop a plan for agricultural work within a month. development by special settlers of the land funds allotted to them and to carry out a number of simple irrigation measures (developing canals, etc.) within two months. To ensure timely sowing in 1932 with the required quantity of seeds, draft power, implements and agricultural assistance, allocating the necessary credits for this.

12. Propose to the Narkomsnab, Tsentrosoyuz and the OGPU to provide food for the entire contingent of those who move in with their families, to develop within five days a procedure for selling food products and organizing a network in rural settlements and enterprises.

## DOCUMENTS \_2L

13. To oblige the People's Commissariat of Health, the People's Commissariat for Education of the RSFSR to provide medical settlers who are resettled. help and schools.

14. In view of the insufficient carrying capacity of the Borovoye-Karaganda line, propose to the NKPS within five days to develop the question of the necessary measures to improve it and increase the carrying capacity, and during May to carry out measures to ensure both the transportation of kulak families, the delivery of building materials and food for them, and the export coal and cargo from Kazugol and Kazmedi.

15. Propose to the Supreme Economic Council of the Union within five days to consider the issue of increasing the Kazugol mining program and expanding the construction program of Kazmedi with a corresponding increase in appropriations in connection with sending a sufficient amount of labor.

16. To oblige the OGPU and all the Central Committees of the National Communist Parties, regional committees and regional committees, carrying out the eviction of kulak families, to take measures to ensure that the evicted kulak households have at least three months of food supplies for each family, a minimum tool (axes, shovels and etc.), s.kh. inventory and 1-2 horses for every five evicted households.

17. Propose to the People's Commissariat of Finance of the Union and the OGPU to submit within five days the amount of financial costs for the entire operation of resettlement and development of the planned contingent.

### III. On the settlement of 55,000 families of special settlers in the northern regions of the Urals

1. Allow 55,000 families of special settlers to move into the northern regions of the Urals between May 25 and July 10 to use them mainly for logging (Uralles).

2. To propose to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to release the necessary financial resources to the OGPU

funds for expenses related to the eviction and resettlement of 55,000 families of special settlers.

3. To oblige Soyuzlesprom (comrade Bergavinov) to immediately begin preparatory work for the reception of the above-mentioned number of special settlers, providing them by August 1 of this year. dwellings in special settlements.

4. Propose to the State Bank to increase lending limits in the amount of 8,000,000 rubles. for housing construction for special settlers, both those transferred earlier to Uralles and those newly accepted.

IV. About transportation, food and honey. service of special settlers during transportation by rail. dor.

1. Offer the NKPS to transport special settlers at the request of the OGPU on a credit basis.

2. To oblige the People's Commissariat of Supply to provide nutritional points along the lines of the railway. the routes of the special settlers with the necessary amount of food, the location of points to receive in the OGPU.

3. Propose to the People's Commissariat of Health to take measures for the medical care of special settlers on the way along the lines of the railway. at the direction of the OGPU.

V. On the distribution of evicted special settlers

1. Approve the submitted draft of the distribution of evicted persons (see Appendix).

2. With regard to Bashkiria and Tataria, to carry out an additional check.

3. Do not carry out internal resettlement in Bashkiria, since internal resettlement concerns areas of complete collectivization.

272

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

VI. special solution

If this special settler fulfills all the decisions of the Sov. authorities, behaves like an honest worker, after a 5-year period from the date of resettlement, he receives the right to vote and all civil rights.

VII. About youth of special settlers

1. To propose to the OGPU in its organizational, economic and administrative work that special attention be paid to young people in the sense of involving them in every possible way in work, placing them in special conditions, developing among them collective labor methods and not extending the strict regime that applies to the head of the family.

VIII. On the Establishment of Careful Monitoring of the Correct Deportation of the Kulaks

1. In view of the available information about cases of a mechanical approach to the issue

about the eviction of kulaks, and this eviction is sometimes associated only with the deprivation of voting rights, which creates the danger of gross errors - to suggest that the OGPU, in its line, establish the most serious and thorough monitoring and take measures to guarantee the prevention of errors.

Oblige all the Central Committees of the National Communist Parties, regional committees and regional committees by a special telegram to establish monitoring of this matter.

THE PLAN FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF THE KULAKS

1) To the Ural region

—

55.000

families, of which:

1. from the Ukrainian SSR

—

30.000

families,

2. from CCM

—

15.000

»

3. from IPO

—

5.000

And

4. from the BSSR

—

5.000

And

Total.

—

55.000

families.

2) To Kazakhstan

—

56.000

families, of which:

n

1. From NKV

—

10.000

2. from SVK

—

10.000

m

3. from the Central Chernozem

—

10.000

And

4. from M.O.

—

6.000

And

5. from LVO

—

4.000

•1

6. from Nizhkrai

—

5.000

II

7. from Bashkiria



—

6.000

II

Tataria

—

5.000

•1

Total.

—

56.000

families.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 46, 51-54. Script. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted at a meeting of the Politburo on May 20, 1931.

\*\*

There is a typewritten note in the text about the distribution: "Extracts sent to t.t. Kerzhentsev, Andreev, Yagoda—everyone; Mikoyan - a, b; 1-6, 7; II-5, 9, 10, 12; 1V-2; Lszhave - a, b; II-10; Pavlunovsky - a; 1-3, 4; 11-5, 7.15; Bergavinov - a; 1-3, 4; W-Z; Vladimirsky - a; 1-8; II-13; IV-3; Bubnov - a, 1-8; II-13; Goloshchekin - a, II-1, 4, 6 - in cipher; Kabakov - a, N-2; II1-1 - in cipher; Leonov - a, II-2 - in cipher; Rukhimovich - a, II 5, 14; IV-1; Yakovlev - a, II-8, 9; Muradov - a, II-11; Zelensky - a, 11-12; Grinko - a, II-17; Kalmanovich - a, Sh-4; Kaminsky - a, II-16; N. Vol. regional committee, Wed. Vol. regional committee, TsCHOBkom, Lenobkom, Nizhegorsk. regional committee, Bashobkom, Tatobkom - 11-16 - in code.

DOCUMENTATION

273

No. 264

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE SUPPLY OF CRIMEA AND THE CAUCASUS  
RESORTS WITH FOOD AND FUEL

May 20, 1931

No. 39 p. 9/12. - On the supply of sanatoriums of the Crimea and the Caucasus with food products and fuel (PB dated 15.V. 31, project No. 38, item 25) (Postyshev, Yagoda).

Accept the proposal of Comrade Postyshev's commission (see appendix).

APPENDIX kp.

9-12 Ave. PB No. 39

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

DATED MAY 20, 1931 ON THE QUESTION OF SUPPLYING THE  
CRIMEA AND CAUCASUS RESORTS  
WITH FOOD AND FUEL

Clause 2 ... To instruct the GPU on the spot to investigate and bring to justice persons who did not comply with the order of industry associations regarding the supply of resorts, as well as those guilty of spending resort funds for other than their intended purpose, clause 6. Offer:

... c) the NKPS (under the responsibility of Comrade Sinev) to ensure the timely movement of all goods destined for the Crimean, North Caucasian, and other resorts; OPTU to monitor the timely progress of the specified cargo.

RGASPI F. 17. Op. 3. D. 826. L. 3, 12-13. Script. Typescript.

No. 265

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE PAMIRS"

June 5, 1931

No. 41, p. 13. - About the Pamirs (comrades Zelensky, Karakhan).

Approve, as amended, the draft resolution on the Pamirs submitted by the commission (see annex).

APPENDIX to  
clause 13, (o.p.) pr. PB No. 41

ABOUT THE PAMIRS

(Approved by the PB of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on 5.VI.31)

About road construction in the Pamirs...

8. To instruct the OGPU and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to instruct the border guards to create favorable conditions for the Kashgarians involved in road work to cross the border.

About the food situation in the Pamirs...

4. Recognize it as necessary to give instructions in the area of protection for the creation of favorable conditions for trade trading posts.

274

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

5. Instruct the OGPU, together with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, to give instructions to the border guards on this issue.

Instruct the OGPU to intensify the fight against the opium trade in the Pamirs. To oblige the Tajik government, together with the Pamir regional committee, to submit a plan of measures for further improvement of the economic situation in the Pamirs within a month and a half.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 65, 70, 71. Original. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Mikoyan, Kerzhentsev, Karakhan, Menzhinsky, Bauman, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Tajikistan - all; Serebryakov - oh dor. builds."

No. 266

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE RESETTLEMENT OF KULAK FAMILIES

June 5, 1931

No. 41, p. 54/54 - Questions of the commission of Comrade Andreev.

To change the decision of the Politburo of May 20 of this year. accept the following proposals from Comrade Andreev's commission (see appendix).

APPLICATION

kp. 54/54 (o.p.), ave. PB No. 41

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE COMMISSION comrade  
ANDREEV May 30, 1931

(Approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on June 5, 1931) LISTENED:

1. On the internal resettlement in the Leningrad region of kulak families from the southern and western regions to the northern regions of the region.

RESOLVED:

a) The adopted decision of the commission dated May 15 of this year. about the eviction of 4,000 kulak families from the Leningrad region to Kazakhstan - cancel.

b) Permit the Leningrad region during the month of June to carry out internal resettlement of 4,000 kulak families to the northern regions for their economic use in the Nivstroy and Khibiny apatite mines.

c) Resettlement of kulak families to the Sinyavsky peat extraction area for economic use in the latter is prohibited.

LISTENED:

The request of Tatobkom to increase the number of kulaks evicted from the region to 8,000 people.

RESOLVED:

Confirm the decision of the commission dated 15.V. - about the eviction from the Tatar region of 5,000 kulaks.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 68, 74. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Andreev, Yagoda - all; Kirov - 1 (in cipher); Tatobkom (on his question) - in cipher.

DOCUMENTATION

275

No. 267

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ISSUES OF THE OGPU"

July 10, 1931

No. 48, p. 1/13 - Questions of the OGPU (PB of 30.VI.31, pr. No. 46, p. 1/17) (comrades Molotov, Stalin, Voroshilov, Andreev, Ordzhonikidze).

1) None of the Communists working in the bodies of the OGPU or outside these bodies, both in the center and in the localities, should not be arrested without the knowledge and consent of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

2) Do not arrest any of the specialists (engineering and technical personnel, military, agronomists, doctors, etc.) without the consent of the relevant people's commissar (union or republic), in case of disagreement, transfer the issue to the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) .

3) Citizens arrested on charges of a political crime should not be kept without interrogation for more than two weeks and under investigation for more than three months, after which the case must be liquidated either by transfer to the court or by an independent decision of the OGPU board.

4) All sentences of capital punishment passed by the OGPU collegium must be submitted for approval by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 108. Original. Typescript.

Published: Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. Sat. doc. S. 60.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the mailing: "The extract was sent: Comrade Menzhinsky. Sent out for No. 45(1/13) prot. No. 54 (as an open solution)"

No. 268

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE cadres of the OGPU (87)

July 25, 1931

No. 51, item 3 - On the GPU (comrade Stalin).

a) Appoint deputy chairmen of the OGPU: the first - comrade. Akulova I.A., with his release from work as a deputy. NK RCT; the second Comrade Yagoda and the third - Comrade Balitsky, with his release from the duties of the OGPU PP in Ukraine.

b) To appoint members of the board: vol. Artuzov, Agranov and Bulatov (having relieved him of his duties as the head of the Central Committee organizer), so that comrade. Bulatov was the head of the personnel department of the OGPU.

c) Release comrade Messing from work in the OGPU and second him to the disposal of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

d) Release comrade Olsky from the duties of the head. special department of the OGPU, leaving him to work in the organs of the OGPU.

E) Accept Comrade Menzhinsky's proposal to appoint Comrade Redens in Ukraine, Comrade Medved in Byelorussia, and Comrade Evdokimov in the Leningrad Region.

e) Instruct the OGPU to outline the candidacy of the head. Special department of the OGPU. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 127. Original. Typescript.

There is a typewritten note in the text about the distribution: "Extracts sent: t .t. Menzhinsky - everything, Kosior St. - a, d; Yagoda, Akulov - a; Artuzov, Agranov, Bulatov - b; Messing - in; Olsky - g; Kirov, Redens, Guy, Evdokimov - d.

276

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 269

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON STAFF AND ACTIVITIES OF THE OGPU

August 5, 1931

No. 54, p. 2 - Issues of the OGPU (comrades Menzhinsky, Akulov, Yagoda).

a) Release Comrade. Prokofiev from work in the Supreme Economic Council and appointed head of the Special Department of the OGPU.

b) Instruct the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the Supreme Economic Council to identify a candidate to replace Comrade Prokofiev in the Supreme Economic Council.

c) To exclude from the provision on the Special Department paragraph "e" of § 1, which gives the Revolutionary Military Council the right to give Os. otd. tasks, and § 3, according to which the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR has the right to control the implementation of these tasks, so that the Special Department is directly subordinate to the OGPU. (88)

d) To consider that paragraph "4" of the decision of the Politburo of 10.VII on the mandatory sanction of the Central Committee of the sentences passed by the OGPU Collegium on capital punishment does not apply to criminals (bandits, counterfeiters, etc.).

e) Appoint Comrade. Belsky as the head of the Narkomsnab department for Narkomsnab and a member of the Collegium of the Narkomsnab with his release from work in the OGPU.

f) Accept the proposal of the OGPU regarding academicians.

g) The question of T.K.P. postpone.

h) Prohibit t.t. Evdokimov, Redens, Balitsky and other senior officials of the OGPU, moving from place to place, to take with them any of the workers close to them of those regions and districts from where they are being transferred.

i) To change the decision of the Politburo of 25.VII, to appoint Comrade Yevdokimov to the PGPU in Central Asia, giving him a special assignment to disarm gangs in Tajikistan, primarily in Turkmenistan.

j) Leave comrade Medved PP OGPU in Leningrad.

k) Transfer Comrade Matson from Central Asia to Belorussia.

l) Propose to the OGPU to submit to the Politburo a report on the economic organizations created under the OGPU (without camps) with an indication of their financial balance.

m) Instruct the OGPU to strictly check the availability of currency and gold funds from the regional and republican OGPU and send all their cash to the State Bank within 10 days. All the availability of currency and gold accumulated in the OGPU should be transferred to the State Bank.

n) Instruct the commission consisting of: t.t. Stalin, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze, Andreev and Menzhinsky to compile comments on the decisions of the Central Committee on changes in the composition of the OGPU and the transfer of some members of the OGPU collegium to another job or to other areas. Offer secretaries of regional committees, regional committees, nat. The Central Committee to report these comments to a narrow meeting of the active workers of the GPU in the regions, territories, and republics.

o) Approve the PG of the OGPU of Transcaucasia, comrade Beria, as a member of the collegium of the OGPU.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 840. L. 1.2. Script. Typescript.

DOCUMENTATION

277

No. 270

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE USE OF REPENTENT "PESTS"

August 5, 1931

No. 54, p.Z. - On the use of pests according to Tsvetmetzoloto (comrade Stalin).

Instruct the commissions as part of t.t. Serebrovsky, Kaganovich and Akulov to resolve the issue of the release and use of repentant wreckers according to Tsvetmetzoloto.

Convening a commission for Comrade Kaganovich.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 138. Original. Typescript.

\* There is a typewritten note in the text about the distribution: "Extracts sent: t .t. Serebrovsky, Kaganovich, Akulov.

No. 271

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE EARLY RELEASE OF THE FORMER  
PESTS UNDER THE LIST OF THE NKPS AND THE OGPU

August 5, 1931

No. 54 p. 4. - On early release b. pests according to the list of NKPS and OGPU. (comrade Stalin).

Accept the agreed proposal of the OGPU and the NKPS: 1) on the early release from punishment of persons listed in the list of specialists transferred by the OGPU to work on transport, leaving them with a conditional sentence, and 2) on the application of public supervision of the OGPU to those released.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 143. L. 60. Copy. Typescript.

No. 272

APPEAL G.G. BERRIES TO ALL CHEKISTS IN  
CONNECTION WITH EXTENSIONS AS A CONSEQUENCE

August 1931

Top secret to ALL Chekists

Dear comrades!

\*3 Recently, through the Central Control Commission, the Prosecutor's Office, and also directly, I have received a number of statements and complaints about the actions of individual of our employees, who allegedly allow such methods in the investigation that force the accused to give false testimony and slander themselves and others. \*.

During the investigation, it turned out that the overwhelming majority of statements are vile lies of our class and political enemies, who are trying to evade the deserved punishment by slandering the organs of the OGPU. BUT A FEW STATEMENTS STILL HAVE MEANING.

I must, however, emphasize that the single excesses that I have noted in the investigation are DEFINITELY NOT OF ANY KIND.

278

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

SYSTEMS ARE RANDOM SINGLE EPISODES WHICH ARE THEREFORE EASY TO ERADICATE AND REMOVE.

But these, although isolated, episodes show that in that sharp struggle against the counter-revolution, which is now being waged by its armed detachment of the OGPU under the leadership of the party, some comrades resorted during interrogations to completely unacceptable methods of treating persons under investigation, abused their position as an investigator and, as the \*investigation showed, they were guided by the biased interests of the case\*.

By using methods of investigation that are unacceptable in our work, our workers not only dishonor the bodies of the OGPU, but actually confuse the matter, thereby giving the real enemy the opportunity to slip away.

The workers who allowed these actions deserved the most merciless and cruel punishment.

For 13 years of struggle against the enemies of the proletarian revolution, employees of the OGPU organs have shown themselves to be staunch fighters for the cause of the working class, resolutely and mercilessly cracking down on our class enemies, the organs of the Cheka-OGPU have never allowed themselves to display cruelty or mockery of the enemy - this is a huge internal the strength of the OGPU.

The glorious battle motto of the OGPU has always been and remains "RULES FIGHT AGAINST THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION, BUT NOT CRUELTY TO THE ENEMY." This motto, which is one of the sources of our strength and superiority over the enemies of the revolution, we must unswervingly continue to be guided by.

We have always defeated the enemy not by using any special methods during interrogations, but by the power of the consciousness of our rightness, the consciousness of what we were entrusted with.



our Leninist Party, the entire working class, to defend the proletarian revolution.

We are cracking down on the enemies of the Soviet Union, firmly realizing that our entire Party and the working class as a whole are supporting us in this difficult struggle. But the Party and the working class will never forgive us if we even in the slightest resort to the methods of our enemies. Bullying of prisoners, beatings and the use of other physical methods of influence are integral attributes of the entire White Guard.

THE OGPU ALWAYS DISCHARGED THESE TECHNIQUES AS ORGANICALLY FOREIGN TO THE BODIES OF THE PROLETARIAN DICTATORY.

The Chekist who allowed even the slightest mockery of the arrested person, who even allowed a hint of extortion of testimony, is not a Chekist, but an enemy of our cause.

Each of our workers must know and remember that even the slightest mistake, made even if not out of malice, is a stain of shame on all of us.

With this letter of mine, I warn all Chekists, whatever their merits, that the repetition of such cases will meet merciless punishment.

At the same time, I warn against the possibility of weakening our struggle against the counter-revolution in the sense of manifesting laxity and helplessness in the face of a stubborn and unyielding enemy.

The Chekist must not allow the accused to lead him.

\*We must firmly remember that among the opponents who come to us there are elements who are ready to give any evidence in order to achieve their release, and sometimes consciously seek to put our organs on the wrong track. On the part of leading workers, a critical verification of the materials of the investigative proceedings with facts and effective management of undercover and investigative work are obligatory.\*

279

DOCUMENTATION

But at the same time, we must be careful to ensure that our representatives \*under the guise of criticism of the essence of the matter do not introduce elements of pity and indulgence towards the enemy.\*

Comrades Chekists! For 13 years we have been fighting the enemies of the Soviet Union.

There is not a single spot on the glorious banner of the OGPU.

There are still many years of struggle and glorious victories ahead. Let's rally our Chekist ranks even closer!

Deputy Chairman of the OGPU Yagoda

APRF F.45. Op. 1. D. 171. L. 6-9. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "Comrade Stalin's archive."  
\*—\* Underlined by hand in pencil.

No. 273

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT PACKAGES" (89)

August 10, 1931

No. 55, item 7/20. — On Packages (PB dated August 5, 1931, project No. 54, item 15) (comrades Andreev, Kaganovich, Litvinov).

Accept commission proposals:

1. Stating that the packages were opened carelessly and delayed for a long time, which is completely intolerable, to propose to the OGPU to punish the guilty persons and report their list to the Central Committee, declaring a secret order in their periphery.
2. Propose to the OGPU to ensure the actual implementation of its order of 11/17/31 on the prohibition of the local bodies of the OGPU from opening and checking diplomatic and consular mail.
3. Considering it correct to check foreign letters, in particular those going through the diplomatic line by mail, the Central Committee obliges the OGPU to allocate a special, carefully checked department for diplomatic mail, putting there responsible persons who would guarantee the cleanliness and speed of work, in no case preventing further such facts of delay or violation of the rules for handling diplomatic mail.
4. Propose to the OGPU to establish a procedure in which all the facts reported by Comrade Litvinov about the unacceptable handling of diplomatic mail would be immediately investigated.
5. Numerous facts of unacceptable handling of diplomatic mail by the NC Postal authorities, a large delay in the delivery of letters, opening their letters, etc. testify to the poor organization of the delivery case in the NKPostele. To instruct Comrade Roizenman to organize an inspection, with the participation of the GPU workers, of the entire Expedition Case and the difference in mail, and to develop, together with Comrade Rykov, such

which would radically improve this aspect of the work of the NC Postel bodies.

In a month, report to the PB on all the measures taken.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 150. Original. Typescript.

\*  
The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "Extracts sent: Comrade Menzhin to whom - all; To comrade Roizenman, comrade Rykov - p. 5 \*.

280

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 274

#### DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE APPROVAL OF THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION OF THE POLITBURO OF  
THE CC AUCP(b) ON THE REASONS FOR CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE OGPU

August 10, 1931

No. 55, p. 26/3 - Decision of the PB commission on the issue of information from the national Central Committees, regional committees, regional committees about changes in the composition of the OGPU (PB of 5. VIII. 31, pr. No. 54, p. 2- O).

Approve the draft letter proposed by the Politburo commission to the secretaries of the national Central Committees, regional committees and regional committees (see Appendix)

Appendix to  
clause 26/3, pr. PB No. 55

TO THE SECRETARIES OF NATIONAL CCs,

TERRITORIAL COMMITTEES, REGIONAL COMMITTEES

Resolution of the Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks,  
approved by the Politburo on August 6, 1931

To instruct the secretaries of the national Central Committees, regional committees and regional committees to explain to the narrow asset of the GPU workers about the reasons for the recent changes in the leadership of the OGPU on the following grounds:

1. T.t. Messing and Belsky suspended from work in the OGPU, comrade. Olsky was removed from work in the Special Department, and Comrade Evdokimov was removed from the post of head of the Secret Operational Directorate and sent to Turkestan to the post of PP on the grounds that:

a) these comrades waged a completely intolerable group struggle within the OGPU against the leadership of the OGPU; b) they spread among the employees of the OGPU completely untrue corrupting rumors that the case of sabotage in the military department is an "exaggerated" case; c) they thereby loosened the iron discipline among the workers of the OGPU.

2. Tov. Akulov was transferred to the post of 1st deputy head. OGPU, comrade Balitsky for the position of 3rd deputy prev. OGPU, and comrade. Bulatov was appointed head of the personnel department of the OGPU in order to strengthen the OGPU politically and to raise the formation, training and distribution of cadres of the OGPU to the proper height.

3. The Central Committee dismisses talk and gossip about the "internal weakness" of the organs of the OGPU and the "incorrectness" of the line of their practical work as rumors coming, no doubt, from the hostile camp and foolishly picked up by some unfortunate "communists."

4. The Central Committee considers that the OGPU is and remains the naked sword of the working class, which has accurately and skillfully defeated the enemy, honestly and skillfully fulfilling its duty to the Soviet government.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

I. Stalin

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 841. L. 5, 9. Original. Typescript

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 6.VIII.31.

DOCUMENTATION

281

No. 275

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE HEAD OF THE ECU OGPU"

August 10, 1931

No. 55, p. 33/10 - About the head of the ECU of the OGPU (comrade Menzhinsky).

Approve Comrade Mironova L.G. Head of the Economic Department of the OGPU.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 841. L. 6. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted at a meeting of the Politburo on July 9, 1931.

No. 276

CIPPHROTELEGRAM I.V. STALIN FROM SOCHI L.M.  
KAGANOVICH ON THE CORRECTION OF THE ERRORS IN THE  
LETTER OF THE CC ON THE REASONS FOR CHANGES  
IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE OGPU

August 15, 1931

No. 6Sh

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Poskrebyshv for Kaganovich

In the letter of the Central Committee to the regional and regional committees about the reasons for the changes in the leadership of the OGPU, a mistake made by the scribe crept in. Paragraph 4 of the letter says: "The OGPU is and remains the naked sword of the working class, which accurately and skillfully defeated the enemy." Instead, it should be: "The OGPU is and remains the naked sword of the working class, accurately and skillfully smashing

enemy."

Please correct the error and report the correction to the secretaries of the regional committees.

Stalin

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 9, 9v. Script. Typescript Published: Stalin and Kaganovich.

Correspondence. 1931-1936 Comp. O.V. Khlevniuk, R.U. Davis, L.P. Kosheleva, E.A. Rees, L.A. Horny. M.: ROSSPEN, 2001. S. 48.

No. 277

CIPPHROTELEGRAM L.M. Kaganovich I.V. TO STALIN IN SOCHI  
ABOUT THE SPEAKER AT THE ASSET OF THE OGPU

August 15, 1931

No. 1047

Art. Stalin

Menzhinsky and Akulov ask for a speaker for the OGPU activists on the decision of the Central Committee.  
Wouldn't it be better to entrust one of them. Please let me know your opinion and whom to entrust.

Kaganovich

RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 10. Original. Typescript, published: Stalin and Kaganovich.

Correspondence. 1931-1936 S. 49.

282

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 278

CIPPHROTELEGRAM I.V. STALIN FROM SOCHI

L.M. KAGANOVICH ABOUT THE SPEAKER AT THE ASSET OF THE OGPU (90)

August 15, 1931

No. 7Sh

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Poskrebyshv for Kaganovich

I insist that the decision of the Central Committee be carried out and that the secretary of the regional party committee must be the speaker on the active side of the OGPU. This is necessary so that the report is not regarded as a massacre by one part of the OGPU against another part of it. This is demanded by the interests of unity and cohesion of all the workers of the GPU.

Stalin

RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 10, 10v. Script. Manuscript.

Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 S. 49.

No. 279

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT SAKHALIN"

August 30, 1931

No. 59, item 13/22. - About Sakhalin (comrade Mikoyan).

In view of the serious situation with the food supply of Sakhalin, appoint Comrade Yagoda as a special representative for ensuring the supply of Sakhalin, entrusting him with the duty to take all necessary measures to ensure the supply of Sakhalin both for the coming months and for the winter, and to check whose fault created the existing intolerable situation with food on Sakhalin.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 177. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted at a meeting of the Politburo on August 30, 1931.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Yagoda, Rudzutaku.

No. 280

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT DEFLECTORS"

August 30, 1931

No. 59, item 16/25. - About defectors (comrade Akulov).

a) Accept the proposal of the OGPU on the establishment of a check point (quarantine) for checking defectors in order to send all those checked to work in their specialty in the corresponding regions of the USSR. Propose to the Council of People's Commissars to release the funds necessary for this.

DOCUMENTATION \_ 283

b) Instruct the OGPU to determine the appropriate regime for suspicious persons from among the defectors.

c) Agree with the proposal of the ECCI on the development of appropriate agitation for the return to their homeland for the revolutionary struggle, first of all, the communists and Komsomol members. To instruct the party organizations of the respective regions to conduct agitation and explanatory work among the defectors.

d) Do not prohibit the coverage of this issue in the Belarusian and Ukrainian press, without inflating it into a political campaign.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 177. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted at a meeting of the Politburo on July 30, 1931.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Menzhin skomu — everything; Kosior, Gay - all (in cipher); Kerzhentsev - "a"; Manuisky - "in"; Kirov - "in" (in cipher).

No. 281

CIPPHROTELEGRAM I.V. STALIN FROM SOCHI  
L.M. KAGANOVICH AND G.G. YAGODA  
ABOUT THE OGPU DESIGN BUREAU

September 14, 1931

P38

Kaganovich, copy to Yagoda.

I consider it premature to transfer the design bureaus of the OGPU to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Economic Council. (91)

Stalin

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 64. Original. Manuscript Published: Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 S. 103.

No. 282

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE USE OF FORMER "PESTS"

BY RAILWAY TRANSPORT

September 15, 1931

N ° 62, paragraph 1-06, the use of exempt b. pests on the railway transport (Postyshev, Yagoda).

Do not object to early release ex. wreckers engineers and technicians of the railway. transport for use on the railway. transport according to the list presented by Postyshev and Akulov, with the suspension of the sentence conditional and the application of public oversight of the GPU to the released. Instruct Akulov and Rukhimovich to determine the forms and place of their work.

RASP. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 11. L. 7. Original. Typewritten.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Akulov, Rukhimovich\*.

284

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 283

CIPPHROTELEGRAM I.V. STALIN FROM SOCHI  
IN TIFLIS L.I. KARTVELISHVILI AND L.P. BERIA  
ABOUT THE ARRESTED TEACHER N.D. MAKHATADZE

September 19, 1931

Nikolai Dmitrievich Makhatadze, a teacher for 73 years, is sitting in the Metekhi isolation ward. I know him from the seminary and I think that he cannot be dangerous for Soviet power. Please release the old man and report the results.

Stalin

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 70. Original. Manuscript.

No. 284

CIPPHROTELEGRAM L.M. Kaganovich and V.M.  
MOLOTOVA I.V. STALIN IN SOCHI  
ON APPOINTMENTS TO THE NKPS

September 25, 1931

No. 1332 Sh

OWL. SECRET

Tov. Stalin.

Today at a meeting of members of the Politburo (Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Rudzutak, Ordzhonikidze, Kirov, Andreev, Postyshev) the question of the position of the NKPS was discussed. Everyone agreed that the work of the NKPS was unsatisfactory. It was recognized as necessary to change the leadership, to release Rukhimovich, Kviring, others have not been determined now, but we believe that another group of workers will have to be released.

The following comrades are outlined as possible candidates for the post of people's commissar: Andreev, Kaganovich Lazar, Kosior Stanislav.

Please let us know your opinion.

Kaganovich, Molotov

RGASPI. F.558. Op.11. D. 76. L. 78. Original. Typescript.

Published: Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 S. 118.

No. 285

CIPPHROTELEGRAM I.V. STALIN AND M.I. KALININA FROM  
SOCHI L.M. KAGANOVICH and V.M. MOLOTOV  
ON APPOINTMENTS TO THE NKPS

September 25, 1931



No. 1183

Kaganovich, Molotov.

We wholeheartedly support Andreev's candidacy, since he knows transport and transport workers and approaches the matter more than anyone else. We think that the final decision of the question should be made in the presence of Rukhimovich, who will have to be summoned from the vacation. It would be good to make Blagonravov one of Andreev's deputies, completely freeing him from work at the TOGPU.

Stalin, Kalinin

RGASPI. F. 558. Op.11. D. 76. L. 78, 78v. Original, manuscript.

Published: Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 S. 118.

#### DOCUMENTATION

285

No. 286

CIPPHROTELEGRAM L.M. KAGANOVICH  
and V.M. MOLOTOVA I.V. TO STALIN ON  
APPOINTMENTS TO THE NKPS AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS

October 1, 1931

No. 1376

Art. Stalin.

1) Today, in the presence of Rukhimovich, his release was formalized and Andreev and Blagonravov were approved. Please let me know whether to issue now in the Soviet order.

2) Andreev projects the following changes in the composition of the deputies and the board. Zamami: Mironova (first), Blagonravova, Mezhlauka Valery (Ordzhonikidze objects strongly), Shushkov, Bulat. Release: Clearing, Postnikov (with sending him on the road), Sinev, Ksandrov, Gorovoy. Take Ivanov Konstantin from the Transcaucasus, Zhukov from the Kazan road or Levchenko, Levitin from the Narkomsnab (Mikoyan strongly objects), Kalashnikov from the RKI to the collegium.

Kaganovich, Molotov

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 85. Original. Manuscript. Stalin and Kaganovich.  
Correspondence. 1931-1936 S. 123.

No. 287

CIPPHROTELEGRAM I.V. STALIN FROM SOCHI

L.M. KAGANOVICH, V.M. MOLOTOV and  
G.K. ORDZHONIKIDZE ON APPOINTMENTS TO THE NKPS  
AND OTHER DEPARTMENTS

October 1, 1931

No. 1183

Kaganovich, Molotov, Ordzhonikidze.

1. I strongly object to the appointment of Rukhimovich as Chairman of the State Planning Commission or Deputy of the Supreme Economic Council. If you can wait a week, put the question aside. It would be better to give him a job outside of Moscow.

2. Andreev, apparently, wants to gather all the North Caucasians into the NKPS. It is hardly advisable. Kalashnikov can be given to Andreev. Zhukov too. You have to think about Mezhlauk. The position of Blagonravov must be clearly defined as the first or second deputy, otherwise there is nothing to remove him from the TOGPU. Postnikov can be put on the Belorusskaya road, removing Polyudov from there, who is unsuitable for work in the NKPS. The queering can be sent to the kraipian to the North Caucasus.

3. The appointment of Andreev and the removal of Rukhimovich can be formalized immediately; I think that UDzutak would be suitable for this case.

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 85, 85v. Script. Manuscript, 'talin and Kaganovich.  
Correspondence. 1931-1936 pp. 123-124.

Stalin

286

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 288

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE REVIEW OF THE CASE OF A. HARRY

October 20, 1931

No. 70, p. 18 - Statement by A. Garry (Stalin).

a) Instruct comrade Kaganovich to inform c. Garry that the Central Committee has been instructed by the OGPU to reconsider his case.

b) Offer the OGPU to reconsider the case of A. Garry within two days and issue him a paper with the following content:

1) The accusation of A. Garry of espionage is considered unproven.

2) Consider A. Harry fully rehabilitated.

3) Cancel the expulsion against A. Garry. (92)

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 855. L. 3. Original. Typescript.

No. 289

INDICATIONS Y.A.L. Ogarev about the meeting with I.V. STALIN

November 18, 1931

Owls. secret

On November 16, at about 3.5 pm, walking together with Dobrov from Red Square in the direction of the Ilyinsky Gates, I met Stalin on the left side of the sidewalk. The meeting took place not far from V. Trading Rows. Stalin was dressed in a soldier's overcoat, with a khaki cap on his head. Walking beside him on the left was a gentleman in a dark coat and cap. In this face, a large red beard caught my eye. And only when I shifted my eyes to the left, I noticed Stalin three steps away from me. I recognized him at once by his resemblance to the portraits I had seen. He seemed to me shorter than I had imagined. He walked slowly and looked straight at me. I didn't take my eyes off him either. I noticed that 8 people immediately followed him. We got so close on the sidewalk (it was quite narrow) that I even touched his neighbor (red-bearded) with my hand. My first thought was to grab a revolver and shoot, but since I was not in a jacket that day, but in a coat, and the revolver was in my pants pocket under my coat, I realized that before I fired they would seize me. This stopped me, especially since the meeting with Stalin was completely unexpected. After walking a few steps, I thought if I should return to shoot. But the presence of 8 people who followed Stalin stopped me immediately. This whole episode struck me by the fact that I had the idea that Stalin always traveled only by car, surrounded by a dense ring of guards, and the car was driving at the fastest speed. It is precisely this conception of the methods of movement of the leading persons of the Bolsheviks that has always caused us the greatest difficulties in raising the question of a terrorist act. I was offended that I missed this opportunity, and said to Dobrov: "How strange! When you meet, you do nothing, and when you want to meet, but you will not meet. "No one will believe me abroad."

OGARRR

Interrogated: Head. 3 Departments of the ECU OGPU Dmitriev

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 226. L. 18, 19. Original. Typescript.

\*

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note of Stalin. "Archive".

On the last sheet there is a handwritten note: "T. Stalin, It has been established that the one who introduced himself as Ogarev is in fact Platonov-Petin, an assistant to the resident of British intelligence for the limitrophs of Bogomolets. In recent years, Platonov-Petin has been to the Union seven times, he confessed. I. Akulov.

DOCUMENTATION \_

No. 290

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE HEAD OF THE SECRET POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE OGPU"

November 20, 1931

No. 76, p. 37/7 - About the head of the secret political department of the OGPU (OB dated 14.XI.-31, pr. No. 82, p. 15-g).

To approve Comrade Molchanov as the head of the secret political department of the OGPU, releasing him from the work of the plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU in the Ivanovo-Industrial Region.

RGASPI. F.17. Ol.Z. D. 861. L.9. Script. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 16.XI.31.

No. 291

NOTE I.A. Akulova I.V. STALIN  
ON THE TRANSFER TO THE POSITION OF ECONOMIC  
AUTHORITIES OF SPECIALISTS CONDEMNED BY THE OGPU

November 26, 1931

No. 40961

I consider it necessary to inform you about the transfer of specialists convicted by the OGPU to the disposal of economic organizations.

During the period May-November, 1,087 people were registered for release through the Collegium of the OGPU\*.

The revision of the measure of social protection was carried out in two types - early release and conditionally convicted. The released specialists are attached to certain enterprises in agreement with economic organizations.

By industries, the attachment was made:

Ferrous metallurgy

- BY

silicate, industry

- 16

color

- 55

Textile

- 13

Heavy mechanical engineering

- 36

Paper

- 14

Fuel industry.

- 82

Lesnaya

-45

Oil

- 40

Rural -farm

- 31

Chemical

- 94

Utilities economy

- 16

Construction

- 85

Patgrubburst

- 37

Energy

-56

FPO

- 37

Electrotechnical

-47

Vohimtrusts

- 13

Parvagdiz

- 41

Narkomsnab system

- 36

WATO

- 15

At the disposal of the Supreme Economic Council

- 17

Aviation industry

- 27

Other industries

-94

shipbuilding

- 15

PP OGPU

- 15

TOTAL: 1087

288

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

By months, the release went like this:

In May, 102 people were released. June - 90

July - 317

August - 147

September - 162

October - 262

In November, about 200 people are registered for release and will be released according to various requirements, mainly for metallurgy, the People's Commissariat for Supply, etc., about 200 people.

In addition, there are requirements from the industry for about 700 people.

The released specialists are distributed according to their professions and specialties into the following categories:

Metallurgists

- 74

Mashinostroit.

- 21

mechanics

- 140

Chemists

- 73

electricians

- 101

Geologists

- 9

Miners

- 122

Economists

- 27

Technologists

- 126

Techniques

- 71

Builders

-62

Other specialties

- 261

TOTAL: 1087 people

Deputy before the OGPU Akulov

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 143. L. 15-16. Script. Typescript.

\*

On the first page there is Stalin's handwritten note: "To members of the PB."

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 292

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON PROTECTION OF POWER PLANTS AND FACTORIES" (93)

December 8, 1931

No. 79, item 16 - On the protection of power plants and factories (comrade Kaganovich).

Approve the project submitted by the commission on the protection of the most important economic facilities (power plants, factories, railway facilities) (see Appendix).

APPENDIX to  
clause 16 of pr. PB No. 79

DECISION OF THE CC AUCP(b) OF DECEMBER 8, 1931

ON ORDERING THE PROTECTION  
OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ECONOMIC  
OBJECTS (POWER PLANTS, FACTORIES, RAILWAY FACILITIES)

1. Stating that at industrial enterprises the protection, both external and internal, is unsatisfactory, the Central Committee obliges the Supreme Council of National Economy, the People's Commissariat of National Economy, the People's Commissariat for National Security, the NKSnab and the organs of the OGPU (to which the paramilitary guards have passed) to organize the protection of enterprises in such a way that, first of all, eliminate such glaring shortcomings as a factory pass

DOCUMENTATION \_ 289

unchecked people, persons who have nothing to do with them, going from shop to shop without business necessity, unauthorized disposal of the relevant equipment, admission to the units of workers who have nothing to do with them, unauthorized demonstration of production processes by individual workers to their friends, buddies, which often leads to accidents, damage and stoppage of machines.

The main attention should be paid to the fight against, detection and prevention of damage to units and machines, etc.

2. The implementation of the above tasks requires:

a) improving and setting up the guard service of the external security of enterprises; b) the development of precise and strict internal regulations, including the duties of workers in relation to machines, units, special technical supervision of preventive repairs



in order to avoid accidents, as well as training workers in the handling of machines; c) changing the procedure for admission to enterprises and workshops; d) improving the verification of personnel and control during admission to the most important enterprises and construction sites; e) improvement of fire protection.

3. All enterprises should be divided into several categories according to their importance. The first category should include the most important power plants and transmission lines, military factories, the largest water pipelines and the largest transport hubs, and the most important enterprises in the main industries.

Oblige the OGPU, together with the relevant economic bodies, to draw up a list of enterprises of the 1st category within 2 weeks.

As specific measures, the Central Committee proposes:

I. On guard duty and outdoor protection.

1. Oblige economic people's commissariats (VSNKh, NKPS, NKSnab, etc.), directors of trusts and enterprises to begin isolating the territories of enterprises from the surrounding residential construction sites, and where, due to location, it is impossible to fence off residential construction sites from the enterprise, evict from the territory the territory of the enterprise of unauthorized persons residing on it and to ensure the establishment of such a procedure that workers and employees living on the territory of the enterprise outside of work would not have access to enterprises and workshops.

At newly built enterprises, ensure complete isolation of factory, factory buildings from residential buildings.

To oblige the Supreme Council of National Economy and the OGPU to draw up a list of enterprises and factories within 2 weeks, at which the present resolution.

2. Clubs, cinemas and other institutions of general (non-factory) use (with the exception of intra-factory canteens, red corners and medical aid points inside factories) must be fenced in such a way that those who come there would not pass through the factory territory and control booths.

3. The list of persons entitled to issue passes to the enterprise is approved in a special order by the director of the enterprise in agreement with the organs of the OGPU.

4. To help the permanent military guard, improve the appropriate staff of watchmen, raising their financial situation, so that there are special watchmen at enterprises of the 1st category and the most important Workshops, on the correct functioning of which the uninterrupted

290

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

the operation of the entire enterprise (for example, machine rooms, switchboard compartments of a power plant, etc.).

The personnel of the watchmen must be checked by the organs of the OGPU.

5. Bring communications, signaling, lighting, fencing of protected objects and all security service premises that ensure the normal organization of security into proper condition.

6. Ensure the placement of personnel of all types of service security (military, paramilitary, police, watchmen and fire) near the protected enterprises, establish a procedure for communicating with them in case of an emergency call.

## II. By internal order.

1. Instruct the economic people's commissariats (VSNKh, NKPS, NKSnab, etc.) to revise all internal regulations in relation to various categories of enterprises so that enterprises of the 1st category, especially at power plants, etc., more strictly regulate duties of workers, technical personnel and administration, especially in terms of handling machines, machine tools, units, power plants and other equipment.

With regard to workers, employees and technical personnel working at the most important key points of enterprises (engine room, switchboard switchboard, etc.), organize every three months an appropriate test of their knowledge of the technology of controlling mechanisms.

Without waiting for the development of these internal regulations, give an order on the obligatory inspection of machinery and equipment at the end of work and the delivery of the newly incoming shift.

The aforementioned internal regulations must be drawn up within a month and considered by a commission consisting of t.t. Pyatakov (prev.), Yagoda, Tsikhon, Antipov, Mironov, Shvernik and Agranov.

2. To propose to the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to extend the provision on disciplinary sanctions in transport (including arrest for official misconduct) to workers and administrative and technical personnel of power plants, military chemical and equipment factories and major water pipelines .

## III. According to the system of passes for protected objects.

1. The direct management of the organization of issuing passes should be entrusted to the commandants of enterprises, appointing to these positions preferably former Chekists or reserve commanders of the Red Army and necessarily members of the CPSU (b).

2. Establish such a system for issuing passes, in which employees and workers could have access only to those shops and production facilities in which they work. Strictly limit the circle of persons who have the right to walk around the entire territory of the enterprise.

3. Oblige enterprises to establish various forms of passes (permanent, temporary and one-time).

4. Before making settlements with the dismissed, take away their passes.

5. Set up a record of lost passes. Persons who have lost passes

bring to administrative responsibility, and those caught in the transfer of passes to other persons to bring to criminal responsibility.

DOCUMENTATION \_ 291

IV. On the personnel of the most important enterprises and structures.

1. Establish at power plants, military factories and major water pipelines a mandatory preliminary check by the secret part of the enterprises of all newly hired personnel, the check should be carried out through the OGPU bodies at the place of their former service.
2. To oblige the directors of enterprises through the appropriate apparatus to identify all the "former" people working at the enterprises of the first category (former landowners, white officers, priests, security guards, etc.) and determine the possibility of leaving them at the enterprise, coordinating these issues with the OGPU bodies .
3. In especially important enterprises and workshops (military and others where there are production secrets), introduce a subscription for the main categories of workers and engineering, technical and administrative personnel on non-disclosure of production secrets.
4. To oblige party committees to appoint only members of the CPSU (b), preferably from former employees of the OGPU bodies or reserve commanders of the Red Army, to the positions of heads of secret parts of enterprises.
5. Organs of the OGPU, within a 3-month period, check the personnel of power plants, the most important military factories, and the largest water pipelines.

V. On fire protection.

Oblige the OGPU to organize verification of the implementation (primarily at enterprises of the 1st category) of the directives of the Central Committee on the establishment of fire protection, and the Supreme Council of National Economy and other economic agencies to take measures to eliminate the abnormalities existing in this matter, providing fire protection with appropriate material and technical means. All of the above measures at enterprises of the 1st category should be introduced no later than two months.

The Central Committee obliges the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties to pay more attention to the protection of enterprises and to ensure the actual implementation of this resolution.

RGASPI. F.P.Op. 3. D. 864 L.. 5, 34-37. Script. Typescript.

No. 293

NOTE V.A. Balitsky I.V. TO STALIN WITH THE  
APPENDIX OF THE TRANSLATION OF JAPANESE DOCUMENTS  
CONCERNING THE WAR WITH THE USSR (94)

December 19, 1931

No. 41083

Please see for yourself the extremely important authentic Japanese

skimi materials relating to the war with the USSR.

Attached:

D An aide-memoire drawn up by the Japanese military attache in Moscow, Lieutenant Colonel KASAHARA, on the opinion transmitted to the Chief of the General Staff of Japan on behalf of the Japanese Ambassador to the USSR Hirota and

2. "Abstract of the report submitted by the military attache of Kasahara to General Ral-Major Harada \*, who was sent by the General Staff to Europe with special assignments related to preparations for a speech in Manchuria; General Harada passed through Moscow in July of this year and had meeting with the ambassador of Lirot and Kasahara.

ZAM. PREV. OGPU BALITSKY

292

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

Top Secret (Translated  
from Japanese.

documented)

1. SUMMARY OF AMBASSADOR HIROT'S  
CONVERSATION WITH MAJOR  
GENERAL HARADA (July 1st, 1931)

Ambassador Hirota requested that his opinion be conveyed to the Chief of the General Staff of Japan regarding Japan's public policy:

"On the question of whether Japan should go to war with the Soviet Union or not, \*\*I consider it necessary that Japan take the path of a firm policy towards the Soviet Union, being ready to go to war at any moment\*\*.

The cardinal goal of this war should be not so much to protect Japan from communism, but to seize the Soviet \*Far East and Eastern Siberia\*.

2. SUMMARY OF THE REPORT MADE  
BY HIS EXCELLENT. MAJOR GENERAL HARADA

Lieutenant Colonel Kasahara

I. General situation in the Soviet Union

The USSR is at the present moment energetically pursuing a five-year plan for building socialism. This plan will form the basis of the future development of the Soviet state. The central place in this plan is occupied by heavy industry, especially those branches of industry that are associated with an increase in the country's defense capability. Those branches of industry that are directly related to the needs of the population come second. The USSR, at the cost of great sacrifices, is vigorously developing heavy industry and is now

entered its third year of the plan. So far, in general, the goals set by the plan have been successfully achieved, but in the future I believe that the implementation of the plan will run into a number of obstacles, that it will hardly be possible to fulfill the planned program. Although the standard of living of the population, sacrificed to state policy, is rapidly flying down, one has to take into account the following features of the Soviet state:

- 1) The system of political government in the USSR is a real absolutist dictatorship, and therefore the government can, at its discretion, cut back on secondary sectors of economic life and throw all financial and human resources into the implementation of the central moments of the program.
- 2) Productivity in the Soviet Union is very low compared to the capitalist states, but while in the latter financial resources are used from the point of view of individual interests, in the USSR capital is invested solely from the point of view of the development of the state.
- 3) The population of the Soviet Union blindly obeys the government and endures all sorts of hardships.
- 4) The USSR has an abundance of natural resources.
- 5) In view of the significant backwardness of the USSR in economic development, it can, with minimal effort, develop industry at a successful pace.

#### DOCUMENTS \_293

- 6) The system of protection and supervision in the USSR is very strict, and the possibility of consolidating anti-government protests is ruled out.

Leaving aside the question of the role of the Five-Year Plan and its significance (in a positive and negative sense) for the people, we conclude that the main points of the Five-Year Plan have already been implemented to a certain extent.

However, it cannot be thought that after the implementation of this plan, the standard of living of the population will begin to rise rapidly.

Turning from the assessment of economic prospects to the prospects of an ideological order, it should be noted that now in responsible positions of power the states are people who have been severely hardened, but in the future, when this generation leaves the scene, it can be assumed that the militancy of the Communist Party will begin to degrade. True, in 10 years the generation that was brought up after the revolution, under communist conditions, will enter the arena, and in the conditions of the completion of the program of the state's economic power, it can carry out shifts in Soviet policy to the right or left, but in general the situation in the country will be stabilized.

But in the future, in the field of domestic politics, there will be questions about the separatist movement (Ukraine, the Caucasus, Turkestan) and about disagreements within the party. These questions will be the gangrene of Soviet statehood and can play a particularly pernicious role in time of war.

#### II. Armed forces of the USSR

a) In principle, the USSR is not at all aggressive. Armed forces are organized on the basis of the principle of self-defence. The Soviet Union harbors a fear of foreign intervention. The argument that the constant proclamation of an external threat is one of the measures of domestic policy aimed at diverting the attention of the population is quite reasonable, but nevertheless, the main incentive in the development of the armed forces is indeed the fear of intervention.

b) The main goal of the five-year plan is to strengthen the armed power. The leaders of the co-government at every opportunity speak openly about the threat from outside. The main instigator in the matter of strengthening armaments is the Communist Party.

\*\* Since 1927, new 4 infantry units have been organized. divisions\*\* and 1 cavalry division. The armament of the Red Army is developing at a rapid pace.

c) Central attention in the matter of arming the army is focused on motorization.

There are: \*500\* tanks, of which \*100\* tanks have been added during the last six months\*.

Five motorized connections: 4 otd. brigades and 1 infantry division \*.

The chemical armament of the Red Army is truly astonishing. • Chemical training is carried out in the troops and among the population very intensively.

r) Air Force: 1,700 to 2,000 aircraft 1 .

The tentative goal is \*to organize 200\* aviation companies\*.

At the moment there are, according to my assumptions, \*about 180\*. In terms of reconnaissance aircraft and fighter aircraft, the required level has already been reached; Apparently, now efforts are concentrated on bomber aircraft 2 .

294

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

Most of the aircraft are in domestic production, but besides this there is a sufficient number of German and Italian (hydroaviation) aircraft  
moletov.

In wartime, the productivity of the aircraft industry will probably reach about 150 aircraft per month 3 .

Great efforts are being made to develop civil aviation and expand the network of air routes.

e) The military budget doubled compared to 1929. We must not lose sight of the fact that expenditures on the military industry in the Soviet budget appear in the column of expenditures on industry in general, expenditures on military equipment go in the column of expenditures on military

industry, and the expenses for the maintenance of the GPU troops do not go according to the estimates of the military and naval departments; As for the expenses for the maintenance of the barracks and for the arrangement of maneuverable parade grounds, etc., they are included in the local budget. Thus, there is a huge difference between the official military budget and the real one.

A large number of aircraft are being built with private donations. Last year 330 aircraft were built in this way 4 .

#### f) Militarization of the population

Huge efforts are focused on militarization. Quantitative growth of Osoviahim:

January 1929 - 3 million members

January 1930 - 5 million members

January 1931 - 9 million members 5

Militarization extends even to kindergartens.

#### III. conclusions

There can be no doubt that in the future, as its economic power develops and its armed forces grow, the Soviet Union will begin to pass from the principle of passive defense to an aggressive policy.

Considering the general state of the country, one can conclude that at present the USSR is not in a position to wage war.

""The present moment is exceptionally favorable for our empire to begin solving the problem of the Far East. The Western states bordering on the USSR (Poland, Romania) have the opportunity now to act in concert with us as well, but this opportunity will gradually weaken from year to year\*\*.

If we now, imbued with a readiness to fight, begin to resolve the problem of the Far East, then we will be able to achieve our goals without opening a war. If, however, a war breaks out more than expected, it will present no difficulties for us.

#### GV. On the issue of arms reduction

It is very difficult to force the co-government to limit the forces of the Red Army by virtue of the conditions of the organization of the Red Army and the methods of compiling the Soviet budget. It also seems impossible to exercise control over legal and illegal ways of circumventing the arms limitation agreement.

If we have not established the proper means of control, then there is a danger that we will eventually reveal our secrets 8 .

In discussing the question of the reduction of armaments, Japan, instead of trailing behind Britain and France, should take the most resolute position with regard to the Red Army.

Foreign military attaches in Moscow fully share this opinion. Japan must resolutely defend its point of view in the consciousness of its rightness. In contrast to the question of the fleet, the Powers will hardly object if we base our demands on the concept that our enemy will be the Red Army.

#### V. Matters Requiring Attention from Our Army

- a) When training troops, it is necessary to clearly explain our objects and the configuration of the probable theater of operations.
- b) Studying the tactics to be applied in the war against the USSR; encouragement of the principle of mobile warfare.
- c) Abolish the standard system for training and arming all our divisions; training and equipment should be carried out on the basis of taking into account the tasks that will be assigned to individual divisions.
- d) In addition to selected qualified troops, we need to have numerous cadres of unskilled soldiers.
- e) It is necessary to pay special attention to the chemical weapons and aviation of Japan.
- f) When training our troops, it is necessary to develop in every possible way the main advantages of our troops and to cultivate these traits in every possible way.
- g) The decisive role in the war against the Red Army will ultimately be played by the highest military command. Therefore, it is necessary to focus all attention on the art of managing large military formations (from the point of view of the war with the USSR).

From the same point of view it is necessary to carry out business trips of generals and military maneuvers.

It is impossible to satisfy all desires in the matter of organizing troops, equipping and training them, because this requires appropriate funds and time. Therefore, when studying the proposed theater of military operations and the tactics that should be used against the Red Army, it is necessary to single out the main points and focus all attention on them in the line of equipping and training troops.

- h) It is necessary to train troops (equipment, training) for military operations in winter.

According to the Special Department of the OGPU

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 185. L.1-9. Script. Typescript.

\*

The text contains Stalin's handwritten notes: on the first page: "T. Gamarnik. Important".

Left margin: "Really?"



6. On the left side of the margin: "Osoviahim is one proclamation so far."

On the left in the margins: "Take-s..."

On the left in the margins: "So we are so intimidated by intervention that we will swallow all sorts of bullying?"

^ Circled in pencil.

Underlined in pencil.

296

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 294

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION OF INO OGPU ABOUT ACTIVITIES  
II DEPARTMENT OF THE FRENCH GENERAL STAFF

January 29, 1932

Owls. secret

ACTIVITIES AND PLANS OF THE II DEPARTMENT  
OF THE FRENCH GENERAL STAFF

The French General Staff is currently developing feverish activity. All preparations for mobilization have been completed and all reserve officers have received new assignments.

The 2nd Division believes that the Conference on Disarmament will fail, as a result of which war will inevitably break out. The date for the start of the war is scheduled for March of this year and, in any case, no later than July.

The reason for the start of hostilities, in the opinion of the 2nd department, could be:

- 1) The occupation of the Rhine region in the event of a revolution in Germany;
- 2) Italy's action against Yugoslavia and the conflict thus created with France, as a result of which the action of French troops in the south of France should follow simultaneously with the action on the Yugoslav front;
- 3) Armed conflict between Poland and Germany, followed by the intervention of France;
- 4) The conflict with the USSR coordinated by many countries.

German problem

In assessing the situation in Germany, the 2nd Division does not agree with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with Laval and with the President of the Republic. In circles close to the second department, there are

It is clear that Germany is on the eve of a revolution that must break out before the onset of spring and develop into a communist revolution. In such a case, French intervention to restore order would have been inevitable. In the event of a German revolution, the Rhine region and Bavaria will immediately withdraw from Germany, French troops will enter these regions and unite with Czechoslovak, Polish and Rumanian troops for a joint action against Germany.

According to the opinion of the second section, the communist revolution in Germany will undoubtedly receive armed support from the USSR, which will cause a general intervention of Europe against the Soviets.

Between the general staffs of France, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, an agreement was allegedly concluded on the creation of a united army under the leadership of Marshal d'Espere of France and General Berthier. Negotiations are underway on the inclusion of the well-equipped Hungarian army in the mentioned military bloc. In the event of Hungary's participation in the aforementioned bloc, the French General Staff would take upon itself the obligation to force the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to recognize Hungary's right to arm and annul those clauses of the agreements on the basis of which she was deprived of this right.

In the event of a Hitlerite revolution, the French General Staff provides for the occupation of the Rhine region, which is necessary to ensure the security of France. French troops would be concentrated on the Rhine, awaiting the unfolding of events. Czechoslovakia, like Poland, will mobilize.

documentation \_ 297

The French General Staff in recent years has taken every opportunity to prevent the creation of a common military front between Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria and Italy. Thanks to the help of the Ministry of Finance, in the person of Flandin, he managed to knock out one link from this chain - Hungary. Italy was militarily isolated. In view of this, Italy's military action against Yugoslavia is feared as early as March, because after this period, i.e. after the possible formalization of the union of Yugoslavia with Hungary, it would be too late for Italy to do anything. In this case, a Franco-Italian conflict is inevitable. In the event that Hungary does not declare its neutrality and does not allow Polish and Czech troops to pass through its territory, Czechoslovak troops will occupy Budapest.

Another reason for the military conflict is the eastern borders. It is possible that when Hitler comes to power, he will occupy the Danzig Corridor. The possibility of crossing the border and invading Polish territory by Nazi gangs is also not ruled out, and \*even\* if Hitler does not come to power. In this case, the Rhine region will be occupied.

As events unfold, French troops will be able to advance as far as Munich and unite with Czech troops, just as in the case of the communist revolution.

The Nth Department of the French General Staff is following the situation in Russia very closely. It is assumed that the Japanese conflict may turn into a conflict between Japan and the USSR, and that for this it will be enough only the occurrence of incidents on the Russian border with Manchuria. French officers following the events taking place in Manchuria and collaborating

fighting with the Japanese troops sent detailed reports to the General Staff on the possibility of a conflict with the USSR.

The N-th department, however, is of the opinion that the USSR is currently avoiding conflict with Europe and Japan and will not react to provocations. Nevertheless, in his opinion, the conflict with the USSR is inevitable sooner or later. The Japanese occupation of Manchuria is the basis for such a conflict and greatly increased the reality of it. The common front in Europe must be prepared under the leadership of the French General Staff. The bloc of Central Europe must first of all be sealed by the annexation of Hungary.

It is difficult to determine what position Germany will take as a result of the conflict with the USSR. The Nth Department believes that in this case Germany will declare neutrality. If French troops pass through German territory to unite with the Polish army, Germany will limit itself to protest, but will not offer resistance. It will take a wait-and-see position and intervene in the conflict only when favorable ground is created for it. French intelligence agents in Germany report that the German General Staff is convinced of the complete defeat of the European armies in the event of intervention in the USSR. In the event of the defeat of the aforementioned armies, Germany would immediately intervene in the conflict in order to win her superiority in terms of armaments in Europe. She would have sought to mediate the conflict after trying to defeat the French army.

The French General Staff is very unfriendly towards the ongoing Franco-Soviet negotiations on the conclusion of a non-aggression pact and is trying with all its might to delay the course of these negotiations. This explains why the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chairman of the Soviets so insistently demanded that the Minister

298

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

ditch that these negotiations, and mainly the negotiations on the conclusion of the Soviet-Romanian non-aggression pact, were conducted in Paris, hoping that in this way it would be easier for him to prevent the success of these negotiations.

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 185. L. 11-14. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "Comrade. Stalin. Report of a newly recruited agent associated with one of the departments of the General Staff. Artuzov. 29.1.32"

No. 295

NOTE V.A. Balitsky I.V. TO STALIN WITH THE  
APPENDIX OF RECORDS OF  
THE JAPANESE MILITARY  
ATTACHE ON THE MILITARY MEASURES OF JAPAN

February 28, 1932

No. 40163

TOP SECRET

Please personally familiarize yourself with the original document compiled by the military attaché at the Japanese Embassy in Moscow KASAHARA - "Considerations on the military measures of the empire directed against the Soviet Union" \*.

KASAHARA is a member of the Young General Staff Party, headed by Lieutenant General ARAKI (the author of the slogan - "TRANSBAIKALE - JAPANESE-RUSSIAN BORDER") and HASHIMOTO - the head of the Russian sector of the General Staff, one of the current leaders of the policy of the Japanese military circles.

\*KASAHARA is leaving for Japan the other day, where he receives a responsible appointment in the Japanese General Staff\*.

ZAM. PREV. OGPU BALITSKY

Top Secret (Japanese  
documentary translation)

CONSIDERATIONS

REGARDING THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF THE EMPIRE,  
DIRECTED AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION

military attaché at the Japanese embassy in the USSR,  
lieutenant colonel of the cavalry KASAHARA YUKI O

The USSR has been steadily increasing its armed forces over the past few years and has now surpassed the Japanese army in terms of organization and level of armament.

This most difficult plan, vigorously carried out, has the main aim of increasing the might of the Red Army. I have repeatedly reported that the armament of the USSR will develop in the future at an even more rapid pace. Arguing from various points of view, we can say that now our empire is entering a crucial phase when it is necessary to carry out measures in the most decisive way. along the line of defense of the country, meaning the USSR.

documentation \_ 299

The Japanese people are, in general, a complete layman in matters of national defense, and therefore the government must first of all explain to the people about the real state of the USSR. But an even more important task is to carry out a series of reforms in the army, which is entrusted with the defense of the empire.

I have been in the USSR for only a year, and therefore my knowledge is not deep enough. But fears involuntarily seize me when I compare the picture of the growth of the USSR and the situation inside our country. Based on this, I consider it necessary to present my considerations.

Perhaps many of my statements are commonplaces already known to our military leadership. It may be that much of what I am going to suggest is very difficult, but I ardently

I wish that the leading military spheres would overcome all obstacles and urgently, most resolutely carry out these measures in life.

My statements are not systematized, they treat large problems interspersed with small ones.

I apologize for the confusion of presentation, but this is due to the fact that I express my point of view in an extremely direct, frank form.

#### I. ON THE POLICY TOWARDS THE USSR IN THE ASPECT OF THE JAPANESE-SOVIET WAR

Can the USSR conduct a war.

On Japan's future policy

At the present moment, the Red Army has already reached the required level in terms of equipment and training and, perhaps, surpasses the armies of the bloc of Poland, Romania and the Baltic states. But the USSR does not yet have sufficient power to carry out a war in the broadest sense of the word. Economic strength, military industry and the unity of the nation have not yet reached the required degree.

\*For the USSR, a war with individual Western neighbors will not be difficult\*. But if all of them, with the active support of strong powers, act as a united front against the USSR, the latter will not be able to wage a war on a large scale.

The fear that after the implementation of the five-year plan (it is quite possible that it will be carried out to a certain extent) the power of the USSR will begin to develop extremely rapidly is by no means unfounded. \*In 10 years\* - when the second five-year plan is close to completion, the \*military power of the Union\*, supported by the vastness of the territory, the abundance of the population and natural wealth, will turn into an extraordinary force.

At the present moment Soviet policy, with the exception of the ideological one, is generally passive. It boils down to maintaining peaceful economic relations with all countries in order to accumulate, through the development of foreign trade, sufficient sums to import the required machinery and Western technology. The USSR is concentrating all its efforts on carrying out the five-year plan, on strengthening armaments in order to ensure the coming prosperity by increasing its economic power. When the SSR unfolds its powerful wings, it will, relying on its colossal armed force, begin to develop an active policy along political, economic and ideological lines.

300

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

Of course, \*the Soviet Union will then raise the problem of Korean independence and proceed to the complete expulsion of all Japanese concessionaires in the fishing, oil, timber and coal sector from Soviet territory\*.

There is no doubt about this, especially since we are already seeing the beginning of this policy.

The position of the powers in the event of a Japanese-Soviet war

The Western states, especially the immediate neighbors of the USSR, who understand the above situation, intend to put an end to the threat without waiting for the final strengthening of the Soviet Union.

But, despite the growth of the anti-Soviet movement, contradictions of a political and economic nature between states hinder the process of forming an anti-Soviet bloc.

Everyone knows that it is very risky to oppose the USSR individually.

If now, more than expected, a war between the USSR and Japan begins, the western neighbors of the USSR - Poland, Romania and the limitrophes will not immediately enter the war, they will join Japan, having seized the favorable moment. France will spare no effort to actively support these states. Of course, all other foreign countries will generally adopt a favorable attitude towards Japan.

\* The White Guard organizations, which are located outside the USSR, although they do not now have such influence as before, nevertheless represent a sufficient force \*, which is evident from a number of counter-revolutionary conspiracies that have been uncovered in recent times.

Some may develop the following reasoning: "If at the moment when the revolution did not yet have sufficient support and the white organizations were powerful enough, the powers did not succeed in overthrowing the Soviet government by intervention, then even more so, acting against the USSR now can only lead to a repetition of the past. stories. Anti-Soviet speeches will now have the opposite result, namely the collapse of Western states. On the one hand, this reasoning is correct. Coming out against the USSR is fraught with dangers.

However, one must take into account the difference between the conditions that existed last time and now.

1. At that time the revolutionary movement burned with a bright flame. Now the revolution has no such pathos.

2. At that time, the powers had not yet recovered from the material and moral results of the war. They did not have sufficient energy to work most resolutely for the destruction of Soviet power, but now they are fully aware of the menacingness of communism.

3. At that time, the anti-Soviet movement was headed by white organizations that aimed at restoring the old regime. But now the main role will belong to foreign armies, which see in the face of the Soviet government a direct enemy of their Fatherland.

4. At that time, the Whites and Reds, as well as Poland, did not have sufficient weapons and organized armies - their military operations were in the nature of children's fights with changeable success. By means of such operations it was impossible to deal a crushing blow to the enemy.

This time both the Red Army and the armies of the powers are equipped and organized

sufficiently, and thus the conditions for a general

DOCUMENTATION \_ 301

contractions. It is especially necessary to take into account the degree of development of military aviation at the present moment.

Based on these considerations, we can come to the conclusion that the destruction of Soviet power will now be easier to carry out than last time\*. The economic crisis that all powers are experiencing will partly make it difficult to open hostilities, but, on the other hand, this war will be one of the ways to eliminate unemployment and get out of the crisis.

This war will also cause the development of specific branches of industry. It can be assumed that foreign states, having clearly realized the disastrous nature of their indecisive policy, are unlikely to put up with the difficult situation in which they now find themselves in the future.

Thus, one can count on certain anti-Soviet actions on the part of the powers and the western neighbors of the USSR at the present moment or in the near future. But it is highly doubtful whether these same states will be able to oppose the USSR in ten years. By that time, the Western neighbors, without waiting for the Japanese-Soviet war, may be Bolshevized from within or from without. If this does not happen, then it may turn out that, despite the outbreak of the Japanese-Soviet war, they will not have the courage to oppose the powerful Soviet Union.

On the policy of the empire towards the USSR

It can be seen from the above that the USSR will intensify its policy as its power grows. If our empire is willing to be "Little Japan", then the matter is different. If it intends to exist as a Greater Japan, sooner or later it will not be possible for it to avoid war with the USSR.

The above also shows that the Japanese-Soviet war, taking into account the state of the armed forces of the USSR and the situation in foreign countries, should be carried out as soon as possible\*. We must realize that as time passes, the environment becomes more and more favorable for them.

I consider it necessary that the imperial government conduct a policy with the expectation of starting a war with the USSR\*\* as soon as possible. Let's not discuss what is more important for Japan - war or peace. It is only necessary to take into account that the opening of the war now will turn out to be more unfavorable for them than for us. It is necessary that the Empire take the path of a firm policy towards the USSR, with the aim of resolving the fishing problem, etc. issues with full readiness to start a war.

## II. PRIORITY QUESTIONS

### WAR RELATED WITH THE SOVIET

#### UNION I. The Need for a Strategy of Destruction

Based on the conditions of the Empire, we need to carry out the war at a rapid pace, seeking a quick denouement. This position does not require proof. However, the Soviet Far East is far removed from the political and

thought centers of the USSR, and we will not be able to deliver a mortal blow to the enemy by occupying the territory. It is not enough for us to have separate military men. We will need to wage a war of destruction in order to cause the disintegration of the Soviet Union from within by inflicting a moral blow on the population of the USSR. This is the only method of war with the USSR.

302

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

Therefore, our leadership of military operations against the USSR, the organization of armament and training of our troops must be carried out exclusively on the basis of this cardinal principle - the principle of the strategy of destruction \*.

## 2. The end point of the military operation

It is quite possible that, despite our strategy of crushing and striving for a quick resolution, due to various conditions, we will not be able to carry out the war in full accordance with the planned plan of action. The question of the final moment of our military operations arises of extreme importance. Of course, we will need to advance to Lake Baikal. As for the further offensive against the West, this must be decided depending on the general situation that will have been created by that time, and especially depending on the state of the states that will come out from the West. In the event that we stop at the Trans-Baikal railway. line, Japan will have to include the occupied Far Eastern Territory completely in the empire's possessions. On this territory, our troops should be deployed in the order of military settlements, i.e. for a long time. We must be prepared to be able to wait for further developments after this occupation.

## 3. Strategic propaganda

In view of the fact that it will be difficult for Japan to inflict a mortal blow on the Soviet Union through a war in the Soviet Far East, one of the main moments of our war should be strategic propaganda, by which we will need to draw our Western neighbors and other states into a war with USSR and cause disintegration within the USSR through the use of white groups inside and outside the Union, foreigners and all anti-Soviet elements\*.

The present state of the USSR is very favorable for carrying out these combinations\*\*.

From this point of view, it is very valuable to strengthen contact with the diplomatic and military circles of the states bordering the USSR, and to maintain contact with various anti-Soviet elements - even in peacetime.

In connection with these tasks, our intelligence agencies must be deployed not only for the purpose of collecting information about the USSR, but also from the point of view of carrying out political combinations against the USSR. From this point of view, the necessity of establishing our military organs in Rumania is acutely felt. In the sense of collecting information about the USSR, Romania is not of particular value to us, but from the point of view of carrying out a combination



It is of tremendous importance, since in the event of a Japanese-Soviet war, Rumania, together with Poland, will fetter the actions of the Red Army against us. Based on our military operational plans against the USSR, we need to know the situation in this country well and have a correct idea of the Romanian army.

#### 4. Our countermeasures against Soviet propaganda

Everyone knows that the Soviet Union and the Red Army attach tremendous importance to propaganda and, in terms of the technique of carrying it out, leave everyone behind them. Soviet propaganda against the workers of the capitalist countries is in many respects based on the true position of the

DOCUMENTATION

303

cabbage soup. Therefore, in wartime, especially if the war drags on, the influence of Soviet propaganda will take on such a scale that has not been observed in the wars that have been fought so far. We must take this circumstance very seriously.

The main problem of defense against propaganda is inextricably linked with the problem of radical reform of public policy. I refrain from discussing this subject in detail. In general, this reform should be reduced to the elimination of the defects of Western capitalism, the assimilation of the reasonable moments of socialism, in other words, to the establishment of such a system of government, which, having the imperial family in the center, will correspond to the aspirations of the whole people.

This task will face Japan not only in anticipation of a war with the USSR, but in general to ensure the stable development of the Empire in the future.

#### 5. Questions about measures for the defense of the empire

The system of measures along the line of defense of the Empire at the present moment, due to insufficient understanding on the part of the broad circles of the population of the tasks of defense, and also in connection with the economic crisis, has a number of shortcomings that require prompt elimination. Even under the condition that military expenditures be left as they were, we will need to set a certain course with a limited budget. \*Our weapons program should be reduced to one of the following two provisions\*:

1) Organization of armaments in such a way as to be ready for war at any moment; or

2) The gradual elimination of defects in the defense of the empire in order to complete the armament program of the army in 10 years.

The question is which setting should be adopted. \*If a course is taken to open war with the USSR as soon as possible, the first principle must, of course, be accepted. The second principle can be adopted if the exact date of the war with the USSR\* is not determined. We need to keep in mind that currently

either in the near future or in the near future the USSR, in the event of a war with Japan, will be deprived of the opportunity to launch military operations on a large scale.

In any case, \*training in the direction of strengthening the maneuverability of the troops and preparations for chemical warfare, which are tasks of an urgent nature\*, must begin now without any delay.

### III. THE QUESTION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF ARMAMENT OF OUR ARMY

#### 1. The principle of focusing on one of the moments of the organization and armament of the army

As has been repeatedly reported in a number of my reports, the Red Army is currently equipped with aviation, chemical weapons, machine guns, artillery and armored parts, i.e. in almost all types of weapons, surpasses the Japanese. The USSR will continue to allocate colossal sums for armaments, making efforts to steadily improve the quality of the latter, and therefore, if our army is satisfied with its present state or stops at half-hearted reforms, the difference in power between the Red Army and the Japanese will acquire enormous proportions. Achieve an advantage in all types of weapons over the Red Army, or at least

304

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

it would be very difficult to become on the same level with it, given the current military budget. \*To ensure victory over the enemy, we have only one method left: to concentrate all our attention on some one of the most important aspects of organizing the armament of the army, in order to suppress the enemy, who is superior to our army in other areas, by this superiority in one branch.

The most dangerous thing for us is the implementation of partial reforms in all areas of armaments and organization of the army, i.e. to remain behind the Red Army in all respects.

#### 2. Development of maneuvering qualities

The question of which moment in the organization of the armament of the army should be chosen as the center of attention should be carefully discussed with the relevant specialists. My personal opinion is this: \*the most important task for us is to increase the maneuverability of our troops and strengthen the maneuverable units\*. To conduct a war with the aim of completely crushing the enemy, the ability to conduct a war of maneuver is most necessary. \*The weakest point of the Red Army is the lack of sufficient maneuverability\*.

In terms of maneuverability, our infantry is the first in the world. But this maneuverable mobility is of a tactical order. From now on, we need to improve the maneuverability of the strategic order. This leads to the following key tasks:

##### 1) Organization of special military formations for maneuvering

war.

It is necessary to organize military formations with high material capabilities based on the meteorological and geographical conditions of the proposed theater of military operations. The question of whether to choose one of the following principles, or adopt both, requires further study:

a) organize special divisions with high maneuverability;

b) the organization of military formations approaching the type of motorized mechanized formations.

2) The creation of large cavalry units and the achievement of an advantage in terms of armament of our cavalry over the Red.

3) Giving the rear organs special maneuverable units.

### 3. Chemical weapons

The Soviet Union is making colossal efforts to increase chemical weapons. In addition to the special chemical troops, the regiments have chemical detachments and laboratories; the entire Red Army is entirely armed with gas masks. I have repeatedly reported on the popularization of chemical knowledge among the population and on training in chemical warfare on maneuvers, etc.

In contrast to this, the Japanese army is not only inferior in chemical weapons and training to the Red Army, it should be said that it has almost no chemical weapons. (I draw this conclusion on the basis of the reality that I saw before the business trip abroad - in what state this matter is now, I do not know.)

\*The most urgent task at the moment is to strengthen the chemical weapons of our army\*.

DOCUMENTATION \_ 305

### 4. Military aviation

Further, it is necessary to strengthen military aviation. The strengthening of aviation in the system of Soviet armaments is in the first place along with chemical weapons. "Now the USSR has 2,000 civil aviation aircraft, adapted \* in order to immediately begin performing the functions of bomb carriers in wartime.

The strengthening of aviation is carried out in such a way as to bring the number of aviation units up to 200 aviation companies.

What is the position of our military aviation? She is truly in a sorry state. In the conditions under which it is now, it is unlikely that we will be able to pursue a strategy of crushing in the war with the USSR.

\*It is necessary to increase our aviation at least to such an extent that the number of our aircraft is equal to half the aircraft of the Red Army\*.

The division of aviation into land and sea under current conditions

the limited military budget is not expedient - both from the point of view of the development of military aviation in general, and from the point of view of its use.

In the event of a war with the USSR, naval aviation, which is sufficiently strong in our country, will remain inactive. Such an order should be recognized as uneconomical and inexpedient in our empire, whose aviation is lower than the Soviet one. Proceeding from this, \*I am in favor of the unification of land and sea aviation\*. If, however, due to a number of conditions this is difficult to accomplish, it will be necessary to establish a specific plan for the use of naval aviation during the war with the USSR.

#### 5. Preparing for winter military operations

During the Sino-Japanese and Japanese-Russian wars, the winter period was regarded simply as one of the seasons of the year. But in the proposed theater of military operations - Northern Manchuria and Siberia - the winter period reaches 5 months, i.e. occupies half of the year, going beyond the concept of "season of the year." The question of the possibility or impossibility of conducting military operations in winter conditions will be of tremendous importance for the fate of the war as a whole. The Russians endure the cold extremely easily and conduct training for winter operations very intensively. It is noteworthy that an article was published in the OKDVA organ, which spoke of the insufficient preparedness of the Japanese troops for operations in the winter and the need for the Red Army to conduct training in order to use the defect of the Japanese troops.

\* Based on this, I believe that in our army it is necessary to more energetically prepare for operations in winter conditions. \*

#### 6. Creation of categories of troops

in the sense of weapons and military units, consisting in the direct jurisdiction of the high command

In view of the difficulty of carrying out a general increase in armaments in all divisions of the troops, we will need to deepen the difference between individual divisions to an even greater extent than at present in the line of organization of divisions in order to single out a number of selected ones. At the same time, it is necessary to increase artillery and mobile units, which are directly under the command of the front, in order to ensure the successful implementation of the tasks of massing troops.

306

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

### IV. QUESTION ABOUT TRAINING OUR ARMY

#### 1. Strengthening the strategic reserve troops

and training of high military command

Yielding by. the number of troops and armament of the Red Army, \*Japanese

the army surpasses it in one respect, namely, in the quality of its strategic leadership\*. We need to deepen this moment

weight.

Sufficient attention is paid in our army to the tactical training of young officers, but an in-depth study of the issues of leadership of higher military formations and training of higher command personnel has not been raised to the proper level. It is necessary to take a number of measures in the line of training of the highest command staff: training camps for officers of the general rank, their business trips, conducting maneuvers with the participation of senior officers, reorganizing the postgraduate system of military academies, holding military games on the topic: "War with the Red Army" under the personal supervision of the Chief of the General Staff (for this it will be possible to use a conference of division commanders and chiefs of staff of the latter), etc.

Further, I consider it necessary to hold special meetings of senior officers to study special problems relating to the war with the Red Army. This is especially important to carry out along the line of cavalry troops.

If carrying out these measures is impossible under the conditions of the military budget, then it will be possible to safely reduce the number of periodic general maneuvers and maneuvers for individual types of troops.

## 2. Studying the tactics of the Red Army

and the tactics to be applied against the latter by our army

The study of tactics is not carried out for theoretical research, but in order to defeat a specific enemy. Therefore, the study of tactics must always keep in mind the potential enemy. Troop training should be carried out under the slogan: "Which way to achieve victory", and the main attention in troop training should be focused on individual specific points.

The study of the tactics of the armies of the Soviet Union, which is the main probable enemy of the Japanese army and the tactics of the American army, as well as the study of the tactics of our army, against the USSR and the USA are carried out in our country only partially. Thus, the tactical training of our army is abstract, that is, figuratively speaking, it comes down to the exercises of a womanizer who wants to change all the beauties indiscriminately.

It is necessary, on the basis of clear leadership, to ensure serious military training in schools and military units.

Training maneuvers in all armies of foreign states are carried out taking into account the expected theater of operations. But we have to conduct these maneuvers inside a country whose local conditions are completely different from those of the proposed theater of operations.

In order to make up for defects in the system of our military training, it is necessary to use maps of the proposed theater of military operations in all tactical games.

The system of using geographical maps of certain regions of Japan in tactical games must be abolished.

DOCUMENTATION \_ 307

### 3. Organization of study trips to Manchuria-Mongolia

Considering that we have a large number of young officers who are unfamiliar with the topographical conditions of Manchuria, it is necessary to systematically send applicants of the 1st category of the infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineering schools to Manchuria so that they conduct tactical on-site lessons.

In case of difficulties in implementing this measure due to the limited military budget, it will be possible to find funds by reducing the number of short-term missions to Europe and America.

### 4. Studying winter time tactics

I have already spoken on this issue above. Particular attention must be paid to the training of troops in winter.

### 5. Establishment of the post of military-technical agent in the USSR

and an increase in the number of officers sent to the USSR

\*In order to intensify the study of the Red Army, it is necessary first of all to increase the number of seconded officers\* and establish the post of military-technical agent. At the present moment in our General Staff, the War Ministry, the Military Academy and officer schools there is a contingent of officials who are specially studying the Red Army. But in the Main Directorate for Military Education, which is the central headquarters for the training of our army, and in the cavalry, artillery, and engineering schools, despite the abundance of capable officers, there is not a single specialist in the study of Red Army technology.

Among the officers of the engineering troops, I can say without any exaggeration, there is not a single officer who studies the USSR. Someone may object to me, pointing out that by studying the technical level of the armies of Germany, America, France, it will be easy to work out countermeasures against the Red Army. This is true, but only in part.

The fact is that now we not only need to learn a lot from the Red Army in terms of technology, but we also need to study in detail \* the technical equipment of our potential enemy, which is superior to us in terms of weapons \*. Through this study, we must strive to establish a preponderance in some branch. There is no need to follow the example of Germany and France in everything.

\*\*Based on this, \*I consider it necessary to send officers of the technical troops to the USSR and establish the post of military-technical agent\*. If, however, this proposal is rejected on the pretext that these officials cannot be placed in the USSR, I propose that they be entrusted with the study of Red Army technology by sending them to countries bordering the USSR\*\*. (95)

## V. AIR DEFENSE

I have already spoken about the colossal efforts that the USSR is making to develop its aviation. The main reason for this forced attention to aviation is the fear that in the event of a war with Western neighbors

the latter can, on the basis of support from Britain and France, organize massive air raids on Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass and other

308

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

political and industrial centers in order to create a chaotic state in the country and paralyze the ability to wage war. These fears will remain in force in the event of a Japanese-Soviet war, only the objects of air attacks change.

In 1930, the Khabarovsk-Sakhalin air line was opened, and in 1931, the organization of the Irkutsk-Vladivostok-Kamchatka line began. When this line is finally established, Japan will find itself in the ring of Soviet air lines. Under the present conditions, aerial bombardment of the central points of Japan by Soviet territory will not pose a particular threat. In any case, the possibility of these attacks is not ruled out. But in a few years this possibility will increase significantly.

What countermeasures can we use if large detachments of enemy aircraft attack the empire with incendiary and gas bombs? We will win on the field fronts, but inside the country we will have

confusion.

At the present moment there is no need to set the task of air defense against Soviet aircraft as a matter of extreme urgency, but in the future we will not be able to ignore this issue.

At the present moment, taking into account the state of the enemy bombers and the weakness of their bases (it is unlikely that the enemy will be able to keep Vladivostok in his hands for a long time), we can limit ourselves to measures that have in mind only to prevent the confusion that could happen at the very beginning of the war as a result of an attack from Soviet territory.

At the present time in the USSR, especially in those areas that may be attacked by enemy aircraft, in addition to preparing troops to fight aircraft, training of the population is being carried out on the basis of specific air defense plans.

According to the special department

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 185. L. 15-36. Script. Typescript.

\*

On the first sheet there are handwritten marks: "From hand to hand. PB members. (every mu separately.) With the obligation to return to the PB. I. Stalin"; "Read by Voroshilov, V. Molotov, V. Kuibyshev."

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

\*\* \_ \*\* Taken in brackets, figures 2), 3) are put in the margins.

No. 296

MESSAGE A.Kh. Artuzova I.A. Akulov about the theft  
of documents from the Russian  
whites in Paris

April 7, 1932

Top secret Tov. Akulov!

In response to your assignment to verify the theft of documents from white Russians in Paris, I  
received a message from n. source:

Indeed, there was an attack during the day on the premises of Russian emigrant organizations: 1)  
the Union of Invalids, 2) the Union of Participants in the Great War. All the cupboards were broken  
into, they made a big mess and scattered the cases.

DOCUMENTATION

309

I asked the Intelligence Agency and the ECCI. Intelligence has nothing to do with this case. Tov.  
Pyatnitsky considers it unlikely that the raid was carried out by the communists. The secretary of  
the French Communist Party arrived in Moscow, with Comrade. Pyatnitsky checked.

Artuzov

APRF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 171. L. 34. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains Stalin's resolution: "To T. Akulov or Menzhinsky. This is not the response of the OGPU, but a  
shame. Whose "attack", who "cracked cabinets", who "scattered cases" - that's  
on  
what questions need to be answered. And the OGPU is silent. Stalin", as well as handwritten notes by I.A. Akulova:  
"T. Poskrebyshov 7.IV.32. I.A. Akulov.

No. 297

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THEFT AND ABUSE IN THE  
SYSTEM OF MOSKOOPKHLEB"

April 8, 1932

No. 95 p. 9. - On theft and abuse in the Moskoophleb system "(comrades Khrushchev, Agranov).

a) Propose to the Moscow City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks  
and the PGPU of the Moscow Region, Comrade Agranov, to submit to the Central Committee a short  
note on the channels through which grain is plundered, and those specific measures that must  
be taken to stop the theft of bread, and also to report on measures to



testimonies of speculators and plunderers, including guilty communists.

b) The question will be heard at the next meeting of the Politburo.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 879. L. 2. Original. Typescript.

No. 298

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"About FIRE IN THE RSFSR GOSPLAN"

April 8, 1932

No. 95, p. 12 - On the fire in the State Planning Committee of the RSFSR (PB from ZLI.32, project No. 90, p. 8) (Antipov, Agranov, Roizenman, Rogov).

a) Instruct t.t. Bulganin and Agranov to submit concrete proposals for the next meeting of the Politburo on how to ensure the protection of institutions in general, fire-fighting in particular (in particular, on weekends).

b) Instruct the OGPU within a month to check the security arrangements for military and civilian warehouses in Moscow and Leningrad and report the results of the check to the Politburo.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 879. L. 3. Original. Typescript.

310

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 299

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE WHITE GUARDS-TERRORISTS (96)

April 8, 1932

No. 95, p. 34. - Message from Comrade Balitsky.

To entrust the solution of the issue of White Guard terrorists to a commission composed of comrades. Molotov, Stalin, Voroshilov, Krylenko, Krestinsky and Balitsky. Convening a commission for Comrade Molotov.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 12. L. 83. Original. Typescript.

\*  
The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Molotov, Stalin, Voroshilov, Krylenko, Krestinsky, Balitsky.

No. 300

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON THE THEFT OF FOOD AND  
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS"

April 16, 1932

No. 96, p. 28/11 - On the theft of food and industrial goods (comrade Akulov).

a) Instruct the commissions composed of com. Vyshinsky, Krylenko, Yagoda, Akulov and Agranov to present to the Politburo a project of organizing from 5 to 10 trials in different places of the USSR, guided by the fact that - considering the organizers of the theft of bread and goods enemies of the people - to sentence them to the highest measure of punishment, especially those guilty of embezzlement by the communists.

b) The rest of the participants in these thefts throughout the USSR should be sentenced to concentration camps for long periods, and the punishment for the communists caught for theft should be increased.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 880. L. 6. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 13 February 1932.

No. 301

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON THE THEFT OF FOOD AND  
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS" (97)

April 23, 1932

No. 97, p. 17 - On the theft of food and industrial goods (PB dated 13.IV.32, pr. No. 96, p. 28/11)  
(vols. Krylenko, Yagoda, Airanov, Vyshinsky).

a) To instruct the commission to select 4 cases with capital punishment from the presented cases for trial, one case in Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov and Stalingrad.

DOCUMENTATION

311

b) Send other cases out of court.

c) Approve the verdict of the Ural Regional Court.

RGASPI. F. 17 Op. 162. D. 12. L. 107. Original. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Menzhinsky, Krylenko.

No. 302

SPECIAL REPORT TO OGLU  
ABOUT THE "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY" GROUP  
ON THE BATTLESHIP "MARAT" WITH THE APP  
PROTOCOL. INTERROGATION G.A. BAHAREVA (98)

May 30, 1932

The OGPU received a message from the Special Department of the LVO about the liquidation of the counter-revolutionary group on the battleship Marat.

Comrade Ivanov, assistant to the head of the Special Department, was sent to check intelligence data and interrogate the arrested.

Based on the materials received, the case is drawn in the following form: a counter-revolutionary grouping consisting of 3 Red Navy men took shape on the battleship Marat:

Bakharev - 24 years old, stoker, from the workers, a former member of the Komsomol;

Lebedev - 24 years old, electrician, employee, son of an accountant, member of the Komsomol;

Kochetkov - 19 years old, electrician, from the peasants, a member of the Komsomol.

The grouping set as its task the establishment of a "non-party" Soviet government, for which individual Red Navy men were recruited and an attempt was made to find some kind of counter-revolutionary organization to establish contact with it.

The Red Navy men were involved in the group: Cheburov, Bondarenko, and others. According to the testimony of those arrested, an active member of the group, Bakharev, put forward a plan for an uprising and the capture of the Marat, which, according to Bakharev, was supposed to serve as a signal for a general uprising.

Arrested Lebedev, Kochetkov, Shevchenko and others confessed. A total of 12 Red Navy men were arrested.

Investigation continues

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE OGPU V. BALITSKY

mountains Kronstadt

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

1932, May 30 days, I, pom. early 00 OGPU Davydov, and the detective of the OO OGPU MSBM Kudryavtsev interrogated Bakharev Grigory Andreevich as an accused, who, on the merits of the case, testified:

I was born in the family of a worker at the Ust-Kataevsky plant. Father, Andrei Mikhailovich Bakharev, worked there as a mechanic, assistant driver. Father died in 1928. Mother works in a guesthouse at a factory as a maid. I have one brother, older than me, Pavel Andreevich, who has been working at the same Ust-Kataevsky plant since 1927. Brother member of the CPSU (b) since 1917. Brother of the Red Partisan. I have a sister, Agafya Andreevna, who works at a factory in Ust-Kataevsk. Her husband Sukin Mikhail Ilyich holds some position in the police of the Ust-Kataevsky district, he is a communist.

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

Before being drafted into the Red Army, I worked at the same plant as a machinist, machinist, then as a mechanic until 1925, and in the same year I joined the Komsomol. In 1930, I was drafted into the ranks of the Red Army and sent to the Baltic Fleet, first to the Baltic naval crew, and two months later I was decommissioned to the battleship Marat, that is, in 1931, as a bilge engineer, and then as a stoker-fitter. In the same year, 1931, I met Tarasov, a member of the Red Navy of the battleship Marat, with whom I went to exercise together. During this time, he carried out social work and Komsomol, collected membership fees of the Komsomol of his cell. I worked like this until 1933, and then I became interested in physical education, abandoned social work, did not attend Komsomol meetings, and for this in January 1933, I was expelled from the members of the Komsomol. I looked at the exclusion like this: "I've been expelled ... I'll correct myself and I can join again." At that time I was in a good mood, there were no discontents, I served well, I had no penalties.

In February 1933, I went on a short monthly vacation home to Ust-Kataevsk, where I stayed with my brother Pavel Andreevich. After living with my brother for some time, I saw that he lives poorly, having a large family. The food was poor, the children were naked, barefoot and thin from poor nutrition. My brother has 7 children in total. I talked with other factory workers and saw for myself, heard from them about the bad life, about the poor supply of food and manufactured goods. During one of my visits to the factory, I saw a worker behind a machine faint. The people gathered, and it turned out that the worker had collapsed from malnutrition. In conversations with workers, they asked me how they live in the navy, I answered that it was good. The workers said: "But we live badly, we thought that it would be better under the Soviet regime, but for now we live poorly." I answered them: "I see for myself that you live badly, so your little brother lives just as badly, but it will get better and it will be better." Then he said: "You can't talk about your bad life on the ship, otherwise they will drag you and put you in jail for such talk." From everything I saw and heard from the workers about their life, unhealthy moods appeared in me, but I did not give myself an account of the causes of these unhealthy moods. I thought that I would come to the ship and tell about everything I saw and heard. Vacation ended in February 1933.

When he arrived on the ship, he spoke with fellow Red Navy men about the bad life of the workers, they also said that it was really bad. I asked the chief foreman V. Arno, political group leader, at political classes: "Why is there not enough food, shoes, clothes, etc." He replied that these questions did not concern the topic, and did not give any explanation. And we discussed these questions in our Red Navy environment and came to the conclusion that the difficulties we are experiencing are due to the large construction.

Shortly after my vacation, about a month later, I met Lebedev, a member of the Red Navy, to whom I told how the workers in the Urals live, and that they live badly. Lebedev told me that where he spent his holidays, the population lives just as badly. For the second time, I will meet Lebedev on the upper deck in the presence of Kochetkov. The talk was again about the shortcomings in the life of the workers. Here we all three came to the conclusion that this is all

It happens because the party line is wrong, and after that we got to talking. After that, I spoke with Lebedev several times, and he once offered me to get together and talk. We gathered in the corridor of electric wires: I, Lebedev and Kochetkov. They talked and asked questions: "a) Why is there discontent among the workers; b) why they live poorly; c) and what can be done to improve the position of the working class. Lebe

DOCUMENTATION \_ 313

Dev and Kochetkov said that all this was happening because the Party's policy was wrong, and I fully agreed with that. They said that it was necessary to identify those who were dissatisfied with the Soviet authorities, to find out the opinion of individual Red Navy men, to process them in the spirit we needed. In order to carry out the tasks of combating the wrong line of the Party, I suggested raising an uprising on the battleship Marat. During a large gathering we were to speak out and tell them that the workers are living poorly, that the policy of the Party is wrong, and that if not everyone agrees here, then we will take up arms, roll out machine guns and raise an uprising. Lebedev and Kochetkov began to object to my proposed plan of insurrection and suggested that for the time being we confine ourselves to recruiting guys into our group. Before this meeting, I spoke one on one near the fourth tower with Kochetkov, we discussed the plan of the uprising, about which he raised the question first. I asked Kochetkov: "There will be a lot of guys in our group, what will we do next?" And Kochetkov answered me: "Let's raise an uprising, we have weapons and machine guns, and, probably, there will be victims." After this meeting, I began to identify dissatisfied guys and named Tarasov, to whom I said: "Here Tarasov, the workers live poorly, the Communist Party is to blame for this. There is a group of dissatisfied guys, it includes Lebedev and Kochetkov, and would you like to take part in it. To his question about what kind of group this is, I replied that we want to change the party line, which we consider wrong. He agreed to participate and asked to show him the guys so that he would know them and not be afraid. Then one day I spoke with Tarasov and Lebedev in a club. Here again there was talk of revealing the dissatisfied. I said here: "We need to work on identifying the guys and expanding the group." The next meeting took place in the power station on the starboard side, consisting of me, Kochetkov, Lebedev and Shevchenko. At first, everyone spoke again about the difficult situation of the working class, that the wrong line of the Party was to blame for this. I raised the issue of insurrection again in response to a series of questions from the assembled guys about how to proceed. This plan was rejected again. Lebedev said: "This plan, the plan of insurrection, does not correspond to our tasks, but I do not know how to act." Kochetkov and Shevchenko confirmed this, and Lebedev suggested contacting some organization in order to get a direction, a guide to further work. Everyone agreed with his proposal, and I offered my services, saying that I had acquaintances in Leningrad who might find an organization going against the party. They didn't talk about anything else and parted ways. This meeting took place two or three days before my trip to Leningrad with Tarasov. I suggested and asked Tarasov to take one pair of black uniforms of my own from the battleship. When Tarasov asked me for what purpose, I answered him that the uniform was needed for a member of the organization with which I would be able to contact in Leningrad, and that this member would have to come to Kronstadt, establish contact with our group and tell us that do in the future. I took to Leningrad the dagger I had, which I had made myself earlier. Then I took about twenty pieces of shells from Nagan cartridges. About the purpose of the trip to Leningrad, I told Tarasov that we had a meeting of the group and that it was decided to use my trip to Leningrad to establish contact with an organization that was going against the party.

When we arrived in Leningrad, we went to my friend, the former Red Navy Pigalov, left the uniform and asked him to keep it, he also handed over the shells from the revolver, saying that when I go on vacation, I'll take them for a friend in the Urals, namely Nikita Shurupov, brother Shura

314

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

Pov, Andrei Shurupov, who lives in Leningrad, whom we visited after Pigalov. In front of Shurupov's house, I told Tarasov not to talk about the organization there, since I would personally speak on this issue. Shurupov was met on the street, and he asked us to come in later and invited me to come and spend the night. After that, they agreed with Tarasov to meet the next day at Shurupov's. Everyone went about their business. I walked the streets, went to the shops and went to spend the night with Shurupov. In the morning Tarasov came to Shurupov. We drank tea and went outside. Then I went to my friend Skribinsky, to the submarine brigade, Tarasov I don't know where, deciding to meet at Truda Square. I began to talk to Skribinsky about the plight of the working class, about the fact that there were guys at the Marat who were dissatisfied with the party line, who had come back from holidays and said that they did not live well at home. Skribinsky replied that he also had friends who were also dissatisfied with the current situation of the working class. I didn't say anything more. I went to meet with Tarasov at Labor Square, where I met Tarasov and conveyed to him the essence of the conversation with Skribinsky. I didn't tell him anything about the uprising. Then we went to the dining room, had a bite to eat, went to Okhta to see Tarasov's friend. When I visited my friend Tarasov for the second time, I told her that there were guys dissatisfied with the Soviet power in the Red Army, and asked her not to tell her husband, the Red Navy battleship "Marat" Bordenkov, because I was afraid that he might tell about it on the ship. Then I went to Shurupov, with whom I talked about the fact that people live poorly at home, that the policy of the party is wrong. Shurupov, after listening to me, said that if I had such thoughts, he would write to the military commissar. I never raised this issue with him again.

When they returned to the ship, I was late for one day, then another one, and I explained my delay to Tarasov in such a way that I saw a group of arrested OGPU workers and that I went to find out why they were arrested. But it was a lie, since I saw the arrested, but did not go anywhere to find out.

On April 27 of this year we left for Kronstadt. On the way to the ship we went to another Red Navy sailor Kuvaytsev, but he did not tell him anything about our group. The next day I saw Lebedev, and when he asked if he had contacted the organization, he replied that he had not learned anything, he scolded me. We gathered on May 1 this year, including myself, Lebedev, Tarasov, Shevchenko and Kochetkov on the upper deck. I suggested everyone go to the photo booth. When we came to the last one, someone from those present at this meeting asked me if I had found the organization and what its goals were. I replied that there is an organization, but that its goals are such that they do not meet our goals, namely, to return the king. I said all this as a blatant lie, just so as not to find myself in an awkward position in front of my group comrades, that I did not fulfill their instructions, which I undertook to fulfill myself. When I told them about the tsar, everyone began to speak against it, that our task is not to return the bourgeoisie, but to fight the party for the improvement of the life of the working class, to fight for freedom and so on. I don't remember the details. Tarasov said that something must be done, lower the water in the boiler,

and Lebedev said that it is possible to close the circuit breakers. After this meeting, at which the question of identifying the dissatisfied and processing them was also discussed again, I, having met a sailor Cheburov, with whom I began to talk, and, having found out that he was also dissatisfied with the Soviet authorities, informed him about the existing group of guys that we meet and discuss these issues. He didn't answer me and I left. Lebedev found out about this incident and scolded me for

DOCUMENTATION \_\_ 315

caution and warned me to be more careful in the future. I spoke with Lebedev and Tarasov that it would be good to recruit Kashchitsa into our group, he, in the event of an uprising, could be useful to us, since he is on the bridge, knows all the commanders in the towers. Tarasov spoke with Kashitsa, and then on May 12 or 13 I spoke with Kashitsa about the uprising and asked him if he could remove all the commanders on the bridge, if he could remove them at the time of the uprising. Then I asked if he knew the guys in the towers, if he could train them there in case the tower was captured, and if he knew how to shoot from a gun. What Kashitsa answered, I do not remember.

On May 14, we all got together: I, Lebedev, Kashitsa, Kochetkov and Shevchenko, but we could not find a suitable place, and I had to go to the upper deck, and at that time I went out for a few minutes to get my bed, and when I went out to the upper deck, then those who remained there had already finished the conversation. I saw that Kochetkov was saying something to Kashytsa, but I don't know what.

Thus, a group was created from among us, dissatisfied sailors of the Red Navy, which set itself the goal of fighting the Communist Party, and Kochetkov and I proposed to raise an uprising on the battleship as one of the means of struggle. In fact, fulfilling the task of the group to identify the dissatisfied, I found out the political moods of the Red Navy sailors Kozochkin, Dyachkov, Skribinsky and recruited Tarasov and Cheburov into the group of Red Navy sailors, of which I plead guilty. I add that I told Tarasov an obvious lie about the uniform that I took to Leningrad, I wanted to keep it with Pigalov.

I read the protocol and wrote it down correctly from my words. Bakharev.

Interrogated: pom. early 00 OGPU Davydov

Detective MSBM Kudryavtsev

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 201. L. 13-21. Script. Typescript.

ÿ303

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE FAR EASTERN TERRITORY (99)

July 16, 1932

No. 108, item 69/15. - Question DVK.

a) Draw the attention of the OGPU to the fact that the case was organized very poorly; the people selected were not properly vetted.

b) Indicate to Comrade Deribas that he personally did not pay due attention to this

important business, especially the selection and testing of people.

c) To issue a severe reprimand to Comrade Zagvozdin, as being directly responsible for the poor organization of the case.

Predetermine the recall of Comrade. Zagvozdin from Vladivostok.

d) To instruct the OGPU to strengthen the military-operational sector with personnel.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 33. Original. Typescript.

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated July 16, 1932.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Menzhinsky (Akulov)\*".

316

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 304

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT SPECULATION AND REBUYING BREAD BY PRIVATE PERSONS"

August 8, 1932

N° 111, item 51/15. — About speculation and repurchase of bread by private traders.

Propose to the OGPU within 3 days to submit to the Central Committee specific measures to combat speculation, speculators and grain dealers. (YuO)

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 52. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted at a meeting of the Politburo on 02.VIII.32.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "The extract was sent to Comrade Menzhinsky."

No. 305

MEMORIAL V.R. Menzhinsky I.V. TO STALIN ON  
THE FIGHT AGAINST HOOLIGANCY, HOMEMAILITY  
AND THEFT IN TRANSPORT (101)

August 31, 1932

No. 40466



I

With regard to the fight against hooliganism and homelessness in transport, the OGPU has done the following:

- 1. On railways and waterways, mobile and stationary brigades from the rifle guards are organized with the involvement of party members and Komsomol members - railway. workers and employees acting under the guidance of OGPU workers at individual stations, in trains, hauls, wharfs - a total of 873 teams of 3-5 people. each.
- 2. In the points most affected by hooliganism, permanent barriers were set up - 243.
- 3. Escort of passenger, fast and express trains by armed teams of NKPS and OGPU shooters has been introduced in areas most prone to hooliganism.
- 4. As part of the ongoing fight against hooliganism, a hooligan element was detained in transport - during April-August - 49,045 people, of which: April - 10,047, May - 7,287, June - 7,565, July - 9,379, August - 14,777.
- 5. Detained street children - 13.122 people.

Of which: April May  
June

July  
August

- 1.303 people
- 1.271 "
- 1.771 "
- 1.092 "
- 7.685 "

DOCUMENTATION \_

- 6. Investigative files opened - 2.573.

Of which: April - 444

May - 449

June - 418

July - 466

August - 796

317

7. Brought to trial those detained at the scene of the crime

hooligans - 3.558 people.

Of which: April

- 567

May

- 620

June

- 498

July

- 618

August

- 1255

Including 640 people arrested in August, of which: 67 people for breaking windows and throwing stones at trains, 11 people for obstructing the track, 16 people for blocking brake valves and stopping trains on the way, 16 people for inflicting beatings on train crews of 181 people, for debauchery at the station. 340 people, for other manifestations - 640 people.

8. Completed investigative cases and transferred to jurisdiction - 2.184, with a total number of accused - 3.111 people.

Of these, 407 cases were completed in August, obv. 706 people

Only 115 cases out of those transferred under jurisdiction in August were considered in courts, and the rest are at the stage of judicial consideration. Sentences were handed down in cases considered (mostly forced labor from 3 months to a year and imprisonment in a concentration camp for up to THREE years).

9. 118,085 people were fined for violating the mandatory regulations of the NKPS (minor hooligan misconduct).

Of which: April May

June

July

August

- 10.972 people per rub.		59.039
- 15.652	""	78.291
- 18.078	**	117.862
- 20.957	**	84.756
- 52.426	**	128.318

10. Fined for ticketless travel on railways and waterways - 129.054 people.

Of which: April May

June  
July  
August

- 17.860 people per rub.		109.365
- 29.274	*""	250.269
- 23.541	**	142.362
- 26.147	**	225.091
- 32.232	**	289.712

A characteristic result of the entire complex of measures taken by the OGPU to combat hooliganism and the criminal element in transport is a sharp decrease in the month of August in the number of cases of theft of luggage from passengers and pickpocketing. So, in April, 1096 cases of theft of things from passengers were registered, in May - 998, in June - 1.014, in July - 1.073, in August - 548.

318

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

II

With regard to the fight against theft of goods and luggage on the railways, the OGPU has recently done the following:

1. April 16 this year A special report drew the attention of the leadership of the NKPS to the need to strengthen the fight against theft through the NKPS, for which the latter was recommended to implement a number of specific preventive measures (fencing stations, increasing lighting, eliminating depersonalization in the area, etc.). ).

## 2. Designed:

a) order No. 36 / s dated April 23, issued with the joint signatures of the NKPS, the OGPU and the Central Committee of the railway, which (after listing the reasons contributing to theft) proposed the directors of the roads to carry out a number of organizational and technical measures to streamline operation of stations and ensuring the safety of goods.

By the same order, organized under the chairmanship of the Head. DTOOGPU and Nach. ODTOOGPU road and district commissions for cleaning the personnel of transport workers associated with commercial operations.

b) Order No. 753/624/ts of August 10, issued jointly by the OGPU and the NKPS, in which, in accordance with the resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of August 7 on the protection of property of state enterprises and institutions of public (socialist) property, roads again, a number of instructions were given to strengthen the fight against cargo theft.

On August 10, a directive was issued to the local bodies of the TOGPU on intensifying work along the Chekist line, on speeding up investigative cases, and so on.

c) Circular No. 229374 (to the directors of roads, Dorprofsozham and Head of DTOOGPU), issued with the joint signatures of the NKPS, TOOGPU and the Central Committee of the railway.

The circular stated that the orders of the People's Commissariat for Combating Theft in terms of prevention were not fulfilled on any of the roads in the network. Road directors were once again asked to implement the directives to fence stations, to increase their lighting, and so on. with the calculation of the implementation of all these activities no later than September 15th.

In view of the inoperability of the commissions to combat theft in transport, organized in December 1931 and headed by deputy directors of roads and heads of districts, these commissions were reorganized and their leadership was entrusted to the heads of the DTOOGPU and ODTOOGPU.

In recent months, the OGPU bodies have uncovered and liquidated a number of large thieves' organizations on the roads of the network, systematically engaged in the theft of luggage and cargo from wagons, station warehouses and goods yards.

## Arrested for theft

Vmaem-tse - 2.438 people, of which transport 939 hours. 1.499 people

June - 1.950	"-" - 761	"-" - 1.189	"
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July - 1.792	"-" - 676	1.116	"
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August - 2.108	"-" - 1200	"-" - 908	"
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TOTAL: 8.288 people 3.576 people 4.712 people

## Conducted investigations:

In May m-tse - 1.130

"June" -1.241

" July " - 1.357  
" august " — 892

TOTAL: 4.620 cases.

DOCUMENTATION \_ 319

According to the cases, the following were convicted:

In May, M-tse - 671 people, including transport. 233 h. 438 people

June - 963 " 325 638 "

July - 765 " 225 540 "

August - 433 " 232 201 "

TOTAL: 2832 people 1015 people 1817 people

Of those convicted in August, 43 people were sentenced to the highest measure of social protection - execution. 86 people for 10 years, 17 for 8 years, 61 for 5 years, the rest from 3 years and below.

Theft in transport in August m-tse decreased compared to previous months. If in May month 3.596 cases of theft were registered, in June month 3.688 and in July 4.202 cases, then in 29 days of August only 2.469 cases were registered, which is 58% in relation to July month.

In August, the percentage of discovered thefts also improved, reaching 44.4%, while in the period May-June it reached an average of 29%.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the punitive measures of the OGPU will not give exhaustive results in terms of eliminating theft in transport if the NKPS and the road administration do not fully implement all the necessary preventive measures developed by the OGPU and included in the orders and circulars mentioned above.

Equally necessary is the real mobilization of the general transport community in the fight against theft. Meanwhile, there are cases of the reverse order, when trade-union organizations evade active participation in the fight against embezzlement.

PREV. OGPU Menzhinsky

CA FSB RF. F. 2. Op. 10. D. 145. L. 3-7. Copy. Typescript.

No. 306

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON THE DECREE FOR  
THE PROTECTION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY" (102)

September 1, 1932

No. 114, item 2. - On the Decree for the Protection of Public Property (comrade Stalin).

Instruct the commissions as part of t.t. Akulov, Vinokurov, Vyshinsky, Bulat and Krasikov to consider specific instructions for the implementation of the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the protection of public property both through the OGPU, and through the judicial and prosecutor's offices and submit for approval to the Politburo within five days.

Convening a commission for Comrade Akulov.

APRF. f. h. Op. 57. D. 60. L. 10. Copy. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Akulov, Vinokurov, Vyshinsky, Bulat, Krasikov.

320

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 307

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE REPLACEMENT OF M.I. KALININ FOR THE TIME OF HIS  
VACATION IN THE SENTENCE COMMISSION

September 1, 1932

No. 114, p. 27. - Issues of the NKJ and OPTU (comrades Postyshev, Akulov).

a) In view of comrade Kalinin's departure on vacation, appoint comrade Yenukidze to the commission on sentences, appointing him to convene the commission.

b) In view of the departure of Comrade Shkiryatov on vacation, replace him in the commission with Comrade Akulov.

c) The question of the procedure for discussing cases related to violations of the law on the protection of public property, to be referred to the commission appointed to develop instructions for its implementation.

d) The questions submitted by the NKJ and the Supreme Court are to be referred to the commission on sentences.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 60. L. 11. Copy. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Yenukidze, Akulova, Posty Sheva."

No. 308

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE TRIP OF THE DELEGATION TO MANEUVERS IN  
GERMANY AND ON THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MILITARY ATTACHES  
AT THE EXERCISE OF THE RKKA (103)

September 8, 1932

No. 115, p. 19/3 - Question of the Revolutionary Military Council (comrade Gamarnik).

a) To approve the trip to the maneuvers in Germany for the following comrades: Tukhachevsky, Feldman, Sedyakin, Garkavy, Weiner, Klein-Burzi, Khoroshilov, Trifonov, Petkevich.

b) Agree to the admission of 6 German and 3 Italian officers to the exercises of the Red Army.

c) Do not object to the presence of foreign military attachés proposed by the RVS at the exercises of the Red Army.

RGASPI F. 17. Op. 162. D.13. L. 90. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 3.1X.32.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Ted the catch, Litvinov - everything; Hump (OGPU) - a, b.

DOCUMENTATION

321

No. 309

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE PRACTICE OF ISSUING VISAS"

] September 6, 1932

No. 116, p. 10. - On the practice of issuing visas (comrades Stomonyakov, Yagoda).

a) Propose to the OGPU to abolish the practice of restricting the entry and exit of foreigners at a certain border point. Leave such a restriction only for those cases when it is caused by special considerations of the OGPU in agreement with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

b) Propose to the OGPU to order the passage of foreigners with visas overdue by no more than 15 days.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 96. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Stomonyakov, Menzhinsky, Yagoda.

No. 310

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE APPROVAL OF "INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW ON THE PROTECTION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY"

September 16, 1932

N ° 116, p. 31/16 - Instructions for the implementation of the law on the protection of public property (PB of 8.9.32, pr. No. 115, p. 5).

a) Approve the text of the instruction of the Supreme Court of the USSR, the prosecutor of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the OGPU on the implementation of the law on the protection of public property (see Appendix).

b) 1. With the exception of the established procedure for approving sentences to capital punishment, sentences to capital punishment in cases provided for by the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated 7.8.8-32 on the protection of property and the strengthening of public (socialist) property, shall enter into force immediately upon their approval:

a) by the Supreme Courts of the Union republics - in cases heard in the republican courts;

b) the Supreme Court of the USSR in cases heard by transport courts and military tribunals;

c) Collegium of the OGPU on cases considered by the PP.

The Supreme Court of the USSR and the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics issue their decision on the approval or cancellation of sentences to capital punishment within 48 hours upon receipt of the case.

Sentences to capital punishment are carried out immediately upon receipt of a message from the Supreme Court of the USSR, the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics and the Collegium of the OGPU about their approval of the sentences.

322

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

2. To oblige the Supreme Court of the Union and the OGPU to report twice a month on the number of those involved in cases of embezzlement, as well as on the number of those convicted in these cases (indicating the measure of social protection applied).

3. Stop publishing in the newspapers reports on court hearings in cases of embezzlement and reports on sentencing.

APPENDIX to

clause 16-rs pr. PB No. 116  
dated 13.1X.32



The Supreme Court of the USSR and the Prosecutor's Office of the Supreme Court of the USSR, the People's Commissariat of Justice of the Union Republics, the chairmen of the regional (regional) courts, the regional (regional) prosecutors, the chairmen and prosecutors of the linear courts, the district prosecutors.

Chairman of the GPU of Ukraine, authorized representatives of the OGPU, DTOOGPU, heads of operational sectors.

#### INSTRUCTIONS

on the application of the resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of 7.8.32 on the protection of property of state enterprises, collective farms and cooperation

and strengthening public (socialist) property

#### Section 1

#### CRIMES COVERED BY THE LAW

dated August 7th

The law of August 7th shall be applied in case of theft of state and public property:

- a) industrial (theft of factory and factory property);
- b) state farm;
- c) state trade organizations;
- d) collective farm;
- e) cooperative;
- f) cargo on railway and water transport and local motor transport.

#### Section 2

#### CATEGORIES OF RAVERS AND THE MEASURE OF SOCIAL PROTECTION THAT SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THEM

1. In cases of organizations and groups that destroy state, public and cooperative property in an organized manner by arson, explosions and mass damage to property, apply the highest measure of social protection - SHOOTING, without indulgence.

2. With regard to kulaks, former merchants and other socially alien elements working in state (industrial and agricultural - state farms) enterprises or institutions, exposed in the theft of property or embezzlement of large sums of money of these enterprises or institutions, as well as officials state institutions and enterprises, apply capital punishment; with extenuating guilt about

statutes (in the case of single and minor theft), capital punishment shall be replaced by 10 years' imprisonment.

In case of theft, although small, committed by persons of the indicated social categories, but entailing a disruption or stoppage of the work of state enterprises (theft of parts of units and machines, deliberate destruction or damage to state farm equipment, etc.), also apply the highest measure punishment.

3. With regard to kulaks, former merchants and other socially hostile elements who have penetrated the supply, trade and cooperation agencies, as well as officials of the commodity distribution network, who have been convicted of stealing goods or selling them to the private market and embezzling large amounts of money, apply the highest measure of punishment, and only under extenuating circumstances, in cases of minor theft, capital punishment shall be replaced by ten years' imprisonment.

Subject to the same measure of punishment also speculators, although they do not directly participate in the theft, but speculate in goods and products, knowing that these goods are stolen from state institutions and cooperatives.

4. Persons found guilty of stealing goods in transport are subject to capital punishment, and only under extenuating circumstances (in isolated cases of theft or theft of minor size) can a ten-year imprisonment be applied.

If theft in transport is carried out with the participation of railway employees and workers, then the same measure of repression should be applied to them.

5. With regard to kulaks, both those who penetrated the collective farm and those who are outside the collective farm, organizing or taking part in the theft of collective farm property and grain, capital punishment is applied without easing.

leniya.

6. With regard to working individual farmers and collective farmers, convicted of stealing collective farm property and grain, ten years' imprisonment should be applied.

Under aggravating circumstances, namely: systematic theft of collective farm bread, beets and other agricultural products and livestock, theft by organized groups, theft on a large scale, theft accompanied by violent actions, terrorist acts, arson, etc., - and in relation to collective farmers and working individual farmers, capital punishment should be applied.

7. With regard to the chairmen of collective farms and members of the boards involved in the theft of state and public property, it is necessary to apply capital punishment and only under extenuating circumstances - ten years' imprisonment.

### Section 3

ABOUT THE PROCEDURE FOR REFERRAL OF CASES  
ON THEFT 1- The OGPU PP are considering:

Cases of embezzlement, accompanied by mass demonstrations, violence

natural actions, acts of terrorism, arson, etc., as well as cases involving organizational groups with a large number of arrests.

324

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

2. Considered by the relevant courts:

Cases of embezzlement in railway transport and all other cases, except for those listed in paragraph 1 of this section.

#### Section 4

ON THE SPECIAL APPLICATION OF THE DECREE OF THE CEC AND SNK

from 7.VIII.32

1. To allow the application of a measure of reprisal in cases falling under the law of August 7 in relation to crimes committed before the promulgation of the law in cases where the crimes have a public policy value.

2. Remove cases of theft of collective farm property from the jurisdiction of rural public and collective-farm comrades' courts.

Only cases of crimes against the personal property of collective farmers and individual farmers should be left in the jurisdiction of rural public and collective-farm comrades' courts.

#### Section 5

ON THE TERMS OF THE  
INVESTIGATION IN CASES OF THEFT

1. Judicial-investigative bodies are obliged to complete cases and issue a sentence on them no longer than within fifteen days from the moment the crime was discovered and the case arose.

2. As an exception, only in respect of cases involving a large number of defendants, the term for conducting the case and issuing a sentence is determined no longer than 30 days.

CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNION OF THE SSR

A. VINOKUROV DEP. PREV. O.G.P.U. I. Akulov

APRF. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 60. L. 13-19. Copy. Typescript.

Partially published: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. T. 3. S. 477-479.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "To Vinokurov (Verkhsud), Akulov - All; to all the Central Committees, regional committees, regional committees and district committees; t.t. Bulat, Pilyakovsky - p. "a".

No. 311

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE FIGHT AGAINST VIOLATIONS OF THE  
LAW IN THE SALES OF BREAD IN THE MARKETS"

September 16, 1932

No. 116, item 47/17. - On the fight against violations of the law in the sale of bread in the markets.

Approve, as amended, the text of the directive of the OGPU to the organs of the OGPU in the field  
(see appendix).

DOCUMENTATION

SECRET

325

CIRCULAR

UNITED STATE POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION for 1932

Content:

On More Resolute Measures for the Implementation of the Government Decree on the Prohibition  
of the Sale of New Harvest Bread until January 15, 1933.

ECU September 16, 1932 Gor. Moscow ALL PP  
OGPU and BEGINNING. GPU of the YAKUT ASSR

According to available information, the sale of grain and flour of the new crop is carried out in bazaars  
and markets almost everywhere, despite the government decree prohibiting the sale of new crop bread  
until January 15, 1933.

At the same time, the local bodies of the OGPU still do not conduct a sufficiently active struggle against  
this phenomenon, allowing the trade in grain and flour.

In this regard, and in the development of the circular of the OGPU No. 530 of 15 / VIII - on the resolute  
struggle against the illegal trade in grain and flour -

I ORDER:

1. To take measures to ensure that the entire rural population is actually fully informed about the  
government decree prohibiting the trade in grain before January 15, 1933, by means of announcements  
at gatherings,

sewing posters in bazaars and other public places, publications in regional newspapers, etc.

2. Stop all trade in grain and flour in the markets and bazaars.

3. Select flour and grain brought to the market for sale, and in those cases when the bread is brought by the producer himself - the collective farmer and individual farmer, count it against the plan for the procurement of the collective farm or individual farmer, ensuring that the procurement center issues receipts to him and payment of the cost of the selected grain at the procurement price, but not to allow round-ups in the markets and bazaars and the organization of barrage detachments and barriers along the roads to the bazaars.

4. The actual selection of grain and flour in the markets is carried out by the police apparatus and Zagotzerno.

5. In view of possible abuses on this ground by the grain procurement apparatus, to intensify surveillance and undercover services for its work in order to immediately stop them, drawing the perpetrators to justice.  
responsibility.

6. Specially instruct the police apparatus and Zagotzerno so that when grain and flour are taken away from the peasants in the bazaars, rudeness and arbitrariness on the part of representatives of the police and Zagotzerno is not practiced towards them. The latter are obliged to explain to the individual farmer and collective farmer that the grain is taken in accordance with the law of the Union Government, which prohibits the trade in grain before January 15, 1933.

7. To categorically prohibit the taking away at the bazaars of any other agricultural products, except for grain and flour.

8. The baked bread sold at the bazaar should not be taken away, but the sellers of large batches of baked bread should be identified and the sources of their flour supply identified.

326

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

9. About collective farmers who take flour to the market for sale, upon selection, report to the Board of collective farms for public influence on them.

As regards collective farmers caught in the repeated or systematic sale of grain, report to the Board of collective farms for bringing them to a comrades' court and imposing fines or other penalties at the disposal of the comrades' court, up to and including expulsion from the collective farm, how malicious violating the laws of Soviet power.

10. In relation to individual farmers convicted of re-selling grain and flour, impose administrative fines.

1. If grain is found from dealers-speculators, the grain is confiscated, and the perpetrators are repressed in accordance with the Government's decree and the directives of the OGPU.

Responsibility for carrying out measures to eliminate grain trade

nom and flour I lay PERSONALLY on the PP and the Head of the SPO PP OGPU.

At the same time, I consider it necessary to pay attention to the inadmissibility of excesses and distortions in the implementation of this directive.

The main blow must be directed at the class enemy, the speculator and second-hand dealer, who uses collective-farm trade for personal enrichment and disruption of grain procurements.

In this regard, one should not dissipate one's strength on trifles: the seizure of a small amount (10-15-20 pounds) of flour, in the event that this is not systematic, but a series of serious operational measures, correctly implementing the Chairman's circular OGPU No. 530, it is necessary to achieve a real cessation of trade in grain and flour before the deadline set by the Government.

Report the results to the ECU of the OGPU once a decade, indicating the measures taken, the amount of grain taken away, the number of repressed persons and their social status. (104)

ZAM. CHAIRMAN OF THE OGPU I. AKULOV

APRF. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 60. L. 25-28. Copy. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted at a meeting of the Politburo on September 15, 1932.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Menzhinsky, Akulov, Kuibyshev, Chernov.

No. 312

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION V.A. Balitsky I.V. TO STALIN ON  
THE DOCUMENTS CONFIRMED FROM H.G. RAKOVSKY

October 11, 1932

URGENTLY. OWL. SECRET

I am sending the following documents, confiscated during the search at RAKOVSKY's:  
"Back to the party program, the Soviet constitution, to Leninism." "A New Stage of Social  
Differentiation and Class Struggle in the USSR". "Two words about intra-factional disputes".

APPENDIX: Mentioned.

ZAM. PREV. OGPU Balitsky

DOCUMENTATION

327

BACK TO THE PARTY PROGRAM,

TO THE SOVIET CONSTITUTION,

LENINISM

(Our tasks)

Letter to Comrade V... .

Dear V., what do you hear? In our region, except for the terrible apathy of economic, physical, spiritual extinction, I, unfortunately, can not report anything.

First of all, about hunger. This is not an ordinary metaphor, but a fact felt at every step. We live near a canteen, and on my way to work, I pass by other canteens. And here are the facts that I witnessed every day throughout the winter until the last day of our departure for treatment.

Several thousand Cossack refugees arrived from Kazakhstan (according to official data, about 3,500). During the winter, they literally starved to death, fed on garbage and slop thrown out of the dining room. With my own eyes, I saw how the Cossack women regularly waited with buckets to receive slop from the kitchen, in which they then chose pieces of bread, vegetables and lard. Under the windows where we live, many times, until the last days, I saw how Cossack boys picked up bones. They broke them and sucked their brains out. Once I saw how three groups of Cossacks, located near the church fence, located opposite the dining room of Akorta No. 1, broke and gnawed a bunch of bones. Obviously, they came here at certain hours, because they were all armed with crowbars. In front of our house, Cossack boys were breaking bones on shoe-cleaning scrapers at the threshold of the house... I know cases when Cossacks abandoned their children. Once in the city, at the end of classes, two boys aged 3 and 5 were found, abandoned by their parents in the hope that they would be taken to homes for street children. I am aware of several other such cases. Parents, considering themselves doomed to starvation, think in this way to save at least their children. Cases of starvation in our country were not uncommon, but most often they were in Rubtsovsk, and especially in Semipalatinsk and in general in Kazakhstan. Crowds of starving Cossacks roamed all the railroads. stations of the Altai road, as well as along the main Siberian highway, especially from Novosibirsk to the Urals. These unfortunates, exhausted by hunger, who have not changed their linen for months, living at railway stations or in the working outskirts of cities in unusual crowding, 8-10 people each. in the room, were a factor in the spread of the epidemic, and in particular, typhus, which made terrible devastation among them, as well as among the local population.

The development of begging has assumed enormous proportions. Passing through the regional capital, I saw Cossack children with bags and handbags over their shoulders, stopping passers-by. I have witnessed such a scene. Near the canteen of the engineer, a group of people surrounded a baby 3-4 years old, emaciated and asleep. In front of him is a mug with several copper coins inside and a bag for bread over his shoulder. The audience loudly asks itself: is he just asleep or is he dying of hunger. Remembering the old profession, I began to feel the pulse of the child, he was in a fever, probably sick.

The situation of workers employed in production is difficult. They receive bread rations from 500 to 700 gr. There hasn't been any sugar for a long time. We have meat You can buy at the market for 6, 7 and 8 rubles. kg. Milk costs 4 r. 50 k. quarter.

Flour from 80-100 r. They buy bundles and "meadow onions", which are called "so -  
vegan meat."

In the dining room at the new construction site of the cotton mill, bread is given in the above-mentioned norms. Instead of tea, they get naked boiling water and wash it down with salt. For dinner they give stew, and sometimes a few fish. In the evening they give boiling water, an exception is made for workers who have come under contracts from collective farms, who are given stew in the evening.

Everyone lives half-starvation, but there are those who are directly starving. This applies to certain categories of employees. They bake cakes from coffee surrogates (within a few days all the coffee from the co-op shops disappeared). In agricultural artels, near the city, collective farmers received (and this was during the sowing campaign) 600 gr. black rye bread (which we all eat) and stew once a day.

On my way from Novosibirsk to the resort, I saw that at the stations they were selling some kind of herb called wild garlic (it emits a sharp smell of garlic and grows in the wild in the taiga). Someone from the outside noticed "an excellent remedy for scurvy diseases of the workers of Kuzbass." That the supply in Kuzbass has deteriorated significantly in comparison with last year, I heard about this from myself. However, this is a general phenomenon. At the resort, from the first day of our arrival, we were already hearing about "malfunctions" with food. Last year, patients spoke of the previous 1930 as a "golden age", when there was always a lot of white bread, butter, ham, sugar, cheese on the tables, and everyone could take as much as they wanted. Last year, this was no longer the case, but this year they remembered the past as a "golden age". Suffice it to say that there was no sugar at all, black and rye bread. The basis of the nutrition of the lower service personnel is porridge. A table for the sick is somewhat better, but not every day, so as not to be a witness to noisy protests.

The nutritional situation in the rest of the Union is reported to be no better. Tov. from Kursk writes that they (employees) receive rations of 100 gr. He also reports that according to the Ukrainians, the situation there is even worse. In Odessa they sold bread at the market for 14 rubles. kg. (In Novosibirsk - black 6 rubles, and white 14 rubles. kg.). People go from Ukraine... to Leningrad to buy baked bread. The fact of the failure of the sowing campaign speaks better than this information about the grave situation of Ukraine. Characteristically, this happens after a year, which, according to the newspapers, was considered fruitful in Ukraine. That the situation there is repulsive can also be judged by another fact: for a long, long time, Stanislav KOSIOR no longer comes forward with a boastful statement about the "solution" of the grain problem.

In connection with the situation in Ukraine, the following fact deserves attention. Wherever last year's harvest was better, this year's sowing campaign has failed miserably. This applies, for example, to the eastern regions of Trans-Siberia (Achinsk, etc.). Last year's grain procurements took place at the expense of food seed and fodder funds.

In one of my letters ("Control Figures of G932") I wrote something like this: "the inevitable further decline in the dead and living inventory of collective farms, the implementation of grain procurement at the expense of food, fodder and seed funds, the continuation of the predatory agronomic policy of the People's Commissariat to a large extent already predetermine dissatisfaction and future harvest. Clinical conditions can only affect the magnitude of the crop failure.

The course of the sowing campaign fully confirmed this forecast. The total sown area this year is less than last year. But that's not the point (though).



DOCUMENTATION \_ 329

given the annual population growth of 2-3 million souls, the stationary crop area already means some deficit). The bottom line is that hardly 50% of the crops were made on time. The quality of processing (with the possible exception of state farms) is even worse than last year.

It is not necessary to stop for a long time on the course of fulfilling the industrial plan in 1932: "teams are growing, while labor productivity is falling." These words best describe the state of the industry. Newspaper hype about "achievements" is no longer able to deceive anyone. However, the signaling of countless breakthroughs confirms the fact of a progressive collapse. But where statistics show growth (for example, in light industry), the figures are not trusted. Disraeli's words that there are two ways to hide the truth: direct lies and ... statistics - are applicable to our reality. Unfavorable statistics, eg. the fact that the turnover sometimes reaches 600 at enterprises is not printed. The secret of the growth of production in the systematic spoilage of goods. It has taken on the same dimensions in our country as once upon the release of metal money from bankrupt governments there was damage to money (with paper money, which made it possible to issue as many new chervonets as you think, the damage to money is called inflation). It is characteristic how the masses are ironic about our statistics. They say: "Numbers have the highest calorie content." But the main thing to note is that the attempt to cheer up the workers with the imaginary promises contained in the second five-year plan has no chance of success. As the author of the second Barnaul five-year plan, on which I worked intensively for about ten months (it was a capital investment of 1,700 million rubles), I had to attend a meeting of the industrial section of the City Council, at which one deputy (a woman, a worker, nominee) baffled the chairman, asking how things would be with the supply of workers. At the same time, she explained that the workers at the plant where she works are expressing fear that in the second five-year plan they will have to endure even greater hardships.

In fact, the working class is thinking with horror about the second five-year plan. For him, it means new unbearable sacrifices. They do not believe in assurances about the improvement of living conditions in the second five-year plan. They are called priestly preaching about the kingdom of heaven. If the Stalinist leadership had been in a position to improve the material conditions of the working class, it would have done so long ago, without waiting for the second five-year plan.

In a country where political life is stifled, where the working masses have no rights, and in a peasant country, with a population scattered over an immense territory, decay can continue for a long time, for decades and even centuries. Hundreds, thousands and millions of working people will die of hunger and epidemics, will sink into ignorance and barbarism, and at the same time a refined civilization will flourish and develop in the capitals. Protecting metropolitan workers from provincial workers not only with the best supplies, providing financially with the help of high salaries and closed distributors the bureaucratic elite and a small percentage of highly qualified workers, our leadership can arrange military and sports spectacles in Moscow, blow up monuments of obscurantism into the air with such noise and clatter, to organize trips of "noble" foreigners, surrounded by honors and attention, who will then issue him a "certificate" about the "cheerful mood" of Russian workers and peasants. And at the same time, in Ukraine, in the Urals, in Central Asia, in Zapsibir, red policemen will pick up on

corpses of those who died of starvation, eaten half by dogs in the streets.

330

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

To build up and clothe one insignificant part of the country, to build factories, roads, bridges, canals in one place, plunging the broad working masses more and more into poverty, to rebuild a couple of dozen or a dozen cities, robbing the communal funds of all the rest, drowning in diseases, rubbish and dirt, is an art as ancient as class society, and which was especially possessed by Eastern despotisms, Roman and Byzantine Caesars, the French King Sun and Napoleon II (under whom Paris was rebuilt) and Russian Tsarism .

Mastering this simple art, the Stalinist regime could have held on for decades more. But this is so only theoretically. Practically, this impossible.

The dynamism of the era of intensified class struggle, the era of revolutions and wars is such that it will raise solid old empires like feathers. This applies all the more to us, the newly formed state, which is experiencing the effect of the process of disintegration of capitalist production (the world crisis of capitalism) and is torn apart simultaneously with its inherent or artificially instilled contradictions between public and private production (city and countryside), between socialist – the premises of their state structure and the feudal-capitalist-colonial methods of the government that now exists.

The best illustration of this dynamism is the history of the first five-year plan. Doesn't take a month for our com. The chief bureaucracy would not proclaim to the working class and the peasantry some new discovery or invention on the part of saving the country. The "epoch" itself was called the era of the "great turning point". Continuity, shock work, brigade work, complete collectivization, the fight against leveling, a new calendar, monetary reform, monopoly reform, administrative reform (planning), the socialization of livestock have now been replaced by the "communist slogan": "each collective farmer has his own cow, his own small horned cattle, own bird. It has been more than a year since the Delphic orator, who named six historical conditions, plunged into deathly silence. His admirers assured him that he was thinking about what new things to say. Magic slogans and amulets have already been exhausted.

About the existence of "great" reforms in the era of the "great turning point" of the first five-year plan, the best proof is that all of them, one after another, failed miserably. The leadership itself has to either be abolished and, as is always the case with incapable and cowardly leadership, to place the blame for the failure on the executors.

We would like the question of the fate of the socialist republic to be decided by the Party, the vanguard of the revolutionary class, by its best and most conscious part, with knowledge of the matter and with a sense of the responsibility that every thoughtless step entails. But historically this path seems more and more closed. The Communist Party, the supposed vanguard of the working class, and the broad working masses are present as a dumb and stupid witness to the duel between the working masses and the rulers.

It is well known with what indignation the peasantry greeted the continuous collectivization. The Party allowed the leadership to be able and openly to deceive the country, turning indignation "into stormy enthusiasm."

When in the spring of 1932 the republic faced a kind of general strike of the peasantry—"tactical self-destruction of the peasants"—the party allowed the blame to be thrown on the "drunk with success" performers. And for three years already, although the fruits of "complete" madness are already evident, the Party allows the continuation of the same deception. This is how she got rid of herself.

#### DOCUMENTATION

331

from his post as the leader of the working masses, providing a solution to the problems of the elements.

In one letter I characterized last year's mood among the collective-farm peasantry as "passive disobedience." It is possible that this passivity was not universal. There were probably places where it actively resisted the administration's measures (and what country we are so ignorant of as our own). But after the famine, which has passed and is still going on, it is more than likely that future grain procurements will cause a transition from passive to active resistance.

However, the most symptomatic phenomenon is the mood of the working masses.

There is no doubt that at the very beginning the workers succumbed to the tempting sermon about the five-year plan. We all understood this, supported the mood that had formed in favor of the five-year plan, but warned against the centrist five-year plan. The proof was our statement of October 28, in which, although we, in the interests of maximum conciliation, avoided pointed formulations, we stressed quite clearly and distinctly that the collectivization and industrialization carried out by the bureaucracy would bring not liberation, but enslavement of the working people. the masses.

In a short time, Stalin squandered all the political capital that the announcement of the five-year plan brought him. The mood of the workers has changed radically. And 1932 brought us events that can be called a turning point in the mood of the working class.

I have in mind the event in Ivanovo-Voznesensk that arose on the basis of the famine.

Those who read with attention Yaroslavsky's article in Pravda (on the general results of the 3 emergency regional party conferences in Ivanovo-Voznesensk) could not help but be struck by the "extremeness" of the total removal of all "committees" and accusing them of inability to class sensitivity to the needs of the workers, their supply, etc.... The "extraordinary" nature of the removal was also matched by the extraordinary nature of Kaganovich's departure from Moscow at the head of a special train with bread, flour, sugar, manufactory, and so on. Pravda is silent about the reasons for all this emergency, and without any special circumstance that would make tongues loosen, it will continue to be silent in the future.

This is understandable. Description of the events that took place in Ivanovo-Voznesensk

ske, would have torn off the mask from that official lie that fills the columns of the Central Office every day. parties.

A party with three million members, candidates, trade unions with 18 million members, soviets "representing" hundreds of millions of proletarians and peasants—all this turned out to be an empty phrase, a complete illusion. Driven out of patience by hunger, the Ivanovo-Voznesensk weavers turned not to the party, but to the trade unions, neither to the soviets, nor to the party press, nor to the "leaders", but to those methods of action that had been consecrated exactly a hundred years ago by their Lyon comrades.

Hiding these events, P[olit]b[yuro] acted critically in his own way. The example is contagious, and workers from Odessa to Vladivostok would follow the example of Ivanovo-Voznesensk. But is it possible to hide such events? On the other hand, don't the same events produce the same consequences?

Against the backdrop of the economic and political collapse that has engulfed the country, numerous decrees, which have recently been baked like pancakes, are doomed, contrary to the will of the leadership, to remain liberal gestures. They only testify to the helplessness of the leadership, its impotence and its intention to carry on with the republic with "extinguished lanterns", with the help of deceit and palliatives. These decrees are just a new case to convince the working class and

332

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

the peasantry, what tricks, what casuistry the leadership has to resort to in order to conceal the truth. The explanation of the decline in grain and livestock procurements by the "successes" of collectivization, presented as a "voluntary" act of generosity on the part of the leadership, is reminiscent of the casuistry of the venerable fox with green grapes. As for collective-farm trade, its meaning is also clear. "Organizing", i.e. By purely forcing the collective farmers to sell their remnants of food at the market, the leadership is pursuing the obvious goal for everyone to transfer part of the tariffed population, including workers, to self-supply. By encouraging speculative prices, bypassing any attempt to regulate prices (the Friedrichs of our communist] Central Committee could be envied by Cobden), the leadership also acts with a certain calculation. The money earned by the peasants through the Soviet tavern (they say that vodka is already sold for 14 rubles a litre) or through the financial relay race and financial organizations should still end up in the state chest. "Kolkhozny Bazaar" is a new form of attack on the wages of the working class.

The biggest mockery, however, is the decree on the so-called. revolutionary legitimacy. The greatest discovery is that it has been in existence for ... 10 years, including, of course, recent years, when hundreds of thousands and millions of peasants, including a significant number of middle and poor peasants, were sent to houses of detention, to concentration camps to the frozen lands of the North, and when tens of thousands of workers and thousands of communists experience the sweetness of bureaucratic arbitrariness in concentration camps, isolation wards, on Solovki and in various places of exile.

Meanwhile, all these decrees, which will probably be followed by others, have their deep symptomatic significance.

First of all, they certify the so-called leadership, (the word is leadership).

child). It rushes about in all directions, tossed by the elements, and resorts to all sorts of military tricks in order to circumvent the solution of those problems that economic development and its insane adventurous historical "genline" already poses with an edge. Three years already, not to talk about what happened before, how Stalin is engaged in "seasonal liberalism" in order to ensure the sowing campaign. But by autumn, all the nuts are again tightened so that all the bones crack. But there is no such cunning who, in the end, would not fall into the traps set for others. In the game played by the Stalinist leadership with the peasantry and the working class, the former have an enormous advantage over the latter, in terms of numbers and historical past. Leadership is already limited in quantity, limited in time, and sooner or later must wear out in this unequal struggle. It becomes the plaything of the elements, and this is the greatest evil that can befall any government. We have repeatedly asserted and will repeatedly affirm that empiricism and tailism are inherent in all of Stalin's politics. It fatally confuses all questions, tightens all the knots and prepares for a catastrophe.

With that exaggerated self-esteem that characterizes people who are deprived of originality and independence of thought, his main concern is to maintain the reputation of an infallible politician. Hence the casuistry and hypocrisy inherent in the present regime, reaching perfect examples of Jesuitism.

One thing cannot be denied to Stalin and his comrades: the ability to suppress. This art they brought to virtuosity. And no wonder, since they meet no resistance in the exercise of their despotic genius. But suppression and control are not the same thing. These two arts are even in some inverse proportion. Suppression - anyone can do it

#### DOCUMENTATION \_ 333

despotic regime since classes exist. Stalin does not possess the art of governing, as the last years of autocratic Stalinist domination show. Therefore, in order to maintain his authority, both he and his supporters need to resort to Oriental means of exaggerating his past and present "merits" and organizing fair advertising around his name. The same applies to other leaders of the "Stalinist formation", whose authority must be maintained, like sick lungs with inhalations. All these leaders, including Stalin, no matter how much they display what Lenin called "ignorant self-conceit", are well aware that they can only stay in power by artificial means. Therefore, all the attention of the chief bureaucracy is focused on strengthening and increasing the apparatus and on its hierarchization and differentiation. What is new in this respect is the "grouping" of party members, the creation of cells and groups in workshops, brigades, etc., and, in accordance with this, the increase in the army of party officials by tens and hundreds of thousands at the expense of the economy or directly at the expense of the budget.

With the apparatus in his hands, Stalin thinks that he can continue to force the entire state, all classes, to revolve around the bureaucracy, like the earth around its axis. He expects that, having an apparatus and adapting to changing circumstances, reincarnating Robespierre, Barras and Bonaparte, to keep power in his hands. The communist bureaucracy, in turn, will support him as long as he ensures their irremovability. This is the "social contract" that is laid at the foundation of our state and in its bureaucratic stage.

But the growth of the bureaucracy will only deepen the gulf between the Soviet state and the working masses. The bureaucracy, ousting the producers-workers and peasants, is turning into the alpha and omega of our entire economic,

political and spiritual life.

I have repeatedly pointed out in my letters that it would be a big theoretical mistake to draw an analogy between our bureaucracy and the bureaucracy of capitalist or absolutist states. In our country, it is not only an administrative body, not a steward, which, under certain historical conditions, when the class struggle is lowered (and classes are neutralized) acquires an independent role (this is only under absolutist regimes), but something more - it is an economic subject. ect, it determines the relations between classes, it replaces the classes themselves, the determination of the size of profits and wages depends on it, it determines fixed prices, all kinds of grain procurements, it holds in its hands the entire spiritual life of the country.

Our bureaucracy is a specific historical product that has grown up on the basis of the nationalization of the economy (nationalization of the instruments of production, etc.) while eliminating the actual, of course (for things are normal otherwise) from the political power of the working masses and reducing them to some kind of props, and, along with with them, on the basis of monstrous administrative centralization and hierarchization. Therefore, the (communist) bureaucracy cannot be imagined outside the Soviet state economy, which absorbed all individual initiatives. It turns out something like a state, according to Hegel, which is also the self-embodiment of abstract "moral ideas" and considers citizens as its tools. Instead of the bureaucracy serving living people and the collective, the productive forces of the classes, on the contrary, the latter serve this venerable Lady. She is everywhere present and omniscient. Party, trade unions, cooperation, collective farms, industry, industrial cooperation, Avtodor, Osoaviakhim, Comintern, MOPR, etc., etc. - these are all reincarnations, pseudonyms of the same bureaucrat

334

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

tic apparatus. Masses of millions are pawns, performers, extras, choir and sewer. The bureaucratic system has killed the initiative of the working people, depersonalized the communists, stifled free creativity, bred medieval scholasticism, sycophancy and carrion in schools, in science, in literature and art. The Stalinist regime, engendered by bureaucratization, being the best embodiment of the apparatus, carries with it a curse - to increase and multiply further and further, more and more this bureaucracy, to lower and lower the economic, political and spiritual level of the country.

When this bureaucracy—civilian, economic, military—feels that the ground is shaking under its feet, it will succumb to panic. Out of this bureaucratic swamp will emerge the Thermidorians and pure Bonapartists, the Talleyrands and Fouches, who will betray their "leader".

The Ivanovo-Voznesensk events testify to the activation of the working masses, which will inevitably cause the activation of the peasantry, among which the discontent is even stronger. And since the general situation of the country is progressively worsening, we can assume that a crisis of Soviet power itself will come.

Because the party has lost the confidence of the masses, because it is no longer a leader

leads, but only orders, since all communist criticism is suppressed, since trade unions and soviets are a fiction, thereby closing all legitimate, legal ways out of the crisis, thereby Stalin's policy increases the chances of underground counter-revolutionary organizations.

The various communist factions themselves withdrew from the struggle. The same thing happened with a significant part of the headquarters of our own faction, which all the "leaders" sold, and sold for lentil stew, for family comfort, for bourgeois prosperity.

The masses who subjectively remained loyal to Soviet power and the socialist institutions created by the October Revolution, and who fight only against bureaucratic perversions, may, against their will, find themselves under the leadership of a white or reformist counter-revolution. They will follow those who will give them slogans, albeit ridiculed, who will give them an example and lead them to fight and to heroic deeds. It is symptomatic to note the report of one comrade that the number of Mensheviks in exile is growing, especially among the Menshevik youth.

This circumstance shows the seriousness and tension of the situation and obliges not only all Bolsheviks to unite their forces, but also all revolutionary communists to contact their actions.

To oppose the Mensheviks and counter-revolutionaries of all stripes, to organize and lead the discontent of the working masses, directing it into a Soviet and communist channel, can only be a revolutionary proletarian vanguard, which is the opposition of the Bolshevik-Leninists. Whether they like it or not, events force the b/l to take on this role in order to save the October Revolution from the inevitable death that the Stalinist leadership is preparing for it.

In the coming battle between the defenders of October and its opponents, the trend that will clearly and distinctly indicate the causes that caused the crisis and the way out of it will win.

APRF. F. 3. Op.'24. D. 139. L. 35-52. Script. Typescript.

\*

On the first sheet there are Stalin's handwritten notes: "To the archive"; "Ha ha ha. Balbes. On the second sheet there is Stalin's handwritten note: "Old blockhead. I. Stalin.

DOCUMENTATION

335

No. 313

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT MAKOVSKY" (105)

November 13, 1932

No. 122, item 8. - About Makovsky (PB dated 16.9.32, project No. 116, item 11) (comrades Postyshev, Yaroslavsky, Yagoda).

Adopt the draft resolution submitted by comrade t. Postyshev and Yaroslavsky (see appendix).

APPENDIX to  
clause 8 (o.p.) pr. PB No. 122

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) dated 13/XI.32

IN THE CASE OF MAKOVSKY

1. Recognize the accusations of bribery, embezzlement, espionage against Comrade A. L. Makovsky as unfounded, and consider him rehabilitated in the case initiated against him.
2. Blame Comrade Makovsky for showing inadmissible trust in a number of people who do not deserve this trust in his work abroad, and insufficiently controlling their work (Illukhhalter, Ginis, etc.), an example of which is the involvement of them in work engineer Ginis (to which Comrade Begge gave wrong consent) already after Ginis, who later turned out to be a defector, aroused suspicion and was fired from his job.

Stating that precisely for this, according to Comrade Roizenman's report back in 1927, a Party penalty was imposed on Comrade Makovsky, and on the basis of the decision of the Central Control Commission-RCI dated June 9, 27, Makovsky was recalled from work abroad, to consider the question settled by this party penalty.

3. Restore Comrade Makovsky A.L. in the ranks of the CPSU (b).
4. Propose to the Distribution Department of the Central Committee to immediately send comrade. Makovsky A.L. for a job in the specialty (wallet engineer).
5. Propose to the OGPU that immediately return Comrade Makovsky his apartment, his personal money confiscated from him and the proceeds from the sale of his belongings.
6. To draw the attention of the Collegium of the OGPU to the fact that the incorrect conduct of the case of Comrade Makovsky and the unacceptable methods of interrogation characterize the lack of control of the members of the Collegium of the OGPU over the conduct of the case in general, and in particular in relation to the communists. Also draw the attention of the OGPU Collegium to the fact that Comrade Makovsky's complaint to the OGPU Collegium and the sending of a copy of this complaint to the Central Control Commission about illegal methods of investigation were not allowed.
7. Propose to the OGPU to bring to trial the investigators in the case of comrade AL Makovsky: Ivanov (former member of the CPSU (b)), Davydov and Derzhavich (members of the Komsomol) and Denotkin. Report the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the measures of punishment to the Collegium of the OGPU.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 1, 10. Original. Typescript.

\*  
The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: T.t. Menzhinsky, Yaroslavsky - all; Makovsky - 1-4, Yezhov - 4.



No. 314

COVERING NOTE I.V. STALIN TO MEMBERS AND  
CANDIDATES TO MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

WITH APPENDIX EXTRACT FROM THE PROTOCOL OF THE INTERROGATION  
OF THE ACCOUNTANT OF THE COLLEGE FARM "ZAVET ILYICH"

November 15, 1932

No. P 4645

To members and candidates of the Politburo: vols. Andreev, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Kalinin, Kirov, Kosior  
St., Kuibyshev, Mikoyan, Molotov, Ordzhonikidze, Petrovsky, Stalin, Chubar etc. Rudzutaku, Postyshev

I am sending out the minutes of the interrogation of the accountant (accountant) of the Zavet Ilyich collective farm, citizen Perov, as one of many documents demonstrating the organized plunder of the collective farm goods and the organized deception of the state by anti-social elements of the collective farm movement in the absence of Bolshevik leadership on the part of party organizations. (106)

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party  
of Bolsheviks Stalin Protocol of interrogation\*

In the autumn of last year, 1931, plowing and sowing were very poor. The plowing was shallow, late, with a lot of flaws, there was a lot of manual sowing, they even sowed under the razor, sowed with their hands by lanterns, sowing went right down to the snow. Everyone, and first of all the management of the collective farm (then we had a single collective farm "Bolshevik" in the village), knew well and said that such sowing was wasted and would not give results. There was widespread talk among the collective farmers that it was impossible to sow in this way, that only grain and labor were wasted. Much was sown on uncultivated areas. In order to free the area, they burned corn, sunflower, peas, despite the fact that from these areas it was possible to collect, for example, corn centners up to 10 centners per hectare. Peas burned up to 300 hectares ...

During sowing, a lot of grain was stolen. There were a number of such cases. For example, a cartload of grain was stolen in the 5th yard. Despite the fact that the norm was often not sown in the reporting, the established norm was always shown ...

In the spring, when seedlings appeared, the village expert commission determined that 25 hectares were completely dead, 255 hectares were thinned by 70%. At the end, an extended commission inspected the fields and found that out of these 255 hectares, 212 hectares were 100% dead (they began to be cut for hay). Then the rains came, the wheat began to rise in this area, they stopped mowing, and here the wheat began to grow and became suitable for harvesting, like the rest. This area was more than 100 hectares. This area has not been shown anywhere. She did not appear in the yield sheets and reports and was listed as dead. The reports included 1285 hectares, for which all harvesting plans were drawn up. This figure was also used as a starting point for the grain procurement plan. In fact, they removed more than 1,400 hectares ...

When harvested, this area of more than 100 hectares yielded about the same (perhaps a little less than the rest). We counted around, approximately 3 centners per hectare. Thus, from this area (more than 100 hectares), over 300 centners of grain after threshing went into the total amount of grain and remained on the collective farm. The plan proceeded from the sowing areas shown

less. No orders to report these 100 s

DOCUMENTATION

337

extra ha, I did not receive. When the grain procurement plan was received on our collective farm, the chairman of the collective farm, Shustov, and the secretary of the cell, Lysenko, said several times to each other in my presence and to me that the plan was very large, difficult, and unrealistic. Both Shustov and Lysenko told me: "We don't know what to do, they will take away all the bread from us, there will be nothing to eat, just run away somewhere." Both Lysenko and Shustov told me that I needed to somehow get out of the situation. One day at the beginning of August (just at that time there was pressure on grain procurements, and little grain was threshed) Lysenko and Shustov arrived from the field (they were at the threshing machine, mowing). They told me that now, perhaps, we would somehow live, since our grain would be more. They told me that now there would be more grain of the second grade (the machinist Svetlichny, his "grandfather", changed the sieves, now more of the second grade will go).

The second grade of grain was not taken into harvest, representatives of the Stansoviet and the district committee often came to check it, they did not pay attention to the second grade. The second grade is littered with sow thistle heads and burdocks, which, being lighter, are at the top ...

Since that time, when threshing, they began to let more grain into the 2nd grade. This 2nd grade was in some cases even better than the first, the grain was larger there. I saw this grain of the 2nd grade, if this 2nd grade is passed through a good cleaning, then another 50 percent of pure grain can be sorted out. Both Lysenko and Shustov said that among this grain there is one that can be sown no worse than the first grade ...

At the beginning of July, we threshed raw bread (for food). 30-40 percent of the grain remained in the straw. This straw is stacked in stacks and taken into account by the field grower as subject to repeated threshing. She is not registered with the accounting department. I know that in one place 32 hectares of such straw are scattered.

On August 20, we had a 15 percent in-kind payment of our income. According to the last order of the district collective farm union, we had to give out 420 grams per workday. They gave out 600 grams. Shustov and I believed that we could do this because our output rate was higher than in other collective farms, and that by doing so we would increase the efficiency of the collective farmers. For example, I know that on collective farm No. 6 "Bolshevik" 430 workdays were charged for processing beets with an area of 16 hectares, while in our country 262 workdays were charged for the same area ...

In August of this year, Shustov and I wanted to meet in Krasnodar and talk to Comrade. Starshinov, ex. partisan, member of the CPSU (b), former. Chekist (we grew up with him) about the state of the collective farm. Shustov wanted to tell him about his actions with grain of the 2nd grade, the issuance of increased norms, and generally consult with him, since Shustov knew that these actions were illegal and even said: "We'll have to sit for this business." But tov. We did not find Starshinov.

Written down from my words correctly, and read to me on November 7, 1932. Dmitry Perov. Gor. Krasnodar.

Interrogated assistant chief. OO OGPU Nikolaev.

I add: in my opinion, Shustov went to these illegal acts because he was afraid that the collective farmers might disperse and the collective farm would fall apart. He himself said several times about this that he would have to answer for this. 7.XI.32

APRF. f. h, Op. 57. D. 60. L. 29-34. Script. Typescript.

\* Perov Dmitry Nikanorovich, born in 1898, was born in the Tambov province, lived in stanitsa Novotatarovskaya of the Krasnodar region of the SKK, accountant of the collective farm "Zavet Ilyich".

338

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 315

NOTE G.G. BERRIES I.V. STALIN

ON THE EVICTION OF PEASANT FAMILIES FROM THE KUBAN REGIONS

November 23, 1932

No. 40636

In the resolution approved by the Politburo, Sev. The Caucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of 20 XI-32 on the eviction from the Kuban of 2000 families indicates in paragraph 4 that the evicted are divided into two groups:

1. A group of prosperous kulak families evicted according to the rules approved for the eviction of kulak farms (in the second category) and
2. a group of individual farms, resettled and not deprived of civil rights.

The organization of both these groups in the places of their new settlement is entrusted to the OGPU. Meanwhile, the OGPU can accept as special settlers, subject to arrangement and maintenance under a special regime, only the first group of kulak-prosperous families deprived of voting rights.

With regard to the second \*group of families of individual farmers who are resettled from the Kuban, but not deprived of their voting rights, the OGPU can only take upon themselves their removal, transportation and delivery to the points of their new resettlement \*.

The assignment of these points, as well as the further organization of these families, should be entrusted to the land management and geodesy department of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR.

I ask you to make the following change to paragraph 4 of the PB resolution. dated 20.XI p. d.: to oblige the Land Management Department of the NKZem of the USSR to allocate areas and land plots for individual farmers resettled from the Kuban, obliging the OGPU to withdraw this contingent and deliver it to the places allotted by the Land Management Department of the NKZem.

ZAM. PREV. OGPU Yagoda  
APRF. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 196. L. 101. Original. Typescript.

\*  
On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "To Kaganovich for a review. Stalin."  
\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 316

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON MEASURES TO COMBAT THE  
THEFT OF PRODUCED GOLD"

November 25, 1932

No. 123, p. 6. - On measures to combat the theft of mined gold. (PB dated 23.X.32, pr. No. 120, p. 25, from appendix p. 6.) (comrade Serebrovsky).

To approve the draft resolution on the issue of measures to combat the theft of gold, submitted by comrade Serebrovsky and Mironov (see Appendix).

DOCUMENTATION

339

APPLICATION

to item 6, pr. IIB No. 123

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) dated 25.XI.32

ON THE QUESTION OF THE FIGHT AGAINST THE THEFT OF GOLD

1. Propose to the regional committees of gold-mining regions to oblige party and trade union organizations to carry out systematic explanatory work to combat the theft and concealment of gold and platinum.

2. Propose to the NKJ to develop an additional law to combat the theft of gold and platinum based on the following provisions:

a) all forms of theft and concealment during the shooting and washing of gold and platinum shall be punished in accordance with the law of 7.VIII.32;

b) in order to involve the broad masses of workers in the detection and prevention of the theft of gold and platinum at enterprises, reward those who warned about the theft in the amount of 33% of the amount detained or discovered;

c) persons who are aware of the theft of gold and platinum and who have not reported this to the administration of the enterprise or state bodies. authorities, be considered as accomplices in this crime with all the ensuing consequences.

3. To instruct the organs of the GPU to liquidate the trade in narcotic substances in the zone of location of gold-platinum mines and mines.

Guilty of selling opium, cocaine, as well as the owners of secret smoking dens, to be brought to justice under Art. 59 p. 9 of the Criminal Code.

4. Approve the instructions for organizing the fight against theft of metal in all processes of mining and processing of ore and sand and propose that the NKTP oblige all associations and trusts that operate and explore gold-platinum deposits to apply it.

5. Oblige Glavtsvetmetzoloto, associations and trusts to ensure that on the basis of the general instructions for combating metal theft in all processes of mining and processing of ore and sand, special workshop instructions for organizing the fight against metal theft for each individual mine are drawn up on the spot. - mine, factory, etc.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 60. L. 41, 42. Copy. Typescript.

No. 317

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE PASSPORT SYSTEM AND UNLOADING CITIES  
FROM EXCESSIVE ELEMENTS"

November 25, 1932

No. 123, paragraph  
34/10 elements.

About the passport system and

the narrowness of cities from unnecessary

In view of the unloading of Moscow and Leningrad and other large urban centers of the USSR from unnecessary institutions not connected with production and work, as well as from kulak, criminal and other antisocial elements hiding in the cities, it is necessary to recognize as necessary:

1. Introduce a unified passport system for the USSR with the abolition of all other types of certificates issued by this or that organization and which until now gave the right to registration in cities.

340

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

2. Organize, primarily in Moscow and Leningrad, an apparatus for recording and registering the population and regulating entry and exit.

3. To develop specific measures, both legislative and organizational and practical, to create a commission consisting of: vol. Balits

cue (chairman), Agranov, Usov, Bulganin, Kadatsky, Medved, Redens, Kuzoyatov (Kharkov), Akulov, Grossman, Ananchenko (Donbass), Yakimovich (NKZem).

The term of work is \* 2 decades. First report to the Politburo on 25 November.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 175. L. 9. Copy. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 15.XI.32.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Balitsky, Agranov, Usov, Bulganin, Kadatsky, Medved, Redens, Kuzoyatov, Akulov, Grossman, Ananchenko, Yakimovich.

No. 318

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE EVICTION OF KULAK FAMILIES

November 25, 1932

N° 123, item 67/43. - Question of the Sevkavkraikom.

Accept offer t.t. Sheboldaev and Kaganovich about the eviction from the regions of the Kuban in a two-decade period of 2 thousand prosperous kulak families, maliciously disrupting sowing. The areas of resettlement shall be determined jointly by the Sevkavkraikomu and the OGPU.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 16. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on November 21, 1932.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Kagano vich; OGPU - Yagoda; Sheboldaev - in cipher.

No. 319

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE SPECIALLY AUTHORIZED OGPU IN UKRAINE" (107)

November 25, 1932

No. 123, item 83/59. - About the specially authorized OGPU in Ukraine.

In view of the special state importance of the rapid improvement of the work of the OGPU bodies in Ukraine and in view of the fact that Comrade Balitsky has extensive experience in Ukrainian work, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decides: to propose to the OGPU to send, as a special representative of the OGPU in Ukraine, for a period of 6 months, the deputy chairman of the OGPU, comrade Balitsky with the subordination of the PG of the OGPU of Ukraine Comrade Redens and the entire apparatus of the OGPU of Ukraine to him, obliging Comrade Balitsky to submit to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks a brief report on the work of the organs of the OGPU of Ukraine every two decades.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 907. L. 20. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 24.XI.32.

DOCUMENTATION \_ 341

No. 320

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION G.E. PROKOFIEV AND L.G.  
MIRONOVA I.V. TO STALIN ON THE "DIVERSION" ORGANIZATION

November 26, 1932

No. 40641

OWL. SECRET

\* As a result of a long-term intelligence development of the ECU OGPU, a large espionage and sabotage organization of the Japanese General Staff was uncovered, which, according to all data, is the central illegal apparatus of the Japanese on the territory of the Union \*.

25 people were arrested - members of the organization, formerly former. white officers, ex. merchants, former fists, etc.; 11 of them have already confessed to espionage and sabotage activities, including the head of the organization MOLGACHEV.

The organization was directly led by the Japanese consuls in Vladivostok - at first by the consul WATANABE, and then by YAMAGUTSCI and a military agent in Sakhalin - KUMAZAVA, as well as by the head of the 2nd Department of the Japanese General Staff - Colonel KANDA MASATANE.

The organization acted under the flag of the private construction office of the inventor MOLGACHEV for the mechanization of labor-intensive processes, concluding agreements with economic agencies for the installation of overhead roads, laying routes and clearings in close proximity to the borders. According to a preliminary estimate, the head of the organization, MOLGACHEV, concluded contracts worth up to 150 million rubles. Contracts have been completed by 15-20%\*.

The organization spread its work along almost the entire Manchurian border, in the border zone of Kazakhstan, to the cities: Leningrad, Moscow, Astrakhan, Baku, Maikop, the Kuzbass region, part of Ukraine, and also to a number of regions near the Polish border. The Far East was the central springboard for the organization's activities, where 21 points were covered by espionage and sabotage activities.

The work of the organization is an important component of the Japanese plans for preparing an intervention against the Union and was supposed to directly ensure the implementation of the widely conceived strategic plan for the attack of Japanese troops on the Soviet Far East from 3 regions: South Sakhalin, North Korea and northern Manchuria.

The organization's sabotage plan of action included the destruction of railways and bridges, in particular bridges of the largest strategic importance: the Amur bridge, the Zeya bridge, the Ussuri bridge, the Bureya bridge over the Lavukha river, and the bridge over the Rakovka river. Tunnels were scheduled for destruction in the Vladivostok region, Dalzavod with docks, port facilities

zheniya, airfield, power plants of Vladivostok, radio stations.

'At the opening of hostilities, the saboteurs had direct instructions to cut off all communication between Vladivostok and Khabarovsk and other points\*.

Members of the organization carried out two acts of sabotage: the arson in 1929 of the warehouses of the State Fisheries Trust in Vladivostok and the arson in 1930 of a large warehouse of machine parts of the State Shipping Company in the mountains. Blagoveshchensk on the Amur, which caused millions of losses.

These acts were carried out in the form of a trial test to determine the effectiveness of the grassroots cell of the organization and to check whether acts of sabotage could be carried out with impunity.

342

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

The members of the organization carried out on the widest scale, on the direct orders of the Japanese General Staff, military, political and economic espionage, directly related to the preparation of Japan's military measures against the USSR. \* The members of the organization obtained and handed over to the Japanese top secret geographical maps (one-size, two-size) of border regions. On the orders of the Japanese, topographic surveys of the most important strategic points were made, maps of the largest industrial points were drawn up, with factories, docks, and ports located nearby \*. Members of the organization photographed bridges and structures of military importance. The organization widely collected information about the political mood of the workers, about the situation of special settlers, the food situation, the situation with salaries, information about the horse composition, meat and draft livestock, about the security of enterprises of defense importance with metal, the progress of the implementation of the industrial financial plan at enterprises of military importance. .

In addition, under the pretext of carrying out construction work for economic agencies, the organization carried out the laying of routes, the construction of clearings in the border areas, which made a number of important strategic points passable for the Japanese troops (the areas of Sidimi, Surazhevka, Grodekovo, etc.).

An examination of the information transmitted by the members of the organization to the Japanese by the Headquarters of the Red Army established that the espionage carried out by the organization caused enormous damage to the defense of the Far East, and the implementation of the sabotage plan should have created exceptional difficulties in repelling the attack of the Japanese troops.

In addition, the Headquarters of the Red Army pointed to the coincidence with its data of the testimony of the accused about the main directions of movement of Japanese troops in the Far East at the start of hostilities in the USSR.

Here are excerpts from the examination of the Headquarters of the Red Army:

"The nature of the materials already handed over to the Japanese on the Surazhevka area - the city of Svobodny of the Ussuri railway. and prepared acts of sabotage in this area is of exceptional military importance in the defense of the Far East for us, since with the Japanese reaching Tikhonkaya along the Sungari, the act of sabotage secures the left flank of the active troops on communications



Songhua. The explosion of the greatest Amur bridge in the USSR near Khabarovsk creates extreme difficulties in the operations of the Red Army.

And further: "The plan of the espionage and sabotage organization for the DVK was developed in such a way that its execution puts D.V. The region, thanks to its geographical features, in its greater part (Ussuri region, part of the Amur region and northern Sakhalin) is in the position of military booty for the Japanese.

The investigation continues at a brisk pace.

At the same time, information about the arrested 1 is attached.

ZAM. PREV. OGPU PROKOFIEV  
BEGINNING. ECU OGPU MIRONOV

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 240. L. 141-144. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first page there are Stalin's handwritten notes: "To Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Gamarnik, Postyshev (to all these comrades personally). I. Stalin"; "Besides, let Karakhan read it."

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

1 The application is not published.

DOCUMENTATION

343

No. 321

NOTE V.R. Menzhinsky I.V. STALIN  
WITH APPENDIX A REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF THE  
FIGHT AGAINST HOOLIGANCY AND THEFT IN TRANSPORT

December 4, 1932

No. 40648

While sending a report to Comrade. PROKHOROV on the results of the fight against hooliganism and theft in transport for the period September-November 1932, the OGPU notes the beginning of a decrease in hooligan-gangster phenomena in transport, as well as theft.

At the same time, the OGPU believes that in order to eradicate hooliganism in transport and consolidate the results achieved, it is necessary to continue the ongoing intensified fight against hooliganism. In this regard, it is also necessary to extend the emergency powers of the OGPU for extrajudicial reprisal against a declassed hooligan-gangster element for another December, January and February.

PREV. OGPU Menzhinsky

PREV. OGPU comrade. MENZHINSKY

REPORT

On the results of the fight against hooliganism and theft in transport for the period from 1/IX to 25/XI, 1932

I

During the reporting period of the fight against hooliganism in transport, the following work was done:

1. Arrested for hooliganism 8439 people.
2. Investigative cases filed 4884.
3. Convicted (for a term of at least three years) 2092 people, including 361 to death and 88 to 10 years.

Cases against those accused of hooliganism are sent, as a rule, to the social-comradely courts, and only if there are appropriate decisions of the latter are they transferred to criminal proceedings. A total of 1,106 cases against 1,826 defendants were sent to the social comradely courts during the reporting period.

As a very important preventive measure to combat hooliganism, the removal of a socially dangerous and homeless element from the territory of transport is used. In total, during the reporting period, 36,887 people were seized and sent to forced labor, of which 6,000 were sent to camps.

As a result of all these measures, in November, there was a significant change in the direction of reducing the number of cases of hooliganism in transport. While 4434 cases of hooliganism were registered in October, only 1901 cases were registered in 25 days of November.

As a by-product of the main operational measures to combat hooliganism, one should point to the number of people fined for violating the rules of the NKPS and for traveling without a ticket. In total, 593,867 people were fined during the reporting period. for 3749395 rubles.

344

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

II

The following results were achieved in the fight against theft in transport during the reporting period:

1. Arrested for theft 3224 people.
2. Completed investigation cases 1438.

3. Convicted 3460 people. (including those arrested in August), including 736 people to be shot. And for 10 years - 1318 people.

The number of thefts for two and a half decades of November was registered 1132, i.e. 40% less than for the same period in September (1875).

BEGINNING TO OGPU PROKHOROV

CA FSB RF. F. 2. Op. 10. D. 21. L. 406-408. Copy. Typescript.

No. 322

MATERIALS ON THE PROGRESS OF THE INVESTIGATION  
IN THE CASE OF RESISTANCE TO GRAIN  
PROCUREMENTS IN OREKHOVSKY DISTRICT IN UKRAINE

December 7, 1932

No. P4731  
SECRET

TO ALL MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES OF THE CC AND CCC, TO ALL SECRETARIES  
OF OBCOMMS, TERRITORIAL COMMISSIONS, NAT. CC, TO ALL SECRETARIES OF  
THE RAYKOV AND ALL PRERIANS, TO ALL PARTY MEMBERS OF THE BOARD

People's Commissariat of the USSR

For information, investigative materials on the sabotage of grain procurements in the Orekhovsky region of Ukraine, sent to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks by the chairman of the GPU of Ukraine, Comrade. Redens. Since these materials are characteristic of a significant part of the regions of the Soviet Union, it would be necessary, in my opinion, to pay special attention to them. The materials once again show that the organizers of sabotage are in most cases "communists", i.e. people who have a party card in their pocket, but have long since been reborn and have broken with the party in practice. These are the same Party deceivers and swindlers who skilfully carry out the kulak policy under the flag of their "agreement" with the general line of the Party.

Here is what Lenin says about such crooks and deceivers:

"Workers and peasants, toilers and exploited! Land, banks, factories, plants have become the property of the whole people! Take charge of accounting and control of the production and distribution of products yourself—this, and this alone, is the path to the victory of socialism, the guarantee of victory over all exploitation, over all want and poverty! For in Russia there will be enough grain, iron, timber, wool, cotton and flax for everyone, if only to correctly distribute labor and products, if only to establish nationwide practical, practical control over this distribution, if only to win not only in politics, but also in the daily economic life of the enemies of the people: the rich, their hangers-on, then swindlers, parasites and hooligans.

"No mercy for these enemies of the people, the enemies of socialism, the enemies of the working people! A life-and-death war against the rich and their hangers-on, bourgeois intellectuals, a war against crooks, parasites and hooligans.

DOCUMENTATION

"The rich and the crooks, these are two sides of the same coin, these are the two main categories of parasites nourished by capitalism, these are the main enemies of socialism, these enemies must be placed under the special supervision of the entire population, they must be dealt with, at the slightest violation of the rules by them. and the laws of socialist society, mercilessly. Any weakness, any hesitation, any sentimentality in this respect would be the greatest crime against socialism" (Lenin, vol. XXII, p. 164. — "How to organize competition").

Since an enemy with a party card in his pocket must be punished more severely than an enemy without a party card, then people like Golovin (former secretary of the Orekhov district committee), Palamarchuk (former chairman of Rick), Lutsenko, Ordelyan, Prigoda and others should immediately arrest and reward them according to their deserts, i.e. give them 5 to 10 years in prison each.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I. Stalin

I am sending a copy of the materials of the investigation in the case of resistance to grain procurements in the Orekhovsky district.

The former was arrested in this case. Chairman of the District Kolkhoz Union Prigoda.

Redens

TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CC CP(b)U Comrade KOSIOR

In the Orekhovsky district, Dnepropetrovsk region, the GPU is investigating opposition to grain procurements on the part of the boards of a number of collective farms.

The investigation establishes that the district leadership, represented by the secretary of the PKK Golovin, prev. RICK Palamarchuk, prev. RKS Prigody, head. Rayza Lutsenko, pres. KK Ordelyan and others instructed rural party organizations and collective farms to fail to fulfill the regional grain procurement plan.

For characterization, I am sending you a copy of the minutes of the testimony of party member Maslyuk - prev. Commune "Vanguard", a member of the party Kostenko - before. Commune "Svoboda", a member of the Wild Party - head. MTS, Moroz, manager of the district office of the Pig Breeding Collective Farm Union, and Budyak, referent-planner of the RIK.

Although the district leadership of the Dnepropetrovsk regional committee of the CP (b) U was removed at one time, I consider it necessary, in connection with the revealed facts, to conduct an investigation to bring the perpetrators to justice.

27.XI.32 Chairman of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR S. Redens

Copy

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

1932, November 21, interrogated as a witness Mr. Maslyuk, Gavriil Amvrosievich, born in 1899, a native of the village. Basan, Chu Barevsky district, from poor peasants, citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR, with a lower education

education, Ukrainian, married, registered in the military as an average political staff, a grain grower by profession, chairman of the Avangard commune, Novo-Karlovy village council, Orekhovsky district, was not under trial and investigation, party member since 1925, party card No. 0787758, living in the Avangard commune, Novo-Karlovy village council, Orekhovsky district, testified as follows:

"... In the Avangard commune in mid-August this year. the district commission presented a plan in the amount of 10,981 cents.

346

LUBYAN KA. January 1922 - December 1936

Upon receipt of such a figure, the party bureau was convened, which decided that the plan for the commune was big, but it must be carried out.

A few days later, the former came to the commune. Secretary of the PKK Golovin, with an extract from the decision of the bureau of the commune, convened the bureau and raised the question of the grain procurement plan, giving the following directive: "You must admit your mistakes in declaring the plan unrealistic, the plan must be accepted, whatever it may be was, and perform at 30%. We will declare the plan unrealistic. Don't we, the district workers, know that the plan is unrealistic, but now, at this time, we need to put the question in such a way that it will be accepted.

This ended the Bureau meeting.

In my opinion, such an installation of the PKK secretary was carried out in order to be able to inform the regional party committee that the plan presented by the masses was accepted and everything was going well in the region.

After a while, a prev arrived at the commune. RICK Palamarchuk. I approached him with a request to reduce the plan, to which he offered me the following:

"... To take out sowing material, as much as possible, for the collective farms of the Orekhovsky district with the fact that the same amount will be included in the grain procurement plan for the commune, rather than counting the same amount of exported grain twice in the implementation of grain procurements - once by offsetting the grain, exported - many as seed material, and another time by reducing the grain procurement plan for the same amount.

I refused such an installation, as I considered it incorrect.

At the end of October this year, together with the head of the Svoboda-Kostenko commune in the office of the head of the district collective farm union of Prigoda, we started talking about grain procurements. I expressed the opinion that the plan was big and difficult to fulfill, since funds had been created, to which Prigoda, addressing me and Kostenko, gave the following directive:

"You need to provide for yourself completely - leave all the funds, both for sowing, the insurance fund and a number of others, and if you do not provide for yourself, then we will put you on trial."

"With the implementation of the plan, you can wait, because in the regional committee from the district

Golovin, Palamarchuk and Lutsenko (former manager Raizu) went to the court with a request to reduce the plan, and we will probably be removed from it.

Such installations demagnetized and cooled the communes and artels in the matter of fulfilling the grain procurement plan.

This policy was carried out by the district leaders not only from the moment the plan was adopted, but far before that period, i.e. from the very spring sowing campaign, commission after commission toured the region continuously, which established the yield and types of sowing in order to reduce the plan, and some collective farms, such as the Kolos artel, were written off under the act of dead wheat 160 hectares, from which the artel threshed about three cents per hectare. As a result, the artel has now fully fulfilled the plan and has large, unnecessary surpluses.

This question was sharpened by me at the plenum of the village council and put before the former. REC chairman Palamarchuk and authorized PKK, however, no measures were taken, and when the plan for the district was reduced, they even received a reduction, while they could boldly fulfill the plan.

When the plan was lowered, I informed the head of this fact about this fact. rai supply Kovalenko with a request not to reduce the plan, but to transfer what was intended to reduce Kolos to another artel, which in reality was not

#### DOCUMENTATION

347

able to fulfill the plan, but even then no measures were taken, but on the contrary, a reduction of 130 cents was made.

Privoda is a colleague of the chairman of the Kolos artel. It is clear that this, in turn, played a considerable role in the fulfillment of the grain procurement plan.

All of the above can be confirmed by at least our Avangard commune, which, as a result of such leadership, before the change of leadership of the district party and Soviet apparatus, in two and a half days, the plan was fulfilled by 100%, plus another counter in the amount of 500 pounds.

I can't show you more. The protocol was written down from my words correctly, in which I sign.

Maslyuk

Interrogated Kaluga, Gaponov

#### INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

Copy

November 22, 1932, Mr. Dikiy was interrogated as a witness

Luka Illarionovich, 42 years old, a native of the village. Chaikovshchina, Lubensky district, Poltava province, Oritskaya volost, from the poor, from the property has a home, citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR, with a lower education, Ukrainian by nationality, married, non-military, agricultural mechanic by profession, works as a manager. MTS in the city of Orekhovo, no previous litigation, member of the party since 1928, member of the union of Soviet employees, lives in the city of Orekhovo, MTS settlement, which testified as follows:

When determining the yield, as members of the commission (it is not known who organized it) traveled around the area: the manager of the office, Zagotzerno Burkivsky, head of the district collective farm union Prigoda, head. district administration - Lutsenko, before. KK - RKI Ordelyan and drew up an act on the yield.

I happened to be in the village of Zherebets and, not knowing this matter, was present in the village council, when Prigoda himself took samples from the fields (ears of green bread plucked from the field) and, sitting in the village council, determined the harvest using these samples. ness.

Zhuravsky, an agronomist of the district collective farm union, who was taken to the district as a specialist, spoke least of all.

All spring crops, ornaut wheat, barley and oats, were determined by Prigoda as 100% dead, although it was still completely green and had not even blossomed yet, and it was impossible to determine the yield at that time.

An act was drawn up about this, and Prigoda gave an order in 2-3 days to mow all the spring sowing, established by the act as dead, to mow hay.

Nevertheless, an insignificant part of the sowing was mowed, and the rest of the sowing remained, since the majority of the collective farmers refused to mow such sowing for hay.

Upon receipt of the annual plan by the district for grain procurement, the chairman of the Regional Executive Committee, Palamarchuk, appeared at the district collective farm union, and, locking himself with Prigoda in his office, they were talking about something. I was present there as a member of the board of the district collective farm union, head. agricultural production department and a party member were asked to leave.

After a two-hour audience, Palamarchuk left, and Prigoda called me and all the agronomists of the apparatus of the district collective farm union to his place and told us:

"Boys, it is necessary to draw up information about the yield and the grain and fodder balance, because we, as a collective farm system, will have to defend the collective farms, otherwise what the hell are the owners of us when we don't stand for the collective farms."

348

LUBYANKA. January 1922—»December 1936

After that, alone with me, Prigoda told me:

"Palamarchuk came and told me that it would be inconvenient for him to speak on the commission for bringing plans about unreality, and you, as a collective farm system, will need to defend the collective farms, armed with a grain and fodder balance, which was previously agreed with the manager . Raizu Lutsenko, He

already knows about it."

Now we need to compile information about the needs for livestock, pigs, and also for the farm, exaggerating the number of livestock for farms, provided for by the plan for the development of livestock in our area.

The apparatus of the district collective farm union took up the compilation of the grain and fodder balance, which was compiled within three days.

It was compiled according to the principle and installation of Prigoda. The material for compiling the balance was partly the information of the detour of the members of the imaginary commission to determine the yield, and to a greater extent the material of district agronomists, people who had absolutely no agronomic education, but simply ordinary collective farmers, field farmers, who would → whether data on yields are presented according to the special task of Prigoda.

Giving assignments, Prigoda said: "We need to establish the yield without offending the collective farms, because the defense of the collective farms depends on us."

The personal composition of the so-called agronomists is as follows: Makhnorylo Andrey Lukyanovich from the village of Omelnik, a wealthy middle peasant; Demyanenko from the village of Yurkovka, a wealthy middle peasant; Rudokop is currently sentenced to 5 years for corrupt work on a collective farm.

During the period of bringing the plan for grain procurement in the building of the district party committee, I went into the office of the secretary of the PKK Golovin, meaning to agree with Prigoda, as with the chairman of the district collective farm union, on the urgent moments of the work of the district collective farm union.

Golovin yelled me out of the office, saying: "This is not the village council, but the district party committee, why are you hanging out here." I left the office, followed by Prigoda, who, giving instructions about work, said: "You go and sit in the district collective farm union and don't go anywhere. Today is the most difficult moment - we will impose grain procurement plans. The chairmen of the collective farms will be worried, I will send them to you, and you calm them down and persuade them not to worry, let them go home and bring bread until there is enough, and then we will say that there is no bread and that's all.

The installation given by Prigoda on determining the yield can be confirmed by the district agronomist Makhnorylo A.D. and a field agronomist - Shram Ko, both workers of the district collective farm union.

The principle of the guidance given by Prigoda on the compilation of the grain-forage balance (inflated) can be confirmed by the agronomist-planner Zhuravsky and the zootechnician Spassky. The first of them works in the city of Dnepropetrovsk, apparently in the regional farm, and the second works in the regional collective farm union as a senior livestock specialist.

The agronomist Moroz, now working at the RZO, will be able to confirm the compilation of the forage balance for farms by collective farms, with an exaggerated increase in livestock - pigs.

The testimonies were read to me, written down from my words correctly, in which I sign Wild.

Interrogated by authorized SPO Kozakov

Present:



Beginning Orekhovsk. R / O GPU Kaluga

Full SPO oblotd. GPU Gaponov

DOCUMENTATION

349

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

Copy

1932, November, 23 days, interrogated as a witness, citizen Kostenko Semyon Gurevich, 37 years old, a native of the village. N.-Andreevka, Orekhovsky district, from poor peasants, member of the commune, citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR, with a lower education, married, a grain grower by profession, head of the Svoboda commune, Panyutinsky village council, was not under trial and investigation, member of the CP(b)U since 1931, p./b. No. 2322926, lives in the Svoboda commune, Panyutinsky village council, testified as follows:

In the Orekhovsky district, the fulfillment of the grain procurement plan was unsatisfactory all the time, and only after the change of the district party and Soviet leadership did the district's situation in this matter begin to improve.

As a worker who is directly involved in the fulfillment of the grain procurement plan, I explain this situation in the following way.

With the old composition of workers, all thoughts and all work are directed exclusively to slowing down the fulfillment of planned targets for the collective farms of the Orekhov region, in particular, for our commune.

In order to implement its policy of disrupting the implementation of plans, the district leadership, represented by the secretary of the PKK Golovin, pres. RIC Palamarchuk, chairman of the district collective farm union of Prigoda and director of MTS Medved, began its work even before the harvest, namely, these leaders created a commission to establish the yield and death of the crop. This work was carried out even at a time when no one knew what kind of crop would be harvested from our fields. The commission consisted of the following persons: KK-RKI Ordelyan, head of the regional economic union Prigoda, director of MTS Medved and agronomists Anistratov and Zhuravsky.

However, agronomists took little part in this matter, since the yield was mainly determined by Prigoda and Ordelyan.

The main principle of the commission was to establish the lowest possible yield and the loss of crops, and I even know of such cases when the commission warned the communes and artels not to make a mistake by accident and best of all to give a low yield themselves.

This was also stated to me by a member of the commission, Medved.

There were also such moments when the commission proposed to mow the crops for se-

but, submitting an act on the death of such on this account, it was proposed to mow up to 300 hectares of winter wheat in the Svoboda commune, but the commune did not do this, and when harvesting from these "finally dead" crops, an average of one and a half centners with hectares.

By such measures and actions, as well as various calculations, they pushed the heads, collective farms, party cells and the entire collective farm mass to disrupt state tasks in the matter of fulfilling the grain procurement plan.

As a concrete example, one should cite the artel "Zgoda", of the Yegorovsky village council, where the previous artel, Peleshko, personally told me on the issue of the plan: "I will not fulfill the plan, I need to fully provide for myself first."

In the Svoboda commune, where I am the chairman, the commission for determining the yield included the chairman. KK-RKI Ordelyan and director of MTS Medved. The commission convinced me that after their establishment, everything is so and 6 UDet. Approximately when I argued that barley would give 10 cents per hectare, they tried to dissuade me by proving the opposite. Ultimately, I was right.

350

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

Such a situation, i.e. reduction in yields, they carried out for all crops in all collective farms and communes, and subsequently my conclusions were confirmed by facts during harvesting.

All other visits to the commune by the leadership of the district were aimed at disrupting these important tasks, especially the arrival of the secretary of the PKK Golovin, the secretary of the party cell of the commune Kozik told me about it.

Arriving at the commune and convening the party unit on the issue of the grain procurement plan, he gave the following directive:

"We were given an unrealistic plan for our district, but nothing, we will fulfill 65 percent, and then there is no trial."

The practice of booking unlimited funds for farms also contributed to the disruption of the grain procurement plan. For example, in the Svoboda commune, a plan was given for booking an area for pig farms in the amount of 287 hectares of grain crops, which was equal to two-thirds of the entire sown area, and we had to put this area under the protection of the plant. STF. Despite the fact that severe directives were given from the leading head on the obligatory preservation of this armor, I nevertheless did not obey these directives and carried out the grain procurement plan.

There were constant threats from the RCC that we would put you on trial and almost shoot you for violating these funds.

I repeatedly put the question to the district collective farm union about disposing of such large funds, but the answer was the same: "For violation of the funds, you will be prosecuted."

Once in the office of the pre-RCS Prigoda, he was told in the presence of

before, the Avangard commune of Maslyuk: "Our business is to raise the question of fulfilling the grain procurement plan, and your business is to calculate and prove that it is not possible to fulfill the plan, and do not dare to touch the funds, otherwise I will put them on trial; although the regional committee called our commission, which established the yield, "parrots," we are still right; let our conversation remain within four walls, and they will give us a reduction.

These "instructions and advice", as well as the "decree" of the district leaders, were very easily instilled in the grass-roots leaders of party cells, pre-collective farms and pre-village councils, and as a result caused such a catastrophe with the fulfillment of planned targets.

Such an inoculation also took root in the collective farms of our village council, the board of the artel "Tersa", represented by the head of the artel Korkhovoi, directly said: "Our plan is unrealistic," and for a long time did not accept it, and when it was categorically proposed to carry out the plan ( under the new leadership), the latter fulfilled the plan by 100% and itself remained provided until the new harvest.

The board of the artel "Chervona Peremoga", especially the previous artel Mochaliv really took the path of the old composition of the district leaders and does not fulfill the grain procurement plan, declaring to the bureau of the party cell: "this year, as in the past, we will remain indebted to the state 2000 pounds .". This artel is littered with a kulak-hostile Soviet power element. For example: the collective farmer Belogub, the kulak who ran the collective farm mass, the initiator of the analysis of socialized cows, having learned that arrests were being carried out in the district for wrecking in the implementation of the grain procurement plan, ran away to no one knows where. Such fists; like Belogub, I know more than 3 people from the artel. However, I don't remember their names now.

A similar situation is in the artel "Signal" of the Omelnitsky village council and in a number of others.

#### DOCUMENTATION

351

The above fact is a vivid indicator and confirmation of the fact that the kulaks and the anti-Soviet element, taking advantage of this position, carried out their sabotage work in the first place.

Thus, to date, the Chervona Peremoga artel, despite the solid pressure of the new leadership, has fulfilled the plan only by 72%; artel "Signal" by 30%, etc.

According to the artel "Chervona Peremoga" they are engaged in malicious non-compliance with the state. tasks not for the first time. Public livestock was dismantled. When Ordelyan came to them and offered to immediately sort out the cattle (this was said to him at the collective farm mass), the cattle was immediately distributed, and his words gave rise to all sorts of lawlessness in the artel.

It can be said about the management of the MTS leaders by the collective farms that they were not involved in this business, since they were busy with consumer tendencies at a time when it was necessary to take the path of helping to fulfill the plan.

This leadership, represented by MTS director Kirilenko and agronomist Bulba, posed the question as follows: "If you don't sell us cows, bread, potatoes, we won't serve you, we serve those who give us." The following fact can serve as a typical example: at the height of the grain procurements, Kirilenko, director of the MTS, arrived in a truck in the commune yard, in the presence of the communards, and said: "Are you going to give us bread or not? If you don't want to, then don't, I don't serve you anymore." When I began to prove to him that there was a categorical prohibition of the government on this matter, and urged him not to take the cars, but to at least let them load bread for export into the grain procurement, he, not even wanting to listen to me, drove back with an empty car. .

This outraged the Communards present at the conversation and for a long time was the subject of their discussion.

In conclusion, I will say that such assistance from the former composition of the district leaders and such leadership put the fulfillment of plan targets, in particular the grain procurement plan, under direct threat of disruption and led the entire mass of the district onto the path of non-fulfillment of the plan.

I can't show you more. The protocol was written down from my words correctly, in which I sign.

Interrogated Kaluga

Copy

#### INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

On November 24, 1932, an authorized SPO of the Orekhovsky regional department of the GPU of the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Department of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Kozakov interrogated Mr. Budyak Sergei Arkhipovich as a witness, who testified:

Budyak Sergey Arkhipovich, 34 years old, born from the village Volovodka, Voronovitsky district, employee, citizen of the Ukrainian SSR, graduated in 1926. Inarchoz, Ukrainian, Married, registered in the military reserve of the 1st stage, economist-planner, works as an assistant planner in the Orekhovsky District Executive Committee, was not under trial and investigation, non-partisan, trade union member, resident. in Orekhovo, st. May 1st, no. 2.

On the merits, he showed:

I work as an assistant planner in the Orekhovsky District Executive Committee and, having some direct relation to the drawing up and layout of the grain procurement plan for 1932, I noticed the following abnormalities in this work.

352

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

Subcommittees of the district of the accounting and control commission, consisting of: 1) the chairman of the District Kolkhoz Union of Prigoda, agronomist Zhuravsky, 2) Ordelyan and ag-

ronom Bulba, 3) Lutsenko, Basiliy and the agronomist Anistratov and 4) Burkivsky - I don't remember which of the agronomists was with him - checking the grain, the sown area as of July 6-10, together with representatives of the village councils and collective farms, drew up acts on the allegedly lost sown areas of winter wheat, rye and spring wheat, as a result of which the sown areas of these crops were reduced against the actual harvested areas: for rye by 884 ha, for winter wheat by 4768 ha, for spring wheat - 476 ha.

These subcommissions for assessing the harvest did not approach the assessment critically, they agreed with the testimony of the village councils and collective farms. This is confirmed by the sending to the region of data on yields, simple totals of data from village councils and collective farms, as data from the district accounting and control commission.

The figures on areas and yields collected by the subcommittees, participation in the assessment of the crop and the compilation of the area under crops with representatives of the village councils and collective farms played a role - the subcommissions sanctioned the fictitious death and the yield shown by the village councils and collective farms.

This influenced (the presence of representatives of the district) when the village soviets and collective farms gave this information to the collective farms and village soviets demagnetizing, this gave some collective farms an excuse to mow part of the crops, some collective farms not to remove part of the crop and hide the sown area.

According to the assessment of the harvest, one commission came from representatives: the agronomist of the Regional Land Department and the agronomist of the Regional Tractor, I don't remember their names. This commission drew up an act, I don't remember for what areas, a copy of the act is in the files of the RZO.

Another commission: two agronomists from the Regional Plan, the name of one was Shakhov, I don't remember the other. This commission did not draw up any act. I don't know what instructions these commissions gave, what conversations they had about crop yields, although there must have been such in the RZO.

The third commission - the manager of the Regional Directorate of the KGO Griednili and Gvdler from TsUNGO - examined the crops together with Comrade Lutsenko, one part of the district on the way to Chubarevka, where they were going. The directive on filling funds for pig farms was given by the District Kolkhozsoyuz, without taking into account the actual availability of pigs and the needs of the pig farm for feed, without indicating the order backfill.

The Raykolkhozsoyuz already insisted on 28/X about filling up the crops from the areas it had spread out, without taking into account the actual need for feed for pig farms and the fulfillment of the grain delivery plan.

Some collective farms poured funds to the detriment of the fulfillment of the grain delivery plan, clearly exaggerating the funds for the yield per hectare subject to exemption from contracting in collective farms. The yield from the area subject to contracting turned out to be much higher, and 65 poods were poured on a pig, as I found in the artel of the Fourth Peremozhny, N.-Soloshansky village council.

I recently noticed that in the Nezamozhnik commune of the Yurkovsky Village Council, after the revision, approval and adoption of the plan for the commune, the plan for grain delivery, 407 cents, was reduced to 267 centners. This was done by Deputy prev. RICK Ryabykh, who asked for the manager by phone. Raysnab Kovalenko, and Kovalenko corrected. What are the reasons for this - I do not know.

All of the above is written with my own hand, in which I sign Budyak.

Interrogated by authorized SPO Kozakov.

DOCUMENTATION

353

Copy

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

On November 24, 1932, Kozakov, an authorized SPO of the Orekhovsky district department of the GPU of the Dnepropetrovsk regional department of the GPU, interrogated Mr. Moroz Vasily Patrikeevich as a witness, who testified:

Moroz Vasily Patrikeevich, 28 years old, a native of the village. Stallion, Orekhovsky district, from middle peasants, poor, citizen of the Ukrainian SSR, with a secondary specialized education, Ukrainian by nationality, single, conscripted, livestock specialist by profession, currently working as the manager of the regional office of the regional pig farm collective farm union, under court and was not a consequence, a member of the VRZL union, lives in the city of Orekhovo, on Zaporozhskaya street, d. No. 46.

On the merits, he showed:

I am a livestock specialist. I work as a manager of the district office of the regional pig farm collective farm union. By the nature of my service, I serve pig-commercial collective farms. One of the main reasons for the extremely weak progress in grain procurements in our Orekhovsky district, as I am close to the collective farm system, I consider the abnormal booking of farms to provide feed for the pig farms of collective farms, the booking of which is excessively exaggerated against the real need, in accordance with the presence of collective farm farms in the area of the pig herd .

In order to provide feed for the pig farms of collective farms in the current year, by order of the Dnepropetrovsk region of July 5-32, an area of \u200b\u200bspring crops was allocated in the amount of 3.448 hectares, of which: barley - 310 hectares, oats - 430 hectares, millet - 476 hectares, corn - 1.164 hectares, and due to the offspring by the end of 1932 - 6.240 heads, which include the livestock of the pig herd. In fact, when distributing this area between pig farms, the number of pig herds was significantly less - 2,007 heads, of which 821 young animals from 4 to 8 months old, 1186 sows older than 8 months of age.

Thus, one pig accounts for 1.67 hectares of grain crops. This area far exaggerates the real need for one head of cattle. Even with the most minimal yield, counting 8 centners per hectare, which will be 1336 kilograms, while the maximum rate per head should not exceed 7 centners of grain crops.

There were no prospects for increasing the herd due to the offspring, as projected by the plan for the development of pig breeding, because for the remaining 5 months until the end of 1932 they could not in any way provide the planned offspring.

It was considered a concentrated feed. In addition, the collective farms laid silage for the entire livestock, including pigs. It is also necessary to take into account that the consumption of fodder in the summer and autumn period of time was completely insignificant, because the pig herds were on pasture - on pasture.

All this taken together, plus the reduction in August 1932 by the Regional Pig Breeding Kolkhoz Union of completing the pig herd from 6,240 heads to 3,917, exacerbates the exaggeration of armored funds.

A striking indicator of the reservation of inflated funds in this case can be the fact that the harvested crop from the reserved sowing area for pig farms, even with the very minimum yield of spring sowing - 8 cents per hectare, in relation to the reduced annual plan grain procurements in the district of 12,000 tons, is 22.5%.

354

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

As a livestock specialist, when distributing these areas, I was struck by the excessive reservation area, and after setting up on this issue, I, referring to the head of the district collective farm union Prigoda, said: "We have too a large harvest area, reaching 1.67 hectares of grain crops, i.e. up to 80 pounds. grains." To this, Prigoda told me: "Your business is small, you have been presented and do it."

At that moment, i.e. during the period of distribution of areas between pig farms, there was an agronomist Khrulenko, who came from Dnepropetrovsk to Orekhovskoe raisa, for what work I do not know.

Considering him a representative from the region, I turned to him for clarification on the distribution of areas for pig farms. To my question - should the area under crops be distributed among collective farms that do not have pig farms, but have more than 10 sows of incomplete age, i.e. younger than 8 months? - the latter said: "Include from 4 months of age and older", which is essentially incorrect, because sows are considered at least 8 months of age, and here he suggested that I include an additional 13 artels in the distribution: the artel named after. Lutsenko, M.-Tokmochansky village council; them. Petrovsky - of the same village council; them. Lenin - Belopolevsky village council; artel them. Blucher - Yurkovsky village council, etc., who did not have the number of adult sows in the pig herd required to include the number of adult sows and, in fact, did not have the right to reserve funds. And when I warned Khrulenko about the extremely large reservation area, the regional agronomist Khrulenko told me: "The larger the area, the better the provision of the pig herd will be."

I also contacted the manager on this issue. Rayza Lutsenko, who told me: "Use the area taught." While a maximum of 1 ha per mature sow was sufficient to ensure stock availability, in reality 1.67 ha were allocated and booked.

Thus, the reservation of the allocated area, in accordance with the availability of livestock, was unrealistic, exaggerated, clearly aimed at counteracting the successful advancement of grain procurements.

By order of the chairman of the district collective farm union of Prigoda, the chairmen of the artels were given an order prohibiting the use of at least one kilogram of grain of the reserved area for other purposes, i.e. for other purposes.

I remember a case when the board of the "Defence of the Country" artel of the Konap village council, represented by the head of the artel Dekhtyarenko, since the district collective farm union was strictly forbidden, up to bringing to court, to spend crops from the reserved areas for other purposes, turned to me for permission to produce exchange barley for winter wheat for sowing. It was at the height of the autumn sowing campaign, and the artel had no sowing material. I agreed to the exchange of barley from the stock of pig farms for wheat on the condition that this amount of the fund be replenished with millet, but in order to provide for myself, I suggested that Dekhtyarenko write a statement about this addressed to the board of the district collective farm union. This statement came to the consideration of a member of the board Lyulko, who imposed a resolution on it with the following content: "Pig water center. Urgently prohibit the exchange of the stock of the pig farm for other crops by telephone message. In pursuance of this resolution, I wrote a categorical prohibition to this artel to carry out the indicated exchange.

Personally, I regarded this fact as one of the methods of clearly counteracting the sowing campaign, because barley could be exchanged painlessly and without damage to the pig farm for sowing material - wheat, with its redemption with millet or corn. Undersowing will affect the general condition of the artel and the provision of the same pig farm for the next year. And, as a fact, according to the artel

DOCUMENTATION \_ 355

"Defense of theft" task for autumn sowing is underfulfilled by 56%, mainly due to the lack of sowing material. Having learned about this case, the pre-department of the district collective farm union Prigoda categorically forbade me to make any exchanges of the pig farm funds, saying: "The exchange is a squandering of reserved funds, for which you are obliged to answer. In the future, you should not take on such responsibilities.

After that, in such matters I referred to the board of the district collective farm union.

During the period of threshing and the peak of grain procurement, the artel "Chervoniy Mayak" of the Andreevsky Village Council, by order of the previous artel of Narinovich, organized by the red roll, unthreshed barley was taken out in the amount of 10 centners from the area booked behind the pig farm for grain procurement, meaning to pay off any amount of barley when threshing areas that are not related to booking behind a pig farm. Prigoda, having learned about this, attacked me with a cry: "You are planting here and you don't know that the artels are taking out the reserved funds for pig farms for grain procurement, offer the artels to immediately replenish the exported amount of barley."

Fulfilling the orders of Prigoda, I proposed by telephone to the artels to immediately replenish the exported amount of barley.

This demagnetized the leadership of the artels and caused confusion.

On this occasion, Narinovich, the previous artel "Chervoniy Mayak", on my proposal to replenish the exported amount of barley, said: "The devil will tell you, an authorized representative of the district is sitting with me and demands to export grain, but you forbid it."

A similar kind of facts took place in the Svoboda commune of the Panyutinskiy village council, where 16 centners of barley were taken from



booked stock of pig farms, and in the artel "Fourth peremozhnyi" - N.-Soloshansky village council. This time too I received a scolding from Prigoda, and on his orders the amount of barley taken out was replenished by the commune. With regard to the artel of the "Fourth Peremognosti" — the material about the removal of the fund of pig farms by Prigoda was sent to the prosecutor's office for trial — the results are unknown to me.

From this it should be concluded that the leadership of the District Kolkhozsoyuz represented by Pred, the board of Prigoda and Raizu represented by Lutsenko was aimed at the implementation of clearly sabotage goals in the matter of successfully promoting grain procurements by creating exaggerated funds. In this case, this will concern the creation of exaggerated funds to ensure the livestock of pig farms of collective farms.

My testimony was read. Written from my words correctly. What I sign. Freezing.

Interrogated by authorized SPO Kozakov

#### REFERENCE

Golovin - (former secretary of the PKK) is at the disposal of the Dnepropetrovsk regional committee. (I have not yet arrived in Dnepropetrovsk - now in Orekhovo.)

Ordelyan - (former chairman of the KK) is now working as an inspector at a state farm in Sinelnikov (Ptakhoproduct).

Palamarchuk - (former chairman of the RIC) director of the MTS in V.-Lepetikha.

Prigoda - (formerly before, collective farm union) deputy. director of a state farm in Krivoy Rog.

This certificate was reported by the head. sector of the party cadres of the Dnepropetrovsk regional committee - comrade. Weisberg.

APRF. f. 3. Op. 58. D. 380. L. 94-97ob. Typographical print.

356

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 323

NOTES G.E. PROKOFIEV AND L.G. MIRONOV TO I.V.  
STALIN ABOUT "wrecking"

IN THE FIELD OF ANIMAL HUSBANDRY

AND ABOUT "VARATIVENESS" IN THE SYSTEM OF THE TRACTOR CENTER (108)

December 27, 1932

No. P4791

MOST SECRET

TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AND THE PRESIDUM OF THE CC AUCP(b), TO ALL SECRETARIES  
OF OBLIGATIONAL COMMITTEES, TERRITORIAL COMMITTEES AND NATIONAL COMMITTEES. Central Committee,

TO ALL PARTY MEMBERS OF THE COLLEGIONS OF THE NARKOMZEM

and NARKOMSOVHOZOV, ALL PP OGPU

\*PP OGPU CENTRAL CHERNOZEM REGION\*

Two notes are being sent out for information. Prokofiev and Mironov: a) on sabotage in the field of animal husbandry, b) on sabotage in the Tractor Center system. In view of the exceptional importance of the materials sent out, it is proposed that they be given serious attention.

SECRETARY OF THE CC I. STALIN

No.

88 Secret

Copy

OGPU USSR

25.XII.32

No. 321160

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE CC AUCP(b) - Comrade STALIN

The bodies of the OGPU disclosed k.r. organization in the livestock sector of agriculture. K.r. the organization had a leading center in Moscow, which included prominent scientific and practical workers of the Veterinary Administration of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR, formerly. Cattle association and its veterinary research institutes.

On the periphery of the k.r. the organization had powerful groups in a number of areas, such as: Leningrad region, Sr.-Volga region, Nizh.-Volzhsky region, Sev. Caucasus, Western Siberia, Iv.-Voznesenskaya region.

At present, the liquidation of the c.r. organizations on Wed. Volga (arrested 14 people), in the Iv.-Voznesensk region. (arrested 8 people) and proceeded to liquidate the k.r. organizations in the center (6 people were arrested), in Nizh. Volga (arrested 2 people), in the North. Caucasus (arrested 6 people) and Voet. Siberia (15 people arrested).

The emergence and structure of the c.r. organizations

K.r. the organization arose locally and in the center on the initiative and with the direct participation of individuals adjoining the k.r. organizations, so-called Microbiologists, which consisted of specialist veterinarians and was liquidated by the OGPU in 1930. Consolidation of the newly emerged k.r. organizations in animal husbandry and the formation of a leading center in Moscow dates back to the beginning of 1931.

DOCUMENTATION

357

During 1931, k.r. groups that have arisen on the ground have established contact with the K.R. center and began to receive guidance from him regarding the methods of subversive work.

Head of the Orenburg k.r. Dorofeev group shows:

"In early November 1931, I was sent to Moscow for a conference on planning scientific veterinary work in the USSR. At the conference, I met with members of the organization Pokshishevsky, Scriabin, Sizov, Ruzhentsov, Kosarev and Belitzer.

We discussed the question of destroying the organization... We shared opinions about the reasons for the failure of the organization... In the course of these conversations, Belitzer informed me about the restructuring of the C.R. organization and about the main guidelines of the organized sabotage carried out by it..."

Member of the governing core of the Samara district. group Zakharov shows:

"In order to coordinate, link and receive instructions on my sabotage activities, in April of this year I went to Moscow to visit a member of the center of the c.r. organizations prof. P.V. Sizov ... During my daily visits to Sizov's laboratory, I had the opportunity to talk with him many times both in relation to the plan of sabotage work, and in relation to wrecking installations, in relation to the composition of the c.r. organizations, etc."

The composition of the c.r. organizations

The composition of the c.r. organizations in the center and locally included qualified specialists in veterinary medicine and animal husbandry. In Moscow - Belitser, prof. Vses. In-ta Experiment. Veterinarians; Sizov, director of the Institute of Bird Diseases; Kosarev - director of the Institute of Equine Diseases; Saikovich - Director of the Institute of Sheep Diseases; Andreev - Art. veterinarian of the Skotovo Association, etc.; on Wednesday Volga - prof. Dorofeev; along Sev. Caucasus - prof. Gurvich and others.

Among the members of the c.r. Many organizations came from privileged estates, members of anti-Soviet parties, sons of clergymen, participants in the active struggle against Soviet power, etc.

So, for example, Zion - served with Kolchak, Kosarev - the son of a large landowner, Strugalsky - formerly. member of the PPS and the AKP, fled to the whites, Dorofeev - served in the army of Kolchak, Permyakov - formerly. Socialist-Revolutionary, in 1918 he participated in the rebel detachments, in 1920 and 1921 he was a member of the Communist Party, Silantiev - the son of a merchant, Reshetov - the son of a large cattle breeder, Andreev - the son of prof. Andreeva, Speransky - the son of a priest, Gusev - the son of a priest, Knyazev - the son of a priest, etc.

Goals and tactics of k.r. organizations

Setting as its goal an active struggle against the Soviet power, k.r. the organization sought, with the help of subversive measures, to disrupt the development of socialist animal husbandry and to arouse dissatisfaction with the authorities on the part of the general public.

some masses of the population.

Close to k.r. to the center a member of the c.r. organization Andreev shows:

"The goal ... k.r. work was to cause difficulties in the successful solution of the meat problem, in the supply of meat and milk to the industrial proletariat and the working people of the city - a blow to the supply of workers in order to achieve the discontent of the working masses in this way "(from Andreev's statement dated 24.XII.32).

358

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

Member Wed. Volzhsk, groups k.r. organization Permyakov showed:

"The tactics consisted in disrupting the development of socialist animal husbandry through wrecking work, creating an unprecedented stagnation, undermining economic power, weakening defense capability, leading to the collapse of the supply of the army and the population, and provoking an uprising within the country." (From the note of Permyakov dated 29.VIII.32).

Subversive work k.r. organizations

In accordance with the main tactical methods of combating the Soviet regime, k.r. the organization developed its subversive activities in the following most important directions:

1. The spread of epizootics and the creation of permanent foci of infection in livestock farms.
2. Mass destruction of livestock through the deliberate use of low-quality biological preparations for vaccinations and the slaughter of healthy livestock under the guise of an infectiously diseased herd.
3. Slowing down research work and directing it along the path of academicization and separation from practical tasks.

Arrested member of the Moscow center k.r. organization Kosarev shows:

"K.r. the organization carried out active destructive work in animal husbandry by slowing down the development of veterinary science in the country, curtailing and misdirecting research work, creating conditions for the mass death of livestock from epizootics and diseases on state farms and collective farms.

Member of the c.r. groups in the Ivanovo-Industrial region Knyazev showed:

"In the tasks of k.r. The organization included the following: as I know from Gusev and Speransky, which Chernyshev, Guzeev, Gontarev, Tsvetkov and Orleansky also knew about, and subsequently other veterinarians I mentioned earlier:

- 1) Release of substandard biological products; sera and vaccines.
- 2) Incorrect diagnosis in the determination of diseases by bacteriological laboratories and separately by veterinary staff.

- 3) Improper treatment of sick animals, causing death.
- 4) Failure to take timely preventive measures, as a result of which various kinds of diseases arose.
- 5) Poor quality treatment - negligence and negligence.
- 6) Production of vaccinations against non-existent diseases that cause both disease in animals and their death.
- 7) Storage of various cultures of virulent microbes: typhus, anthrax, and other types of typhoid diseases.

On the issues of sabotage in research work, the accused Dorofeev testified:

"In the field of scientific research, pest activity was directed, firstly, to filling the laboratory with solving problems that are currently unnecessary for the state, secondly, to the development of biological preparations that cause a large waste of animals after vaccination, and thirdly, the introduction into practice of biological preparations that give animals such a weak immunity that vaccinations did not interrupt the epizootic, but, on the contrary, delayed it.

To characterize the results of the subversive work of k.r. organizations, it can be indicated that in 1931 alone in the Middle Volga region, 98,415 heads were slaughtered in connection with felling. As established after slaughter is really pain

DOCUMENTATION \_ 359

There were only 3546 goals, or 3.7% of the total number of goals scored.

Pest activity k.r. organization for the spread of meningitis among horses led to the fact that in the same year in the Middle Volga region 20182 heads fell and in 10 months of 1932 - 8346 heads.

Since the beginning of 1932, in connection with the aggravated international situation and the emergence of hopes for a close intervention of the c.r. the organization, under a directive from the Center, concentrated its activities on more active methods of subversive work, starting to use direct infection of livestock and soil in livestock farms.

On this occasion, the arrested Zakharov (Wednesday Volga) testified:

"Prof. Sizov said that the methods of sabotage used until now did not give a quick effect, that it was time to switch to the path of more decisive methods of sabotage in order to achieve the final goals as soon as possible. He informed me that k.r. the center adopted the installation for the production of contamination of livestock and soil in state farms. Upon my return from Moscow, I informed the other members of our local organization about the change in the tactics of the C.R. organizations in the center and about the installations for the production of infection.

On the implementation of these installations in practice, a member of the c.r. organization on the Middle Volga Temnikov showed:

"In order to develop a plague epizootic, a member of our group, Silantiev, prepared a weak virus last year in order to deliberately create low immunity among vaccinated pigs (state farm Krasnaya Za-

rya"), but the teaching of insufficient immunity should have caused further spread of the infection.

At the Zhiguli state farm, during immunization, conditions were deliberately created for increased mortality after vaccination (mixing passively and actively vaccinated in one room).

The result of wrecking in this part was a large waste in state farms (Lassalle, Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya, Krasny Pig Breeder, etc.). The case is under expedited investigation.

APPENDIX: Records of interrogations.

Deputy Previous OGPU PROKOFIEV  
Head. ECU OGPU MIRONOV

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

ANDREEV Konstantin Pavlovich dated December 21, 1932

I'm involved in k.r. organization in July 1931 by Gandelsman.

I met him in April. 1931, during this period of time I had to repeatedly meet and talk with Gandelsman, the conversations took place in an office setting, for the most part in his office at the VET trust.

The mood that arose in me in 1930 about the need to slow down the development of livestock-breeding state and collective farms prepared the ground for my participation in the k.r. an organization that set itself the goal of preventing in an organized way the intensive growth of socialist forms of agriculture.

I did not hide my anti-Soviet sentiments in conversations with Gandelsman.

Gandelsman, in one-on-one conversations, at first in a covert and evasive, and then in a more frank form, supported and strengthened my sentiments about the need for a conscious inhibition of the development of livestock farms and collective farms through subversive work.

360

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

In one of the regular meetings with him at the end of July, p.g. in his office, I put before him the question that the existing method of combating cattle felling is harmful, because. its application in practice causes significant losses of livestock in livestock farms, expressing to him fears that as a result of this there may be big troubles and you will have to answer for this.

Gandelsman frankly told me that "it is no secret to him that the method of combating felling leads in practice to harmful consequences", we know, he said, that the method is harmful, but for you and me and for many others who share in our opinion, this is not a minus in the technique, but a plus; it fully satisfies and

groups of people, and further, continuing the conversation, Gandelsman said that you need to adhere firmly to this line, hiding the viciousness and harmfulness of the methodology according to the Cattle Breeding Association system, decisively stopping any criticism of this methodology and attacks against Tartakovsky as the main theorist this method.

At the end of the conversation, I agreed to conduct this line through the Cattle Breeding Association system, and from that moment I consider myself a member of the organization.

Subsequently, I carried out this line.

In the same conversation, he suggested that I adhere to an agreement with him at the upcoming meetings of the headquarters for combating felling, organized at the "Skotovod", where this issue may arise, mentioning at the same time that all orders of the most important order related to measures on felling, henceforth I must coordinate with him in advance, I agreed and subsequently basically carried out this.

Gandelsman pointed out the need for extreme caution in carrying out this line, because every careless step can ruin our cause, we should be especially careful, as he said, in expressing our opinions on political and organizational issues, i.e., in other words, hiding our frank opinion about the situation in the livestock farms.

In the course of further conversations, he pointed out that there was nothing to be particularly afraid of, since the felling technique was officially approved and, thus, carefully conspired, and all prominent veterinary workers who know the habit are our like-minded people, and the main person Tartakovskiy uses enormous authority, has a worldwide reputation and support in the governing bodies.

He also emphasized that, observing the necessary rules of caution in individual cases associated with errors in the methodology and its harmful consequences, it is necessary to immediately take positive measures, emphasizing this in the eyes of the leaders.

In one of the conversations, Gandelsman told me that he managed to attract several people from veterinary specialists to the organization to conduct subversive work in animal husbandry, and that on the periphery, in the regional offices of VET and wind teams, there are people on whom you can rely and who they won't let you down.

Subsequently, from separate conversations at different times with Gandelsman, I learned that in the c.r. The organization also includes and carries out subversive work the following persons: Tartakovsky Mikhail Gavrilovich (Leningrad), Strugalsky (Middle Volga), Dorofeev A.F. and Sorokaletov (Orenburg), Podkopaev B.P. (West. Sib.), Kazan (Ural) and vet. doctor of "Skotovod" - Agapatov (Ural), Khomutov (NKZem RSFSR), Lenshin (Uzbe

DOCUMENTATION \_ 361

kistan), Luchinsky (Uzb.) and a number of persons whose names were mentioned, but I do not remember.

Gandelsman mentioned that a number of veterinarians in livestock farms and

"Vet" detachments were not recruited by us directly into the organization, but in fact, thanks to their anti-Soviet sentiments, they are carrying out our line.

Exactly the time of occurrence of the c.r. I don't know the organization, on this occasion Gandelsman once told me in a conversation:

"We were not just born into the world - believe that people thought something a little earlier than you."

Without hiding his anti-Soviet sentiments before me, Gandelsman, when we discussed the state of affairs in the Union, said that "at the present time, resistance to the policy of the party and government is growing among the masses both in the city and in the countryside, that people see in their own skin the results of this wrong disastrous politics of the Soviets. power, such a situation cannot continue for a long time, and the question (in connection with this) of great political events and changes in the country is just around the corner, but we must contribute to this

wat."

In connection with individual arrests of veterinarians on the periphery, who worked on felling, carried out around August 1931, I had anxious moods, and I turned to Gandelsman about this, he explained to me that these arrests, as far as he knew, are not directly related to the organization as a whole, they occurred, obviously, as a result of deliberately wrong actions or mistakes of individuals, that no one guesses the essence of the ongoing subversive work of our organization and you have nothing to worry about, mentioning that the mistakes of the liquidated k.r. We do not repeat organizations, and that the basis of our secrecy lies in the fact that we are smuggling in the organization's guidelines in official orders approved by the People's Commissariat of the Union.

In response to my attempts in conversations with Gandelsman to be privy to the activities and composition of the organization as a whole, he usually said that in due time you would find out everything in detail, but we, veterinarians, are not alone in subversive work. Of course, you know that there were a number of processes of open organizations whose people sought to change the situation in the country through active opposition, do not think that this case was limited to "confirming once again that you veterinarians are not alone, that this the line is followed by other specialists in our Union, leading the same line next to us and around us. Who, exactly, did not name names.

Gandelsman maintained a close relationship with Prof. Tartakovsky.

Written from my words correctly.

What was written was read to me: K. ANDREEV.

Interrogated authorized 8 Det. ECU OGPU PETROV

INDICATIONS

KOSAREV Vasily Alexandrovich dated November 26, 1932

I plead guilty to the fact that I was a member of the c.r. pest organization of veterinarians.

In addition to me, Kosarev, the center of the c.r. organizations in Moscow include the following persons: Belitser Alexander Vasilyevich - Head. Protozoological Department of VEV, Saikovich Ironii Vasilievich - Director of the Institute of Fear of Sheep VEV, Sizov Pavel Vasilievich - Director of the Institute of Diseases



PTI Ch VEV, Tavel'sky Pavel Vladimirovich - Deputy. head Microbiological

362

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

Department of VEV, Ivanov Boris Georgievich - head. Pat. anat. Department, Gusynin Ivan Afanasevich — Toxicological Laboratory of VEV.

Tavel'sky P.V., Ivanov B.G. and Gusynin I.A. - I was brought to the c.r. work on meningitis while on an expedition in the Middle Volga region in July-August 1932.

The composition of the c.r. organizations also include: Gandelsman Fedor Efremovich - Deputy. Beginning Glavvetupra NKZema Union, Andreev Konstantin Pavlovich - Senior Veterinarian Cattle Breeding Association, Rechmensky Sergei Sergeevich - Researcher at the Institute of Horse Breeding and Titov Nikolai Mikhailovich - Head. veterinary group of the All-Union Institute of Horse Breeding.

In the governing core of the c.r. organizations include: Belitser A.V., Sizov P.V., Saykovich I.V. and Tartakovsky M.G.

K.r. the organization of the center is connected with the peripheral c.r. groupings.

The composition of the c.r. groups on the periphery include the following persons: in Leningrad - prof. Tartakovsky Mikhail Gavrilovich, prof. Pokshishevsky Nikolai Alexandrovich. In the Middle Volga region: prof. Dorofeev Alexander Fedorovich, Germanov Nikolai Ivanovich; Samara NIVI: Polimpsestov Mikhail Alexandrovich - Samara NIVI. In the Lower Volga region: prof. Landa Noy Viktorovich, Kostenko Alexander Ivanovich (arrested). In the North Caucasus: prof. Gurvich Boris Moiseevich, Novochoerkassky Vet. University, Associate Professor Skorodumov (I don't remember his first name, patronymic), works at the Novochoerkassk Vetvuz. In Western Siberia: Podkopaev B.P. (arrested).

Personally, I am recruited into the K.R. organization Belitser A.V. in 1931 at the end.

K.r. the organization carried out active destructive work in animal husbandry, by slowing down the development of veterinary science in the country, curtailing and misdirecting research work and creating conditions for the mass death of livestock from epizootics and diseases on state farms

and collective farms.

The ultimate goal of k.r. organization was the overthrow of the Soviet government.

Detailed testimony as to the activities of k.r. organization as a whole, and about his personal k.r. activity ladies in the following testimony.

It was written down from my words correctly, what was written down was read to me.

V. KOSAREV

Interrogated authorized 8 dep. ECU OGPU PETROV

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

KOSAREV Vasily Alexandrovich dated December 3, 1932

Before leaving Moscow on an expedition to the Middle Volga region, I received from prof. Belitsera A.V. assignment: at the time of my stay on the expedition, establish contact with the head of the Orenburg region. groups of veterinarians prof. Dorofeev A.F.

Prof. Belitzer suggested that I should inform Prof. Dorofeev about the installations of the c.r. organizations in the field of the spread of meningitis, in a conversation he emphasized that Dorofeev is his own person - a tried and tested one, he needs to tell our installations in the main, and you need to share everything with him alone or in a narrow circle of his people, in any case, observing the necessary rules of caution .

I arrived on the expedition at the beginning of July this year.

At the beginning of August of this year. I left together with Tavel'sky, Germanov and Ivanov B.G. from the Sharlyk region, where the expedition was located, to the city of Orenburg.

DOCUMENTATION \_ 363

Prof. On the day of my arrival in Orenburg, I met Dorofeev at work at the institute, and since it was inconvenient to talk at the institute, prof. Dorofeev suggested that we meet at his apartment, where, as he put it, "it will be possible to talk heart to heart and in more detail," I agreed, and we, i.e. I, Kosarev, Germanov, Tavel'sky and Ivanov, gathered at his apartment; doctors Elmanov and Po

limpsests.

During dinner, I informed those present about the position in which, i.e., where and at what work are convicted for wrecking prof. Mikhin, Vyshel'sky and Andreev P.N.

After lunch I am alone with Prof. Dorofeev had a long conversation.

At the beginning of the conversation with him, I told him that in the center (Moscow) there is currently a consolidation of anti-Soviet-minded veterinary specialists and that a core has already been created at the VIEV in Kuzminki, which includes: prof. Belitser A.V., Sizov P.V., I, Saykovich I.V. The organization also includes Prof. Tartakovsky M.G. Here I mentioned that I have orders from Prof. Belitzer to establish and maintain contact with you (Dorofeev).

Continuing the conversation, I informed Prof. Dorofeev about the installations of the c.r. organization for meningitis of horses, saying that the essence of the installations boils down to the deliberate spread of meningitis in the Union, by obscuring the true reason for the appearance of such that the spread of meningitis must be explained by the excessive exploitation of horses on collective farms and state farms, poisoning with poisonous herbs and other causes, hiding the most important thing that meningitis is an infectious disease.

Each of the persons named by me (Belitser, Saikovich, Sizov, Tartakovsky), who are members of the c.r. organization in the center, carries out subversive work in his own, according to his specialty, area. The main task for everyone, which is being carried out, is the deliberate spread of infection.

tional diseases in livestock farms and collective farms.

Prof. Dorofeev, in turn, informed me that he had also created a vet in Orenburg from anti-Soviet-minded vets. workers k.r. a group consisting of: he, Dorofeev, Elmanov, Germanov, Polymp Sestov and two other people, whose names Dorofeev named, but I don't remember.

Informing me about the subversive work carried out by the Orenburg k.r. grouping in animal husbandry, prof. Dorofeev said that they were working on spreading habits among cattle on state farms, and that they carried out this by administering preventive vaccinations to cattle with obviously unsuitable biological preparations, as a result of which immunity was not created in animals, but, on the contrary, after vaccinations, unsuitable with the inoculation material, healthy livestock become infected with the felling, which in turn spreads the infection, thus creating

dumping foci.

According to Dorofeev, they receive unusable biological products from the Omsk Oiofactory, where their own man Podkopaev from the Tobolsk Olofactory works, but he did not mention who personally produces unusable biological products at the latter.

Here, i.e. at the apartment of Prof. Dorofeev, us, i.e. I, Dorofei VIII, Germanov, Elmanov, Tavel'sky, discussed the question put forward by Elma Novy and Germanov about the need to create piroplasmic

364

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

foci on the left side of the Middle Volga Territory (Orenburg, Parlyk, Orsk, Kashirinsky, and other districts), which until that moment was considered safe in relation to piroplasmosis. When discussing this issue, Germanov and Elmanov proposed deliberately infecting livestock with pyroplasmosis by transferring sick cattle with pyroplasmosis from disadvantaged areas to prosperous ones (the left side of the Middle Volga region) - the proposal was approved and accepted.

Written down from my words correctly, what I wrote down was read.

V. KOSAREV

Interrogated

authorized 8 sec. ECU OGPU PETROV

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

GR-na KOSAREV Vasily Aleksandrovich dated 15.XII.32

One of the main tasks of the c.r. organization of veterinarians was the deliberate spread of infectious diseases among the livestock.

In order to cause damage to horse breeding, I personally carried out according to the

According to the innovations of the organization, subversive work was aimed at deliberately spreading among the horse population on collective farms and state farms a very dangerous disease of equine meningitis that had appeared on a large scale.

The way to accomplish this (the spread of meningitis) was to consciously obscure the true cause of meningitis (infection). The setting of the organization, which I also carried out, was that, hiding the infectious nature of this disease, to explain the cause of the spread of meningitis in our Union by the excessive exploitation of horses in collective farms, poisoning with poisonous herbs, etc., i.e. . factors that are not the leading causes of meningitis.

In March and April of this year. I had repeated conversations with Belitzer about the development of a plan for the forthcoming meningitis expedition in the Middle Volga region.

In these conversations, we agreed that the work plan of the expedition should be developed in accordance with the guidelines of the organization, which, in fact, was carried out by me.

Having previously agreed with Belitser in this way, we at official meetings in Moscow at VIEV, vet. When discussing the issue of meningitis, the NKZ sector of the Union gave conflicting instructions, in general, consisting in the fact that the cause of horse meningitis should be sought in the excessive exploitation of horses, poisoning with poisonous herbs, mold fungi, etc. , hiding in their speeches the infectious nature of the disease.

Fulfilling the order of Belitzer to establish communication with the head of the Orenburg k.r. grouping Dorofeev, I, in a conversation with the latter in his apartment alone, informed him about the subversive work carried out by the organization on meningitis, while mentioning that in the end the subversive work carried out by us would lead to the fact that the cause of meningitis would remain unknown, and meningitis in the meantime will spread wider and wider, causing damage to the horse stock.

Neither by me nor by others, i.e. Belitser, Gurvich, Pokshishevsky, Landa, Germanov and others, specific measures and specific measures for the fight against meningitis, which would give an effect, have not been developed.

#### DOCUMENTS \_365

The subversive work carried out by the organization and personally by me in the field of the spread of meningitis led in practice to the fact that meningitis of horses assumed wide proportions in its distribution, affecting district after district, on individual collective farms the death rate of horses from meningitis reached 30-40%, in In the Middle Volga region alone, according to very inaccurate data, during 1932, about 6,000 horses fell from meningitis. In 1932, horse meningitis also began to spread in the state farm sector, affecting horses.

state farm livestock.

As a result:

a) The intentional spread of equine meningitis in collective farms and state farms by the organization and personally by me caused significant damage to the horse population;

b) by my speeches, in which I hid the true cause of meningitis, i.e. its infectious nature, covering it up with reasons for exploitation, poisoning, etc., I misled the organs of Soviet power while on an expedition (veterinary sector of the Middle Volga, district sector);

c) I did not develop specific specific measures to combat meningitis, I dragged out the experiments on the expedition, thereby contributing to the spread of meningitis;

d) by conducting experiments on the reinfection of horses on collective farms in three points (the villages of Mustafino, Kolychevo and N.-Aleksandrovka, Middle Volga), I, Tavel'sky and Germanov, and others artificially infected collective farm horses with meningitis in the amount of 40, and, thus, in obviously prosperous collective farms we created meningitis foci;

e) deliberately, in order to spread meningitis, I instructed the members of the expedition to decompose meningitis into parts in order to further obscure the true cause of meningitis, i.e. hide the infection;

f) by carrying out the work of the expedition only according to a plan drawn up in advance and not changing it at the place of work of the expedition, and also by not conducting experiments and observations on measures against meningitis, I thereby contributed to the natural spread of it.

Written from my words correctly.

What I wrote down was read by V. KOSAREV

Interrogated authorized 8th dep. ECU OGPU PETROV

INDICATIONS

ZAKHAROV Alexander Mikhailovich dated 26.VII.32

In April of this year, in order to coordinate, link and receive instructions on my wrecking activity, I went to Moscow to visit a member of the center of k.r. organizations to Professor P.V. Sizov, director of the Institute for the Study of Bird Diseases at VIEV. During my daily visits to Sizov's laboratory, I had the opportunity to talk with him many times about the plan of wrecking work, and about the sabotage installations, about the composition of the c.r. organizations, etc. Conversations took place both in his office and in his apartment. Prof. Sizov told, among other things, about how some members of the K.R. were arrested in the recent past. organizations, as he had been expecting all the time of his arrest, about nightmarishly difficult conditions, "and they are also forced to engage in diamatism, which no one needs", etc., that all this is so tired that all this should come limit that the methods of wrecking that we have used until now do not give a quick effect, that it is time to move on to the path of more decisive methods of wrecking

366

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

efforts to achieve their ultimate goals as soon as possible. He informed me that k.r. the center adopted the installation for the production of infections

livestock and soil in state farms. In particular, prof. Sizov gave a sabotage directive for infecting the soil in poultry farms with typhus, using for this purpose experiments on the study of immunity with various methods of vaccination against typhus in poultry farms.

The test of immunity with strong typhoid viruses when infected into a vein through the mouth is in itself a dangerous moment in terms of spreading the infection. An infected bird, excreting typhoid bacilli with feces, serves as a moment, all the more dangerous in relation to spreading on the arms, legs, and clothing of persons in contact with infected chickens. Finally, work with the corpses of chickens that have died from infection with a virus during autopsy, microscopic examination and bacteriological work, and the very burying of the corpses, provide a wide opportunity for using these moments for sabotage purposes.

When discussing the question of where this wrecking work should take place, I was told by Prof. Sizov in his office in the presence of A.P. Muratov, that you can set up experiments at any state farm, and in which one, consider for yourself where it will be most safe in the sense of revealing our sabotage activities in this regard. When I said that M.P. Popov advises the Pantsyrevsky poultry farm, I was told that this is the most convenient, since Popov is a member of the k.r. organizations and will help me in the Pantsyrevsk poultry farm in carrying out a sabotage act of infection.

Upon my return from Moscow, I informed other members of our local R.R. organizations about changing the tactics of k.r. organizations in the center and about the installations for the production of infections. I talked about this with M.A. Polymp Sestov, with V.I. Koshelev (in his apartment), with M.P. Popov. I have already dealt with this in my previous testimony.

In order to carry out a wrecking act of infecting the soil and birds on state farms, according to the instructions received by me from a member of the center of the wrecking organization, prof. Sizov, upon arrival from Moscow, some time later, I began to prepare for an expedition to the Pantsyrevsky poultry farm. To carry out wrecking work, I attracted the head. Helminthological department of NIVI M.A. Polimpsestov, devoting him to the essence of the ongoing sabotage experiment, and a member of the group M.P. Popov. Thus, I could count on their help in my wrecking work. But later it turned out that Palimpsestov could not go to the state farm for various reasons. Easily received in principle consent to work in the Pantsyrevsky poultry farm from the directorate of the NIVI, since according to the plan, according to the installation given to me in the center by prof. Sizov, infection with the typhoid virus was not entered during experiments at the state farm, I went to the representative of the Ptitsetrest, with whom I easily agreed in the presence of M.P. Popov. To the latter, as was said above, even earlier I outlined the plan of our wrecking work on infection at the state farm and received from him also consent to participate in it. Bearing in mind, therefore, help from two of his own people, Polimpsestov and Popov, and even the promised representative from the center of the wrecking organization (Sizov promised to send one of his people to guide the implementation of the wrecking act), I hoped that the success of the ongoing wrecking work on infection is assured.

Parallel to this, work was underway to select the most virulent strain of typhoid cultures in order to cause the most rapid infection. According to

installation prof. Sizov, it was stipulated that if someone would pay attention to the strong virulence of the virus, then use the reference that the test of immunity obtained as a result of preliminary vaccination of typhoid vaccine formulas gives the most effective result if apply the strongest virus. An explanation behind which it is easy to hide your real sabotage goals.

Upon arrival at the Pantsyrevsky poultry farm, when from a letter from prof. Sizov, it turned out that from k.r. the head of the center cannot come, and also out of fear that the wrecking purpose of the experiment being carried out could be revealed, the veterinarian of the state farm, Petrov, a communist, who, as a specialist, could guess from the nature and methods of conducting our work about what we were doing under the guise of experiments infecting the state farm with typhus, I hesitated whether to start this wrecking work. But at a meeting in the room vt. outpatient clinics at the state farm M.P. Popov encouraged me with his decision to carry out the act of sabotage.

As a result, I decided to carry out a wrecking act.

The implementation of wrecking activity was facilitated by the fact that there was no sufficiently qualified preparator, due to which the possibility of revealing the essence of our wrecking act of infection was reduced to nothing.

When working at the Pantsyrevsky poultry farm, we had the opportunity to carry out sabotage in other places, for example, at the Atyashevsky poultry farm, where, according to M.P. Popov, there were some indications of the presence of typhus and that, consequently, it was possible to carry out wrecking work to infect the soil under cover of it. For the same purpose, Popov's trip to one of the collective farms in the Syzran region was planned. Then, during my trip to the city of Syzran to clarify the issue of choosing an object for work on the wrecking installations I received from a member of the center of the K.R. organizations of prof. Sizov, designed for mass infection, I had the opportunity to conduct them at the hatchery and poultry station in the city of Syzran, where I implemented the organization formula "no infection - there will be infection" (typhoid). The essence of the sabotage committed by me at the incubator-poultry station in the city of Syzran was that, under the slogan not to disrupt the incubation campaign, which is of a political nature, and by this, using the weak string of the business executive, I gave my conclusion and permission to collect eggs for incubation from a typhoid-affected area for IPS and its transfer of chickens from the station to typhoid-affected collective farms for industrial purposes. The purpose of this act of wrecking was to cause the spread of infection throughout the region with the transfer of chickens, since the egg and chicken are carriers of typhoid infection and the entry of an infected egg from a region unfavorable for typhus to the IRS and the release of infected Chickens from the latter ( incubated from a typhoid egg) actually turns the IRS into a place of constant cultivation and spread of typhus throughout all areas of the station. Typhoid infection is constantly maintained both at the station and at the places where the station sends chickens. The said permission was made by me contrary to the categorical statement of the veterinarian Nal, the veterinarian of the incubator-association Kukhlyakov (in Samara) and the veterinarian of the Incubator-association Evstigneev (in Moscow).

In order to carry out sabotage by infecting the soil and introducing the Infection into the Pantsyrevsky poultry farm, I used Vet. outpatient clinic for the state farm, where the laboratory part of the work was carried out, making it the center of in-

368

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

typhus infection. Proximity to vet. the ambulatory to the state farm created the best conditions for our wrecking purposes of introducing typhoid infection into the state farm. Anyone entering the vet. the outpatient clinic, without suspecting it, spread the infection, which invisibly settled on it from all sides with dust, dirt, etc., since the whole room was heavily infected by us. For infection, various moments of laboratory work were used, which were deliberately performed extremely carelessly. So, a drop of the virus, deliberately dropped on a dressing gown, seeped through it and was carried away to an apartment in a state farm. The corpses of chickens and chickens, although they were burned, were deliberately left on the floor at the wrong time and for a long time. Flies landed on their insides, as well as on tools, and then flew to the state farm. When working with the virus, with cultures of cholera, typhoid, chicken colibacillosis, when seeding from pipettes, then when transferring from one nutrient medium to another, such as: on agar-agar, broth, various sugars, under the pretext of differential diagnosis, I made a conscious infection of objects and outpatient clinics in general.

In addition to the spread of typhus, I contributed to the spread of colibacillosis in chickens by consciously not taking measures of a medical order, as well as by not taking measures to carry out prevention, carrying out the general installation of k.r. wrecking organization - to study the causes of diseases in general, but not to take measures to stop the epizootic.

Written by ZAKHAROV with his own hand.

Interrogated the Executive. 2 sec. ECO PP OGPU SVK OPRITOV

#### INDICATIONS

Strugalsky Vyacheslav Yulianovich dated July 18, 1932

In accordance with the general guidelines of our counter-revolutionary grouping, my personal sabotage activities are aimed at undermining socialist animal husbandry, at creating conditions hindering the solution of the meat problem, and also at kindling the discontent of the peasantry with the Soviet regime. As a consultant to the authorized VET, I was in fact the head of the operational wind squads and used this official position to carry out my sabotage activities through the following measures. -

In order to slow down the quantitative growth of the livestock, I carried out a mass slaughter of healthy cattle under the guise of a patient with peripneumonia, using for this purpose the point of the instruction on the slaughter of all sick, suspected in the disease and suspected of infecting cattle with peripneumonia. In official orders, I demanded strict adherence to this paragraph of the instruction. In conversations with the leaders of wind detachments and individual workers, I said that it is better to slaughter healthy cattle more than to leave in the herd at least a few animals that are sick with felling, thereby setting the stage for mass slaughter of livestock. As a result of this sabotage, for the 31st year it was killed in the region in connection with the elimination of peripneumonia



up to 15,000 heads of cattle, of which no more than 20-25% were sick with felling.

Knowing that the serological method of diagnosing peripneumonia by 50% or more gives incorrect readings and that it is one of the methods of wrecking work of the counter-revolutionary organization, I persistently carried out a mass diagnosis of peripneumonia by the serological method. By this I pursued the goal of increasing the contingent of cattle to be slaughtered,

DOCUMENTATION \_ 369

wasting public funds on costly serodiagnostics and thwarting the plan to eradicate peripneumonia. Indeed, the mass of animals slaughtered on the basis of positive indications of seroreaction turned out to be free from peripneumonia, and vice versa, animals that gave a negative seroreaction later turned out to be sick with peripneumonia. Thus, in addition to increasing the contingents of cattle to be slaughtered, the serological method, hiding by its negative indications the mass of cattle affected by peripneumonia, contributed to the further infection of the herd.

In order to uselessly spend public funds and create favorable conditions for the natural development of peripneumonia, I used deliberately low-quality biological preparations from the Tobolsk biofactory. The fact that the technical manager at this biofactory was a member of Ph.D. organization, a veterinarian KAZANSKY, orientated me in the poor quality of biological preparations produced by the Tobolsk biofactory, which was actually confirmed in practice. In the past 31st year, 6 culture series turned out to be completely inactive. Of the 93,000 heads of cattle vaccinated with these crops, 58,000 vaccinations were invalidated by acts. This is formal, but in fact, all vaccinated cattle did not receive immunity. As a result, huge folk funds for these vaccinations were ruined, and favorable conditions were created in the vaccinated herds for the natural development of peripneumonia, since, having not received immunity from vaccination with these cultures, the cattle remained susceptible to infection with peripneumonia. Epizooty after these vaccinations did not stop, so later vaccinations were still carried out, repeating in separate herds up to 5-6 times.

This year, peripneumonia lymph from the Tobolsk biofactory was used for vaccinations. TARTAKOVSKY's instructions at the Orenburg conference on the need to replace culture with lymph and his hints in behind-the-scenes conversations about lymph as a new method of wrecking, I accepted as a sabotage directive from a member of the counter-revolutionary center to disrupt further measures to eliminate peripneumonia by inoculation with lymph and persistently let it go. into use. The wrecking bet on the lymph was justified. A number of batches of lymph from the Tobolsk Biofactory caused a violent reaction in the vaccinated cattle with mass complications, falling off of tails and a waste of up to 3%, and in some herds even up to 8% of vaccinated cattle. The use of such lymph was intended, on the one hand, to cause a mass exodus of livestock, and on the other hand, to kindle dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime among the peasantry and push them to actively oppose the authorities, since this year the work of the veto ranks to eliminate peripneumonia is being carried out in the collective farm sector. Indeed, the vaccinations aroused the strongest indignation among the collective farmers.

I carried out a whole series of wrecking actions, work to delay the activities carried out by the wind detachments. This carried out the sabotage target setting to artificially maintain and delay the epidemiological

zootia of peripneumonia in the region. To this end, I carried out measures aimed at disrupting the timely supply of detachments with biological preparations, etc. veterinary supply; I gave belated applications to the biofactory for the release of biological products in the region; plans for the need for biological preparations and, in general, for veterinary supplies for veterinary teams, were drawn up incorrectly in terms of the timing of receipt; the fulfillment of the requirements of the veterinary teams for veterinary supply and biological preparations was delayed; instructions were given to a member of our group PERMYAKOV, the manager of the warehouse for veterinary supply, to send

370

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

to crop orders with an expiring shelf life; with the aim of insufficient supply of culture to some detachments, it was sent in excess quantities to other wind detachments. In order to lull the vigilance of the Kraivetsektor, he gave him data that did not correspond to the actual state of affairs on the degree of provision of veterinary detachments with biological preparations. In addition to delaying the work to eliminate peripneumonia, interruptions in the supply of wind teams caused them downtime and, as a result, their unproductive expenditure of funds.

For wrecking purposes, I carried out an incorrect alignment of veterinary forces: some veterinary teams were overloaded with veterinary personnel, while in others there was an acute shortage of wind workers; The veterinary staff was also unevenly distributed according to their production qualities, which had a particularly harmful effect on the work of the veterinary teams, the appointment of anti-Soviet and solidary people as heads of the veterinary teams: Rozhdestvensky - Sol-Iletsk veterinary team, Blagorazumov - in the meat state farm "Ko-mintern", Yankov - Orsk wind detachment. In order to increase the desertion of veterinarians, in conversations with them, I maintained a demobilization mood, developing the idea that the size of the salary does not correspond to the severity of the work and the hardships of the veterinary staff of operational veterinary teams; spoke about the injustice of such a situation, when some workers work for a year or more on felling, while others live and work in a calm home environment, etc. With the same sabotage goal of delaying the eradication of peripneumonia, I delayed for two winter months, December-January, the implementation of vaccinations, covering this sabotage with formal motives: by an order from the central headquarters for the elimination of peripneumonia to stop vaccination from December 15 for the whole winter and the need to give veterinary staff labor holidays. Deliberately, I gave belated general orders to the wind teams, as well as answers to the requests of the wind teams. In order to cause interruptions in the veterinary supply of the windrowers, to delay the timely resolution of the needs of the windrower, etc., I inspired the leaders of the veterinary teams that it would be useless for them to address all the issues that concern them to the Territory of the veterinary sector and the need to apply in all cases directly to the VET office. In particular, in October in the city of Orenburg, at a meeting with some leaders of the wind detachments: Kazansky, Shersnov, Arkhangelsky, and others, I said: "Why go to the Crivetsektor with your needs? Anyway, he will send your letters and telegrams to the authorized VET. You will be satisfied much faster if you apply directly to the authorized VET."

In order to collect information about the political mood of the collective farmers and state farm workers, I used all the meetings with the workers of the wind detachments. Everything that I learned through questioning about the mood of the village, I shared with the members of our counter-revolutionary group, and the latter

buildings were transferred to -r. center.

Written by V. Strugalsky

Interrogated by the Plenipotentiary. 2nd Dep. ECO PP OGPU SVK OPRITOV

EXTRACT FROM THE

TESTIMONY OF DOROFEEV Alexander Fedorovich dated 27-29/IX-32

The transmission of wrecking attitudes and the essence and purposefulness of the general direction of wrecking activity was carried out during meetings, interviews, during personal briefings and information on certain issues of work that took place both in the service and outside it.

DOCUMENTATION

371

So, during a break in work, the commission of the Orenburg conference in the premises of my department of epizootology, member of Ph.D. Organization Kazansky, in a conversation with me on the question of the wrecking activities of Tartakovsky and the methods of carrying them out, informed me that at the December Moscow conference, all the main wrecking installations were very successfully carried out by Tartakovsky without any difficulties. The same Kazansky after Tartakovsky at the Orenburg conference at ours, i.e. members of the organization - participants of the conference, assistance managed to implement the method of inoculation with lymph from the three new sabotage guidelines put forward by him (about inoculation with lymph, about reducing the quarantine period and about the non-infectiousness of chronicles), conveying to me in an intimate conversation that he has a very strong , a standard peripneumonic virus that can give a strong reaction, and that Tartakovsky instructs him to organize the preparation and distribution of such lymph for tail vaccinations in the Tobolsk biofactory in 1932, while he added that in order to calm the veterinary staff (that is, to divert eyes ) it will be possible to release lymph diluted 10 times with saline, which he did in 1932.

During the period of the Orenburg Conference, the members of our organization expressed great fears among themselves that the conference would expose the essence of the sabotage work inherent in the complex of measures.

In particular, Gandelsman, a member of the organization of the center, expressed these fears in conversations with me, and at the end of the conference he shared with me his joy that the complex was recognized as correct and thus the wrecking principles of our organization were once again formalized and legalized.

Secret Copy

OGPU USSR

December 25, 1932

No. 321161

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE CC AUCP(b) Comrade STALIN

On December 12, the OGPU bodies in the center and in Ukraine began to liquidate the k.r. organization opened by undercover agents in the Tractorcenter system.

On December 22, the OGPU arrested 15 members of the organization in Moscow and 48 members of the organization in Ukraine (Kharkov, Kyiv, Odessa).

The initiated investigation fully confirmed the undercover materials and additionally established that the organization in the Tractor Center is the main core of a more powerful C.R. an organization that embraced the most important agricultural institutions (People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR, People's Commissariat of Land of the Ukrainian SSR, People's Commissariat of State Farms, etc.).

The composition of the c.r. organizations

The composition of the c.r. organizations in Moscow and in regional centers included specialists holding responsible positions in various agricultural institutions, and a significant part of them had previously worked in Ukraine and graduated from agricultural educational institutions there; among this category of members of the organization there are a large number of former officers of the tsarist and white armies. So, for example, Zabolotsky is an agronomist of the Tractor Center, second lieutenant of the Kolchak army, Petrov is a responsible

372

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

Executive of the Tractor Center, nobleman, staff captain of the tsarist army, Kush Narenko - senior agronomist of the Dobrovoyelchkovskaya MTS, former officer of the Denikin army, Kiyashko - head of the planning group of the Narkomzem of the Ukrainian SSR, former officer of the tsarist and white army, Kiyansky - head of the grain group of the MTS of the Odessa Regional Tractor, a former white officer, Babak - head of the Planning and Production Department of the Odessa Regional Tractor, a former white officer and a member of punitive expeditions, etc.

The lower levels of the organization almost entirely consist of former kulaks, white officers, merchants, and the like.

Individual members of the c.r. organizations penetrated into the party, namely: one of the leaders of the organization - Kovarsky Mikhail Efimovich, born in 1899, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR and Deputy Chairman of the Board of the Grain Tractor Center, has close relatives in Poland, graduated from the Technological Institute in Ukraine, member party since 1932, and POROGOV - born in 1898, graduated from the Odessa Agricultural Institute, candidate member of the CPSU (b) since 1930.

Particular attention should be paid to Porogovo. The real name of Porotov is Pirogov, he changed his surname in order to hide his past. In the past, the son of a fist, he served with the whites. In 1922, he committed a terrorist act against party member Gorban (inflicted a severe wound with three shots) because the latter was conducting a campaign to evict landowners from nationalized estates.

The emergence and structure of the c.r. organizations

The data of the investigation established that k.r. organization arose first

initially in Ukraine in the autumn of 1931, where a "practical center" was formed, which led the entire k.r. work in Ukraine.

Almost simultaneously, a "political center" was created in Moscow (the composition of which has not yet been established by the investigation) for the general leadership of the K.R. activities of the entire organization as a whole.

On this occasion, an active member of the c.r. organization, senior agronomist of the Production Department of the Grain and Tractor Center Koroy I.A. shows:

"On the organizational structure of the c.r. organization Kovarsky told me the following: c.r. the organization arose in Ukraine by the autumn of 1931. At present, there is a political center of the k.r. organizations in Moscow and peripheral cells in a number of territories and regions, including Ukraine, which is the most tense region, has its own practical center, the importance of which is very great.

(From the testimony of Koroy I.A. dated November 15, 1932).

On the periphery, the organization has an extensive network of cells planted mainly in the MTS, as well as in state farms and individual collective farms.

In particular, in Ukraine, the investigation revealed grassroots cells of the c.r. organizations in the MTS: Korenovskaya, Dmitrovskaya, Novobugskaya, Vladimirskaia, Bosniatskaya, Akkardzhanskaya, Dobrovelichkovskaya, Shmelevskaya, Kakhovskaya and at the Pioneer state farm.

The testimony of a member of the organization Zorin, a former senior agronomist of the olive state farm, establishes the existence of kulak cells created under his leadership in the villages: Trudolyubovka, Lyubimovka, at the Pioneer state farm.

On this occasion, the accused Zorin M.Ya. shows:

#### DOCUMENTATION

373

"In accordance with the instructions given to us by Gurov (a member of the C.R. organization—our note), the results of our C.R. wrecking work were are:

Organized agro circles worked out and selected an asset for agitation among the villagers to organize peasant unions and to use it in general at the right moment.

So, according to Trudolyubovka - Zinchenko P.V., dispossessed; Zinchenko F. - dispossessed; Kiva D. - middle peasant, Zinchenko N. - middle peasant.

According to Lyubimovka - Vdovenko A., dispossessed; Kikot N. - dispossessed, Fomenko O. - dispossessed, Berezhnoy N. - dispossessed.

I personally, Zorin, conducted their processing and instruction.

I personally organized a group (Pioner state farm - our comment), whose tasks included wrecking, the decomposition of collective farms and agitation in order to provoke discontent among the villagers against the Soviet regime.

(From the testimony of Zorin M.Ya. dated November 19, 1.32).

In the North Caucasus, cells of organization have been identified in the Yeysk, Tikhoretsk, Yegorlyksky, and Kropotkinsky grain state farms.

(Excerpts from the testimony of Koroy I.A., Zorina M.I., Orlenko I.E. -

Appendix No. 1).

#### Objectives of k.r. organizations

The main purpose of the c.r. organizations - to cause an uprising in the countryside, primarily in Ukraine, for which the organization carried out the following practical measures:

1. Planted kulak-insurgent groups on the periphery.
2. Widely deployed k.r. kulak agitation in order to recruit numerous cadres for the upcoming uprising.
3. In order to cause acute dissatisfaction in the countryside with Soviet power and to discredit in the eyes of the peasantry the ideas of mechanization and collectivization of agriculture, the organization carried out systematic subversive work on the collapse of collective farms, MTS and state farms, by disorganizing the tractor fleet, direct damage and putting tractors out of action, sending surplus spare parts to some regions due to underdelivery to others, deliberate clogging of fields.
4. Relying on its grassroots counter-revolutionary cells in the MTS, state farms and collective farms, and on kulak groups, it organized sabotage of grain procurements and the sowing campaign in a number of regions of Ukraine and the North Caucasus. accused Kuznetsov AND.The. shows: "In order to achieve the set tasks, c.-r. the organization, by its subversive measures, disrupted the work of the MTS and thereby caused breakthroughs in the conduct of agricultural production. campaign, sought to disrupt the procurement of grain and raw materials for industry, trying to worsen the work of supply and arouse the discontent of the workers, tried to use the difficulties in the countryside and provoke political work in the collective farms, the collapse of the collective farms and the active resistance of the peasantry to the Soviet government

In addition to subversive work, the main task of the counter-revolutionary organization was political work in the collective farms, with the aim of disintegrating the collective farms and causing uprisings.

(From the testimony of Kuznetsov I.V. dated 21.XN.32).

374

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

On this occasion, the accused Koroy testifies:

"Through people associated with k.-r. organization, the latter carried out systematic work to weaken the collective farms and their collapse, using grain procurements, the issuance of advance payments in kind, the distribution of income, k.-r. On this basis, the organization conducted agitation among collective farmers for absenteeism from work, for opposition to grain procurements, for mass withdrawals from collective farms and, as the ultimate goal, for organizing an uprising with the aim of overthrowing Soviet power.

(From the testimony of Koroy I.A. dated 22.XII.32).

The testimony of the same Koroy AND.A. it was established that the majority of the "political center" considered it necessary to speed up the preparation of an uprising in the border regions of Ukraine, namely: Kiev, Vinnitsa, Odessa, Moldavian ASSR, since the organization assumed that conditions might be brewing already in the autumn of this year, in which it is possible to organize performances.

Koroy shows:

"Even in the summer of this year. From Kovarsky, I learned that the "Ukrainians" and the majority of the political center consider it necessary to speed up the preparation of an armed uprising in Ukraine, in particular in the border regions: Kiev, Vinnitsa, Odessa and the MASSR. It was assumed that already in the fall of this year. conditions may arise under which it is possible to organize an armed uprising.

(From the testimony of Koroy IL dated 22.KhP32).

(Excerpts from the testimony of Koroy IL, Kuznetsova I.V., Ponomarenko A.S., Zorina M.Ya., Orlenko I.E. - Appendix No. 2).

Connection with Poland

The investigation found that k.-r. the organization was connected with the Polish agents and worked on their direct assignments.

In particular, the insurgent work of k.-r. The organization followed the direct instructions of the Polish agents, and the Poles were promised help with weapons and the transfer of people from Poland to the territory of Ukraine. On the instructions of the Polish agents, the organization carried out espionage and reconnaissance work and preparations for sabotage, for which special sums were released by the Poles.

M.E. Kovarsky was in direct contact with the Polish agents. and on his behalf Koroy I.A.

"Kovarsky, in a conversation with me about relations with Poland, said that the latter was interested in deploying a c.-r. works specifically in Ukraine and gives direct directives on this matter to the political center, from which, in turn, Kovarsky receives instructions on practical subversive work.

(From the testimony of Koroy I.A. dated 18.XI32).

(Excerpts from the testimony of Koroy I.A. - Appendix No. 3).

The OGPU is simultaneously investigating the disclosed k.-r. organizations in animal husbandry.

In the course of the investigation, data subject to refinement were obtained, which indicate a relation between the c.-r. organizations in animal husbandry with this organization.

The investigation in both cases began on December 12, and more detailed data on the activities of these organizations, obtained in the process of further development of the investigation, will be reported later.

ZAM. CHAIRMAN OF THE OGPU PROKOFIEV

BEGINNING ECU OGPU MIRONOV

DOCUMENTATION

375

PROTOCOL OF THE  
INTERROGATION OF KOROV Ivan Alexandrovich dated 24.XII.32

QUESTION. Since when have you been involved in k.r. organization?

ANSWER. Since December last year, and began to carry out practical instructions for the organization since February 1932.

QUESTION. Who are you involved in the organization?

ANSWER. Kovarsky M.E.

QUESTION. Where did the recruitment take place?

ANSWER. At Kovarsky's apartment.

QUESTION. What did Kovarsky say to you when recruiting for the K.R. organization?

ANSWER. In a private conversation with him, which at first was of a general nature, Kovarsky developed his views on the ways and forms of the development of agriculture: he gave a number of examples from the capitalist economy of America, where he was on a 6-month business trip. On this basis, he expressed the idea that the normal development and mechanization of agriculture under collectivization is impossible, and therefore it is necessary to fight against the existing agricultural policy of the Soviet government.

This point of view, according to him, is shared by a group of people working in this direction. He invited me to join them and practically work with them, i.e. counteract the mechanization and collectivization of agriculture.

QUESTION. Did you take part in the practical work of k.r. organizations?

ANSWER. Yes, I did.

QUESTION. When did the k.r. organization?

ANSWER. By the autumn of 1931.

QUESTION. What are the political goals of the organization?



ANSWER. K.r. The organization set itself the task of combating Soviet power, considering all forms of combating it acceptable and necessary: the organization of an armed uprising, the preparation of sabotage, as well as reconnaissance and subversive work in the field of agriculture.

QUESTION. What was the practical insurrectionary work of K.R. organizations?

ANSWER. K.r. the organization, taking advantage of the difficulties in agriculture, worked to weaken and break up collective farms, organizing absences from work, mass withdrawals from collective farms, opposition to grain procurements, and so on. By weakening the collective farms and the direct campaign work of the k.r. the organization created a hostile attitude of the peasantry towards the Soviet power and prepared the mood for armed action. For the same purpose, the organization created and strengthened regional groupings, creating district groupings in the most responsible areas. She recruited supporters and participants in the villages from among the elements hostile, dissatisfied and offended by the Soviet power and organized a special apparatus for communication and leadership of the C.R. work in the countryside.

QUESTION. What areas were designated by the organization as the main centers of the uprising?

ANSWER. Regions of Ukraine: Kiev, Vinnitsa, Odessa and MASSR.

QUESTION. What determined the choice of these areas as the main centers of uprisings?

ANSWER. Firstly, these areas were considered k.r. organization the most intense and, from this point of view, the most suitable for the organization

376 \_ LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

uprisings. Secondly, on this occasion there were direct instructions from Poland, with which the K.R. organization was connected.

QUESTION. Was there any time limit for the armed uprising?

ANSWER. Kovarsky reported that, in the opinion of the Political Center, as early as the autumn of 1932 conditions favorable for an armed uprising might be ripening.

QUESTION. Who led the practically insurgent work?

ANSWER. The main leading role in the preparation of the uprising was played by the Political Center; organizational and practical work in this direction was carried out by the Ukrainian Practical Center.

QUESTION. What was the practical work in preparation for the uprising?

ANSWER. I know that in connection with the turn of the struggle towards the organization of the insurrection, the political center considered it especially necessary to strengthen the regional groupings of the K.R. organization and for this purpose sent special people to the Kyiv, Vinnitsa and Odessa regions, whose names are unknown to me. In addition, according to Kovarsky, a special apparatus was created for communication and practical guidance in the preparation

uprisings in the countryside.

QUESTION. Who personally from the members of the c.r. organization participated in practical insurrectionary work?

ANSWER. I don't know, Kovarsky didn't tell me anything about it.

QUESTION. What kind of forces did the c.r. count on for help? organization in insurgency?

ANSWER. K.r. The organization was promised help from Poland, with which the organization was associated.

QUESTION. How exactly should this help be expressed?

ANSWER. In case of armed uprisings, Poland promised the transfer of the necessary people and support with weapons. In addition, I know that Poland financed k.r. organization on a large scale.

QUESTION. Have you personally used k.r. organization for insurrectionary work?

ANSWER. No, it hasn't been used.

QUESTION. Were you supposed to be used?

ANSWER. Kovarsky told me that in connection with the change in the direction of work of k.r. organizations, i.e. with the transition to more active forms of struggle against the Soviet regime, including the organization of insurrectionary work, he plans to use me to travel to Ukraine, to the Odessa region, for the purpose of communication and instructing. One such trip was planned in November, but for reasons unknown to me it did not take place.

QUESTION. What do you know about the connection of k.r. organizations with Polish agents?

ANSWER. K.r. The organization had close ties with Poland, both directly through the Polish mission in Moscow, and in the form of personal ties between individual leading members of the K.R. organizations with white émigré circles in Poland.

QUESTION. Have you personally participated in the implementation of communications k.r. organizations with a Polish mission?

ANSWER. Yes, I did.

QUESTION. Indicate how specifically your participation was expressed?

ANSWER. On behalf of Kovarsky, in his apartment in July of this year, I met twice with a person whom Kovarsky called to me the representative of the Polish mission. In addition, in June, on behalf of Kovarsky, I handed over to a member of the organization Skorupsky a letter for a certain Yakubovsky and

## DOCUMENTS \_377

in the same month, at the Belorussky railway station, he handed over to a person who identified himself as Vladimirsky a letter from Kovarsky addressed to Minsk. Both of these cases also

are related to the organization's connection with Poland.

QUESTION. Tell us about these meetings in detail.

ANSWER. At the beginning of June, Kovarsky asked me to give Skorupsky, with whom I was then living in the same house in Losinoostrovskaya, a letter addressed to Yakubovsky, moreover, Kovarsky warned that the letter had to do with relations with Poland. At the same time, on behalf of Kovarsky, I met at the Belorussky railway station at the agreed password with a citizen who identified himself as Vladimirsky, and handed him a letter addressed to Minsk. In the middle of June, in the evening at the apartment of Kovarsky, who at that time lived in a dacha, I met with a citizen unknown to me, whose name Kovarsky did not tell me, but warned that he was a representative of the Polish mission. At the meeting, I gave him the packages prepared by Kovarsky, and received from him two packages, as well as a bundle containing 50,000 rubles. I gave the money and packages to Kovarsky. At the end of July, in the same place, at Kovarsky's apartment, a second meeting took place with the same person, and this time I received two packages from him to hand over to Kovarsky and handed him also two packages prepared by Kovarsky. In addition, I informed the representative of the Polish mission about the work of the c.r. organizations according to a note prepared in advance by Kovarsky.

QUESTION. Do you know the contents of the packets you handed over to the representative of the Polish mission?

ANSWER. Known. At the first meeting, a summary of spring sowing in the regions of Ukraine, the Central Chernobyl region, the North Caucasus and Crimea, as well as a summary of beet weeding, was handed over. At the second meeting, a list of MTS and machine and tractor workshops in the Kyiv, Vinnitsa and Odessa regions was handed over. The contents of the remaining packets handed over to the representative of the Polish mission and received from him for delivery to Kovarsky are unknown to me.

QUESTION. Do you know the amount of funding for c.r. organizations by Polish agents?

ANSWER. No, I don't know the exact amount of funding, but Kovarsky told me that funding is provided on a large scale, both in foreign currency and in Soviet signs.

QUESTION. Have there been any other cases in which you received money for c.r. organizations?

ANSWER. No, there were no other cases.

QUESTION. For what purposes did the funds received from the Polish agents go?

ANSWER. Basically, for the organization of intelligence work, the preparation of sabotage, insurgent work and the maintenance of members of the K.R. organizations that are in an illegal position.

QUESTION. What do you know about the intelligence work of k.r. organizations?

ANSWER. I know that the intelligence work of the organization was carried out on behalf of Poland. Except in those cases in which I personally took part by passing on information, other facts of intelligence work unknown to me.

QUESTION. What do you know about the sabotage work of the organization?

ANSWER. I know that the organization carried out practical measures in this direction, but I personally was not involved in this work, and therefore I do not know any specific facts about this work or about the objects of the Sabotage.

QUESTION. What do you know about the structure of the organization?

378

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

ANSWER. The organization is headed by the Political Center, located in Moscow. In addition, there is a practical center in the Ukraine, which is given great independence in resolving all practical issues. In a number of regions, including all regions of Ukraine, there are groups of k.r. organizations carrying out the directives of the political center and conducting organizational work in their fields. According to Kovarsky, district groupings have also been created in critical areas, as, for example, he pointed out to the Olishevsky and Proskurovsky districts. In the villages and collective farms, members of the KR are recruited. organizations from among alien and dissatisfied

nyh co-power elements.

QUESTION. What are the functions of the Moscow Political Center?

ANSWER. General management of all work of the c.r. organization, its Ukrainian and regional groupings, as well as those branch groupings that exist through agricultural institutions in Moscow. In addition, the Political Center mainly communicates with Poland.

QUESTION. Who is a member of the Moscow Political and Ukrainian Practical Centers?

ANSWER. The composition of the centers is unknown to me.

QUESTION. Which of the members of the c.r. organizations close to the center?

ANSWER. Of the members of the organization known to me, Kovarsky is close to the political center.

QUESTION. Which members of the organization do you know?

ANSWER. In Moscow, in the Tractor Center, from the members of the k.r. organizations known to me: Kuznetsov, Kremenetsky, Skorupsky, Zabolotsky, Masterenko, Dolt, and, it seems, is a member of the Dubrovin organization. Of the employees of the Tractor Center on the periphery, I know: in Kharkov - Rodzevich and Kovarsky's brother, in Odessa - Babak and Kiyansky, in Vinnitsa - Shekhovtsov, Rostov-on-Don - Ulitin, Simferopol - Grauden, Leningrad - Pokrovsky and Yakovlev, Minsk - Tarasov. In addition, I heard from Kovarsky as a member of the organization in Samara - Safonov, but the specific facts of his participation in the c.r. I don't know about work. Of the members of the organization working in Moscow in agricultural institutions, I know: Porogov in the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, Oleinikov - Zernotrest, Mikhailovsky - Sortsemtrest, Serikov - Semenovod, Kramarenko - Cattle Breeding Association and Klepikov - Soyuzsakhhar.

QUESTION. What areas are covered by the periphery of the c.r. organizations?

ANSWER. I know that the organization covers all regions of Ukraine, the North Caucasus, the Central Chernobyl region, the Leningrad region and Belarus.

QUESTION. Did the organization carry out subversive work in the field of agriculture, and in what way?

ANSWER. Yes, she did. Basically, subversive work was carried out by disorganizing the tractor fleet, ignoring agrotechnical measures, underusing complex machines, delaying the introduction of new mechanization, etc. The counter-revolutionary work in the MTS and the collective farms was aimed at the collapse of the collective farms by reducing labor discipline, absenteeism, organizing mass exits from the collective farms and by fighting against grain procurements.

QUESTION. What was the expression of your subversive work as a member of the organization?

ANSWER. The main instructions of Kovarsky, carried out by me with a subversive purpose, were as follows: directives were developed for the introduction of crop rotation along the lines of the Tractor Center, lubricating the combat significance of this measure to increase productivity. Developed with Kovarsky

DOCUMENTATION \_ 379

materials on the use of tractors for a report in government bodies; negative indicators on tractor use were deliberately hidden in the materials. In the production guidelines for the harvesting campaign, there was an attempt to lubricate the most important measures for organizing labor and combating losses. A line was drawn on the underutilization of pickers in corn harvesting and combine harvesters in sunflower harvesting in order to increase crop losses. The production directives, which were of great practical importance, were delayed in order to disrupt the work of the MTS (production instructions for the processing of tilled crops), the development and distribution of the form of the MTS production plan for 1933 was delayed in order to delay and disorganize the preparation of the MTS for the spring sowing season. campaigns of 1933.

QUESTION. What place was occupied by subversive work in the k.r. activities of the organization?

ANSWER. In the first period, subversive work was of primary importance and the main attention was directed to it, for which the k.r. the organization created its branches along the lines of the main institutions working in the field of agriculture. Since the summer of 1932, political work has occupied the main attention, while subversive work has become a secondary part of the general political work. organization's activities.

The answers were shorthand and read by me. CORA

INTERROGATED: BEGINNING. ECU OGPU MIRONOV

BEGINNING 8 DEP. ECU APRESYAN

APPENDIX No. 1

EXTRACT

From the protocol of interrogation of Mr. KOROY Ivan Alexandrovich dated December 18, 1932

"In the previously mentioned conversations that took place between me and Kovarsky M.E., the latter answered my questions that k.r. The organization originated initially in the Ukraine, where, approximately in August-September 1931, the c.r. a group that later turned into the Ukrainian Practical Center. Kovarsky did not tell me the names of the participants and the size of this group, but he told me that it was mainly made up of the remnants of the wrecking organization in agriculture, discovered and liquidated by the GPU in 1930. Establishing a connection with Moscow and the formation of a political center here, as well as a practical group of k.r. organization in the Tractor Center belongs to the same period, i.e. by September-October 1931.

#### EXTRACT

From the testimony of Mr. ORLENKO Ivan Evgrafovich dated December 10, 1932

"In August 1931, at my apartment, my brother Orlenko declared that he personally, together with other villagers and employees of the state farm, in an organized way, set out to undermine Soviet power in every possible way, to harm the state farm, to corrupt the collective farmers, to counteract the campaigns and activities of the Soviet government, carried out in the countryside. At the same time, he told me that some people were gathering at his place and he gave specific instructions to them on what to do and how to behave both on the state farm, on the collective farm, and in general.

in the village.

380

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

Absolutely not hiding from me, he told me at the same time that there was a group of people headed by him: 1) Yakov Yevtushenko, 2) Nikolay Trofimovich Berezhnoy, 3) Anton Lebedev, 4) Sokrut Salifon, 5) Anton Sgonik and others whose last name I don't remember now. I remember another one—Medved Vasily Akimovich—all the prosperous and kulaks living in the village of Lyubimovka, who, visiting him, conducted counter-revolutionary work on his instructions, namely: agitation among the collective farmers with the aim of disintegrating the collective farms, when harvesting and sowing grain and other crops, setting fire to state farm and collective farm property and agitation among the villagers in order to provoke discontent against the Soviet regime.

At the same time, my brother, the priest Orlenko, declared that he was connected with Art. the agronomist of the state farm, Zorin, who visits him, and that Zorin also has a group of people in the state farm, in particular, he named the head of the tractor column of the state farm, Matvienko, who was a member of this group.

Zorin, together with this group, at the request of my brother Orlenko, are sabotaging the state farm, both by putting tractors out of action and by deliberately disrupting production campaigns at the state farm.

I personally answered him, in turn, that indeed Zorin, Matvienko K.I., Mogilny G.Ya. and Rudenko Petr Ar. and I'm wreaking havoc

work on the farm."

#### EXTRACT

From the testimony of Zorin Mikhail Yakovlevich dated December 19, 32

"I, Zorin, had to work on Trudolyubovka and Lyubimovka.

In accordance with the setup given to us by Gurov, the results of our c.r. wrecking work were as follows:

In organized agro circles, an asset was worked out and selected for agitation among the villagers on the organization of peasant unions and for use in general at the right moment.

So, according to Trudolyubovka - Zinchenko Petr Vlasovich, dispossessed; Zinchenko Thaddeus, dispossessed; Kiva Demyan - middle peasant; Zinchenko Nikifor is a middle peasant.

According to Lyubimovka - Andrei Vdovenko, dispossessed; Kikot Nikolai - dispossessed; Fomenko Onisy - dispossessed; Berezhnoy Nikolai - dispossessed.

I personally, Zorin, conducted their processing and instruction.

According to N.-Vorontsovka - Ednak Leonty Korneevich, dispossessed; Ednak Yakov Korneevich, dispossessed; Severe Kondrat, dispossessed; Kozytsky Vasily, dispossessed; Kozitsky Konon Vasilyevich, dispossessed; Bear Prokofy, middle peasant; Shapovalov Emelyan - middle peasant.

I personally carried out their processing and briefing, but from the moment Navitny joined our organization, Navitny led further work.

According to Sokorovka, Orlenko conducted the work, he named such persons for me: Gorba, Sokrut and Rakityansky.

The persons indicated above conducted k.r. agitation both for the creation of peasant unions and against the measures of Soviet power.

Departing, Barashkov gave the following installation in the work:

To promote the degradation of collective farms and state farms by all means by means of sabotage. Contribute to the reduction of labor discipline. To do this, organize a group at the state farm, strictly conspiratorial, and work in this direction, simultaneously doing the same work in the countryside on collective farms.

#### DOCUMENTS \_381^

After Barashkov's departure, I told Orlenko Yakov about all of the above and suggested that he resume work. He agreed, but soon left for another MTS.

I personally organized a group whose tasks included sabotage, the decomposition of collective farms and agitation in order to cause noise and discontent among the villagers against Soviet power.

The composition of the group was as follows: 1) Rudenko Petr Sr. - mechanic of the state farm;

2) Orlenko Ivan - head. workshops of the state farm, he is the brother of Orlenko Yakov;

3) Shpartak Ivan - agronomist of the state farm; 4) Bespaly Vasily - supply manager of the state farm;

5) Belokon Sidor - commandant; 6) Vedmir Yakim was at the state farm doing general work, after which he was dispossessed.

All of them separately were told about the goals and objectives of the organization, and it was also suggested to each carefully, after studying, to recruit certain persons.

## APPENDIX No. 2

### EXTRACT

From the protocol of the interrogation of Mr. KOROY Ivan Alexandrovich dated December 22, 1932

"In my earlier testimony, I indicated that the Political Center of the k.r. The organization considers it possible and necessary to use all forms of struggle against Soviet power already at the present moment, and is conducting practical work in this direction. In this regard, subversive work in the area of agriculture, which in the first period of the activity of the k.r. organization was the main one, by the summer of this year. took a secondary place in comparison with the main political tasks, for the resolution of which k.r. the organization directed its main efforts. For clarity, I consider it necessary to note here that the c.r. the organization arose and launched its subversive work not on the basis of difficulties in agriculture, but only used these difficulties to develop its own C.R. work. In connection with the direct directives of Poland and under the influence of the majority of the Political Center and the Ukrainian leading members of the c.r. organizations, the latter sharply turned in the direction of direct political struggle against Soviet power. As the main forms of political struggle, k.r. the organization chose the preparation of an armed uprising in a number of regions of Ukraine, intelligence work and preparatory work for sabotage in the event of armed uprisings or war.

On the practical work of k.r. organization for the preparation for an armed uprising, I know the following: in the summer of this year. I learned from Kovarsky that the "Ukrainians" and the majority of the Political Center consider it necessary to speed up the preparation of an armed uprising in Ukraine, in particular in the border regions of Kyiv, Chernigov, Odessa and the MASSR. It was assumed that already in the fall of this year. conditions may arise under which it is possible to organize an armed uprising. Kovarsky told me that the same assignments were received from Poland, which promises to provide assistance with weapons and the transfer of people in this case.

In this regard, the center of attention of k.r. organization has recently been focused on the above areas of Ukraine. This was expressed in

GGO To strengthen the regional groups were singled out and sent from the composition Centers special leading members k.r. organizations whose names I do not know.



LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

For the same purpose, district groupings were created and strengthened in the most responsible areas, which were supposed to carry out preparatory political work related to the organization of the uprising. Kovarsky pointed out to me the presence of such groups in the Olishevsky and Proskurovsky districts. Regional groups k.r. organizations, in turn, recruited people directly in the villages from among alien, "offended" and dissatisfied people with the Soviet power. Through these people associated with k.r. organization, the latter carried out systematic work to weaken the collective farms and their collapse, using grain procurement, the issuance of in-kind advances, the distribution of income, k.r. On this basis, the organization carried out agitation among collective farmers for absenteeism from work, for opposition to grain procurements, for mass exits from collective farms, and as the ultimate goal for organizing an uprising with the aim of overthrowing Soviet power.

For communication and direct management of the work of district and rural groups in the preparation of the insurrection, k.r. organization created a special apparatus. On this occasion, Kovarsky told me that "communication is maintained through a special apparatus - a hundred people who are busy only with this."

Concerning the issue of using the members of the c.r. organization from the Traktortsentr system on political work in the countryside, Kovarsky believed that the main attention should be paid to the members of the k.r. organizations from the inspectorate of departments directly related to the village.

#### EXTRACT

From the testimony of Mr. KUZNETSOV Ivan Vasilievich dated December 21, 1932.

"In order to achieve the tasks set, k.r. the organization, by its subversive measures, disrupted the work of the MTS and thereby caused breakthroughs in the conduct of agricultural production. The campaign, seeking to disrupt the procurement of grain and raw materials for industry, trying to worsen the supply of workers and arouse the discontent of the workers, tried to use the difficulties in the countryside and provoke the collapse of the collective farms and active resistance of the peasantry to Soviet power by political work in the collective farms.

In addition to subversive work, the main task of the k.r. organization was political work in the collective farms, with the aim of disintegrating the collective farms and causing an uprising. This work was organized by members of the c.r. organizations - employees of the MTS (agronomists, mechanics, etc.). Grain delivery and distribution of income were the key issues around which political work was carried out. The task was to show the collective farmer that he would receive little bread and would starve on the collective farm, that he had to leave the collective farm, but it was impossible to leave the collective farm, since they would not give him land, which means that the collective farm had to be destroyed, which could only be done by an uprising against Soviet power.

#### EXTRACT

From the protocol of interrogation dated 19/XII-32  
PONOMARENKO Oleksandr Stepanovich,  
economist-planner of the Ukrtraktorocenter

"In November 1931, he was transferred to the Ukrtraktorotsentr from Mogi lev-Pod. agronomist Borshchik Varfolomey Danilovich. Before that, I did not know him. Work in the same room, and therefore everyday communication,

unity of views and then a number of personal moments quickly brought us closer.

DOCUMENTATION \_ 383

As early as February 1932, Borshchik put before me directly the question of joining the K.R. an organization covering the Tractor Center system for the active struggle against the Sov. power.

From his words, it became known to me that this organization has as its ultimate goal the overthrow of the Sov. power by force of arms and the establishment of a democratic form of government.

The immediate tasks of the organization were:

- a) Selection and involvement in the organization of the necessary personnel who could lead the masses of the peasantry.
- b) Disorganization of agriculture by all means available to us. On this basis, provoke the discontent of the masses and prepare them for insurrectionary actions. For the same purpose, to conduct agitation against grain procurements and other economic and political campaigns carried out by the Soviets. power in the countryside.
- c) Establishing a connection with other k.r. organizations in Ukraine and outside, in particular in Moscow.
- d) Searching for ways to penetrate the Red Army in order to provide themselves with the necessary command heights.

We hoped for those demobilized from the army, who, under the influence of rural kras. sentiments at the right moment, they will take our side and, as those who have undergone military training, will be able to command the rebellious peasants.

EXTRACT FROM THE PROTOCOL OF  
THE INTERROGATION of Count Eduard Chigizmundovich  
SKORUPSKY dated DECEMBER 20, 1932

"The work of the counter-revolutionary organization was carried out in the direction of disorganization and disruption of the work of the machine and tractor stations. The practical activity of the counterrevolutionary organization in this case proceeded, as I know from the orientations given by KOVARSKY and on the basis of personal participation in it, along the line of disrupting the maintenance of the tractor fleet, disrupting the training of mass-qualified personnel (helmsmen, etc.), deliberate creation of favorable conditions for the development of weeds in the fields cultivated by MTS, delay and disruption of the introduction of crop rotation, disruption of technical propaganda.

I have indicated here those lines of subversive work of the counter-revolutionary organization which are well known to me.

Through its work, the counter-revolutionary organization sought to strike a blow at collective-farm construction in the countryside and arouse sharp discontent among the peasantry against the Soviets. authorities".

EXTRACT

From the protocol of interrogation KUZNETSOV Ivan Vasilyevich dated  
December 18, 1932

"In the period of preparation for the spring sowing campaign of 1932, the tractor plows assigned for delivery to the MTS of the Central Chernobyl region were unloaded by me for the MTS for sabotage purposes. As a result of this assignment, dozens of MTS received extra plows, while others had a shortage, which caused completely unnecessary transfers and complicated preparations for the spring sowing campaign.

When distributing machines in the I and N quarters of 1932 over the MTS, I Deliberately sent machines they didn't need, for example, part of the flax harvesters were loaded and shipped to the MTS of Ukraine, which did not have flax crops, and Titov's hemp threshers ended up in the MTS who do not have hemp

384

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

li (Nosovskaya Kiev region, Aleksandrovskaya Odessa region), wheat plows, in which there was an acute shortage in the southern grain regions, were sent to the northern MTS of Vinnitsa, Kiev, Kharkov regions under 2-4 pcs. under the guise of experience.

Before the harvesting campaign of 1932, I distributed the motors and combines allocated for the North Caucasian region. When unloading the indicated motors, I deliberately sent some motors (about 15 pieces) to the MTS that did not have combines, as a result of which these motors did not participate in the harvesting campaign.

#### EXTRACT

From the testimony of Mr. ORLENKO Ivan Evgrafovich, head.  
workshop of the state farm "Pioneer" dated December 10, 1932

"As with my personal direct participation, as well as Matvienko, Mogilny and Rudenko, the repair of the tractor fleet was carried out in such a way that it was not suitable for spring sowing. In most tractors, the parts were assembled incorrectly, of poor quality, and all the repair work was built in such a way that the tractors worked at idle, but lost power when loaded and could not pull the trailing equipment.

When the tractors were handed over after repair, the acceptance committee signed the acts mechanically and made a conclusion that the repairs had been carried out satisfactorily, but the tractors did not work.

Personally, I myself inserted the parts incorrectly on five tractors, filling the bearings was of poor quality. In general, the motors were deliberately compiled and assembled incorrectly.

Matvienko and Mogilny produced the same. In total, 30 tractors were rendered unusable in this way.

All this led to the fact that the spring sowing at the state farm was disrupted, I know that the sowing was delayed by a whole month against the established deadline according to the plan.

#### EXTRACT

From the testimony of ZORIN Mikhail Yakovlevich -

Art. agronomist of the state farm "Pioneer" dated December 19, 1932

"Both I personally and Orlenko Y. throughout 1930 and 1931 conducted agitation among the villagers on an individual basis with the aim of disintegrating the collective farms, and, taking advantage of food difficulties, urged the villagers to fail to fulfill grain procurement plans, motivating them with unreality.

During the grain procurements, they tried to prove to the villagers that the plans for the delivery of grain were unrealistic, and by this they agitated for the failure to deliver grain to the state.

#### APPENDIX No. 3

#### EXTRACT

From the protocol of interrogation of KOROY Ivan Alexandrovich dated December 15, 1932.

"I repeatedly had to talk with Kovarsky M.E. about the political goals, practical tasks and organizational structure of the c.r. organizations. The first conversation with Kovarsky on this subject took place in March at his home. In a conversation with him, I raised the question: "Is not this whole undertaking a groundless and hopeless affair? A handful of people without strength and connections enter into a struggle with a powerful state apparatus, with huge construction, with the ideas of millions of people. I think it's useless and hopeless

DOCUMENTATION \_ 385

risk". Kovarsky answered me: "That's not true! Three enormous forces are at work in this matter: firstly, the peasantry, which, under the influence of the difficulties they are experiencing, may turn away from Soviet power; secondly, the work of k.r. an organization that can increase these difficulties and thereby shake both the peasantry and part of the technical intelligentsia, and, finally, thirdly, we are not isolated.

Above, I showed that Kovarsky did not explain to me in what sense our k.r. the organization is not isolated. In one of the subsequent conversations, I directly put the question to him: what does it mean that we are not isolated, or otherwise, who is the third force supporting us. In response to this, Kovarsky, having previously warned me about the exceptional secrecy of the forthcoming message, told me that our c.r. the organization is known and supported by the neighboring state. At the same time, he did not tell me exactly which state, and only the next day, after my insistent requests, he informed me that this state, supporting our c.r. organization is Poland. Kovarsky also told me that in addition to personal ties with Poland, where he has relatives, he is connected in Moscow with the Polish embassy. With whom personally from the Polish embassy Kovarsky is connected, he did not tell me. In addition, he said that Poland itself has friends who also know our work and who are also our friends. Although he did not tell me who he meant, it was clear to me that he was talking about France, and he did not give a negative answer to my question about this to Kovarsky. In the same conversation, Kovarsky developed the idea of the great importance for us of support from Poland. Communication with her, according to Kovarsky, is valuable because, on the one hand, it gives state support, and on the other hand, one must keep in mind those Ukrainian forces that are concentrated in Poland and are of great importance in connection with the border position of Ukraine. In connection with this communication from Kovarsky, I had to

terrible time to fulfill several of his orders in connection with Poland.

#### EXTRACT

From the testimony of Ivan Aleksandrovich KOROV dated 18/XII-32.

"In addition to the previous testimony, I am reporting the details of my conversation with Kovarsky on the question of the goals of the K.R. organization and forms of its work. In connection with the receipt by me from the representative of the Polish Embassy of money, I asked Kovarsky a question, what is the reason for this, does the financing of the c.r. organizations in the system of relations with Poland or is it a random fact, what are the amounts of funding and for what purposes the funds are used. I was informed of the following: the organization systematically receives large sums both in soviet signs and in foreign currency, but all funding comes from the political center. The latter explained the receipt of the amount indicated in my previous testimony through me and Kovarsky by the fact that at that moment there was no person from the political center who was in constant contact with the Polish Embassy, and this work was temporarily entrusted by the center to Kovarsky, who was personally acquainted with the corresponding person from the Embassy. Still, Kovarsky did not tell me the names of this person, but if I had been shown a photograph of the person who handed me the money, I would have recognized him.

Kovarsky told me very reservedly, only in general terms, about the goals of financing: the work that we practically carried out at the Tractor Center does not give an idea of the nature and volume of counterrevolutionary work as a whole.

386

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

Kovarsky made it clear to me that the subversive work along the lines of the Tractor Center was only a part of the general subversive work of the K.R. organization carried out in various branches of agriculture. This latter, in turn, does not exhaust the entire volume of the c.r. work that is carried out in other forms, requiring connections and maintenance of people working in an illegal position. It is for the implementation of these tasks, according to Kovarsky, that the funds received are used.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 381. L. 14-18v. Typographical print.

No. 324

NOTE G.G. BERRIES I.V. STALIN

ABOUT THE COMPLETION OF THE OPERATION

ON THE EVICTION OF FAMILIES FROM THE KUBAN REGIONS

December 29, 1932

No. 574985

Top secret

The eviction operation from the village of Poltavskaya in the North Caucasus Territory was completed on December 27th.

The evicted in the amount of 2158 families (9.187 people) as part of 5 echelons follow to the Urals, where the necessary preparations have been made for their acceptance, placement and labor use.

At the same time, I inform you that the earlier eviction from 13 districts of the Kuban was completed on December 19th.

Currently, all evicted from the Kuban in the amount of 1992 fam. (9442 people) are located and arranged in Northern Kazakhstan and in special settlements of the Northern Territory. The transfer of these contingents took place without any excesses.

ZAM. CHAIRMAN OF THE OGPU YAGODA

APRF. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 196. L. 108. Original. Typescript.

\*

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "T. Molotov. Stalin."

ÿ325

MESSAGE K.A. PAVLOV FROM IRKUTSK BY  
DIRECT WIRE G.G. Yagoda and L.G. MIRONOV ABOUT  
"WRECKING" IN GRAIN SOVHOZES

January 15, 1933

No. 14043

Top secret

According to preliminary data of the investigation in the case of the Kansk, Krasnoyarsk, Kamalinsky grain state farms, the presence of a k.r. wrecking groups-cells interconnected by individual figurants. The testimonies of the arrested k.r. the cells were led by grain trust specialists. Basically k.r. The activities of the opened cells, according to the testimony of the accused, amounted to the following:

1. Disruption of the spring sowing, grain-harvesting campaign of 1932 by lengthening the sowing time, establishing lower yield indicators, and reducing wheat seeding rates.

DOCUMENTATION

387

2. The collapse of the motor transport fleet at all state farms by direct incapacitation, damage to tractors, the acceptance of obviously unusable tractors from repair (Kansky grain state farm) with registration of acceptance as corrected, the actual cessation of repair of machines on the plots by deliberately transferring workshops to the city, according to Kansky out of 104 tractors, 20 work at the state farm, 10 out of 64 combines work.

3. Preparation for the disruption of the sowing campaign of 1933 by: the failure of the steam campaign, the complete disruption of the plan for the repair of machines.

4. The failure of the housing construction program, carried out as soon as possible, the removal of the entire labor force for construction sites in the midst of the harvest under the pretext of pressure on grain harvesting, the sending to grain trusts of drawings of plans that do not correspond to the economic indicators of state farms (in the Kansk state farm, the construction of a garage for 30 cars, grain trust sent a project for 4 machines).

In the case of all state farms, 35 people were arrested, of which: kulaks - 20, admsils - 1, former owners - 2, merchants - 1, employees - 10, others - 1, non-party - 29, members of the CPSU (b) - 6. there were 5 more people at the Kansk state farm, and one at the grain trust.

Engineer Astashkevich, accused of deliberately destroying a park at the Kansky state farm, convicted in 1931 for sabotage at the Kamalinsky state farm for 8 years and working at the Kansky state farm, escaped, is in Moscow, Sadovo-Karetnaya street, 3rd House of Soviets, apartment 12, please arrest and escort to Krasnoyarsk.

The investigation into the case of the state farm "Komsomolets" by Chitaopersektor established the deliberate collapse of the state farm, the creation of conditions that caused a large death of sheep (up to 40%) from diseases, exhaustion, almost a total loss of offspring, the deliberate spread of outbreaks of smallpox.

The mechanic of the KOTUKH state farm, in the past Semyonov's personal driver, an active Ungerian, emigrated abroad for several years (China, Mongolia), an agronomist of the KOTUKH district (brother), in the past the chairman of the Petliurovsky military field court (commander of the Petliura detachment, personal - but was associated with a member of the Directory of Ukraine VINICHENKO), a senior sheep breeder of the state farm SPEKHT, a former landowner. SPEKHT, being in Omsk in 1930, knew about the existence of a large grouping of the TKP, headed by the former landowner Markovsky and Khaimovich, convicted in the TKP case. He reported on his connections with a number of former landowners - owners of large herds in pre-revolutionary times, now working in various state farms:

1) KAZAS, before the revolution, had 300,000 heads of sheep, working in one of the state farms, in a conversation with SPEKHT, he said: "If these herds were left to us, old cattle breeders, then things would be fine, but nothing will come of it" .

2) Mamontov, had over 1,000 heads in 1927, works as a sheep breeder in one of the state farms of the region. 3) STATSENKO, formerly a major sheep breeder Sev. Caucasus, now an engineer of a sheep breeding trust. The whereabouts of all three have been established; pest activity. SPEKHT confessed that he was aware of the sabotage content of the installations for the winter shearing of sheep, adopted at the regional congress of sheep breeders in the autumn of 1932. early ECO CHERNOV.

APRF f. s Op. 58. D. 383. L. 123-126. Script. Typescript.

Stalin 3 PS R VOM sheet handwritten note: "To members of the PB, Yurkin, Yakovlev, Grushevsky.

No. 326

SPECIAL MESSAGE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN ON  
THE ARREST OF TROTSKYISTS

January 15, 1933

No. 50018

January 14 this year we promptly liquidated the development of the central group of Trotskyists.

Of the 87 persons subject to arrest in Moscow, 68 people were arrested, an order was given to arrest 7 people. in DVK and 6 people who are on business trips in different cities; 6 people who disappeared, we are looking for.

A significant amount of Trotskyist literature, 5 archives of Trotskyist materials and correspondence with links were confiscated from the vast majority of the arrested Trotskyists. During GAYEVSKY's arrest, Comrade RADEK called the latter and inquired: "Are you all in good health?"

The most characteristic is selected from the following individuals:

1. SMIRNOV I.N. - during the search, an archive of Trotskyist documents was seized, covering the period from 1928 to the beginning of 1931. Among the seized documents are articles and directive letters of TROTSKY written abroad (known to us), as well as political correspondence between exiled Trotskyists, indicating that after filing an application for a break with the opposition and the restoration of the rights of a member of the party, SMIRNOV continued to maintain contact with the Trotskyists.

2. PREOBRAZHENSKY E.A. - the archive of Trotskyist documents was seized: articles by TROTSKY, RAKOVSKY and other leaders of the opposition from 1928-29.

3. TER-VAGANYAN V.A. - a significant number of Trotskyist documents and authentic letters from TROTSKY to VAGANYAN from the period of 1928 were seized.

4. UFIMTSEV N.I. - an extensive archive of Trotskyist literature containing documents from the period 1928-30 was confiscated.

5. KOZLOVSKY Ch.M. - 10 original manuscripts and notes of LENIN were confiscated, which were kept by KOZLOVSKY with the knowledge of the Trotskyists and were not handed over to the LENIN Institute, one note by DZERZHINSKY and the original telegram written by TROTSKY to LENIN about the capture of Kazan.

6. BLISKAVITSKY N.M. - clippings from the foreign Trotskyist press and correspondence with references were found.

7. MEKLER N.O. - Trotskyist archive confiscated.

8. STOLOV F.D. - 34 specimens were found. testament of LENIN, printed in a typographical way, correspondence with reference and old Trotskyist leaflets.

9. SIMBIRSKY A.E. - TROTSKY's latest articles and an archive of old



Trotskyist documents.

10. MALEEV I.A. - the original text of his essays on the Saratov combine construction, written on behalf of SMIRNOV with Trotskyist guidelines, has been removed.

11. RAFAIL R.B. - extensive correspondence with reference and addresses of the Trotskyists.

12. MYAGKOVA T.I. - Extensive correspondence with exiled Trotskyists.

documentation \_ 389

In addition, arrested:

13. GINZBURG L.G. 14. SADOVSKII L.Ya. 15. Lyubich A.S. 16. Yatsek V.K. 17. IVASHKIN B.V. 18. GRYUNSHTEIN K.I. 19. VERZHBLOVSKII D.V. 20. Gaevsky D.S. 21. Livshits B.S. 22. BELYAEV M.A. 23. NIKOLA-  
EV N.I. 24. Gluzkina A.A. 25. Grinchenko M.L. 26. VENKUS P.I. 27. BRONSHTEIN L.I. 28. GOLODETS M.G. 29. BARANOV R.I. 30. Altaev Ya. Yu. 31. Besspalov M.S. 32. VASIL'EV M.P. 33. GLAN-GLOBUS V.B. 34. DMITRIEV M.P. 35. EPIKHIN S.S. 36. ZELTSER M.G. 37. KRASAVIN M.I. 38. LOVUT M.S. 39. LETUNOV V.V. 40. Lipenzon S.M.

41. MIRIMOVICH Ya.M. 42. NEVZHINSKY A.A. 43. Oganessov A.V. 44. Okudzhava N.S. 45. Roitman D.L. 46. SAMINSKII M.S. 47. SE-  
NATSKAYA E.M. 48. SOLOVIAN A.A. 49. SORKIN M.R. 50. TANKHILEVICH O.M. 51. USAGIN A.I. 52. FISHMAN B.N. 53. FRID M.Ya. 54. KHOTINSKAYA L.I. 55. CHAGOVSKY HELL. 56. Schreiber L.N. 57. STEINBERG E.G. 58. Shabion A.M. 59. SHURL L.O. 60. Yugov M.S. 61. RADIN I.S. 62. RA BINSON S.G. 63. ZELBERSHTEIN B.M. 64. KRASKINA E.I. 65. Popov V.F. 66. SELIVERSTOV G.S. 67. POPOV V.F\*\* and 68. BELEVICH I.N.

Most of those listed also contained Trotskyist documents.

Simultaneously with the arrests in Moscow, an arrest order was issued: 69. P.V. 70. Safonova A.N. 71. ESTERMANA I.S. 72. LEVITAN and 73. LYUBIMOV M., who are in the Far East during the construction of the Baikal-Amur road. An arrest order was also issued. 74. A.A. KONSTANTINOVA (Cherepovets) 75. KRICHEVSKY R.E. (Smolensk) 76. SHVYRKOVA D.N. (Kemerovo) and 77. BOLOTNIKOVA (Kislovodsk).

The fugitives 78. KUZMIN, 79. SOLOVIEVA, 80. BOBROVSKII, 81. LOMOV-SHUPLY, 82. KRAVCHUK, 83. CHILIKIN, 84. GAUKHER, 85. MUSHLIN, 86. NECHAYEV and 87. OSTROVSKAYA - we are looking for.

ZAM. PREV. OGPU YAGODA

APRF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 139. L. 173-176. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there is Stalin's handwritten note: "My Archive".

\* The text repeats the surname.

No. 327

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) "ON POLAND"

January 16, 1933

No. 128, item 4 - On Poland (comrade Litvinov).

a) Propose to the OGPU to submit to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs a list of persons in Poland whose entry into the USSR as diplomatic couriers is undesirable, and to prohibit the issuance of visas to such persons.

b) Propose to the plenipotentiary in Warsaw to accept under strict control the order of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on the non-issuance of local visas without the sanction of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 43. Original. Typescript.

\*

The text contains typewritten notes about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Litvin, Yagoda \* -

390

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 328

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT JUDICIAL COMMISSION

January 16, 1933

No. 128 p. 17-c - Message from the Commission on Judicial Affairs (comrades Kalinin, Shkiryatov, Yenukidze, Prokofiev, Krylenko)

a) Approve the decisions of the commission, with the exception of decisions on cases of animal pests. ( 109 )

b) In the case of pest breeders, consider it expedient to organize a court.

c) Instruct t.t. Yagoda and Krylenko to submit to the next meeting of the Politburo a draft proposal on organizing a trial of livestock breeders  
tel.

d) Introduce Comrade Kalinin on Judicial Affairs, Comrade T.T. Yagoda and Prokofiev.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 43. Original. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Kalinin, Yagoda, Prokofiev wu - everything, Krylenko - a, b, c, Vinokurov, Krasikov - a, b.

No. 329

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE EVICTION OF THE KULAK ELEMENTS  
FROM THE ODESSA REGION

WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE TELEGRAM V.A. BALITSKY

January 16, 1933

No. 128, paragraph 24 / 4. - Telegram from comrade. Balitsky.

Accept offer t.t. Kaganovich and Balitsky about the expulsion of 500 families from the Odessa region.

Encryption input. No. 29002. 12/24/32 From Voznesensk OGPU Yagoda In order to strike at the kulak Petliura elements who are disrupting grain procurements, Kaganovich and I consider it necessary to evict five hundred families, I repeat, five hundred families. We ask you to coordinate the authorities, telegraph the decision to me Odessa. Balitsky. No. 42013.

APRF. F.Z. Op. 30. D. 196. L. 106, 107. Copy. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 26.XII.32.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Kaganovich, Kosior. Yagoda.

391

DOCUMENTATION \_

No. 330

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON EVICTION FROM KHARKOV REGION

January 16, 1933

No. 128, item 59/39. - Telegram from Comrade Kosior dated 3.1.33.

Accept the following proposal of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U:

Approve the expulsion to the north from the Kharkov region of four hundred families of malicious elements and kulaks, as well as the expulsion to the north of 40 communists expelled from the party.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 45. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 4.1.33.

\*\*

The text contains a handwritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Kosior - cipher; Menzhinsky.

No. 331

Directive of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks  
and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR ON THE PREVENTION OF THE  
MASS DEPARTURE OF STARVING PEASANTS

January 22, 1933

No. 65/sh

Information reached the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of People's Commissars that in the Kuban and Ukraine a mass exodus of peasants "for bread" began to go to the Central Chernobyl region, to the Volga, Moscow region, Western region, Belarus. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR have no doubt that this departure of peasants, like the departure from Ukraine last year, was organized by the enemies of Soviet power, the Social Revolutionaries and agents of Poland with the aim of agitating "through the peasants" in the northern regions of the USSR against the collective farms and in general against the Soviet Union. → Veteran authorities. Last year, the Party, Soviet and Chekist organs of the Ukraine missed this counter-revolutionary undertaking by the enemies of Soviet power. This year, a repeat of last year's mistake cannot be allowed.

First. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR instruct the regional committee, the regional executive committee and the PG of the OGPU of the North Caucasus to prevent the mass exodus of peasants from the North Caucasus to other regions and entry into the region from Ukraine.

Second. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of People's Commissars instruct the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (b)U, the Ukrsovnarkom, Balitsky and Redens to prevent the mass exodus of peasants from Ukraine to other regions and entry into Ukraine from the North Caucasus.

.Third. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of People's Commissars order the PGPU of the Moscow Region, the Central Chernobyl Region, the Western Region, Belarus, the Lower Volga and the Middle Volga to arrest the "peasants" of Ukraine and the North Caucasus who have made their way to the north and, after the counter-revolutionary elements have been selected, to install the rest to their place of residence.

Fourth. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of People's Commissars order the TO of the GPU Prokhorov to give an appropriate order on the TO system of the GPU.

Presovnarkom of the USSR V.M. Molotof Secretary of the Central  
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Ya. Stalin

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. ID 45. L. 109-109v. Script. Typescript. „Published: The tragedy of the Soviet village.  
Collectivization and dispossession. 1927-1939: Documents and materials: In 5 volumes / Vol. 3. End of 1930-1933. pp. 634-635.

392

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 332

NOTE G.E. PROKOFIEVA I.V. STALIN  
ABOUT THE MEASURES TO COMBAT MASS  
DEPARTURES FROM UKRAINE AND JCC

WITH APPENDIX NOTES

E.G. Evdokimov and V.A. BALITSKY

January 23, 1933

No. 141286

Owls. secret

I am enclosing the first reports, vol. Balitsky, Evdokimov to combat mass departures from Ukraine and the SKK.

I inform you that the OGPU has given appropriate instructions to all PPs.

Attachment: note on wire tg. Balitsky and Evdokimov.

Deputy prev. OGPU PROKOFIEV

Owls. secret

No. 141256

Note by direct wire from Rostov Moscow OGPU

comrade. Berry

The question of combating flight was raised by me immediately upon my arrival at the MCC, on the basis of materials from a number of districts, which testified to an intensified flight, which in places assumed a mass character. \* At the end of November and in the future, I repeatedly gave categorical orders to operational sectors, regional departments, city district departments, DTO, and the regional police to take versatile decisive measures to prevent the flight \*. Basically, at that time, local activities were carried out in the following directions: 1) agents were mobilized to combat the mass exodus, especially the fugitive kulak-White Guard element, especially the identification of organizers, agitators, provoking the flight. Expansion work is being carried out: clarifications, challenges, etc. 2) Measures were taken, the question of strengthening mass explanatory work in order to organize public opposition to flight was continuously raised on the ground. The question was raised in the regional committee, in which special directives were given to the localities. 3) Along the line of the ATT, in addition to the agoper work on transport, mobile groups have been created, operational barriers in points, areas of the greatest concentration of fugitives, especially in the direction of Ukraine, Transcaucasia, up to checking travelers who buy tickets. 4) Police forces, with the involvement of party activists, organized cordons on the main routes of movement of the fugitives, especially in the direction of the Black Sea, Transcaucasia, the Black Sea coast, on the border with Abkhazia, as well as Dagestan on the border with Azerbaijan, in the main passes to Transcaucasia. 'Detained kulaks, k.-r. elements were arrested, the rest were filtered, some after processing were returned to their places for explanatory work\*. Departure without the permission of the soviets, the boards of collective farms is prohibited, but these measures do not give an effect, they flee without permission. 5) Agencies have been mobilized in the cities to identify the fugitives and to suppress possible corruption. active sabotage work of fugitives who settled in cities, enterprises, new buildings. Measures have been taken in the area of undercover and physical protection of the most important strategic points, state structures, large enterprises, in the first place

DOCUMENTS \_393

line of military importance. A number of operations on fugitives were carried out in the cities. \*6) The main efforts were directed towards the organized insurgent K-R-» its awakening, organizing role in flight\*. As you know, a large insurrectionary organization in the Kurganensk and other areas of the JCC has been uncovered in the Kuban - the case of Colonel Popov and others. In this case, work has been uncovered to organize an escape for the purpose of sabotage, the formation of fugitive insurgent groups (in the Black Sea region). Along with this, from other liquidated cases, a c.r. work on the concentration of fugitives in remote forested mountainous areas, as well as in cities. As a result of the measures taken in the region (as well as the operations carried out in Shakhty, Taganrog, Rostov and others), our bodies detained 7,534 runaways. Of these: the Black Sea operations sector up to 5,000 fled from the Kuban regions, of which 1,216 people. The Shakhty operational sector confiscated 349 people in the coal industry of the kulak-White Guard element, including 104 White Guards, 18 repatriates. It must be taken into account that due to the lack of forces, the concentration of our main forces in the countryside, the leap in sabotage, the work in the cities to clean up, of course, has not yet been fully carried out. During November-December, flight to individual places, to individual villages gave rise. In particular, in the villages where there was the strongest pressure in connection with grain procurements. Now it is noted: 1) \* in January, the flight in comparison with November-December gives a decrease \*. However, in some areas, villages, the flight continues. We have established the concentration of runaways in the Azov floodplains. \*Prepare the operation\*. We are preparing an operation in Rostov. At the same time, in a number of places, the facts of the return of those who fled are also noted. 2) Now, in connection with the end of grain procurements in most districts of the region, preparatory work is underway for spring sowing, subject to a turn, along with our measures of mass explanatory work. Flight, of course, can give a further decline. It is necessary to indicate: Mass explanatory work in the field is weak. 3) I reissue orders to the localities to organize a check of the strengthening of measures along all lines. Please take into account that under the present conditions in the districts, villages, bearing in mind the number of our workers, military, police resources, it is naturally not physically possible to organize a continuous, guaranteeing blockage, interception of roads. 4) According to our information, the issues of flight were continuously covered, starting from my first telegram from the Kuban, as well as in reports through the SPO line, in information on black pages for eviction. 0170064 Evdokimov

SECR. SPO OGPU

January 22, 1933

Secret

The mass exodus of peasants from the village, which began at the end of December 1932, mainly in Kharkov, Odessa, Kyiv, and partly Chernihiv Regions, is presented in the following form:

Kharkov region. Departure registered in 19 districts, 39 villages. A total of 20,129 people left; of which 7.423 collective farmers, 12.698 individual farmers,

asset - 8.

394

LUBYAN KA. January 1922 - December 1936

Odessa region. - Departure is registered in 19 districts, 177 villages, 228 collective farms. In total, 3,447 individuals left, 2,642 families, of which: 1,683 single collective farmers, 1,259 families, 1,320 individual farmers, 1,007 families, 438 single firms, 377 families, and 6 assets.

Kyiv region. Departure registered in 27 districts, 437 villages. A total of 6,576 people left; of them: collective farmers - 1287, individual farmers - 3936, hard workers - 1244, asset - 109.

Chernihiv region. - Departure registered in 9 districts, 68 villages. In total, 1541 singles left, 146 families. Of these: 146 single collective farmers, 3 families; 1246 individual farmers, 124 families, 141 single firms, 19 families, 5 assets.

In total, in these regions, departure was registered in 74 districts, 721 villages, 228 collective farms; 1823 singles, 396 families, 126 active members. In most cases, leaving the villages is motivated by going to work. However, the predominance of malicious non-deliverers of bread among those leaving indicates that in this case there is an flight from the village. Not all, but only a part of those leaving the villages take their families with them, boarding up houses and hiding their grain stocks from neighbors and relatives. Some of those who fled from the village left pits with buried bread. In some villages, it is mainly the heads of families who go out. A large part of those leaving the villages are sent to the Donbass and large industrial centers. The departure of collective farmers is much smaller than the flight of individual farmers. There is also an unauthorized departure of leaders from / councils and collective farms, including "communists". The latter are fleeing the village because they are afraid of reprisals for sabotaging grain procurements and disrupting party tasks.

Checking the junction stations of Lozova and Sumy in the Kharkiv region, where the flight from the village is especially developed, shows a large sale of tickets for long-distance trains in January of this year. Thus, in January, 16,500 tickets were sold at the Lozovaya station, and 15,000 at the Sumy station. An increase in ticket sales is also noted at the Pomoshnaya junction station in the Odessa region. So, if in November 879 long-distance tickets were sold, then in December 3614, and in the first half of January - 1617. The remaining junction stations in other areas do not give a sharp increase in the sale of long-distance tickets. In order to resolutely stop the flight from the village, in early January the GPU of Ukraine began to seize the organizers and instigators of the flight and to intensify intelligence and information work in places affected by the mass exodus. More than 500 malicious instigators of departures were arrested.

Starting from December 25, 1932, the GPU of Ukraine informed the CP(b) and the SPO of the OGPU about mass departures. I am giving additional directives based on your instructions.

V. BALITSKY

APRF. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 189. L. 3-10. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "To Molotov, Kaganovich, Postyshev. I. Stalin.

\* Underlined in pencil.

DOCUMENTS \_ 395

No. 333

MEMORY YA.S. AGRANOVA I.V. STALIN IN THE CASE OF THE  
PEASANT DEMOCRATIC PARTY

January 23, 1933

TOP SECRET

The Plenipotentiary Representation of the OGPU of the Moscow Region uncovered and liquidated a counter-revolutionary organization that called itself the "PEASANT DEMOCRATIC PARTY".

The organization had a regional center in the Moscow region. The members of the Moscow Regional Center included the following persons: 1) ORLINSKY Al[eksan]dr Al[eksan]drovich - head the production sector of the Regional Kolkhozsoyuz, formerly. socialist-revolutionary; 2) Vitaliy Adolfovich KALECHITS, Art. agronomist of the Moszhilkolkhoesoyuz, ex. Menshevik, his brother was sentenced to 10 years in the case of the Labor Peasant Party; 3) POKROVSKY Sergey Al[eksan]drovich, agronomist of the Regional Kolkhozsoyuz, son of a priest, in the past an active Social Revolutionary; 4) STEPANOV N.A. agronomist, former Officer; 5) SAILING I.V. - Deputy head grain crops sector MOZO, formerly. Officer; 6) OBUKHOV N.I., agronomist for agrotechnical propaganda of the Mosoblkolkhozsoyuz, son of b. big merchant; 7) O.N. agronomist, former member of the AKP; 8) KAZACHEK A.G. - former member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian party LSR, now working at the Moscow Institute for the Reconstruction of Agriculture; 9) SI NITSKY E.L. - Associate Professor at the Institute for the retraining of agricultural specialists, ex. white officer, b. emigrant.

The leading trio of the regional center were ORLINSKY, KALECHITS and POKROVSKY.

According to the materials of the investigation, there were regional organizations of the "Peasant Democratic Party" in a number of districts of the Moscow region.

At present, we have uncovered and liquidated the following regional organizations:

In the KASHIR region, headed by the agronomist MOLCHANOV (former officer, landowner) and VELICHKIN (former officer). The organization included 10 agricultural specialists and 46 kulaks united in 18 cells.

In the Klin district, headed by the agronomist MATVEEV. The organization included 6 agronomists, 4 Social Revolutionaries and 22 kulaks.

In the Noginsk region, headed by the agronomist MIKHNEVICH (formerly a large landowner) and the agronomist BUCHINSKY (formerly a white officer).



The organization included 5 agronomists, 1 veterinarian and 22 fists.

In the PRONSKY district, headed by the district gronomist BELYAEV. The organization consisted of 8 kulak cells with 30 members.

In the Maksatikhinsky district, the organization was headed by the agronomist KRYLOV. It included 3 agronomists, 3 kulak cells were created.

In the KALUGA region, the organization was headed by the agronomist BATASHE in 1902 (a member of the AKP since 1902). An active part in the organization was taken by agrono MIZUDSHSHN N.V. - former member RPS; Kiryakov S.S. - former member of the AKP; 111 @VOV A.S. - former member of the LSR and SKOKOV - teacher of the agricultural technical school.

The investigation also revealed organizations in TEPLO-OGAREVSK, RUZSK and a number of other districts of the region.

396

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

The "Peasant Democratic Party" set as its task the armed overthrow of Soviet power with the help of foreign military intervention and the establishment of a bourgeois-democratic system.

To this end, the organization directed its main attention to the training and unification of personnel for mass peasant uprisings, selecting in the regions special military leaders from among the former. officers.

In order to prepare an armed uprising and weaken the defense capability of the USSR, as well as in order to create widespread discontent among the peasant masses, the organization considered it necessary to undermine the economic power of the country by wrecking in all sectors of the economy.

Proceeding from this, the cells of the organization carried out systematic wrecking work in the collective farms and state farms, aimed at destroying them from the inside and at disrupting all the economic-watered. campaigns in the countryside.

According to the testimony of a member of the Moscow center, the agronomist KALECHITS, the organization was connected with the all-Union political center headed by academicians: VAVILOV, TULAIKOV, PRYANISHNIKOV, Professor LISKUN, and others, from whom the Moscow organization received instructions on practical work.

According to his own testimony, there were regional organizations in the North Caucasus, the Central Black Earth Region, the Middle Volga Territory, the Nizhny Novgorod Territory, the Leningrad Region, and so on.

The investigation into this case is proceeding at an accelerated pace.

We have taken measures to liquidate the organizations of the "Peasant Democratic Party" in a number of districts of the Moscow region.

Attached are the protocols of interrogations: V. A. KALECHITS, I. A. STEPANOVA, PA-

I. V. Rusnikova, N. I. Obukhova, A. T. Vladimirova, E. L. Sinitsko, V. Ya. Molchanova, Yu. and ILKEVICH\*.

AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE  
OGPU OF THE MOSCOW REGION Agranov

BEGINNING SPO PP OGPU MOSCOW REGION Radzivshiovsky

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 384. yb 1-4. Script. Typescript.

\*

The document is published without protocols.

No. 334

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE DISADVANTAGES OF BERTHOLET  
SALT FOR MATCH FACTORIES"

February 1, 1933

No. 129, p. 1 - On the shortcomings of Bertolet salt for match factories. (Lubimov).

Instruct the OGPU to urgently investigate the reasons for the shutdown of the Bereznikovsky plant, find out the persons responsible for this and report to the Politburo.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 914. L. 1. Original. Typescript.

DOCUMENTATION

397

No. 335

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) ON THE  
CLEANING OF MAGNITOGORSK FROM CRIMINAL ELEMENTS

] February 1933

No. 129, p. 2 - On the accumulation of criminal elements in Magnitogorsk (Myshkov's telegram)  
(Stalin).

To instruct the OGPU to immediately organize a special group of OGPU workers to clear  
Magnitogorsk of criminal and unnecessary elements and report on the execution to the Politburo.

RGASPI. F. 17.0p. 3. D. 914. L. 1. Original. Typescript.

No. 336

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON QUESTIONS IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS REGION  
OF THE NORTHERN KRAIKOM

February 1, 1933

No. 129, p. 47/28 - Issues of the Northern Regional Committee (PB of 15.1.33, project No. 128, p. 97/77).

Approve the following proposals of the Commission Comrade. Postyshev: a) the request of the Sevkraikom of the CPSU (b) for a one-time expulsion of 3,000 kulak families to Pechora - to refuse.

Approve the measures of the regional committee for the settlement of Pechora at the expense of:

1) resettlement to Pechora of kulak families deported to the Northern Territory from other regions and territories of the USSR;

2) deportation to Pechora of active counter-revolutionary elements with their families on an individual basis in accordance with the decision of the Central Committee.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 48. Original. Typescript.

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated January 24, 1933.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "The extracts have been sent to: comrade Kerzhentsev; Sev. to the regional committee - in cipher.

No. 337

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT EVENTS IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS REGION  
IN CONNECTION WITH B.P. SHEBOLDAEV

February 1, 1933

No. 129, paragraph 72/54 - Telegram comrade. Sheboldaeva.

1) Reject the proposal to organize a temporary concentration camp on the territory of ^RII Sev. Caucasian region.

Instruct the OGPU to take out 30,000 convicts to concentration camps from the North within a month. Caucasus, offering the CTO (Committee of Funds) to help the OGPU with uniforms and food.

398

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

3) Agree with the settlement in the villages, from where the kulak families were deported, up to 3 thousand demobilized Red Army volunteers.

4) Instruct the PUR and the OGPU (comrades Yagoda and Bulin) to recruit the indicated number of volunteers and ensure their resettlement.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 51. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated January 29, 1933.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Yagoda, Bulin - everyone; Sevkavkraikom - in cipher. Committee of Funds - p. 2.

No. 338

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE EXPANSION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE SESSION OF THE SUPREME COURT

February 1, 1933

N ° 129, p. 121/103 - Question of the Sevkavkraikom.

Allow the session of the Supreme Court, located in the North Caucasus Territory, to finally approve the verdict not only for embezzlement, as it is currently provided to it, but also for cases of terrorist attacks and counter-revolutionary sabotage (Articles 58-8 and 58-14).

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 52. Original. Typescript.

Published: Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. Sat. doc. S. 63.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 1.II.33.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Yagoda, Vinokurov, Krylenko, Krasikov; Sevkavkraikom - in cipher.

No. 339

MEMORIAL G.G. BERRIES I.V. STALIN AND V.M. MOLOTOV  
ON SUPPRESSION OF MASS DEPARTURES FROM THE Ukrainian  
SSR, THE NORTH CAUCASIAN TERRITORY AND THE BSSR

February 2, 1933

No. 50045

To prevent mass exodus from Ukraine, the North Caucasus and Belarus, the transport authorities organized the OGPU \*on the roads\*; S. Caucasus, Ukraine, South-Eastern, Western, Ryazan, Ural, Zlatoust, October, M-Kazan, M-Kursk, Moscow-Baltic-Belor. \*for elephants and operational-search groups\*.

As a result of the measures taken, \*from January 22 to January 30 inclusive, a total of 24,961 people were detained\* who had fled from their places of permanent residence, of which: 18,379 Ukrainians, 6,225 SKKs; other districts 357 h.

•Returned back to the place of residence 16046 h.\*; 1016 hours arrested; the remaining 7879 hours are under review.

On separate roads, detentions were expressed as follows: 2,519 hours were detained along the North Caucasus, 2,192 hours were returned, 98 hours were arrested, 299 hours are being investigated. 12,842 hours were detained along the southern roads, 6,763 hours were returned; arrested 826 h; it turns out 6250 h. In the South-East. delayed 3555 h; returned 2266 h; arrested 32 hours; it turns out 1260 hours; on Zapadnaya detained 2274 hours, returned 2270 hours; arrested 4 h; along the Ryaz.-Uralskaya

DOCUMENTATION

399

delayed 134 hours; returned 7 hours, it turns out 127 hours; according to Sam.-Gold. delayed 45 hours; returned 22h; it turns out 23 hours; along Oktyabrskaya, 427 hours were detained, 412 hours were returned; arrested 15 h; along M.-Kazanskaya, 191 hours were detained; returned 123 hours; arrested 8 h; 1,710 people were detained along M-Kurskaya; 1672 people returned; arrested 18 hours, and under the MBB detained 264 hours; 249 returned, 15 arrested.

Deputy Previous OGPU Yagoda

APRF. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 189. L. 26-27. Script. Typescript.

\*—ý Underlined in pencil.

No. 340

MEMORIAL G.G. BERRIES AND M.D. BERMANA I.V. TO STALIN  
ON THE ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL SETTLEMENTS

February 13, 1933

No. 50073

\* In accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the OGPU, a resettlement plan is being developed during 1933 and 1934 \* of anti-Soviet elements evicted from villages and cities and the organization of labor settlements from such.

Preliminary considerations for the resettlement of \*2,000,000 people in the regions of Western Siberia and Kazakhstan\* are set out below.

KAZAKHSTAN . - In Kazakhstan, resettlement is planned to be carried out mainly in the following districts: Naurzum, Akmola, Atbasar, European, Leninsky, Revolutionary, Socialist, Kurgoldzhimsky, Aryk-Balyksky, Urtsky and Ubagansky.

\*According to the People's Commissariat of Land, the total area of free land funds in these areas is 2,244,000 hectares, of which 1,100,000 hectares are arable land. The distance from the railway of these funds reaches a maximum of 280 km\*. (Naurzum district) and a minimum of 35—40 km. (Akmola and European regions).

A significant part of these regions is located in Central Kazakhstan, which is poorly populated and poorly developed. The soil of most of these regions is loamy, partly interspersed with chernozem and solonchaks. Some of these regions are characterized by periodic droughts (Atbasar and Socialist). Water supply is provided by existing rivers and

lakes and groundwater, occurring at a depth of 8 to 20 meters.

The funds are suitable for agriculture, and grain farming will be cultivated on natural irrigation (bagara), and vegetable gardens and partly potatoes - on irrigation.

Based on the calculation of allocating arable land to one family from 3.5-4 hectares, it seems possible to resettle up to a million people on the above 1,100,000 hectares of land.

## WESTERN SIBERIA.

\* In Western Siberia, resettlement will take place mainly on the free lands of the following northern districts: Narymsky, Krivosheinsky, Birilyusky, Narabelsky, Kargassky, Rybinsk, Kozhevnikovsky, Ishimsky \*, Tarsky, Suslovsky and Novokuskovsky, as well as in the southern : Kurgan, Oniudai, Ust-Abakan (see map).

400

## LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

These areas are located at a distance of 50 to 500 km. from railway stations roads. In total, there are 1,600,000 hectares of land in these areas, of which 418,000 hectares are arable land, 237,000 hectares are hayfields, and 407,000 hectares are pastures. These areas are watered quite satisfactorily, the soils are suitable for agriculture. At the moment, through the PP OPTU of Western Siberia, we are clarifying the availability of funds and the possibility of their development.

Instructions were given to the PGPU of Kazakhstan and Western Siberia to urgently send competent commissions to the resettlement areas to survey these areas and find out the possibility of developing them in the near future.

The nature of the direction of the economy of special settlements

It is planned to create farms of special settlements in four areas:

1. Special settlements engaged exclusively in agricultural activities with the production of commercial grain (bread, cereals and fodder) crops.
2. Special settlements engaged in animal husbandry (dairy, meat) with subsidiary horticulture\*.
3. Special settlements engaged in fishing and at the same time conducting auxiliary gardening. In winter, these villages work for timber blanks.
4. Special settlements engaged in logging as their main activity, with auxiliary gardening, so that as the forests are cleared and subsequent uprooting and reclamation, they would switch to agriculture.

In addition, in all organized special settlements, depending on the

Factor and the availability of raw materials, all kinds of handicraft industries will be developed, producing consumer goods, in which the second and third members of the family, the incapacitated and the disabled will be employed.

Contingent                      to be resettled

The following contingents:

- a) kulaks evicted from areas of complete collectivization,
- b) evicted for disruption and sabotage of grain procurement and other campaigns,
- c) an urban element who does not want to leave the cities in connection with passportization,
- d) kulaks removed from industrial production, who fled from the villages,
- e) evicted in order to clear the state borders (the West and Ukraine),
- f) condemned by the OGPU bodies and courts for a term of up to 5 years inclusive, except for the most socially dangerous of them.

The legal status of the resettled

All those resettled in the new special settlements are in all respects equal to the special settlers of 1930 and 1931, in particular, by the very fact of eviction they are deprived of their voting rights, they do not have the right to move and leave the special settlements in which they will be resettled; they are subject to the decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on the restoration of voting rights in 5 years, if they prove their devotion to Soviet power by hard work\*\*.

#### DOCUMENTATION

401

Administrative management of special settlements

and protection of those

New special settlements will be organized on the basis of placing in each of them \*\*\*from 500 to 1,000\*\*\* households. Depending on the nature of the activities of one or another special settlement, it is possible to create settlements with a smaller number of people. \* Commandants-chekists are appointed at the head of these special settlements \*. Groups of settlements with a number of 7.500 families are united in district commandant's offices headed by district commandants.

The protection of the settlements is carried out by the militia, which is subordinate in all respects to the district and settlement commandant.

Operational security service is assigned to the corresponding PGPU PP.

In the center, as part of the OGPU, the Main Directorate of Labor Special Settlements is being created, similar Directorates will be created in Siberia and Kazakhstan.

The tasks of the Main Directorate of Labor Special Settlements include:

- a) Development of all issues related to the organization of labor special settlements, and drawing up control figures-plans that regulate the economic activities of special settlements.
- b) Organization of acceptance and deployment of new contingents.
- c) All types of construction.
- d) Supply (food, building materials, transport, seeds, equipment, etc.).
- e) Agricultural equipment, fish, handicraft and other trades and logging.
- \*\*\*\*f) Organization of livestock and other state farms and farms.
- g) Administrative and Economic Department\*\*\*\*.

\*We requested the PPs of Western Siberia and Kazakhstan on the possibility of settling within their borders by 1,000,000 people, with a proposal to clarify in which areas\*, on what lands, what types of agriculture can be organized during 1933, i.e. To the complicated descriptions of the areas planned for settlement that we received from the People's Commissariat of Agriculture may not be accurate enough.

Since preparations for eviction will require at least 3 months, the resettlement of these contingents can begin no earlier than the 2nd half of April, so that possible preparatory work can be carried out during this period until April.

#### Economic Development Plans

\*The plan for the economic development of new contingents comes down to the following\*:

- a) 75% of the new contingent or 1,500,000 people will be transferred to the land for grain and vegetable gardening and livestock farming with the expectation that in the next two years the state will be freed from worries about their food supply, after which these settlements will move to production of commodity agricultural products, meaning in autumn

\* to G ' n R ° lime sowing winter crops in Western Siberia at 0.5 ha per family and autumn plowing, 1 ha per family, and in Kazakhstan, 1.5 ha per family. In the spring of 1934, to sow spring crops in Western Siberia, 2 ha per family, and in Kazakhstan 2.5 ha per family (938 tons of ha to be sown in total).

- b) \* 25% of the contingent - 500,000 people should be mastered in fisheries and handicrafts \* while maintaining a subsidiary gardening and dairy farming with the expectation of providing themselves with vegetables and potatoes



from the first harvest (1934), and in the subsequent 1935, these vegetable gardens should already produce marketable products.

c) All special settlers of the new contingent, as a rule, are united in non-statutory agricultural artels according to the type of existing ones.

d) After the approval of the sowing plan for each non-statutory agricultural artel, firm plans for sowing spring and winter crops, as well as a harvesting plan, are proposed for steadfast implementation. In the event of malicious non-fulfillment of these plans, the non-statutory agricultural artel is removed from the state food and industrial supply.

e) An organized non-statutory agricultural artel receives a long-term (2-3 years) interest-free loan from the state in the form of cash, building materials, agricultural equipment, sowing seeds, working and productive livestock.

f) Special settlers who do not want to join non-statutory artels do not enjoy the right to receive a loan.

g) The food that will be spent on the special settlers in the first years of their development is an irrevocable loan. All other types of expenses listed above are refundable.

h) All special settlers of the new contingent are allowed to purchase at their own expense the working and productive livestock, agricultural and transport equipment necessary for farming.

i) The distribution of the harvest and income of non-statutory agricultural artels is carried out according to the procedure established by the Committee of Commodity Funds, the People's Commissariat of Land and the OGPU for already existing special settlements.

j) \*Immediately after the resettlement of the first batches, the entire workable part will be used for \*: a) construction of dwellings and other necessary premises and agricultural buildings, b) logging, c) preparation and improvement of land funds and road construction.

k) All special settlers employed in the construction and organization of special settlements, children and the disabled, until they receive their first harvest, are supplied with a rationed food ration free of charge. All able-bodied special settlers who refuse to work, from the supply

removed.

l) \*Spring and summer periods of 1933 are used for\*:

1) construction of dwellings,

2) the delivery of food, building materials, tools, fodder, tractors, agricultural and transport equipment, seeds for winter crops in 1933 to new places of resettlement,

3) uprooting, reclamation and irrigation works, plowing, harrowing and sowing, as well as for the development of fish and handicraft industries.

m) \*Autumn and winter 1933-34 used on\*:

1) further work on the development of land funds, with the expectation of preparing the maximum amount of arable land for spring sowing in 1934,

2) the final deployment of fisheries and handicrafts,

3) completion of all construction works,

4) seeding for spring sowing in 1934,

5) organization of MTS, etc.

o) In the early spring of 1934, the entire able-bodied contingent completely switches to plowing, harrowing and fulfilling the spring sowing plan.

campaigns.

#### DOCUMENTATION

403

Material costs and funds.

required for resettlement of 2 million people

To accommodate the above contingent, it is necessary to organize from 750-1,000 special settlements with the expectation of providing each family with one room (for 1 person - 3 square meters of living space, and in the first year of development - 2 square meters, with the accommodation rate in cities 6 sq. mtr.).

To do this, you need to build:

a) In Western Siberia - 125,000 two-apartment houses (of which in the first year - 83,500).

b) In Kazakhstan - 62,500 houses with 4 apartments (of which in the first year - 41,700).

In Western Siberia - to build wooden log houses, and in Kazakhstan - adobe, with the maximum use of local building materials and the minimum expenditure of scarce imported building materials.

In addition, it will be necessary to build hospitals, outpatient clinics, bathhouses, warehouses, dezo chambers, woofers, stables, cattle yards, garages for transport and motor vehicles in the first year of development; in the 2nd year, build canteens, schools, reading rooms, stalls, etc.

All this will require the following amount of materials:

TOTAL

1933

Forests

3.385 thousand sq.m.

2.475 thousand sq.m.

lumber

1.497

1.222

Nails

6.929 tons

1.894 tons

glass

2.591 sq.m.

1.816 sq. m

High grade iron

8.117 tons

5.634 tons

Roofing iron

2.171

1.472

Furnace appliances

591 thousand sets

401 thousand sets

Window and door

appliances

1.517

1.266

Drying oils

462 tons

349 tons

Consumption of listed building materials for

1 cubic meter, buildings installed

the following comes up:

Norms Forest Glass Nails

Iron

Iron Chalk Drying oil

Pip.

shelter.

grade.

Gosplan 0.15m 0.6m

0.24kg

0.06kg

0.08kg 0.05 0.07kg

0.04m

OGPU 0.10m 0.6m

0.15

0.05

0.07 0.03 0.008

0.03

#### Organization of transportation

The main difficulty that will have to be overcome during resettlement is the transfer from the final railway stations and water piers of human contingents, especially women and children, and a huge amount of building materials, food supplies, fodder, live and dead inventory.

Since resettlement will be carried out in sparsely populated areas, the use of local transport is almost excluded, and thereby the inevitable need is determined for all these transportations to be provided by specially allocated motor vehicles.

Preliminary calculations of the cargo and partially human contingents (old people and children) necessary for transportation determine the need for:

1) 2416 motor vehicles (of which: 2.5 tons - 50%. 3 tons - 35% and 5 tons - 15%) from the Calculation that the motor vehicle must daily transport 3 tons (on average) at 200 km. with return.

404

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

2) 90,000 horses on the basis that 1 horse must cultivate 10 hectares, while the existing 4-6 hectares in these areas. In their free time from agricultural work, the horse composition is meant to be used in logging work.

This also takes into account the possibility of partial use of those planned for agricultural production. works of 1200 tractors for transportation of page - x. tools and inventory.

Although the cost norms for the development of one family in terms of housing construction, scarce materials, food, tools are taken on the basis of our experience in managing the economic organization of special settlers in 1930-31. extremely minimal, much lower than the usual norms for the corresponding types of work according to the norms of the State Planning Commission or other People's Commissariats and organizations, nevertheless, in absolute figures, the planned costs are extremely grandiose values, because we are talking about the development in uninhabited and undeveloped areas far from the railway (which determines the need for significant imports) up to 2,000,000 people who have almost no property.

Bearing in mind that the simultaneous allocation of such large funds is associated with exceptional difficulties, it is considered necessary to oblige:

1. \*\*\*\*\* The People's Commissariat of Land to allocate land funds in the amount of 3,000,000 hectares in the planned settlement areas. suitable for agricultural development.

2. People's Commissariat of Forests to immediately allocate in places, according to the instructions of the OGPU, the necessary cutting areas for logging by the forces of the settlers.

3. The State Planning Commission and the People's Commissariat for Forests immediately issue orders for 250,000 cubic meters to the OGPU. meters of roundwood and 80,000 cubic meters. meter, lumber in the areas closest to the new settlements for the construction of barracks for the first arriving parties of special settlers \*\*\*\*\*.

4. Committee of Commodity Funds, Narkomzem, Narkomsovkhoz, Zagotskot and Zagotkon to allocate to the disposal of the OGPU:

TOTAL

1933

Winter and spring seeds

75.000 tons of them

37.500 tons

horses

90.000 goals

50.000 "

cattle

25.000 "

15.000 "

Sheep

500.000 in

100.000 "

C-s inventory on

62.000 thousand rubles

28.000 thousand rubles

and the corresponding amount of conc. and rude

feed according to the established

norms.

5. Gosplan, Tsudortrans and Narkomtyazhprom allocate: Tractors  
15-30 HP STZ 2640 of which 1200 are tracts.

in 1933

Cars (50% - 2.5 tons,

35% - 3 tons, and 15% - 5 tons) 2416 Tools  
(construction and logging) 5.900. t. rub.

Funds for the above building materials.

6. Committee of Commodity Funds and Regulation of Trade to allocate the following food funds to the  
OGPU for the 2nd quarter of 1933:

Rye flour - 72.000 tons

Cereals - 6.300

#### DOCUMENTATION

405

Fish

- 8.400 - "-

Oils rast.

- 960

Sahara

- 2.160 - "-

Natural tea.

- 14

surrogate

- 432

7. The Committee of Commodity Funds and OSHU to clarify the quarterly need for commodity funds  
(including fodder) for the resettled contingents from I.VII. 1933 to 1.VII. 1934, taking into account the need for  
seasonal delivery to remote areas.

Personnel. Given that:

1. All work on the development and all types of services for the evicted will be carried out entirely and  
completely by the organs of the OGPU without the direct participation of people's commissariats and economic  
agencies,

2. The composition of those resettled due to their social danger is more serious than the special settlers of  
1930-31,

3. This contingent includes both the declassified urban element and

4. That the resettlement itself should be carried out in an exceptionally short time, it seems absolutely necessary to strengthen the administrative staff of the commandant's offices and the protection of special settlements.

According to preliminary calculations, this will require \*:

Commandants and assistants commandants - 3,250 people.

Policemen - 5 700

Doctors of various specialties - 470

Nursing staff — 3,500

Engineers, agronomist, and other specialists. - 500

Construction technicians - 1000

development costs

Approximate calculations showed that the cost of the development of the 2 million contingent is expressed as follows:

1) Agricultural. development, including agricultural construction and organization of 66 MTS —

2) Construction of dwellings

and cultural buildings -

3) The cost of food for the year -

4) The cost of household goods and manufactured goods. —

5) Cost of fodder -

6) Cost of tools -

7) Medical service -

C) The cost of transportation from railway. stations

and piers to places of resettlement -

TOTAL:

325.593. t. r.

571.396 thousand  
rubles 218.000 tr.  
63.000 tr. 10.000  
tr.

8.000 tr.



34.000 tr.

165.000 tr.

\*1. 394.989 thousand rubles\*

The labor force spent on construction is not included in the cost of construction, because the special settlers do not receive a salary due to the fact that the state will supply them with food free of charge during the year.

Thus, from the total costs for the development of a new contingent, irretrievable 657,000 thousand rubles are obtained.

and returnable 737.153 thousand rubles,

which in terms of one family is: irrevocable 1.315 rubles.

and returnable 1.475 rubles.

406

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

CONCLUSION.

THE MONEY EXPENSES LISTED HERE, THE NUMBER OF VARIOUS BUILDING MATERIALS, CARS, TRACTORS, WORKING AND PRODUCTIVE LIVESTOCK, FOOD, FORAGE, THE LOAD ON RAILWAYS AND WATER TRANSPORT IS SO GREAT THAT TO REFINE THE PLAN DECISION AND FINAL Clarification of the REAL POSSIBILITIES OF SATISFACTION REVEALED DURING THE PRELIMINARY STUDYING THE NEEDS FOR MONETARY AND MATERIAL RESOURCES - IT IS NECESSARY TO CREATE A SPECIAL COMMISSION.

ZAM. CHAIRMAN OF THE OGPU: BERRY  
BEGINNING. GULAG BERMAN

AP RF F.Z. Op. 30. D. 196. L. 127-138. Script. Typescript

\* On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "To the archive. I. Stalin. Except above all, it is necessary to connect this case with the unloading of prisons"; "Read. Expenses (1394 million rubles) are grossly exaggerated. It is necessary to involve the resettlers themselves in the expenses. Molotov"; Poskrebyshchev - "From Comrade Yagoda".

Underlined in pencil.

It is crossed out in the margins with two lines, and there is also a handwritten note of Sta-

Lina: "Relocate for how long? For 10 years."

\*\*\*\_\_\*\*\* Inscribed in pencil above the figures "300 to 500".

\*\*\*\*" \*||\*\* In the margins there is Stalin's handwritten note: "And the protection and prevention of flight?"

\*\*\*\*\* An "x" is placed in front of each paragraph in the margins.

No. 341

MEMORIAL G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN ON THE  
RESULTS OF OPERATIONAL MEASURES TO  
SUPPRESS MASS DEPARTURES OF PEASANTS

February 17, 1933

142869

Owls. secret

In addition to the report of 13.11. this year on the results of operational measures taken by the local bodies of the OGPU in order to prevent mass departures from the Ukrainian SSR, the SKK, etc., we report:

PO Ukrainian SSR - for the period from February 11 to February 13 of this year. the fugitive element was detained and filtered - 2377 people; of them expelled at the place of residence - 2354 people. and 23 people were arrested.

PO CChO - for the period from February 10 to February 12 of this year. 118 people were detained. Together with those previously detained, 297 people were returned to their place of residence during this time. and subject to deportation to the Ukrainian SSR - 96 people.

PO NVK - during the period from February 7 to 14, 227 people were detained on the territory of the NVK. Together with those previously detained, 1209 people were returned to their place of residence during the same time.

DOCUMENTS \_407

At railway stations and in the right-of-way during the period from February 11 to February 14 of this year. 2,450 people were detained, 2,392 of them were returned, 9 people were arrested, the rest are being filtered.

\*3a elapsed days for most trains. roads, there is a significant decrease in the flow of people moving\*.

The table of final data for February 14 of this year is given.

INTELLIGENCE

on the number of the detained fugitive element from the beginning of the operation to 14.11-33 ( 110 )

According to what

mu land

Total

delay

jano

Returned to the  
place  
residence

Selected for  
prosecution

property

Condemned. and  
directed. to concentration camps

Selected for  
direction to the  
KASSR

Ukrainian SSR

31783

28351

3434

—

579

tscho

27368

26578

694

—

—

ekk

29116

8663

10528

192

—

nvk

2261

1653

—

—

99

ZSFSR

7302

2037

1148

2490

—

Zap. Region

5115

4087

432

—

—

SVK

27

29

—

—

—

OTR

47417

43411

2825

eleven

—

Total

150391

114759

19059

2693

678

SPO Secretary Svetlov

APRF.F. 3. Op. 30. D. 189. L. 36, 37. Original. Typescript.

\*

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "T. Molotov. Stalin"; "Molotov". \*—\* Underlined in pencil.

ÿ342

LETTER TO THE OGPU

FROM THE MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEER CIRCLE

February 17, 1933

The Narodnaya Volya circle, which is attached to the Central Council of the All-Union Society of political prisoners and exiled settlers, asks to satisfy the petition of its member Vladimir Ivanovich PEROV, with which the latter addresses the OGPU in the application attached here, and also asks to speed up the investigation into the case of his son-in-law Nikolai Vladimirovich GRUM-GRGI MAILO and, taking into account the serious state of his health (tuberculosis), put him in appropriate hygienic conditions.

Chairman of the Narodnaya Volya Circle A.V. YAKIMOV Secretary of the Circle: KM. TERESHKOVICH

APRF. f. 3. Op. 58. D. 326. L. 136. Original. Typescript.

408

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 343

LETTER FROM RELATIVES N.V. GROM-GRZHIMAYLO  
I.V. STALIN

February 28, 1933

Dear comrade. STALIN,

We, the undersigned, appeal to you with an urgent and urgent request to intervene in a case that could end fatally, tragically. Briefly, the matter is as follows:

\*1) At the factory. Stalin, about 2-3 months ago, a group of specialist engineers was arrested, apparently for wrecking (we do not know exactly)\*.

\*2) After 1.5 months, i.e. A month ago, the engineer Nikolai Vladimirovich Grum-Grzhimailo, the son of the late scientific metallurgist of world renown\*, was also arrested. This arrest was absolutely unexpected not only for the engineer N.V. Grum-Grzhimailo, but also for his family and acquaintances, both in production and in private life.

\* Grum-Grzhimailo at the plant enjoyed the love and trust of workers, craftsmen and honest Soviet engineers. He was twice awarded the diploma of a drummer. He spent whole nights at the plant when it was necessary to eliminate the breakthrough, storming our production problems \*. These sleepless nights in hard, hard work greatly undermined his health, and \*he acquired tuberculosis\*. In short, the figure of Grum-Grzhimailo emerges as the figure of a true fighter for socialist construction. And suddenly this arrest, like snow on the head.

3) It is very difficult to defend Nikolai Vladimirovich without knowing exactly what he is accused of. But if we are talking about his imaginary connection with pests, then this, of course, is absurd. \* He repeatedly said in his home circle with anxiety that it seemed to him that pests were sitting somewhere at the plant, pointing even to planned management, where, in his opinion, it was unfavorable \*. An anxious, sharply negative attitude to these moments characterizes psychologically a person, by no means from a negative side.

4) Nevertheless, according to the information we have, which is very scarce, he was charged with high treason. How can these incongruous contradictions be reconciled? How could he have done anything criminal, being an absolutely and unconditionally genuine Soviet engineer, always ready to sacrifice himself for the cause of socialism?

\*5) The writers of these lines are convinced of the complete and unconditional innocence of Grum-Grzhimailo and are convinced that a more thorough investigation of his case will prove this. We are afraid that a group of real pests (if they were there) deliberately, class-sequentially involved Grum-Grzhimailo in

this is a matter to wrest from the ranks of the proletariat the fighter for the socialist reconstruction of Soviet metallurgy\*.

6) Since there is a very real danger threatening the life of Grum-Grzhimailo, since the organs of the OGPU, in our opinion, have been misled, we ask you, comrade. Stalin, order an urgent

DOCUMENTATION

409

review of the Grum-Grzhimailo case \* \*\* a scientist , save by this one of the unconditionally devoted to you and the Soviet Union, of great scientific value, who invented a special steel that does not require imports  
ny metals.

Mother of the prisoner, widow Vl. Eph. Grum-Grzhimailo S. Grum-Grzhimailo

Wife of S. V. Grum-Grzhimailo

The father of the prisoner's wife, the old Narodnaya Volya V. Perov. (111)

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 326. L. 135-135v. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "Find out, check and, if it turns out possible to help. I. Stalin.

\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 344

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON GRANTING THE RIGHT TO THE TROIKA PP OGPU  
BELARUS TO APPLY CAPITAL PENALTY  
WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE TELEGRAM N.F. GIKALO

March 1, 1933

No. 131, item 37/2. - Question of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus.

Satisfy the request of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to grant the right to the troika of the PG OGPU of Belarus to apply capital punishment in cases of counter-revolutionary organizations and groups consisting of kulak and White Guard elements.

Top secret

ENCRYPTION

From Minsk 5.II.1933. No. 150/sh/192 Moscow, Central Committee of the All-  
Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, comrade STALIN

OGPU Comrade Yagoda

Recently, in addition to the uncovered counter-revolutionary conspiracy in agriculture, the systems of the Tractor Center of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture have dealt a decisive blow to the organized counter-revolution of the countryside by disclosing a large number of counter-revolutionary organizations and groups, consisting mainly of kulak, bandit, White Guard elements.

In order to resolve this case as quickly as possible, the Central Committee of the CPB asks that the troika of the PGPU of Belarus be given the right to apply capital punishment.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus Gikalo

APRF. f. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 1.2. Copy. Typescript.

Partially published: Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. Sat. doc. S. 63.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 9 January 33.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Gikalo, Menzhinsky, Krylenko.

410

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 345

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT UNLOADING OF PLACES OF DEPARTMENT OF FREEDOM

March 8, 1933

No. 132, p. 22. - Question of the NKJUST (PB dated 23.P.ZZ, project No. 131, p. 106/71) (comrades Krylenko, Yagoda, Mikoyan).

To approve, as amended, the draft resolution submitted by the commission on unloading places of deprivation of liberty (see annex).

APPLICATION

kp. 22 (O.P.) Ave. PB No. 132

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) dated 8.21.33

ABOUT UNLOADING OF PLACES OF DEPARTMENT OF FREEDOM

A.

By unloading

I. In Ukraine



1. Propose to the OGPU during the month of March to take out 25,000 people sentenced to more than 3 years to their camps.
2. With regard to those sentenced to 3 years, propose to the OGPU that all those convicted for a period of 2 years or more be taken out to organized special settlements.

All convicts are subject to removal, regardless of physical condition and age.

3. With regard to the rest of the convicts, to propose that the NKJ of Ukraine place them within the Ukrainian SSR in their colonies, transferring to corrective labor without imprisonment those of them whose maintenance with imprisonment does not seem necessary.

The total number of items to be exported and placed, in accordance with paragraphs. 2 and 3 - 40.000 people. The deadline is March-April.

4. Propose to the NKJ of Ukraine to carry out a thorough personal review of all investigatory persons taken into custody pending trial, with the release of those who are held illegally or whose detention is incorrect (inappropriate).
5. To release for Ukraine for the month of March 50,000 rations for persons held in corrective labor institutions of Ukraine.
6. Propose to the Central Committee of the CP(b)U to monitor the implementation of this resolution, reporting on the results of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks by April 1 of this year.

## II. In the North Caucasus

1. Propose to the OGPU that all those convicted over 3 years, including those on cassation in the amount of at least 10,000 people, be taken to their camps. Disabled and sick leave within the region. Deadline is March.
2. Propose to the OGPU to take out of the region all those convicted by the courts for a period of 2 years or more, including cassation, on the same conditions as in Ukraine.
3. To propose to the NKJ of the RSFSR, in respect of the rest of the convicts, to place them within the region in the corrective labor colonies of the NKJ, transferring to corrective labor without imprisonment those of them whose detention does not seem necessary.

## DOCUMENTATION

411

The total number of exported at points 2 and 3 is 30,000 people.

Everyone is subject to export, regardless of physical condition and age. The deadline is March-April.

## III. According to C.Ch.O.

1. To propose to the OGPU to take out in March from the region to their camps those convicted for a term of more than 3 years, including those on cassation, in

an average of 15,000 people.

2. To offer the NJU of the RSFSR to take out of the region during the month of March. convicted for up to 3 years - 6,000 people.

3. Propose to GUIT to accommodate 10,000 people. within the region.

GV. Along the Lower Volga

1. To propose to the OGPU that 7,000 convicts for a term of more than 3 years, including cassation ones, be taken out of the region. Deadline is March.

2. Propose to the NKJ to take out of the region convicts up to 2 years, including cassation, in the month of March - 7,000 people.

3. To propose to the GUITU to place 10,000 people within the region.

v.

With regard to the remaining regions and territories, to agree, t.t. Krylenko and Yagoda for each region to take appropriate measures to remove the convicts, or to place them within the region, so that these measures were carried out in March-April.

B.

Measures in the field of reducing the number of persons under investigation in custody pending trial

1. Propose to the OGPU to immediately take measures to speed up the investigative proceedings on persons listed as OGPU, especially in the North. Caucasus (35,000 people), Ukraine (25,000 people), Central Black Sea Region (12 and a half thousand people) and the Lower Volga (over 5,000 people).

2. Prohibit judicial and investigative bodies from taking into custody in the order of preliminary investigation in all cases, except for cases of counter-revolutionary crimes, theft of state and public property, mercenary malfeasance - embezzlement, bribery, etc., speculation, serious crimes against a person (murder, robbery, banditry, severe injury, etc.), fraud, theft of private property (relapse), malicious hooliganism, kulak resistance. In all other cases, as a rule, it is limited to taking away a written undertaking not to leave, guarantees, bail, etc.

Immediately release investigatory cases that do not fall under this category with replacement by the indicated measures.

3. To oblige all large places of deprivation of liberty to appoint special prosecutors with the obligation to review every evening the lists of newly arrived arrested persons, checking the motives for their detention and, as a rule, releasing those of them who do not fall under the above decree.

In doubtful cases, detain those arrested at the place of deprivation of liberty until clarification.

4. Establish the same procedure for militia arrest houses, granting the right to check to the investigator. In case of objection from the militia.

412

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

the dispute is resolved by the prosecutor, in respect of those arrested by the OGPU - by agreement with the OGPU.

5. To organize special chambers of the people's court at all large places of deprivation of liberty to try cases of persons imprisoned in this place of deprivation of liberty. Exceptions may be established for individual cases of public importance.

6. Reduce the existing 14-day cassation period for all categories of cases to 5 days.

7. To propose to the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine, the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties, regional and regional committees, in order to quickly unload cases in the courts, to mobilize for 3 months. the necessary number of employees to strengthen the judicial and prosecutorial and investigative apparatus with the attribution of costs to the local budget.

8. In view of the increase in the volume of work of the central bodies of justice, it is necessary to recognize the need to increase the apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Justice for a period of 6 months. by the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor's Office and the GUITU for 44 people.

Propose to the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR to provide appropriate appropriations.

9. As places of deprivation of liberty are unloaded, transfer there all convicts and investigators who are in arrest houses under the police, in order to complete this transfer by April 15 of this year.

10. To oblige the militia to escort the arrested in areas where there are no points of escort troops, from the cells of preliminary detention and correctional labor institutions of the People's Commissariat of Justice to and from the judicial-investigative bodies, as well as from and to the landing points.

11. Propose to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to increase the number of militia accordingly.

IN.

Measures to improve the supply of food and clothing allowances to detainees

1. To take into account the food leave established by agreement with the People's Commissariat of Supply for those deprived of liberty according to the agreed minimum standards (see appendix).

2. Propose to the Committee of Commodity Funds to discuss the possibility of satisfying, in the minimum required amount, an application for clothing allowance for those deprived of their liberty of the GUITU system.

3. Provide the NKJ within a month for conversion into places of deprivation of liberty, the required number of former. prisons or other buildings. The selection of buildings is made by the Commission consisting of representatives of the regional executive committee, the prosecutor's office, the local UITU and the collective farm.

G.

1. Determine the amount of the contribution to the budget of the RSFSR from the accumulated GUITU NKJU in 20 million rubles.
2. Approve capital investments under the GUITU system in the amount of 47.7 million rubles. against 30 million rubles approved by the Session of the CEC of the Union, instructing the Council of People's Commissars of the Union to provide the indicated capital investments with the appropriate limits niya.
3. To instruct the NKF of the Union and the RSFSR to establish sources for covering 20 million rubles from the budget of the USSR, in connection with a decrease in withdrawals from the accumulations of the GUITU to the budget of the RSFSR for 1933.

#### DOCUMENTATION

413

Annex to paragraph B-1

On the establishment of nutritional standards for detainees of the NKJ system and measures to unload places of deprivation of liberty

1. Establish the following average norms for the supply of foodstuffs for detainees of the NKJ system:
  - a) for flour - 15 kilograms per person per month, suggesting that the NKJ establish a differentiated bread ration in places of deprivation of liberty of its system, depending on the nature of the work, by analogy with the OGPU camps;
  - b) for cereals - 1.5 kg per person per month;
  - c) for fish - 1 kg per person per month;
  - d) for vegetable oil - 0.15 kg per person. per month;
  - e) for sugar - 0.3 kg per person. per month;
  - f) for confectionery - 0.3 kg per person. per month.
2. For minors who are students of the head teacher of the NKJ system, to leave the same supply norms as for adults deprived of liberty with a decrease in the norm of bread to 12 kg per month and with an increase in norms for fish to 1.5 kg.
3. To assign all the products of the agricultural enterprises of the GUITU to the GUITU in order to supply the deprived of their liberty with food products, including grain bread, taking into account the planned supply.
4. Prohibit the seizure of food products from the ITU's own farm, with the exception of commodity surpluses handed over to trade organizations.
5. Establish a supply contingent of detainees for the month of March

400,000 people, in order to revise the contingent on April 1st.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 76, 89-92. Script. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: T.t. Krylenko, Yagoda, Sulimov, Kerzhentsev. Kuibyshev - all; Kosior S. - 1; Sheboldaev - 2; Vareikisu - 3; Ptuhe - 4; Grinko, Yakovleva - p. G; to all regional committees, regional committees and nat. Central Committee - B.

No. 346

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

IN CONNECTION WITH THE TRANSITION OF THE CHINESE  
ON THE TERRITORY OF THE USSR

March 8, 1933

No. 132, item 23. - On the crossing of the Chinese into our territory (comrades Stalin, Voroshilov). -

Give the following order signed by t.t. Voroshilov and Yagoda vol. Blue dick and Deribas (see attachment).

APPENDIX to  
clause 23 (o.p.) pr. PB No. 132

In connection with the incessant crossing of Chinese detachments into our territory, we order:

- 1) From now on, only senior and senior command personnel will be interned in compliance with the previously established procedure.
- 2) The rest of the staff after disarmament should not be imprisoned in a concentration camp, not fed, offering them to get to work, and in case of refusal to work -

414 \_ LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

drive them in the neck away from the borders. If they wish to return to China, do not prevent them from leaving with their own funds.

- 3) The GPU should place under special supervision all Chinese who have crossed over to our territory.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 76, 93. Original. Typescript.

ÿ The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Voroshilov, Yagoda, Karakhan.

No. 347

MEMORIAL G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN ON THE  
ARRESTS OF SPECIALISTS IN  
THE OIL INDUSTRY

March 16, 1933

No. 50123

On March 14, 1933, the OGPU arrested specialists from the Oil Sector of the Main Top of the NKTP and the trusts "Azneft" and "Grozneft", who were exposed as participating in the k.r. espionage, wrecking organization in the oil industry features:

In Moscow.

1. NEYMAN N.M. - engineer, assistant early factory section, ex. nobel laureate.
2. Kupriyanov I.A. - engineer, manager commodity group of the factory section, ex. nobel laureate.
3. ZHURAVLEV B.N. - engineer, manager processing group of the factory section, ex. nobleman, former mazutovets, was held in the case of k.r. wrecking organization in the oil industry, liquidated in 1930.
4. PROTSIKOV L.A. - engineer, manager exploratory drilling group of the field section, ex. a nobleman, the son of a guards officer, in the past worked in oil companies, was involved in the case of k.r. wrecking organization in the oil industry, liquidated in 1930.
5. TVERSKY S. I. - planner, head. transport planning section of Soyuzneftetorg, son of a large timber exporter.
6. BONDAREVSKY A.M. - Economist, head of the long-term planning group, son of a major Baku oilman, had a large personal capital.
7. Tolstonogov N.A. - economist, editorial department of the oil magazine, ex. officer, during the Musavatist coup in the Caucasus, he was on the side of the latter and opposed the Soviet power.
8. PIOTROVSKY Yu.Yu. - planner, water transport inspector of Soyuzneftetorg.
9. KUNIN E.L. - economist, master planning group, ex. financial worker in various oil firms, ex. Bundist.  
  
in Grozny
10. KOLYBELNIKOV T.N. - Art. chemical engineer of the factory technical department of Grozneft. Son of a fist, ex. officer of the Kolchak army, participant in the "ice campaign".
11. Govorkov V.P. - Design engineer of the design and estimate office of Grozneft. The son of a colonel, served as a volunteer in the Kornilov army.

415

participant of the "ice campaign", for which he was awarded the Order of the Crown of Thorns.

12. KULIKOV A.I. - Design engineer of the design and estimate office of Grozneft, son of a wealthy Cossack.

13. Grechkin A.I. - Art. engineer of the design and estimate office of Grozneft, the son of a wealthy Cossack.

In Baku

14. POLYAKOV M.L. 1999-1999 - mechanical engineer of the drilling department of Azneft, in the past had his own contract drilling.

15. WAGENGEIM N.V. - main Drilling Rationalization Engineer of the Azneft Trust, ex. nobel laureate.

16. NIKOV I.O. - Engineer of the Azneft drilling department, son of a kulak.

On March 15, 1933, the following were additionally arrested in Moscow:

1. SOROKER G.N. - engineer, assistant early of the oil sector of Glavtop NKTP and the head of the field section. In the past, he worked in oil companies in responsible positions; passed in the case of k.r. organizations in the oil industry, liquidated in 1930.

2. Rabinovich V.R. - engineer, assistant early field section, in the past he worked in various oil firms.

3. BOGDANOVSKII S.D. - Art. the economist of the factory section, from a bourgeois family, was closely connected with the executed pests in the case of the k.r. organizations in the oil industry, liquidated in 1930.

APPENDIX: Records of the testimony of NEIMAN and KUNIN.

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE OGPU YAGODA

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 337. L. 26-29. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there are Stalin's handwritten notes: "About k.r. wrecking work in the oil industry"; "Set aside for me."

\*\* Published without attachment.

No. 348

PROTOCOL OF INTERROGATION OF THE ENGLISH  
SPECIALIST V.V. MACDONALD

March 16, 1933

(Translation from English)

ABOUT THE METHODS OF  
PERFORMING ACCIDENTS PERFORMED BY  
RUSSIAN SPECIALISTS ON MY REQUESTS AT ZUGRES.

The work on committing accidents in the Donbass region was organized by me as follows:

during the installation of three turbine generators at ZUGRES, I instructed the turbine foreman Vasiliev to arrange in such a way that the work done by his people would be unsatisfactory, so that when the turbines started working, they caused trouble and had to stop for repairs.

To achieve this, it was stipulated that the oil pipe system was not cleaned properly, and this caused the failure of the oil pumps in turbines No. 1 and No. 3 of the station. This necessitated the analysis of the entire

416

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

oil line system in order to properly clean it. Also, the drain pipes of the heaters were left in a dirty state, which made it necessary to remove them for cleaning a little later, after the machines were put into operation. Also, the inlet of the circulation system was not cleaned, and this led to the fact that in several cases pieces of wood fell into the circulation pump, making it necessary to stop the pump for cleaning.

In another case, the bolts holding together parts of the ring covers of generator No. 3 were not properly tightened, and this led to the bolt breaking and falling into the generator, where it could cause an accident. Because of this, it became necessary to remove the generator rotor for inspection. Damage was also caused to stop and throttle valves by leaving foreign objects in the steam pipes between the boilers and turbines. After the installation was completed, when the machines began to work, the wrecking work was continued by the turbine foreman Fomichev and the engineer Kotlyarevsky, since the turbine foreman Vasiliev left ZUGRES for Lugansk. The method of operation was to delay all the repairs that had to be made as a result of these various accidents, and thus keep the machines idle. Repairs were also made in a deliberately unsatisfactory manner, which necessitated repairs a second, a third time, and so on.

The result of all accidents was that the duration of the operation of the machines could not be counted on, as well as the fact that there was a threat of stopping all three turbines, which in turn would lead to a shortage of energy in the Donbass region, as a result of which they could be flooded some mines, as the pumping system would not be able to cope with the water flooding the mines.

In the same way, a threat was created for the operation of plants powered by the energy of ZUGRES.

Recorded by his own hand: V.V. McDonald ( 112 )



Interrogated:

Beginning ECU OGPU Mironov

Pom. early ECU OGPU Dmitriev

APRF. F. 45. Op.1. D. 171. L. 84, 85. Original. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet is Stalin's handwritten note: "To my archive."

No. 349

NOTE G.E. PROKOFIEV AND L.G. MIRONOVA I.V. TO  
STALIN ON THE NUMBER OF THE OGPU INVOLVED FOR  
THE THEFT OF PUBLIC PROPERTY

March 20, 1933

No. 285483

"ÿ The total number of people involved by the OGPU for theft of state and public property is 127,318 people as of March 15 of this year. \* 55,166 people were involved in embezzlement from state farms and collective farms - 72.152 people.

DOCUMENTATION

417

ÿ Of the total number of those involved in theft, 73,743 people were convicted by the courts and bodies of the OGPU (the Collegium of the OGPU and troikas at the PP OGPU) \*.

The bodies of the OGPU convicted 14.56 people. (on the largest cases of organized theft). According to the measures of punishment, this number of convicts is subdivided as follows:

VMN. 2.052 people

5-10 years camp. 7.661 people.

below 5 years. 4343 people

Total 14056 people.

\* According to the social composition, the division of convicts by the OGPU bodies follows

blowing\*:

Ex. merchants, speculators, kulaks. Employees, . . . 4467 people  
collective farmers, individual farmers

and other workers. 8209 people

Others. 1080 people

Total 14056 people.

Of the cases of theft uncovered by the OGPU during the reporting two weeks, the large-scale theft of bread that took place in Rostov-on-Don attracts attention. Embezzlement covered the entire system of the Rostprokhlbokombinat: the bakery. 2 mills, 2 bakeries and 33 shops from which bread was sold to the population. More than 6,000 poods of bread, 1,000 poods of sugar, 500 poods of bran and other products have been plundered. Embezzlement was facilitated by the lack of a clear statement of accountability and control, as well as criminal nepotism and soldering of employees. The public workers' control, attached to the grain trading network, did not justify its purpose. In all established cases of theft, the inspectors were accomplices, affixing their signatures to obviously fictitious acts for underdelivery of bread, write-offs of shrinkage and weight, etc. 54 people were arrested in the case, including 5 members of the CPSU(b).

Large thefts were uncovered in the peat section of the MOSPO, which is in charge of supplying peat workers. The predatory group was headed by Nikitin, head of the trading department of the peat section, ex. the officer who picked up the warehouses as employees who had already sued former. merchants, landowners and another alien element. The organization had its own agents in the torf cops on the ground, in particular in Orekhovo-Zuyevo and Shaturstroy. Not limited to direct theft, the organization used the money of the peat section to buy products in wagons and sell them to the side, appropriating the proceeds. 10 people have been arrested in the case. The investigation continues.

In the air defense system of the Stalin plant in Taganrog (a military plant with 9,000 workers), a large predatory organization consisting of 82 people was opened, having plundered Shai from the Workers' Food Supply Fund for 435,000 rubles according to Hard penalties, this organization included employees of the local fish factory and meat processing plant.

In the Taganrog branch of Soyuztrans, an organization consisting of 62 drivers, loaders and port employees was liquidated, among whom a significant number of former. kulaks, merchants, and also the criminal element. During transportation, the organization stole goods on the road that carried

from the port. The size of the theft can be judged by the fact that only about 1,500 pounds of grain and flour were stolen.

In total for the period from 1st to 15th March of this year. OGPU arrested 2829 people for embezzlement.

Deputy prev. OGPU Prokofiev Head.  
ECO OGPU Mironov

APRF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 171. L. 87-89. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there is Stalin's handwritten note: "My Archive".

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 350

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON GRANTING THE RIGHT TO CONSIDER CASES WITH  
THE APPLICATION OF CAPITAL PENALTY TO  
THE TROIKA IN THE COMPOSITION OF V.A. BALITSKY, K.M.  
CARLSON and I.M. LEPLEVSKY (FROM)

March 20, 1933

No. 133, item 27/4. - Question of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine.

Grant the right to consider cases of insurrection and counter-revolution in Ukraine with the application of the highest measure of social protection to the troika in the composition of the so-called. Balitsky, Carlson and Leplevsky.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 96. Original. Typescript.

Published: Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. Sat. doc. S. 63.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 10.III.33.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Menzhinsky, Vinokurov, Krasikov;  
Central Committee of the CP(b)U (in cipher).

No. 351

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON FORMATION OF LABOR SETTLEMENTS IN  
THE REGIONS OF WESTERN SIBERIA AND KAZAKHSTAN

March 20, 1933

No. 133, item 28/5. - Question of the OGPU.

1. To accept basically the proposal of the OGPU on the formation of labor settlements in the regions of Western Siberia and Kazakhstan (500,000 people in each region).

2. Offer commissions as part of t.t. Yagoda (convocation), Mezhlauka V.I., Blagonravova, Chernov, Grinko, Yakovlev, Fomin, Berman - to consider and verify the applications of the OGPU, finally setting the figures, and to give a draft resolution on the whole issue as a whole.

The term of the commission is 5 days.

RGASPI. F. 1/. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 96. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 10.Sh.ZZ

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Yagoda, V. I. Mezhlauk, Blagonravov, Chernov, Grinko, Yakovlev, Fomin, Berman\*.

#### DOCUMENTATION

419

No. 352

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON RE-REGISTRATION OF WEAPONS IN THE USSR"

March 20, 1933

No. 133, item 35/12. - On the re-registration of weapons in the USSR.

1. Propose to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR to carry out the following amendment of Art. 182 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and the corresponding articles of the Criminal Code of the Union Republics:

Manufacture, storage, purchase and sale of explosives or shells, as well as firearms (except for hunting) weapons without proper permission entails -

imprisonment for up to five years, with confiscation of the said substances, shells and weapons.

Sending by mail and other means of firearms (not hunting), explosive and flammable substances and objects, such as: gunpowder, cartridges, etc. - Imprisonment for up to five years.

2. Propose to the OGPU to re-register weapons throughout the USSR, with a view to seizing the largest number of weapons from the population and reducing the number of persons enjoying the right to acquire and store them.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 96-97. Script. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 10.11.33.

\*\* There is a typewritten note in the text about the distribution: "Extracts sent: t .t. Yagoda, Yenukidze, Krylenko.

No. 353

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON ENSURING THE SPRING SEEDING CAMPAIGN IN THE SUGAR REGIONS OF THE Kyiv REGION"

March 20, 1933

No. 133, paragraph 78/60. — On ensuring the spring sowing campaign in the sugar regions of the Kyiv region.

<...>

2. Release 200,000 poods of fodder crops, of which 100,000 poods on account of those previously released to the Ukrainian SSR and 100,000 poods additionally from the funds of the Committee of Reserves.

3. Release 100,000 poods of oats as a seed loan from the funds of the Committee of Reserves.

5. The issuance of seed and food loans to be made on the terms of repayment in kind in the autumn of 1933, and administrative and transport expenses of the state to be charged in the amount of 10 poods for every 100 poods of food and seed loans.

420

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

7. To offer the OGPU and the PGPU of the OGPU of the Ukrainian SSR to Comrade Balitsky to evict the Petliura elements from the indicated areas, evicting up to 1000 families before the start of spring field work.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 101. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on March 18, 1933.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Kerzhentsev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Odintsov, Kosior, Demchenko—everyone; Chernov, Zibrak - 1, 2, 3, 5; Menzhinsky, Yagoda, Balitsky - 7.

No. 354

SPECIAL MESSAGE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN ON THE OPERATION TO CLEAN THE BORDER STRIP ON THE WESTERN BORDER OF THE USSR

March 26, 1933

No. 50147

Owls. secret

Starting from March 16 this year. an operation to clear the border strip in sections of the Polish border in the Ukrainian SSR and Belarus, in sections of the Polish and Latvian borders in the Western Region, and in sections of the Latvian and Finnish borders in the LVO, as of March 20, 1938. the existence of the c.-r. rebel and sabotage organizations directly created and led by the Polish and Finnish general staffs or contacted with them in the process of gathering forces.

Organizations were planted in the main strategic areas around the railway. dor. nodes, fortified areas and defense construction.

For almost all the organizations that have been opened, the same dates for the uprising are set, timed to coincide with the spring of this year.

Along with the defeat of the rebel organizations and centers, residencies, crossings and a numerous spy network of the Main Staff and Finnish intelligence were liquidated, in some cases they managed to get into the personnel units of the Red Army, the police, military schools and defense construction.

In addition to gathering forces, training and uniting the insurgent underground, organizations carried out systematic work to destroy collective farms, to disrupt the spring sowing campaign, to aggravate food difficulties (by burning, stealing and spoiling stocks of fodder and food) and to create discontent and tense situation along the entire border strip.

PO U.S.S.R.

A large Petliurist organization was liquidated in a number of settlements of the Teplinsky, Bershadsky, Trostyanitsky, Gaisinsky districts of the Vinnitsa region, associated with the Polish-Petliura intelligence agencies that were preparing the uprising in the spring of this year, the Polish intelligence officer SOROKA Anastasy led the insurrectionary work (arrested) .

The organization planned to carry out mass terror against the Soviet-party and collective-farm activists. Members of the organization were identified at the Kharkov Tractor Plant and at the Moscow Elektrostal plant, where they were sent by the leadership for sabotage work.

DOCUMENTATION

421

The insurgent espionage organization in the Yarunsky, Novograd-Volynsky, Slavutsky and Staro-Konstantinovsky districts of the Vinnitsa and Kiev regions, created by the Polish-Peter Gtyur intelligence officer transferred from behind the cordon, 6. the leader of the gang in 1930 KUCHEROY, was liquidated. Identified ~ on the cell of the organization at the Staro-Konstantinovsky military construction.

On the territory of the Vinnitsa region and the Kamenetz-Podolsky border guard, the espionage-insurgent organization associated with the Tarnopol sub-exposition and created by the white fists transferred from Poland was liquidated. In addition to planting insurgent cells, the organization carried out extensive agitation among the peasantry for mass emigration to Poland.

In the sector of the Slavuta frontier detachment, an insurrectionary K-r organization was uncovered, which planned the date for the uprising in the spring of this year and was headed by agents of the Polish-Petliura intelligence KHOMICH and MELENCHUK. The organization distributed the appeal of the "Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee" and worked to disrupt the sowing campaign and to destroy the collective farms.

The Petlyurist-insurgent organization in the Potievsky and Malinsky districts of the Kyiv region, which planned an uprising in the spring of this year, was liquidated.

According to the plan, it was supposed to capture the weapons depot in Radomysl and then move on the city of Zhitomir.

The organization was associated with Poland.

In the area of the Olevsky border guard detachment, an insurgent organization was opened, created by the Polish-Petliura scout Istnyuk, who arrived from behind the cordon. The connections of the organization in Kyiv and in transport were revealed.

An insurgent organization was revealed in the defense construction zone of the Kyiv and Makarov regions.

The insurgent organization in the Korsunsky district of the Kiev region, consisting mainly of teachers and students, was liquidated. The connections of the organization in Kyiv universities were established.

The insurgent organization was liquidated in six settlements of the Zvenigorod district of the Kyiv region, led by b. active Petliurite Derkach.

In the Chernyakhovsky district of the Kyiv region, the existence of an insurgent organization has been established, which has engulfed a number of settlements in the region with its influence. 18 members of the organization were identified. An insurgent organization in the Proskurovsky district of the Vinnitsa region, consisting of white and repressed kulaks, led by a Galician and associated with Poland, was liquidated.

In the area of the Volochisk border guard detachment, the Polish rebel organization was liquidated, headed by members of the church "twenty" Ataman and Belinsky. The organization was connected with the priest Nanovsky, who was in Poland, and received instructions from him to carry out demoralizing work on the collective farms and to prepare an uprising.

In the sectors of the Slavutsky, Olevsky and Volochinsky border detachments, spy organizations and groups were uncovered, led by agents of the 2nd department of the PGSH, planting sabotage cells in the most important directions, distributing appeals of the "Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee", collecting information on the state of the and the course of collective farm construction and compiled nominal lists of the Soviet and party activists of the districts in order to physically destroy them at the time of the uprising.

The sabotage and rebel organization headed by engineer Petersdorf deserves special attention. handed over to the Polish intelligence

not a realistic plan of the military construction site.

422

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

Of the insurgent formations of national minorities, k.r. organization of German colonists in the Zeltsky district of the Odessa region, created by b. Socialist-Revolutionary Rothaker and building her plans for insurrection in the hope of Hitler's coming to Ukraine.

Large insurgent organization of Germans in the Karlibknekhtsky district of the Odessa region, associated with Romania. The organization scheduled the performance dates for the spring of this year. The German colonist Steckler (arrested) led the organization. The connections of the organization in Odessa and Donbass were revealed.

As part of the liquidation of the Polish residences, 14 agents of various expositions of P.G.Sh and 8 agents deployed specifically for the deployment of espionage and insurgent work in the Donbass were seized.

In total, 9,514 people have been seized so far, of which 2,311 people have been involved in espionage and communications in espionage cases, 6,074 people in insurgent organizations and groups, who have fled beyond the cordon, were repressed and so on. signs of k.-r. - 1119 people 2,011 weapons were confiscated, 1,780 rifled weapons, 213 smooth-bore weapons.

PO BSSR

The main blow was inflicted on the sabotage and rebel organizations planted by the II Department of the Polgenstab in strategic directions, rokades, railways. nodes, around fortified areas and defense construction.

In the Polotsk fortified region, a sabotage and rebel organization was liquidated, created by the PGSH agent Golovnev and Kunetsevich and preparing to blow up bridges, military base warehouses and railway structures at the time of the war. Contacts of the organization in Leningrad (Bolshevik plant) were established.

In the Glusk and Lyuban districts, a sabotage insurgent organization was liquidated, created on the instructions of the 2nd department of the PGSH by the former leader of the gang, Peregud, and scouts Nekrashevich and Krukovsky, transferred from Poland. 53 members of the organization were arrested, mostly b. bandits, nobles and landlords. The organization's links with other rebel formations in adjacent regions of the BSSR have been established.

In the area of the Minsk fortified region (Lagoisk region), a sabotage and rebel organization was liquidated, led by a resident of the Vilna exposition of the 2nd department of the PGSH, b. staff captain of the Kolchak army Zanemonets.



Carrying out the tasks of the exposition, Zanemonets planted insurgent cells at various points in the Lagoi region. A total of 31 people were identified, including a Red Army soldier of the 31st cavalry regiment Kartul Joseph. (Additional arrests are made.)

The sabotage and rebel organization in the Khoiniki region, created by the Polish intelligence officer Rubachevsky, was liquidated.

On the site of the 18th border detachment in the Petrikovsky district, a sabotage and rebel organization headed by the Polish intelligence officer Yakub Maslo was liquidated.

At the Bobruisk meat-packing plant, a sabotage group was liquidated, created by Ostakovich, an agent of the 2nd department of the Primary School of Staff, and associated with an organization in the Glusk region, headed by Peregud.

The sabotage and rebel organization on the Gomel railway was liquidated. node, created by the PGSH agent Father Andrekus. The organization included employees of the Lantsutsky Locomotive Repair Plant. The tasks of the organization in peacetime were reduced to wrecking activities in transport, and in wartime to the suspension of the movement of military flows.

424

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

seniors from MURZA-MURZICH, an employee of the Main Police of the BSSR, who maintains illegal ties with Poland;

k.-r. Latvian nationalist organization in Lioznyansky, created by b. participants in the uprising of 1923, Kalnin and Tsalit, and dated the time of the uprising to the beginning of the war.

In total, 3,492 people were arrested in connection with the operation, of which 13 k.r. organizations 445 people, 16 spy residencies 203 people, and signs of espionage, rebellion 2844 hours.

software l.v.o.

The widely ramified network of cells of the insurgent organization created by the Finnish General Staff and covering Karelia was liquidated. Karelian Isthmus and individual national regions of the LVO.

The investigation obtained data on the presence of secret weapons depots in Karelia, created by Belokarelian povstbands. Operational groups were sent to the places to detect them.

According to the testimony of the arrested leaders of the cells (chairman of the village council 1st

Savinovo, member of the CPSU (b) MATVEEV P. Ya; the pre-collective farm "The Way to Socialism" of the candidate of the CPSU (b) MATVEEV Ivan; secretary of the party cell of the same collective farm Ivan DEMENTYEV; the pre-collective farm "The Path to Communism" of the candidate of the CPSU (b) IVANOV Grigory; Chairman of the Sysoylovsky village council KORNILOVA and the foreman of the collective farm "Simonovskaya Selga" MATVEEV Ivan, etc.)

it is established that wrecking work in collective farms, at logging sites and the organization of the rebellion was carried out on direct assignments of the Finnish intelligence.

The residency and separate connections of financial intelligence in the Karelian separate jaeger brigade and Osoviahim were opened.

It has been established that the financial intelligence introduced its agents into the Leningrad International Military School and conducted a C.R. nationalist work. The command staff of the brigade in the overwhelming majority consists of pupils of the Intermilitary School.

Arrested by the commanding officer of the Jaeger battalion LINNOLA-LEHTI, NEN confessed that since 1921 he had been a provocateur of the financial secret police in the Finnish Party, and in 1928-29, conducting intelligence work from the 4th department of the headquarters of the LVO, he collaborated with Finnish intelligence.

It turns out that a significant part of the intelligence work of the 4th department of the headquarters of the LVO was controlled by the financial secretary.

For example, the crossing of couriers to communicate with 4 residents of the 4th department of the headquarters of the LVO in Finland passed through one single line on the Karelian Isthmus, which was in charge of 3 brothers KOUHYA, who testified during interrogation that since 1929 they have been collaborating with the Finnish secret police .

Both P.R.P (border reconnaissance post), all in Karelia, on the Karelian Isthmus gave 100% failures.

Arrested b. the commander of a separate Karelian Jaeger brigade, being an employee of confessed that at the same time he the 4th department of the headquarters of the LVO, IOKELO collaborated in the Lammerfor Okhrana.

A connection has been established with (intelligence, with the Finnish consulate in Leningrad, leading workers Osoviahim PAVLOV, OKSANEN and KHARYA KA, pupils of the intermilitary school, purged from the jaeger brigade in 1931.

At the same time, the c.r. an insurrectionary organization in the Pryazha region, connected with the kulak exile in the Pudozh region and having connections among the soldiers of the Red Army.

The leadership of the organization (Mikhailov, chairman of the Olonets regional executive committee Rozhkov) was connected with Finnish intelligence.

Of the liquidated k.-r. youth organizations, an organization called the "Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Workers" deserves attention, which planned the creation of rebel cells in large industrial centers, sabotage and expropriation of public funds. distribution of prepared leaflets, organized abduction of weapons from command personnel by using a criminal element (pickpockets in trams, at stations, etc.) and establishing links with foreign cr. white migrant centers.

Among those arrested was an employee of the Krasny Portovik editorial office, the candidate of the CPSU (b) Zhilin (the son of a kulak).

A terrorist-insurgent organization consisting of people - employees of the Krasny Putilovets plant, the photo laboratory of the Civil Air Fleet Institute, the Lepse plant and other institutions.

The tasks of the organization included: propaganda of the ideas of individual terror and its mass conduct against the leadership of the party and the authorities, the use of sabotage as a means of struggle during the uprising, poisoning drinking water tanks with strychnine in places where workers gathered. During the search, a jar with 25 gr. strychnine of Germanic origin.

In order to eliminate espionage connections in Petrozavodsk, a Swedish citizen, engineer Gaglunde, was arrested, who confessed to espionage and in connection with the English resident in Leningrad, Norwegian Lee.

A total of 2,074 people were arrested. Weapons were confiscated: 875 rifles, 2,425 sawn-off shotguns and revolvers.

ZAM. CHAIRMAN OF THE OGPU G. YAGODA

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 201. L. 75-87. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there is a handwritten note by Stalin: "What is the fate of arrested?"

No. 355

NOTE G.E. PROKOFIEV AND L.G. MIRONOV  
I.V. TO STALIN ON THE NUMBER OF OGPU BODIES  
INVOLVED FOR SPECULATION (114)

April 2, 1933

No. 50168

Secret

The total number of people involved by the OGPU for speculation "is as of April 1 of this year - 54,370 people. \*

Of the total number of those involved for theft, \* 32,340 \* people were convicted by the courts and bodies of the OGPU (the Collegium of the OGPU and the troikas at the PP OGPU).

The bodies of the OGPU convicted 16,636 people. According to the measures of punishment, the convicts are divided as follows:

5 10 years camp. 7.124 pers.

below 5 years.9.512 -"-

Total 16.636 people.

426

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

According to the social composition, the division of those convicted by the OGPU bodies is as follows:

Ex. merchants, speculators, kulaks. . . . 13.364 people

Employees, collective farmers, individual farmers

and other workers. 2.655 people

Others.617 people

Total 16.636 people.

In total for the period from March 15 to April 1 of this year. 1,350 people were arrested by the OGPU for speculation.

Deputy Chairman OGPU Prokofiev Head  
of IVF OGPU Mironov

AP RF F. 45. Op. 1. D. 171. L. 90. Original. Typescript.

\* There is a handwritten note in the text: "My archive. I. Stalin.

\*—\* \*\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 356

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE EVICTION OF 600 PEOPLE  
FROM THE KURGAN AND BARDYM REGIONS  
AT THE PROPOSAL OF Comrade I.D. KABAKOV

April 4, 1933

No. 134, p. 62/50 - Telegram from Comrade Kabakov.

Accept Comrade Kabakov's proposal to evict 300 people from the Kurgan region and 300 people from the Bardym region within the region.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 107. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on March 21, 1933.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Kabakov (in cipher), Menzhinsky, Yagoda.

No. 357

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON GRANTING THE RIGHT TO CONSIDER  
CASES ON REBELLION IN WESTERN SIBERIA TO  
THE TROIKA PN OGPU WESTERN SIBERIA

April 4, 1933

No. 134, p. 75/63 - Telegram of the West Siberian Regional Committee.

Grant the right to consider cases of insurrection and counter-revolution in Western Siberia to the Troika of the PGPU of Western Siberia.

RGASPI. F. D7. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 107. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 29.33.33.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: Zap.-Sib. regional committee (in cipher), vol. Yagoda, Vinokurov, Krasikov, Krylenko.

427

DOCUMENTATION \_

No. 358

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

About the expulsion of kulak and individual farms that refuse to sow

April 4, 1933

No. 134, item 109/97. - Question of the North Caucasian Regional Committee.

Accept the next offer t.t. Sheboldaeva and Larina:

a) During the month of April, expel 3,000 kulak farms, individual farmers who refuse to sow (according to the decision of the Central Committee on measures for spring sowing in the North Caucasus) and the most malicious violators of public property and saboteurs among the collective farmers.

b) First of all, before the start of the holiday season, no later than April 15, 3,000 families of counter-revolutionary, parasitic and declared elements from the Sochi and Tuapse districts and from the group of Minvodsk resorts should be sent, littering the resort areas.

c) Provide assistance with food for their expulsion at the rate of 1 pood of bread for a family.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 108-109. Script. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 1.IV.33.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Sheboldaev, Larin (in code), Menzhinsky, Yagoda.

ÿ359

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON CONVENING A CONVENTION OF THE LEADERS OF THE OGPU (115)

April 23, 1933

No. 136, p. 2 - About the OGPU PP (comrade Stalin).

Instruct the OGPU to convene on May 3 of this year. meeting of all PGPU PPs, excluding the Far East.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 921. L. 1. Original. Typescript.

No. 360

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE EVICTION FROM THE LIMITS OF THE MIDDLE VOLGA REGION OF KULAK AND INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLDS

April 23, 1933

No. 136, p. 71/47 - Question of the Middle Volga.

Accept the proposal of the Central Volga regional committee: to carry out the withdrawal and eviction outside the region during May-June of this year. not less than 6 thousand

Latsk farms and 1 thousand farms of the most decomposed individual farmers.

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 9.IV.33.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Shubrikov, Polbitsin, Menzhinsky, Yagoda.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 122. Original. Typescript. io \* n P ^ jubilantly: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. 1927

T. 3. S. 739.

428

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 361

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON GRANTING THE RIGHT TO USE VMN TO THE TROIKA IN  
THE COMPOSITION OF K.Ya. BAUMAN, R.A. PILLYAR AND A.I. IKRAMOVA

April 23, 1933

No. 136, p. 78/54 - Telegram of the Sredazburo of the Central Committee.

Grant the right to consider cases of insurrection and counter-revolution in Central Asia with the application of the highest measure of social protection to the troika in the composition of the so-called. Bauman, Pillar and Ikramov.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 123. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 16.1V.33.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Kalinin, Vinokurov, Krasikov, Krylenko, Yagoda; Sredazburo of the Central Committee.

No. 362

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON GRANTING THE RIGHT TO USE VMN TO THE  
TROIKA IN THE COMPOSITION OF S.M. KIROVA, F.D.  
MEDVED AND I.F. KODATSKY

April 23, 1933

No. 136, p. 79/55 - The issue of the Leningrad region.

Grant the right to consider cases of insurrection and counter-revolution in the Leningrad region with the application of the highest measure of social

protection troika as part of t.t. Kirov, Medved and Kodatsky.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 123. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 16.IV.33.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the scattering: "Extracts sent: vol. Kalini well, Yagoda, Vinokurov, Krasikov, Krylenko; Lenobkom.

No. 363

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"On the eviction of KULAKS IN THE CAUCASUS"

April 23, 1933

No. 136, p. 94/70 - On the eviction of kulaks in the Transcaucasus.

Allow 900 kulak farms with families to be evicted from the cotton and border regions of Azerbaijan, 300 farms from Eastern Georgia (Kakhetia, Borgalo), 300 farms from the cotton regions of Armenia (and in total in Transcaucasia - 1,500 farms, of which eviction of kulak farms purged from collective farms).

RGASPI. F., 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 124. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 19.IV.33.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Beria, Menzhinsky, Yagoda.

No. 364

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I.  
DOBRODITSKOY ON NEGATIVE PHENOMENA IN THE STATE  
OF OKDVA, DIRECTED TO G.G. YAGODOY I.V. STALIN

May 4, 1933

No. 223939

\*From December y/y to March y/y, there was an increase and aggravation of negative political sentiments in the army\*.

The facts of manifestation of negative moods were recorded: \*December - 2338, January - 3082, February - 3120\*.

One of the reasons for the increase in negative sentiments is the activation of socially and negatively inclined elements that have penetrated into the units as part of the new replenishment. Out of 4830 recruits for 1/1-33 revealed:

associated with zakordon - 8 people,



kulaks and relatives of kulaks - 171,

total 179 people.

#### NEGATIVE MOODS AMONG THE PRIVATE STAFF

By their very nature, the negative political sentiments of the Red Army personnel \*are in the majority of dissatisfaction with collectivization and food difficulties and are often generated by documents with a message from the countryside about the "hunger strike in the villages"\*.

Under their influence, individual Red Army soldiers express their unwillingness to serve and defend the USSR in case of war.

"... When there were no collective farms, the peasants lived much better; now, under the collective farms, everyone is starving. In the event of war, no one will go to defend the Soviet authorities, but everyone will go against it "(cr-ts of the Achinsk regiment of the Krasnoyarsk division. Bulakhov, b / n, poor peasant, collective farmer).

"... At home they took away all the bread, I will protect someone here, and at home they will take away the last crumbs and leave them hungry. Yes, after that, will study really come to mind, here, brother, there's no time for study "(cr-c 36th div. Ushakov, collective farmer, non-party).

Similar facts are noted in a number of parts.

"Based" on food difficulties, some part of the negatively minded Red Army men sought to discredit the achievements of the USSR in social construction in the eyes of the Red Army masses. Such attacks were mainly observed in the process of working out the decisions of the January plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Moreover, in some cases, they came from Komsomol members:

"... What the hell are our achievements, what a waste of time to write, as we see in practice - the army is starving, there is no light, and we won't remember civil conditions" (cr-ts 1 battery of the 36th p. Regiment 12th div., Novikov, middle peasant-sole individual, b / p, expelled from the KSM).

Kr-ts artillery battalion 2nd div. Lyaleko, a member of the Komsomol, during a meeting of the red and RMeytsev division, according to the report of commander Kolesnikov, shouted: "Do not listen, nonsense. He is lying, there are no achievements in the USSR. Hey, comrades, come to my circle, I'll tell you everything. (Lyaleko is proposed to be arrested.)

430

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

\*Among other negative manifestations, treacherous moods, fixed on the part of a/c-minded individuals, deserve special attention.

"... In case something starts, a war with the Japanese in the spring, I know what I will do. My easy way is to tear off the buttonhole and the star, take a white handkerchief in my hands and go to the Japanese, die anyway "(kr-ts 1st battalion. Marytak,

collective farmer, in the presence of kr-ts Yuryev.)

"... I won't suffer here for a long time, once I go to the hills, the second time to alarm, but the third time I won't be here, I won't be on our territory." (assistant commander of a platoon of an infantry battalion [tallion], b / p, middle peasant, is being checked.)

Similar statements are taken into account in other parts.

Particularly sharp and numerous complaints among the rank and file are fixed on insufficient and poor nutrition (see the reasons below - on the shortcomings of economic services).

On January 7, 1933, at 11 p.m., in the Red Army canteen of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, a leaflet was found glued to the door, written in pencil by hand, with the following content:

"A petition to the higher authorities.

According to the Daursky garrison.

We, the fighters, ask to increase, i.e. enhance nutrition. We consider ourselves that we are not full, i.e. half-starved. We cannot increase combat training, we can be agitated by an alien element and we are poor border defenders if we are hungry, so we ask you to increase food, if not, then do not expect good border defenders from us. Signature: from all fighters", (no signature.)

An exceptionally characteristic fact is the refusal of political studies by ml. commanders of the uchpulrota 3 s.p. 21st division: Kalashnikov - non-party, Averochkina, Ph.D. All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, who on 23/1-33 refused to go to political classes, on 26/1 they again did not go to political classes, arguing that they were malnourished, stating that on 24/1 they did not eat anything.

Reported to pdiv for events.

#### PARTY COMSOMOLE MEMBERS

\*Among those who are negatively inclined, a significant proportion are Party Komsomol members\*. Of the total number of recorded negative statements, 28.6% fall on members of the Party Komsomol in January and 25% in February.

In terms of content, the manifestations of Party Komsomol members are not much different from the manifestations of non-Party people and are concentrated mainly around the same questions. Some of them have a pronounced anti-Soviet character:

A cadet of the 18th tank [battalion] on Konyshyn Zakhar said: "Let them put them up against the wall, I won't serve. They say that there is no violence and coercion in the USSR, but in reality everything is forcibly taken away from the peasants and we are forced to serve, I'd rather go to the Japanese" (Konyshin, a collective farmer, a member of the Komsomol, is being checked).

To some extent, the generation of such sentiments among some of the party Komsomol members is facilitated by shortcomings in political educational work, right-wing opportunist attacks by individual party political workers, and a conciliatory attitude towards them on the part of the party political apparatus. Such facts were noted in a number of parts of the army.

DOCUMENTATION \_ 431

Pom. for the political part of the chief of communications of the tyazartdiv 1 S.D. Divanov, a member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, during political studies at the kr-tsakh called the book "Issues of Leninism" a prayer book, the law of God, painted Jesus Christ on it and before the start of classes said: "Hallelujah, hallelujah." Reported to DPK 00, investigation is ongoing.

In the commandant's platoon of the Kansk Regiment, the negatively-minded kr-tsev are headed by the secretary of the communist cell, Stolyarov, who, in a conversation with the kr-tsa, declares: "At the moment, our country is moving forward, but not for the better, but for the worse: to take 1926 was something anything and as much as you want, but now there is nothing, people are dying of hunger, "etc. (94th div.)

Political instructor of the 2nd Artillery Regiment Kirsanov, a worker, being on courses in October this year. in the city of Nikolsk-Ussuriysk, at one of the political classes, he made a statement on the issue of material support for the workers and peasantry and stated: "The material situation of the workers and peasants has deteriorated significantly compared to what it was in 1928. The masses of workers and peasants have been brought to the point where they have nothing on themselves or in themselves.

Two political instructors of the artillery regiment Filippenko and Grishchenko, who were on the same courses, openly supported Kirsanov.

The question of all was raised at a meeting of the party cell of the course. During the analysis, Kirsanov declared that he was deeply convinced of the correctness of his own speech, and refused to admit mistakes. Grishchenko and Filippenko admitted their mistakes and condemned Kirsanov's behavior in this matter.

4/X1 the question of Kirsanov was raised at the party meeting of the regiment.

Characteristic in this case is the behavior of the military commissar of the Brodsky regiment, who both at the bureau of the party team and at the general party meeting voted against the expulsion, citing the allegedly incorrect formulation of Kirsanov's question, insisting on limiting himself to explaining mistakes, but not applying organizational conclusions, thereby standing on a way to justify Kirsanov's mistakes.

In addition, Brodsky has recently taken a generally dubious position: 1) refused to make a report "The Party's Struggle on Two Fronts" at a seminar of garrison propagandists, citing the necessary treatment for the refusal, 2) did not appear at a meeting of the garrison party activists, where the question was about the Ryutin group, 3) did not take measures to organize work with the Komsomol and the candidate.

#### MANAGEMENT STAFF

Negative manifestations among the command staff are numerically small (from 16% of all registered in the army), but in some cases they are very sharp, especially on the part of people from a non-proletarian environment, and boil down to the opinion: "the worse, the better", for example :

"... I am now glad that there is a train wreck, sabotage at factories, expensive products on the market, this is how our brother needs it. We have won power, there is something to be proud of. Stalin fettered the workers and peasants;

There are isolated manifestations of insurrectionary and treacherous attitudes.

enii. "They write and talk about the crisis in the capitalist countries and the growth of the Soviet economy in the USSR—they lie and deceive; at the first opportunity I will cross the border "(platoon commander UR 107 Mityushin, expelled from the CPSU (b)).

Platoon commander of the training battalion of the 2nd s.p. Sankov, a member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a worker, said during classes to the gunsmith Konshin: "Now we need to build a revolution in our country and fight against bureaucrats." (Recorded.)

432

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

Particularly acute and relatively common among certain groups of command personnel, including individual party members, is the unwillingness to serve in the OKDVA and the resulting demobilization moods, decadence and even sabotage of official duties.

The commander of the platoon of the 4th cavalry regiment Zheludev, a b/p, a worker, daily expresses dissatisfaction with the service both in the Far East and in the Red Army in general, filed a report on his dismissal, which he was denied, on this basis he said: "No way escape from the Far East, so be it, there will be a war, I will take and take my platoon to the enemy. (He spoke as if in jest.) Zheludev was taken into active development.

"... They threw it to hell in some kind of pit. We suffer with apartments, do not see any amenities and freeze. Rather than suffer like this, it's better to escape from the army. " (Combatant of the 73rd Zen. Dr. Kruglov.)

The political instructor of the battery of the 35th Dr. Samokhvalov declares: "I don't want to serve in the army, they took me by force." After reviewing the case on the PC, he admitted that everything he did was directed towards one idea - "demobilize at all costs." He does not show any desire and initiative in his work and declares: "I don't know how to work."

The above manifestations are to a certain extent due to the material and domestic disorder of some of the commanders, especially in terms of housing, and insufficiently satisfactory nutrition.

The commanders of the tank company are located in a former hotel where there is no kitchen, they cook food in the corridor, which causes dirt, soot, 4 people live in a 10-meter room. Part of the commanders of the same company live next to the carport of the 61st Infantry Regiment in damp rooms.

In the 62nd Rifle Regiment, 4 people of political commissars (promoted from junior command staff and one-year-olds) have no apartments at all.

60-70% of the commanders of the Iman garrison are in completely unsatisfactory conditions.

Platoon commander of the 103rd s.p. Basov, unable to purchase fuel, formally begs and asks someone for a bucket of coal, someone for a log of firewood.

Commanders Parshchenko and Rudenko live for 8-9 days in unheated rooms (35th division).

"... Very soon they won't even feed, you come to the dining room - they give you some water, but there is no fat at home." (Chief of Staff of the Battalion of the 3rd Special Operations Regiment of the 57th Kazan Division, b/p,

clerk.)

"In view of the poor preparation of food in the canteen of the ZVK, most commanders switch to home allowance, and the received ration, of course, is not enough for the family commander, and there are no markets." (Political instructor of the 3rd s.p. 57th div. Bezvalov, member of the CPSU(b).)

^There are cases of moral decay, drunkenness, reflected in the performance of service \*.

In the 2nd Cavalry Regiment of the 15th Cavalry Division, the presence of the "Union of Standard Bachelors" grouping was noted, the members of which, on the basis of boredom, dissatisfaction with the Daurian living conditions and lack of cultural services, took up pornography. The chairman of this "union" is the commander of the platoon Zabolotin (b / n, worker), the scientific secretary of the commander of the platoon Yudin, a member of the RCP (b), and members of Esipov and others, all single. This "alliance" is being talked about all over the regiment. Wreed Commissioner Pavlov asks in the dining room: "Well, chairman, how are things? What is your union planning? Everyone went on vacation, you were left alone. Zabolotin replied: "Summer will come, we will organize again, but now everyone has scattered."

The question of the "alliance" on 26/XII was discussed at the regimental bureau.

DOCUMENTATION \_ 433

The secretary of the "union" of the platoon commander Yudin, a worker, a member of the CPSU (b), was reprimanded.

ZO.XI platoon commander of the 2nd s.p. Nikitin of the 26th division was on duty in the regiment in a half-drunk state. In the same state, he checked and inspected the guard and daily outfit.

## K.-R. GROUPINGS

During the reporting period, 17 espionage and wrecking groups in the army were again opened and liquidated, which indicates the unrelenting activity of both military units that penetrated the army and foreign intelligence organizations.

Period

Number of opened  
groups

Number of participants

September

7

39

December

9

61

February

8

no information

The counterintelligence activities of the liquidated groups were mainly aimed at the political decomposition of the fighters through systematic anti-Soviet agitation.

In the 1st s.p. an a/s group was liquidated, consisting of the following persons: kr-tsa Mityukov (son of a kulak, judged for hooliganism), Dorofeev (son of an exiled kulak), Voichuk and Moiseenko (the last of the kulak milieu).

This group was engaged in systematic a / c agitation among the cr-tsev of its unit, instilling in them kulak and defeatist views.

Along with this, Mityukov and others had close ties with institutions, organizations, persons suspected of espionage - Semyonov and Bychkov.

Mityukov and Dorofeev were arrested and confessed to their a/c deeds. The investigation continues.

Separate groups were engaged in sabotage in order to undermine and destroy the material and technical resources of the army.

At the factory building of a separate rifle corps, a wrecking group consisting of 9 drivers and tractor drivers was eliminated. This group of persons, by their system of wrecking actions, ensured that almost all the transport and horse stock available at the factory building was completely out of order, namely: out of the 15 tractors available at the factory building, of which 2 were Katepillers belonging to the grain state farm, 3 "Fordson", 10 "Inter" require major repairs; 4 AMO vehicles are disabled, 3 of them require major repairs, and only one requires minor repairs. Of the total number of available 30 horses, only 5-6 are able-bodied.

The head of transport, Arykov, treated his duties criminally and negligently, condoned all the outrageous things that were happening and the disregard for the attitude of drivers and tractor drivers.

The barbaric and sabotage attitude towards motor transport on the part of a group of drivers and tractor drivers led to 10 accidents during September-November.

\* Of the espionage groups, the liquidation in the UNR-104, consisting of 6 people, headed by an employee of the UNR-104, Subbotin, deserves special attention. Harbin\*.

434

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

Subbotin arrived in the USSR from Harbin in August 1931, appeared at the Vladivostok GZK, and as a subject to conscription was enrolled in the Primorsky sapper battalion. In February 1932, Subbotin was seconded to military construction in the city of Blagoveshchensk (UNR-104), where he began to put together a group of UNR workers for espionage work in favor of Japan. For this purpose, Subbotin first recruited Kozintseva, who was familiar from the Harbin registry, UNR-104, then Morozov, assistant superintendent in the household department, Bobylyova, a draftsman (she was admitted to secret office work), Krachkov, the technician of the UNR-104 central workshops, and later Matafonova, clerk of the general part of the UNR.

Thus, in 3 months, Subbotin created a spy cell at the most important military construction site (UNR-104).

#### FAULTS OF HOUSEHOLD AND SANITARY SERVICE

Economic service, especially in terms of food, is in some parts unsatisfactory, due to observed shortages of food and their theft. During the reporting period, several cases of group theft were uncovered, for example: the investigation completed the case against the 4th kr-tsev of the 44th artillery division of the ARGC, who were systematically engaged in the theft and sale of property and products from the Red Army canteen.

The following persons were arrested in the case: 1) V.P. Balandin, collective farmer, candidate of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks; 2) Garbovsky, Pole, middle peasant, unemployed, cook at the Red Army canteen; 3) kr-ts Shisov M.P., middle peasant, collective farmer, member of the Komsomol; 4) Forzarchuk, b / n, middle peasant, collective farmer.

This group, stealing things and products, sold them, played cards with the proceeds. During the search, 990 rubles were seized. money, 6 kg. meat, and 4 kg. soap stolen from the dining room. They also prepared the theft of property from warehouses, for which they selected the key to the warehouse lock, confiscated from Nazarchuk.

Sanitary service in a number of parts of the army is extremely poor, mass lice and cases of typhus are observed.

Due to the insufficiency of serviceable baths in some garrisons (the 105th regiment of the 35th division and the 3rd artillery regiment of the 57th division), sanitation of soldiers is poorly provided, planned, visiting the baths is disrupted, and the Red Army men wash 2 times at best per month, and in some cases (1st division of the USC), the Red Army did not wash in the bath from 1-2 months, during the same time the linen was not changed.

Due to the overcrowding and unsanitary condition of the barracks, mass lice are observed among the k-tsev, reaching in some cases from 10 to 25% of the available composition of the unit (in 3 KP - Nik. Ussursanrota 35, units 1 and 2 of the OSK divisions, etc. ).

This is facilitated by poor washing of linen, the lack of disinfection and the poor quality of preventive work.

Over the past two months, cases of the spread of typhus among servicemen have been recorded in units of OKDVA.

In total, up to 50 cases of typhus were recorded in the army in 1/1-33. The greatest spread of typhus is noted in parts of the Irkutsk garrison, which accounts for up to 30 cases of diseases both among military personnel and members of their families.

#### DOCUMENTATION

435

There are facts of negligent and criminal attitude of medical personnel towards sick servicemen in medical institutions, which give rise to discontent among the fighters\*.

The Red Navy sailor Kiselev with an inflammatory process, appendicitis, was operated on at t. 40.4 and died after the operation. Red Navy sailor Novikov was discharged from the hospital after an operation with a non-closing deep wound, as a result of which he returned to the hospital a few days later. The wound was not bandaged for a long time, it turned out to be a large suppuration, the patient died. Kr-Ts Bulgakov was poorly bandaged after the operation, the wound became contaminated and profuse suppuration, he lay in this position for three days and died. Art. the doctor of the 11th regiment of the Berezovskaya division Shaydurov sent the kr-tsa, sick with syphilis, Vagin, to the Chita hospital, providing him with a note to the general practitioner Kudryavtsev, who, after examining Vagin, sent him to the doctor of the ear, throat, nose and , giving Vagina a soothing, sent to the unit.

The second time Vagin was sent to the Chithospital by the regiment's junior doctor Arbuzov, who saw signs of syphilis in Vagin. On July 23, upon arrival at the hospital, Vagin was diagnosed with stage 2 syphilis, and on July 26, doctor Baryshev, who examined Vagin, concluded that there was no syphilis. Being referred to a venereologist, doctor Neiman, the latter looked at Vagin's nose and declared: "The nose is still healthy, but it will fail soon" - and offered to treat only the nose, and everything will pass. Vagin was again sent to the unit.

Being sent to the hospital for the third time, Vagin was received by the doctor Baryshev, who began to transfer Vagin daily to different wards (dental, ear, throat, etc.). Then he sent him to the head physician of the hospital, who, having done a whole execution on Vagin, sent him back. The next day, Vagin called again and asked: "If a pig is poisoned with arsenic, what will happen?", But he did not receive an answer. After that, he wrote a note to doctor Baryshev: "As you wish, 0.5 arsenic is enough for him." The case has been completed and handed over to the prosecutor.

Pom. early 00 OGPU Dobroditsky APRF.  
F. 45. Op. 1. D. 171. L. 91-101. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "Send to Comrade Poskrebyshov for Comrade Stalin"; "My archive. Stalin"; in addition, there is a typewritten note: "Deputy head. 00 OGPU Guy.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.



ÿ365

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO "ON OGPU TRIOKI"

May 10, 1933

No. 137, p. 75/62 - On the troikas of the OGPU.

a) prohibit the troikas of the OGPU in the republics, territories and regions (except for the DVK) to pass sentences on V.M.N.

b) approve comrade. Mironova L.G. Member of the board of the OGPU.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 922. L. 16. Original. Typescript.

Published: Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. Collection of documents. M., 1995. S. 63.

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 7.V.33.

436

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 366

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) AND THE SNK OF THE  
USSR "ÿ ON THE UNLOADING OF PRISONS" (116)

May 10, 1933

\*

No. 137, paragraph 76/63 - On unloading prisons. Approve the draft instruction to all party and Soviet officials and to all organs of the OGPU and the prosecutor's office (see appendix).

Confidential

Not for publication

TO ALL PARTY AND SOVIET WORKERS AND TO ALL  
BODIES OF THE OGPU, THE COURT AND THE PROSECUTION OFFICE

The desperate resistance of the kulaks to the collective farm movement of the working peasants, which unfolded as early as the end of 1929 and took the form of arson and terrorist acts against collective farm workers, created the need for the Soviet government to use mass arrests and acute forms of repression in the form of mass deportation of kulaks and subkulakists to northern regions. and distant lands.

Further resistance by kulak elements, sabotage in collective and state farms, uncovered in 1932, widespread mass theft of collective and state farm property required further intensification of repressive measures against kulak elements, thieves and all kinds of saboteurs.

Thus, the last three years of our work in the countryside were years of struggle for the liquidation\*\* of the kulaks and the victory of the collective farms.

And these three years of struggle led to the defeat of the forces of our class enemies in the countryside, to the final strengthening of our Soviet socialist positions in the countryside.

Summing up, we can now say that the position of individual farming has already been overcome in all the main regions of the USSR, the collective farms have become the universal and dominant form of farming in the countryside, the collective-farm movement has firmly strengthened, the complete victory of the collective-farm system in the countryside has been assured.

Now the task is no longer to defend the collective-farm form of management in its struggle against the private form of management, for this task has already been successfully accomplished. The task now is to meet the growing desire of individual working peasants to join the collective farms and to help them enter the collective farm, where only they can save themselves from the danger of impoverishment and starvation.

The Central Committee and Council of People's Commissars of the USSR believe that all these circumstances are creating a new favorable situation in the countryside, which makes it possible, as a rule, to stop the use of mass evictions and acute forms of repression in the countryside.

The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars believe that as a result of our successes in the countryside, a moment has come when we no longer need mass repressions, which, as you know, affect not only kulaks, but also individual farmers and part of the collective farmers.

True, demands are still coming from a number of regions for mass eviction from the countryside and the use of acute forms of repression. in the Central Committee and

DOCUMENTATION \_ 437

The Council of People's Commissars has applications for immediate eviction from the regions and territories of about one hundred thousand families. The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars have information from which it is clear that mass disorderly arrests in the countryside still continue to exist in the practice of our workers. Arrest chairmen of collective farms and members of the boards of collective farms. Arrest chairmen of village councils and secretaries of cells. District and regional commissioners are arrested. Everyone is arrested, who is not too lazy and who, in fact, has no right to arrest. It is not surprising that with such a rampant practice of arrests, the bodies that have the right to arrest, including the bodies of the OGPU, and especially the police, lose their sense of proportion and often make arrests without any reason, acting according to the rule: first arrest, and then figure it out.

But what does all this say?

All this suggests that there are still quite a few comrades in the regions and territories who have not understood the new situation and are still continuing to live in the past.

All this shows that, in spite of the presence of a new situation, which requires the shifting of the center of gravity to mass political and organizational work, these comrades are clinging to moribund forms of work that no longer correspond to the new situation and threaten to weaken

the authority of Soviet power in the countryside.

It seems that these comrades are ready to replace and are already replacing political work among the masses with the aim of isolating kulak and anti-collective farm elements by administrative-Chekist operations of the GPU and police, not realizing that such a substitution, if it takes on any mass character, can nullify the influence of our party in the countryside.

These comrades apparently do not understand that the method of mass eviction of peasants from the region under the conditions of the new situation has already outlived itself, that eviction can be applied only in a partial and individual manner, and only to the ringleaders and organizers of the struggle against the collective farms.

These comrades do not understand that the method of mass and indiscriminate arrests, if it can only be considered a method, in the new situation gives only disadvantages that lower the authority of the Soviet government, that the production of arrests should be limited and strictly controlled by the relevant authorities, that arrests should be applied only to active enemies of Soviet power.

The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars have no doubt that all these and similar errors and deviations from the Party line will be eliminated in the shortest possible time.

It would be wrong to think that the existence of a new situation and the need for a transition to new methods of work signify the liquidation or even the weakening of the class struggle in the countryside. On the contrary, the class struggle in the countryside will inevitably intensify, because the class enemy sees that the collective farms have won, he sees that the last days of his existence have come, and he cannot help clutching in despair at the sharpest forms of struggle against the Soviet suit. Therefore, there can be no question of weakening our struggle against the class enemy. On the contrary, our struggle must be intensified in every possible way, our vigilance sharpened in every way. It is, therefore, a matter of intensifying our struggle against the class enemy. But the point is that it is impossible to intensify the struggle against the class enemy and liquidate him with the help of the old methods of work in the present new situation, because they, these methods, have outlived their usefulness. It is therefore a matter of improving the old ways of fighting, rationalizing them and making our blows more accurate and organized. It is, finally, about the fact that each of our blows should be prepared in advance.

438

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

politically engineered so that our every blow is reinforced by the actions of the broad masses of the peasantry. For only with such methods of improving the methods of our work can we achieve the final liquidation of the class enemy in the countryside.

The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars have no doubt that all our Party-Soviet and Chekist-judicial organizations will take into account the new situation created as a result of our victories, and accordingly reorganize their work in relation to the new conditions of struggle.

## I. On the termination of mass evictions of peasants

Stop all mass evictions of peasants immediately. Evictions are to be allowed only on an individual and private basis, and in respect of only those farms whose heads are actively fighting against the collective farms and are organizing the rejection of sowing and harvesting.

Eviction is allowed only from the following areas and in the following limits:

Ukraine

2 thousand households

North Caucasus

1 thousand farms

Lower Volga

1 thousand households

Middle Volga

1 thousand households

tscho

1 thousand farms

Ural

1 thousand farms

Gorky region

500 farms

Western Siberia

1 thousand farms

Eastern Siberia

1 thousand farms

Belarus

500 farms

Western region

500 farms

Bashkiria

500 farms

Transcaucasia

500 farms

middle Asia

500 farms

Total

12 thousand households

## II. On streamlining the production of arrests

1) Prohibit arrests by persons who are not authorized to do so by law, chairmen of the REC, district and regional commissioners, chairmen of village councils, chairmen of collective farms and collective farm associations, cell secretaries, etc.

Arrests can be made only by the prosecutor's office, the OGPU or the chiefs of the police.

Investigators may make arrests only with the prior authorization of the prosecutor.

Arrests made by police chiefs must be confirmed or canceled by the district authorized officers of the OGPU or the prosecutor's office, according to their affiliation, no later than 48 hours after the arrest.

2) Prohibit the prosecutor's office, the OGPU and the police to use as a preventive measure detention before trial \* for minor crimes.

## DOCUMENTS \_439

As a preventive measure, only persons accused in cases of counter-revolution, terrorist attacks, sabotage, banditry and robbery, espionage, border crossing and smuggling, \*murder and serious wounds\*, large-scale theft and embezzlement, professional speculation, currency traders, counterfeiters, malicious hooliganism and professional repeat offenders.

3) To establish, when making arrests by the OGPU bodies, the preliminary consent of the prosecutor's supervision in all cases, except for cases of terrorist acts, explosions, arson, espionage and defectors, political banditry and counter-revolutionary anti-party groups.

The procedure established in this paragraph is put into effect for the Far East, Central Asia and Kazakhstan only after 6 months.

4) Oblige the prosecutor of the USSR and the OGPU to ensure the steady implementation of the instructions of 1922 on the procedure for prosecutorial control over the arrests and detention of persons arrested by the OGPU.

## III. About unloading places of detention

1) Establish that the maximum number of persons who can be held in custody in the places of detention of the NKJ, the OGPU and the Main Directorate of Militia, except for camps and colonies, should not exceed 400 thousand \*\*\*\* people for the entire USSR.

To oblige the prosecutor of the USSR and the OGPU within two decades to determine the maximum number of prisoners in individual republics and regions (territories), \*based on the above total figure\*.

To oblige the OGPU, the People's Commissariat of Justice of the Union Republics and the USSR Prosecutor's Office to immediately begin unloading places of detention and to bring \*within two months\* the total number of people deprived of liberty from 800,000, actually imprisoned today, to 400,000.

Responsibility for the exact implementation of this decision rests with the USSR Prosecutor's Office.

2) Establish for each place of detention the maximum number of persons who can be held in this place of detention, based on the above figure of 400 thousand people.

Prohibit the heads of places of detention to accept arrested persons in excess of the established limit.

3) Determine the time limit for keeping arrested persons in police custody for no more than three days. Be sure to provide the arrested with bread rations.

4) Propose to the OGPU, the People's Commissariat of Justice of the Union Republics and the USSR Prosecutor's Office to immediately organize a review of the personnel of the investigative prisoners so that all, except for especially dangerous elements, replace detention with another measure of restraint (guarantee, bail, undertaking not to leave ).

5) In relation to convicts, take the following measures:

a) for all those convicted by a court of up to 3 years, to replace imprisonment with forced labor for up to 1 year, and consider the rest of the term conditional;

6) send those convicted for a term of 3 to 5 years inclusive to the labor camps of the OGPU;

c) send those sentenced to more than 5 years to the camps of the OGPU.

b) Kulaks sentenced to a term of 3 to 5 years inclusive are subject to being sent to work settlements together with their dependents.

440

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

7) For unloading places of detention and carrying out specified in paragraphs. 5 and 6 events to organize in each republic, region (territory) special regional commissions consisting of: the regional (regional) prosecutor, the chairman of the regional (regional) court, the OGPU PR and the head of the regional (regional)

police department chaired by the regional (regional) prosecutor.

8) In the republics, territories, regions, where the total number of prisoners at the moment exceeds 30 thousand people, to allow the regional commissions to form inter-district mobile sub-commissions as their auxiliary bodies, so that the decisions of the inter-district commissions are approved by the regional commissions .

9) Grant the right to regional commissions to exempt from being sent to camps and settlements, regardless of the term of conviction, the disabled, the disabled, the elderly, mothers with small children, pregnant women, replacing their deprivation of liberty with forced labor.

In some cases, regional commissions have the right to send especially dangerous elements to camps, even if they are sentenced to up to 5 years.

10) To carry out unloading in the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan, Kara-Kalpakia, propose to the USSR Prosecutor's Office, the OGPU and the Supreme Court of the USSR to send special commissions from Moscow for the general management of the work of the republican commissions of these republics.

To oblige the NKVD of the Union Republics and the People's Commissariat of Health of the Union Republics to completely eliminate typhus diseases in places of detention within a month.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V. Molotov (Scriabin)

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks J. Stalin

APRF. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 196. L. 163, 163v. Typewritten copy.

Partially published: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. 1927-1939. Documents and materials: In 5 vols. T. 3. S. 746-750.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 7.V.33.

\*\* Crossed out "against".

\*\*\* Crossed out "From indiscriminate and ill-conceived."

\*\*\*\* Crossed out "300".

\*- 1 \* Inscribed by hand by Stalin.

No. 367

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

IN THE CASE OF THE "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY" ORGANIZATION  
IN ANIMAL HUSBANDRY

May 10, 1933

No. 137, item 14/1. - a) Case to / revolutionary. organizations in animal husbandry.

The case of a k/revolutionary organization in animal husbandry and the case of the explosion in the VEI are to be submitted for consideration in an out-of-court procedure. Death sentences are not passed.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 133. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 23.IV.33.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Krylenko, Yagoda.

#### DOCUMENTATION

441

No. 368

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT MONGOLIA"

May 10, 1933

No. 137, item 121/108. — About Mongolia.

1. Permit the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade to transfer to Mongolia for the transportation of goods from the border into Mongolia for a period of 2 months Sovmontovtorg vehicles operating on the Kyakhtinsky and Borzinsky highways, together with the driver's staff.

2. Instruct Comrade Yagoda to allow the driver's train to enter Mongolia (according to paragraph 1) in a simplified manner.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 137. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 10.V.33.

\*+ In the text there is a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Rozen char, Yagoda, Voroshilov.

No. 369

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE FLIGHT OF GERMAN AIRPLACES"

June 1, 1933

No. 138, item 131/110. - About the flight of German airplanes.

To allow a single flight through the USSR to Western China along the Deruluft route to Moscow, and then through Kazan-Sverdlovsk-Semipalatinsk-Sergiopol of three airplanes belonging to the German Air Communications Society - Lufthansa.



RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 148. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on May 28, 33.

\*\* There is a typewritten note in the text about the distribution: "Extracts sent: t .t. Krestinsky, Anvelt, Artuzov.

No. 370

NOTE by Ya.S. AGRANOVA I.V. STALIN  
WITH A MESSAGE FROM THE PGPU  
DVK ABOUT THE "REBELLION"  
ORGANIZATION IN THE GOLD MINES

June 9, 1933

No. 50362

\*OGPU received from the PG OGPU DVK a note on a direct wire with the following content\*:

As a result of intelligence and investigative measures in connection with the distribution of counter-revolutionary leaflets in February 1933, a counter-revolutionary insurgent sabotage organization was uncovered in two mines of the Afanasevsky district, which has its groups in the following mines: Spor

442

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

nom, Lyappe, Mikhailovsky, Afanasevsky and Doubtful. Contacts of the organization have been established in Blagoveshchensk and Khabarovsk, where the center of the organization is supposed to be located.

A search of teacher Kutvin (disputed mine), associated with Bakshanov (a member of the AKP since 1904, a former militant-terrorist), and a resident of Primzoloto Gritsky found correspondence, which is encrypted directives on the work of the organization, drafts of counter-revolutionary appeals and etc.

Here are excerpts from these materials:

"The first meeting of our bureau of OKPS was opened by Alexander Ivanovich, who warmly welcomed the beginning of our work at the Ubyl mines in general in your strip. The meeting recognized that the main thing in the work of the organization is vigilance when recruiting to the organization. Organizations are often focused on quantity rather than quality. The meeting decided: to temporarily stop recruiting into the organization, to prohibit the presence at meetings of persons who have no merit in the past. Stop all terrorist attacks, change the tactics of the leadership. The main leading link in the area must be concentrated on one person, in extreme cases two people who know one. All other accomplices should not know each other, i.e. that they are united by one organization.

Carry out urgently behind the scenes a full account of the dispossessed peasants, individual special settlers. Start explanatory work on the vile policy of the communists, declare the second five-year plan as the death of the Russian peasantry, create among the masses the opinion that we do not want a tsar or any other bourgeois system. Having risen, we are fighting for Soviet power against communism, which dooms the peasantry to an obvious painful death. In order to strengthen the work in the regional center, one of you needs to transfer to Khabarovsk on a job. Upon arrival in Khabarovsk, contact Turgenevskaya 24, where to ask 418, through which you need to get acquainted with 64 and 86. Take a picture of the military camp (guideline 12). In the system of the Ubyl mines, entrust your role to Lev Nikolaevich, and transfer him to work in the district center 323, 12 and 54. Pass it on to Georgy Vasilyevich.

\* "In the field of supply in 1933, the bet on crop failure is to be carried out by poisoning seeds both in storage areas and in crops (guideline 03 to our speech). In June, in your zone, cause a complete epidemic of typhus in the collective farms, in the army, in Artyom and Permsk, Suchan, Dalzavod - leadership 722. Work with the partisans 203. All the forces of the Japanese army are concentrated in the south \*. This operation will be completed in July. We will not tell you the day of the speech, but as soon as you find out, start working hard on 003,004, 782.

The operation is designed to take control of the DVK and weaken the forces of the USSR. Strengthen the front and start an offensive to the west.

On the 15th of July at the mines Doubtful, Lyappe, Afanasyevsky and Sporny - \*general epidemics of typhoid fever through drinking water\*. On July 22, warehouses and fodder are burning.

Preliminary interrogations of those arrested established the existence of a k.r. groupings, uniting mainly employees and specialists\*. At the mine Agnis-Afanasievskiy k.-r. the group was headed by the Socialist-Revolutionary Bakshanov. The group included: Kutvin Lev Nikolaevich, b. white officer; Yuzefov Georgy Konstantinovich - paramedic of the mine; Atanov - head. shop; Zharova Maria Semyonovna, special settler, b. teacher. This group during 1931-32 gathered repeatedly. Arrested Zharova M.S. in its

#### DOCUMENTATION

443

their first testimony confirms the existence of an organization and signs of belonging to it.

Kutvin, during interrogation, qualifies the fact of finding a cipher in his apartment, materials, as a provocation, thus settling personal scores. The rest of those arrested during the initial interrogations deny their belonging to the organization.

At the mine Doubtful in k.-r. the group included: Kositsyn Innokenty Fedorovich, a white counterintelligence officer, the son of a steamship owner; Zinchenko, engineer-geologist; Zenyuk - engineer; Prizhalkovsky - accountant, etc.

Both groups were linked. In addition, Kutvin kept in touch with Pozdnyakov Pavel Konstantinovich, head. Lyappe mine (according to

assumption, is the addressee of the cipher material); Shadymov - accountant; Kositsyn Innokenty (mine Doubtful); Shirokov - authorized for hay harvesting; Gritskikh Innokenty Ivanovich - a resident of Primzolota at the Lyappe mine, and others.

Gritskikh, in his initial testimony, does not deny receiving the coded directive found in his possession by the search, indicating that he received it from the Red Army, but refused to show from whom exactly and for what purpose.

\* In connection with the discovery of cipher materials and data previously obtained in the case, 19 people were arrested. Arrests continue\*.

ZAM. CHAIRMAN OF THE OGPU AGRANOV

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 201. L. 90-92. Script. Typescript.

\* There are handwritten notes in the text: "T. Stalin. G. Yagoda"; "What else is planned by the GPU about this question? I. St.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 371

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION Ya.S. AGRANOVA I.V. TO STALIN  
ON THE DETENTION OF THE JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHE

June 15, 1933

No. 50378

TOP SECRET

At 20.00 on July 14-33, near the wire fence of the airfield of plant No. 22, a sentinel guard from the 1st d[ivizio] on the 56th regiment of the OGPU MO troops, a Red Army soldier comrade. KOPYTOV detained the military attache of the Japanese embassy Kawabe Torashillo.

The circumstances of the arrest are as follows:

Worker-carpenter of the plant number 22 Comrade. GORYACHEV, being at the boilers near the river. Moscow, I saw a new car No. D-40-73 descending to the territory of the plant with the flag of the Japanese embassy. An unknown person got out of the car and walked along the edge of the forest towards the dead end of the plant's fence. The worker ORYACHEV, following the unknown, went and reported to the commandant's office about the car that had come with the suspicious unknown and about his behavior. At the same time, the same data were reported to Comrade KOPYTOV by the workers at the oda, who were near the canteen located on the territory of the plant.

Comrade KOPYTOV, having driven directly to the fence, saw an unknown person who had already moved away from the car - about 20 meters from the car. The unknown person went forward along the edge of the forest, trying to inspect the territory of the airfield along with the TB-3 vehicles located on it (there were about 70 vehicles at the airfield).

444

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

The unknown person reached a dead end, inspected the new construction site and went to the corner of the fence, where for 3-5 minutes he monitored the territory of the airfield and the cars located there through a gap. After that, he turned back and went the same way towards the car.

From the car, an unknown person crossed the meadow and went to the bank of the river. Moscow to the barbed wire fence. At this moment, sentinel cr-ts comrade. KOPYTOV detained an unknown person and invited him to the territory of the airfield.

The stranger refused to go, threatening the k-tsu: "You will be very bad." Kr-ts KOPYTOV answered this: "Well, well, is it bad, is it good, but I won't let you go."

At that moment, on a conditional call through sentry post No. 7, a karnach-assistant commander of the platoon, comrade KHIZHNYAK, came running, who asked the detainee the following questions:

Q. "Why did you come here and what interests you here."

A. "There is nothing to do and I decided to take a walk along the Moscow River."

B. "Show your documents."

A. "I'm a Japanese military attache, write down my last name and my car number and let me go."

At this time, pom. director of the plant for t / gt. FELDMAN and the head of the PRIPO shop, comrade TITOV, who, together with the detainee, went to the factory commandant's office, where they checked his documents and, after agreeing on the issue with the plant director, after apologizing, the detainee was released.

ZAM. CHAIRMAN OF THE OGPU Y. AGRANOV

APRF. F. 3. Op.58. D. 240. L. 159a-159c. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first page there is Stalin's resolution: "I propose to give the Red Army soldier Kopytov 50 rubles as a reward for the correct performance of his duties and to express gratitude to him. Announce all this in the appropriate part.

No. 372

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

IN CONNECTION WITH THE ARRESTS OF RESPONSIBLE  
EMPLOYEES IN TAJIKISTAN

July 1, 1933

No. 140, p. 13 - Telegram t.t. Bauman and Pillar dated 28.VI about Tajikistan (comrade Stalin).

Send t.t. Bauman and Pilyar the following telegram: "Your message about Khodjibaev, Maksum and others is doubtful. We order you not to arrest responsible officials in this case without the consent of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Organize a well-hidden surveillance of suspects, especially Mukhetdinov. Immediately send Ashurmukhamedov, the protocol of his interrogation and all other materials to the OGPU."

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 14. L. 162. Original. Typescript.

\* There is a typewritten note in the text: "Extracts sent: vol. Bauman, Pillar - cipher; Yagoda.

445

DOCUMENTATION \_

No. 373

DRAFT ORDER OF THE OGPU No. 00237 ON THE FIGHT  
AGAINST THE THEFT OF BREAD,

DIRECTIONAL GG YAGODOY I.V. STALIN

July 5, 1933

Secret

Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated May 24 of this year. On the organization of grain harvesting, all Party and Soviet organizations were given a particularly urgent task of protecting the new crop from plunder.

The protection of the collective-farm and state-farm crops must be organized in such a way that the safety of grain from plunder is ensured along the entire path of grain, from harvesting, threshing and transportation to the receiving point and the elevator. The resolution provides for the strict application of the law of August 7, 1932 to all grain plunderers.

The experience of the OGPU organs in combating theft shows that the most common methods of stealing bread during the last year's grain procurement campaign were the following:

1. Stealing of grain in the vine by groups of 25-50 people at night under the leadership of kulaks and dispossessed kulaks (the Novy Mir commune in Ukraine, the Udarnik grain farm in Central Asia, etc.).
2. Loading state-farm and collective-farm grain onto carts under the guise of sending it to collection points and selling it to speculators (numerous cases in the Ukraine and elsewhere).
3. Widespread use of fictitious "Zagotzern" receipts to evade delivery of grain (Gorky Territory, Ukraine, Moscow Region, etc.).

4. Theft of grain by carters during the transportation of grain (mass cases in Bashkiria and other regions).
5. Non-receipt of part of the grain supplied to procurement centers, elevators, mills and its subsequent sale to speculators (the Batalpashinsky elevator in the North Caucasus, the Tuplazinsky flour mill in Bashkiria, the Mogilev office "Zagotzerno", etc.).
6. Understatement by collective farms and state farms in daily reports of data on the progress of threshing and, in connection with this, concealment of part of the grain.
7. Mass drawing up of fictitious acts on the spoilage of bread, exaggerated losses, shortages, etc.
8. Overweighting by receivers of procurement stations of grain deliverers and plundering the resulting surplus.

The main task facing the organs of the OGPU in the grain procurement campaign of 1933 is the fight against the theft of bread.

This obliges the organs of the OGPU to carefully study all possible methods and forms of theft of grain and to provide all dangerous sectors with trusted, honest and loyal agents.

In their operational work, the organs of the OGPU must take into account the considerable assistance that can be rendered to us in the fight against theft by the considerably grown collective-farm assets.

446

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

A zealous, careful attitude towards socialist property, embracing ever larger masses of collective farmers, should be widely used by the organs of the OGPU.

The entire path of grain movement from the field to the receiving point and the elevator is serviced by collective farmers, and the theft of grain along this path, theft of grain on the vine, from the field, from the supply during its transportation to the receiving points can be quickly eliminated and even prevented, if they are organized: an honest dedicated network in these areas, a good and fast connection of this network with the residents and the public apparatus, and the rapid operational implementation of intelligence reports.

I order:

- 1) Organize operational intelligence work in such a way as to prevent the development of theft, and eliminate them at the very beginning, identifying the organizers of the theft of bread.
- 2) If the thefts of bread are of an organized, group nature, the main blow should be directed at the organizers and active participants in the theft.
- 3) Persons convicted of individual theft of bread, reaching

significant sizes - the export of grain from the field in whole wagons, theft of sheaves, etc. - to be arrested.

4) Collective farmers convicted of stealing grain, if they are not the organizers of the theft or if the theft committed by them are of an unimportant nature, should not be arrested, and cases of crimes committed by them should be transferred to comradely collective farm courts.

5) Collective farmers and individual workers caught in repeated petty theft of grain, to be arrested.

6) To take especially serious measures to protect those collective and state farm fields in the area of which the appearance of significant groups of declassed elements and baggers, who have broken with agriculture and are an unconditional threat to the safety of the harvest, has been noted.

Rayapparatom OGPU and deputy. early political departments of the MTS and state farms to take measures through local Party and Soviet bodies and political departments to protect grain by special groups of collective farm activists and Komsomol members, to establish special posts and night shifts. In necessary cases, establish police guards, giving instructions to these guards not to resort to weapons unless absolutely necessary.

7) To focus the attention of the intelligence network on the timely identification of organized groups of grain thieves, on the identification and prevention of all organized or individual attempts to destroy crops in the bud, set fire to collective and state farm barns, warehouses and other grain storages, as well as mills.

8) Establish careful undercover surveillance of all workers and employees of reception points, elevators, mills, transport organizations of state farms and MTS, revealing all the facts of the theft of bread, deliberate underweighting of collective farmers and individual farmers, malicious sabotage at reception and procurement points, drawing up fictitious acts about spoilage of bread and losses, etc., arresting all persons caught in these crimes

Ieniyah.

#### DOCUMENTATION \_ 447

9) Strictly follow the instructions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated May 8 of this year. about the prohibition of mass arrests in the countryside.

10) All cases of grain theft must be completed within two weeks, with their consideration in judicial troikas at the OGPU PP. Cases in which it is necessary to apply the highest measure of social protection should be sent for approval to the Collegium of the OGPU.

11) In the course of operational work to combat the theft of bread, send reports to the ECU of the OGPU, starting from July 15 of this year, every 1st and 15th day of memorandums.

Deputy Chairman of the OGPU

APRF. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 60. L. 66-71. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: Poskrebysheva "T. Stalin. These two draft orders of the OGPU were sent by Comrade Yagoda for approval: 1) On the theft of bread. 2) On political departments", "Comrade Yagoda reported"; Stalin: "I don't mind. Stalin", "P5 It would be necessary to simultaneously give a similar directive (or directives) from the Union Prosecutor's Office to its local bodies. I. Stalin. (117)

No. 374

SPBTsmmessage Ya.S. AGRANOVA I.V. TO STALIN ON  
THE INVESTIGATION

ON THE CASE OF THE "REBELLION"  
ORGANIZATION IN THE GOLD MINES IN DVK

July 5, 1933

No. 50424

Top secret

In addition to our note dated July 9, 1933, about a counter-revolutionary sabotage insurgent organization uncovered in the Far East Krai, whose task was to destroy the 1933 crop by poisoning crops and seeds, to cause epidemics in the collective farms and the Red Army, and to train an armed of the uprising, we inform you that, according to the data received from the PGPU DVK, Gritskikh, who was arrested in this case (a resident of Primzoloto at the Lyappe mine), confessed to belonging to a counter-revolutionary organization.

\*According to the testimony of the Gritskys, Pozdnyakov, head of the organization, was at the head of the organization. the mine of Lyappe and Arshatov, the manager of the Udylsky mines \*  
Gritsky was recruited into the organization by Pozdnyakov in October 1932 during his work in the mine of the Disputable Udylsky system. Pozdnyakov, when recruiting the Gritskys, told him that the organization set itself the task of an armed uprising and the seizure of power. After the Gritskys agreed to join the organization, Pozdnyakov entrusted him with the management of the organization's work at the Sporny mine, recommending him Yarlykov as an assistant to the drilling foreman.

According to the PG OGPU DVK, all those arrested in this case are now concentrated in Khabarovsk, which makes it possible to launch an investigation in an expedited manner.

Deputy Chairman of the OGPU Agranov  
APRf f.Z, Op.58. D. 202. L. 2. Original. Typescript.

448

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 375

NOTE N.I. Krylenko I.V. STALIN,

V.M. MOLOTOV, D.E. SULIMOV,



G.G. Yagoda and A.Ya. VYSHINSKY ON  
THE ILLEGALITY OF THE ORGPU ORDERS

July 14, 1933

No. 11/480

ÿ The OGPU, signed by Comrade Agranov, on July 9 issued order No. 00237, by which point 10 it removed from judicial consideration all cases of theft of bread, which took place both under the law of August 7 and under the articles of the Criminal Code. \*

The original text of paragraph 10 reads:

"All cases of theft of bread must be completed within 2 weeks with their consideration in judicial troikas at the OGPU PP. Cases requiring the application of the highest social measure. protection, send for approval by the Collegium of the OGPU.

\* Not to mention the formal illegality of this decision, because the OGPU, by its order, does not have the right to establish a different jurisdiction for cases, except for that determined by law, and any such withdrawal of a certain category of cases from the court must go through the PP - this order, from → given without the knowledge of the Prosecutor's Office of the Union and the People's Commissar of Justice, it seems completely impracticable. \*

The total number of cases that went through the courts according to the law of August 7 is in the tens of thousands. The number of cases with capital punishment that have passed only through the Supreme Court of the RSFSR is in the thousands. Under these conditions, it is physically impossible for a more or less careful consideration of these cases in a troika at the SP. And if we had to deal with judicial excesses on the basis of stamping cases, then when considering extrajudicial troikas, we will get a complete absence of any guarantee against errors. The same for cases with the highest measure. If 25 members of the Supreme Court could hardly cope with the consideration of cases of this category, then with the concentration of cases throughout the Union in the Collegium of the OGPU, we will get an even greater load and even less opportunity for verification and control.

\*2. This order completely frustrates the decision of the Central Committee of May 8 on sanctioning the arrests of the Prosecutor's Office, because, although paragraph 9 orders to be guided by the instructions of the Central Committee of May 8, but, firstly, only on the prohibition of mass arrests in the countryside and, in -second, p.p. 3 and 5 offer:

"3) Persons found guilty of individual theft of grain, reaching significant proportions - the removal of grain from the field in whole wagons, theft of sheaves, etc. - shall be arrested"\*.

"5) Collective farmers and working individual farmers, caught in repeated petty theft of grain, shall be arrested." ^

With such a wording of the order, any possibility of control on the part of the Prosecutor's Office falls, because any district representative of the OGPU, in response to the prosecutor's demand for sanctioning the arrest, will answer: "I don't need any sanction, I have an order from the OGPU and it is obligatory for me." And from his point of view, he would be right.

3. Even more incomprehensible is paragraph 4, which proposes: "collective farmers convicted of stealing grain, in the event that they are not the organizers of the theft or if the theft committed by them are

DOCUMENTATION

449

of an unimportant nature, not to arrest, but to transfer cases of crimes committed by them to comradely collective farm courts.

It is completely unclear: firstly, who will decide the question of sending cases to a comrades' court - the district representative of the OGPU, the police chief, the judge or the prosecutor?

Secondly, comrades' courts themselves do not exist everywhere, there is no law on these courts. No matter how much I tried to promote this law, the Central Executive Committee of the Union removed it from the queue "because of prematurity", although there are now up to 25 thousand of these courts.

Thirdly, it is completely unknown what to do with petty thefts of bread, which were supposed to go to the people's courts under Art. 162 of the Criminal Code, who cannot be sent to comrades' courts due to the weakness of repression and who are not mentioned in the order and at the same time withdrawn from the court.

4. The indication of the comrades from the OGPU that by this means they wanted to avoid sending to court only the cases of the so-called "shearers of ears", which are hungry people in the villages, does not withstand any criticism, because in the order, in its first part, these categories of cases are not indicated at all, but typical cases of "theft of standing bread in groups of 25-50 people. at night under the leadership of kulaks and dispossessed kulaks", about "loading state-farm and collective-farm grain onto carts", about "using fictitious receipts of Zagotzern to evade delivery of bread", about "plundering grain by carters when transporting grain", about "not receiving part of the bread, coming to procurement centers ... ", etc., i.e. a number of malfeasance or a category of cases that has nothing to do with "hungry people" and "striguns".

For these reasons, I would consider it expedient: 1) to suspend the order, 2) to propose to the OGPU, together with the Prosecutor's Office of the Union, to determine the exact signs of those cases that are subject to referral out of court.

According to information received from Comrade Vyshinsky, the OGPU agrees to agree on changes to the order, but one has already been sent out.

Ya. Krylenko

APRF. f. 3. Op. 57. D. 60. L. 55-55v. Script. Typescript.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 376

NOTE A.Ya. VYSHINSKY I.V. STALIN, V.m.  
MOLOTOV, D.E. SULIMOV,

G. G. YAGODA, N.I. KRYLENKO ON  
ORDER OF THE OGPU No. 00237

July 1933

N° 0071143  
OWL. SECRET

Regarding Comrade Krylenko's letter regarding the order of the OGPU dated 9/VII No. 00237, signed by Comrade Agranov, I consider it necessary to report the following:

1) upon receipt of Order No. 00237, I immediately drew Comrade Ag Ranov's attention, and then Comrade Yagoda's attention to paragraph 10 of the order, which actually contained an excellent wording, thanks to which an unforeseen

450 \_ LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

jurisdiction, excluded from the fight against theft of bread all judicial  
naya system.

Tov. Agranov and Comrade Yagoda at the same time recognized the fallacy of paragraph 10 and agreed (even before Comrade Krylenko's letter) with the changes I proposed, the introduction of which into order No. 00237, this issue should be considered, in my opinion, settled.

In order to avoid the repetition of such misunderstandings, I put before the OGPU the question of the need to continue to coordinate orders of this kind with the Prosecutor's Office of the Union, as affecting very important fundamental and practical issues.

I enclose a copy of the new wording of paragraph 10.

2) Comrade Krylenko's assertion that this order "completely frustrates the Decree of the Central Committee dated 8/V - on the sanctioning of arrests by the Prosecutor's Office", I consider incorrect. P.p. 3 and 5 of the order can in no way be understood as an indiscriminate demand for arrests in the cases specified in these paragraphs, and even more so without the sanction of the prosecutor's office. This is all the more obvious since, as Comrade Krylenko himself points out, paragraph 9 of the order emphasizes the need to strictly follow the instruction of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated 8/V on the prohibition of mass arrests in the countryside.

In view of precisely these considerations, the USSR Prosecutor's Office did not consider it necessary to protest paragraphs 3 and 5 of the order.

3) a) Nor can we agree with Comrade Krylenko's objections to paragraph 4 of the OGPU order regarding the transfer of cases of a certain category to collective-farm comrades' courts. The question of who will determine the direction of cases to comrades' courts does not seem to me as complicated as it seems to Comrade Krylenko. This issue will be decided by the bodies in charge of these cases, and the prosecutor will exercise in this case, too, the right granted to him by law to supervise the correctness of these decisions.

b) The absence of a law on collective-farm courts has not yet served as an obstacle to their work, although, of course, it introduces some complications into the matter. By the way, in the RSFSR alone, if I am not mistaken, there are now about

24,000 collective farm ships.

c) The possibility and expediency of applying Art. 162 of the Criminal Code, as already explained by the decision-making bodies, is not subject to any doubt. This question is exhausted by the new edition of paragraph 10 of the Order of the OGPU No. 00237.

Comrade Krylenko's proposal to define the exact features of "those cases that are subject to extrajudicial referral" is inappropriate, both because the order of the OGPU has not canceled and cannot cancel the instruction on the application of the Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated 7 / VIII, section 3 of which answers the question posed, and because further detailing of these features is currently hardly possible.

can.

ZAM. PROSECUTOR OF THE UNION OF THE SSR A. VYSHINSKY

APPENDIX: Point 10 of the order of the OGPU (118)

APRF. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 60. L. 57, 58. Original. Typescript.

DOCUMENTATION

451

No. 377

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE EXCHANGE OF LITHUANIAN  
PRISONERS FOR COMMUNISTS IN  
LITHUANIAN PRISONS

July 15, 1933

No. 141, paragraph 11/2 - Proposal from Lithuania.

Allow the exchange of 18 white Lithuanians for communists sitting in Lithuanian prisons.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 1. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 2.VII.33.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Friday to whom, Stomonyakov, Yagoda.

No. 378

SPECIAL MESSAGE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN  
WITH A COPY OF THE STATEMENT  
EXILED TROTSKIST K.I. GRUNSTEIN

July 26, 1933

No. 156449

TOP SECRET

We are sending the statement of the exiled Trotskyite GRUNSTEIN Karl Ivanovich, born in 1886, b. member of the CPSU (b) from 1903 to 1907, expelled for active Trotskyist activities.

\* In 1927 he was a member of the All-Union Trotskyist Center; was in charge of underground technology. On behalf of Trotsky, he organized an underground printing house near Moscow\*.

By the Resolution of the Special Meeting of 13/1-1928 he was exiled to the Urals for a period of 3 years. In the link for the active to-r. work was arrested a second time and by a resolution of the Special Meeting of 3 / KhN-1930, he was exiled to Bashkiria for the remaining period. Upon serving the term, by a resolution of the Special Meeting of 23/1-31, he was deprived of the right to reside in 15 points for a period of 3 years. . „Having chosen the mountains as a permanent residence. SARATOV, GRUNSTEIN in February 1931 contacted I.N. SMIRNOV, at whose suggestion he filed an application for a rupture with the Trotskyist organization for a maneuverable purpose.

In March 1932, during a search, GRUNSTEIN tried to hide Trotskyist materials from his wife R.A. GRUN Grjvi Yi, who is still a convinced Trotskyist. During a search of \* GUNSHTEIN, the platform of the opposition and Trotsky's article "At a New Stage" were found and confiscated.

In SMIRNOV's group, GRUNSTEIN occupied a leading position, supplying the latter with information about the Trotskyist exile. By a resolution of the Special Conference dated 16/4V-33, he was exiled to Central Asia for a period of a year. According to the testimony of the active Trotskyist V.D. KASCHAROVA, he was arrested

452

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

Noah in 1933 in Saratov, GRUNSTEIN is exposed in connection with the exiled Trotskyists.

The confidence of the Trotskyists in GRUNSHTEIN is evidenced by the fact that the warden of the Trotskyists imprisoned in the V.-Uralsky political isolator, leaving the isolation ward, is given a connection to GRUN SHTEIN\*.

APPENDIX: mentioned.

ZAM. PREV. OGPU YAGODA  
Copy

Tov. STALIN

Dear Joseph Vissarionovich!

I am sending you a copy of my statement to the Central Committee, the Central Control Commission and the OGPU; I ask you to assist me in returning to the Party, since I fully and completely share the Party policy\*.

I finally broke with Trotskyism at the end of 1931, after I had finally become convinced of its counter-revolutionary nature, and after the Trotskyists in Saratov, where I was. The wife informed the Plenipotentiary of the OGPU, comrade CHERNICHENKO, about the upcoming uprising of the exiled Kuban kulaks in the Cherdyn region (the Trotskyists allowed it to be possible, with certain reservations, in such extreme cases to inform only the Party Committees, but not the organs of the OGPU). This amazing decision of the Trotskyites became known to the Saratov OGPU at the same time. To the question put to me by the authorized comrade RATNER, how I would act in relation to the activities of my comrades from the opposition, I replied that if their actions were in the nature of a counter-revolutionary act against the party and Soviet power, then I would consider it my most elementary duty as a Bolshevik to report it to the OGPU.

I was asked the same question in Moscow after I was arrested over the disagreements between Iv. Nik. SMIRNOV with the party line.

However, if in Cherdyn my wife and I knew definitely about the plans of the kulaks, then I knew nothing about SMIRNOV's disagreement with the party and could not say anything, and only now can I vaguely guess about them.

They did not want to believe this, and it seems to me that it was this circumstance that led me to a new exile for 3 years; I can't find any other explanation, no matter how much I think about it and guess, because I don't feel any guilt in myself.

With Iv. Nick. I met SMIRNOV in Moscow in the service of the NKTP and twice during the whole summer, without any special reason, I visited his apartment at home. These meetings usually went like this: we clapped each other on the hands, exchanged brief business or personal remarks, I briefly reported on the ordeals I endured in search of work, etc., serious conversations on political or purely party topics. We never arose between us, I think it didn't arise precisely because the Trotskyist past weighed on us unpleasantly ... Of course, they can object to me with a grin that everything should be clear without words between close people ... So, not so! And that's why.

At the time of my departure from Trotskyism, I did have one serious, principled conversation with SMIRNOV. It was at SMIR's apartment

DOCUMENTATION

453

NOVA in Saratov at the beginning of 1932. I was embarrassed by the question of the form of my application to the Central Control Commission. Iv. Nick. urged me to call things by their names and put an end to

over i. "Do you think," he said, "it was easier for me to write such a statement, for several months I was afraid that I would go crazy; but since you have come to the conclusion that STALIN is right, and he was undoubtedly right on all issues, you must do everything to return to the party.

Could I, after this conversation, assume or simply think that my meetings with SMIRNOV in Moscow in the same 32, based on the old factional friendship, would serve as one of the reasons for accusing me of the OGPU? ... I myself came to conclusions about your undoubtedly right - in stages from the end of 1929, and to the extent of this, he broke ideologically with Trotskyism. On the questions of collectivization and liquidation of the kulaks, I followed you from the very beginning, remaining on a number of other questions still in the camp of Trotskyism. \*I showed a surprising inconsistency, but thanks to this inconsistency I got rid of double-dealing. I have never been a double-dealer, and to be one would be repugnant to my whole being\*. Before finally breaking down my stubbornness and frankly repenting of my mistakes and misdeeds before the Party, I had to serve five years of exile. But on the other hand, I came to the examination of my case at the Central Control Commission fully convinced of the correctness of the general line of the Party and with a feeling of sincere respect for you personally.

Of course, after all that I had done in recent years against the Party, I believed that I could prove my loyalty only by deed, by practical work. Having received such an opportunity as a deputy. Director of Work Supply at Plant No. 39, I began to establish this business quite successfully, when my ill-fated arrest suddenly followed. In January 1928, I was arrested by the OGPU and exiled on good grounds for having fought against the party and its leadership, being fundamentally wrong; \*now on the contrary, my arrest followed when I was entirely for the party, on the side of the leadership and wanted to correct my guilt\*. No friendship with SMIRNOV could change anything, just as it cannot change my attitude towards the Party, the Central Committee and personally to you my present position, no matter how long it lasts.

With communist greetings, I firmly shake your hand and wish you all the best.

KARL GRUNSTEIN

P.S. The comrades who probably meet me personally know me: MANUILSKY, TOVSTUKHA, ST. NAZAROV, S. GOPPNER, Lyudmila STAL, YAROSLAVSKY, ROZENGOLTS; on old underground work: Ed. MEDIS (Verkhsud), L. RUBINSTEIN (Amtorg), BORODIN and others.

K. Gr.

%• Tashkent, 26/7-1933

AGIRf. f. h, Op. 24. D. 140. L. 44-49. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "To Kaganovich. I think this gentleman

Bye

not trustworthy. I. Stalin"; "Agranov. Give appropriate instructions. L. Kaganovich.

Underlined in pencil.

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 379

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE INCREASE OF BORDER GUARD  
TROOPS IN EASTERN SIBERIA

August 1, 1933

No. 142, item 63/49. - Question of the Vostsibkraikom.

Accept the following proposals from Comrade Leonov:

- a) To increase the border guard troops in Eastern Siberia by 20% by enlarging the border detachments.
- b) To equate Transbaikalia of the East Siberian Territory under the conditions of the regime in it with the Far East, giving the plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU the right to take decisive measures to eradicate and evict hostile elements associated in the past with the foreign White Guards.
- c) Carry out passportization in Chita and in the border areas, following the example of the western border.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 17. Original. Typewrite.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated July 27, 1933.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Leonov  
— ciphers, Menzhinsky, Molotov.

No. 380

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE EVICTION OF KULAK FAMILIES  
FOR USE AT THE ENTERPRISES OF THE  
GOLD AND FOREST INDUSTRY

August 1, 1933

No. 142, p. 83/69 - Question of the Dalkraikom of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

To allow the Far-Eastern Territory Committee to evict 5,000 kulak families from the rural areas of the Territory for use in household work at enterprises in the gold and timber industries.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 17. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 31.7.7.33.



\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Lawrence wu - in cipher, Yagoda.

No. 381

SPECIAL MESSAGE G.G. BERRIES AND L.G. MIRONOV

I.V. TO STALIN ON THE PRESENCE OF A "SPY" ORGANIZATION

IN THE GUNS AND ARSENAL INDUSTRY

August 7, 1933

No. 294301  
SOV. SECRET

As a result, it was established that in the tool-arsenal industry there is a c.-r. a wrecking and espionage organization, embracing both the central apparatus - the weapons and arsenal association, and its factories, led by the German National Socialists\*.

455

#### DOCUMENTATION

The composition of the organization - the former. officers, nobles, people from the bourgeois environment, some of them non-repressed members of the sabotage organization liquidated in the military industry, headed by General MIKHAILOV.

The organization also includes a number of young professionals.

Arrested in this case:

1. MIKHAILOV Alexander Ivanovich - former. those. Director of plant number 8, a native of a bourgeois family, in the past a pupil of Baroness Shpig Lets-Polovtska.
2. KHANDOMIROV David Sergeevich - early. department of equipment and capacities of plant No. 8, an employee, a native of a bourgeois family.
3. TYCHKOV Igor Neofitovich - assistant. early tool department of the plant number 8, from a wealthy peasant family.
4. SHAFER Alexander Yakovlevich - engineer of the bureau of rationalization of plant No. 8, in the past the owner of a large plant.
5. SLUTSKY Ilya Petrovich - rationing technician of shop No. 2 of plant No. 8; until 1918 he lived in Poland.
6. TEIKHMAN Alexander Konstantinovich - from a bourgeois family, officer, relatives live in America, early. supply department of the Construction Office of the Barricades plant.

7. KAMENOV Semyon Evgrafovich - metallurgical engineer, early. in the thermal workshop of the Barrikady plant, relatives and brothers officers, served in the White Army, emigrated, KAMENOV himself was previously a member of a kulak-insurgent organization.

8. ULYANOV Fyodor Filimonovich - chief accountant of the Barrikady plant, before the revolution he worked at the Zlatoust plant, was a provocateur, passing revolutionary workers into the hands of the police.

9. Pavel Anzelmovich KARPOVICH - ex. pom. early management of the reconstruction of the VOA and tech. director of the Bolshevik plant, from the nobility, colonel.

10. YURISSON Georgy Yuryevich - engineer, head. Gun department of the VOA, from the nobility, formerly. officer, captain of the navy.

11. NOTARY Semyon Zakharovich — ch. mechanic VOA, a native of the bourgeois environment.

12. SPIRIDONOV Pavel Georgievich - engineer of the capital construction department of the Eastern Administrative District, son of a kulak, ex. Officer.

The testimonies of these persons, as well as the testimonies of other participants in the K.-R. organizations, we interrogated, but not arrested (PARIYSKY V.V. - chief metallurgist of the Barrikady plant, DANILEVSKY V.P. - assistant technical director of the Barrikady plant, ZAKRZHEVSKY V.L. - former tech. Director of the Bolshevik plant and MIROLYUBOV - head of the hammer shop of the Bolshevik plant) - ESTABLISHED:

The foundation of the organization was laid by the remaining at large members of the liquidated "MIKHAILOVSKAYA" organization in the military industry. <sup>\*\*</sup> since the activities that intensified their subversive activities of the DVI from the German engineers of the companies "Krvpp" and "Rhine-Me VDD", which are members of the National Socialist Party, to the factories of the VOA. KIRMZE, A. SCHEGn. LANDEN. ROLF. RESGEN, ZITZ and others

On the instructions of the latter, fascist cells for subversive and espionage work were created at the factories of the Eastern Administrative District.

The largest fascist cells were created at the leading gun factories: Moscow No. 8, "Barrikada" and "Bolshevik".

456

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

After the departure of the above-mentioned fascists to Germany, communication was carried out through a representative of the German firms \*\*\* "Gutegofnungsshtte" and "Shloman" Schwartz, who, according to the OGPU, was a major German intelligence officer. (See appendix no. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)\*\*\*.

Disruption of the reconstruction of gun factories

As a result of the activities of the said wrecking and espionage organization:

\*a) The plan for the reconstruction of the main plants of the VOA \* (Barrikada, Novoe Sormovo, Bolshevik and Perm) was disrupted.

Of those released during 1931-32. 145,000,000 rubles or 78% were spent on industrial construction of 186,818,000 rubles, 85,719,000 rubles or 59% were disbursed.

\*The blow was mainly aimed at disrupting the reconstruction of hot shops and the development of capital investments \* (56,723,000 rubles were allocated, 36,665,000 rubles or 65% were spent, and only 13,893 rubles or 38% were mastered) in order to increase the disproportion between cold (processing) and hot (preparation) workshops (see Appendix No. 9).

According to the 1933 program, the hot shops are 100% loaded, plus a shortage of 14,000 tons of rolled metal caused by the failure of the installation of large section machines, mechanical shops 65%. (See Appendix No. 10).

Import of unwanted equipment

b) \*Equipment, including imported equipment, was ordered incomplete, with gaps in terms of receipt and completely unnecessary by VOA \*.

In the warehouses of the factories, the VOA lies in conditions of poor storage for 11,000,000 rubles. uninstalled equipment, including imported equipment for 9,000,000 rubles. gold, which leads to breakage, damage to equipment and loss of parts. (See appendix nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16.)

Disruption of the current military and peaceful programs

c) \* Frustrated the implementation of the military program on gun systems \*.

1932 program 6078 systems, 1882 systems presented, 771 delivered.

For the 1st quarter of 1933, the program was 410, 225 were presented, 25 systems were delivered.

The program was disrupted primarily due to the scarcest and latest types of weapons (tank, anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, large-caliber armor-piercing shells), the output of which is determined by units (see appendices No. 17 and 18.)

In addition, deliberately poor-quality systems were put into service by deceiving military acceptance (see Appendices 18-a and 39).

d) The production of peaceful products of heavy engineering (turbine disks, rotors, high-pressure boilers, chemical equipment) was disrupted, which created the need for imports (see Appendices No. 29, 34.)

e) By sabotage planning and the introduction of a technological process, backlogs were created and defects increased.

At the factories of the Eastern Administrative District there is a work in progress for 107,000,000 rubles.

Marriage according to the main details ranges from 27 to 75% (see appendices No. 19 and 19-a).

f) Members of the organization passed information of a spy nature to the German fascists. (A number of information about production programs, mobilization information, drawings of an extra-dial 152 m / m gun was transmitted). (See Appendix No. 20.)

DOCUMENTATION

457

AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE FOLLOWING ACTS OF  
WRECKING HAVE BEEN DOCUMENTED PROVEN

Wrecking at the Barricades plant

\*\*\*\* For the reconstruction and new construction of hot machine shops, 64,000,000 rubles were allocated, 48,000,000 rubles were spent. or 79%, mastered 30,000,000 rubles. or 58%\*\*\*\*.

\*\*\*\* Of the indicated amount, 21,000,000 rubles were allocated for hot shops, 14,000,000 rubles were spent. or 67%, and mastered only 4.900.000 rubles. or 34%\*\*\*\*.

The construction of the main hot shops (open-hearth, peeling, torpedo-pressing, new thermal) was disrupted.

The leaders of the cell at the plant - Ch. metallurgist KRAVS-TARNAVSKY, his assistant PARISKY and head. thermal shops NAGOROV - agreed to sabotage all requests from the UKS, referring to their incompetence, or not to give any technical instructions at all, or to give incorrect ones, which they did.

\*\*\* With the participation of a foreign specialist SCHILLING, deliberately incorrect technical instructions were given on newly built open-hearth and vertical hardening furnaces, which reduced their efficiency. (See appendix no. 21, 22, 23, 24)\*\*\*.

Imperfect methods of melting and heat treatment were used, which increased the marriage, decreased the percentage of completion of production tasks for gun systems, and put into service poor quality  
natural systems.

a) Under the guise of facilitating the process of forging gun forgings, a mold was deliberately used incorrectly, which led to contamination of the gun tubes in critical places (in the chamber and at the beginning of the rifling).

As a result, in 1932, 100 pipes were finally rejected, and 110, clearly of poor quality, were sent to plant No. 13 (Bryansk Arsenal).

At the same time, TARNAVSKY instructed PARIYSKY to send more polluted tubes to plant No. 13, declaring that there was no optical tube, the examination was carried out with a mirror and the defects would not be visible.

This sabotage was carried out with the direct \*\*\* participation of foreign experts FEIST and BERNGORN, who proved that slag inclusions had no effect on the service of guns \*\*\*.

b) Under the pretext of the absence of pyromothermal devices, while there are such in the warehouses of the plant, artisanal heat treatment of tool parts was carried out, due to which the rejection increased from incorrect temperatures, reaching 30%.

By means of incorrect calculations of the stresses in parts of the system, guns of clearly poor quality were handed over to the Military Veterinarian by the member of the cell, SHUKALOV (former head of the Design Bureau of the plant).

c) Handed over to the Military Veterinarian were thinned by 10 m/m ladygi (a part that secures the body with a sledge), which introduces a weakening of the section by 100 m/m and will inevitably lead to a gun failure during firing.

SHUKALOV told PARIYSKY about this, laughing, after he had "proved" the suitability of these ladies for military acceptance.

d) Brackets for 152 m / m guns were handed over, obviously unusable due to "a large presence of a shell.

458

LUBYANKA. January 1922—December 1936

e) 212 low-quality pipes were handed over to the military inspector. The presence of slag inclusions in the chamber and at the beginning of the rifling of the pipe reduces its service life, namely: instead of the supposed 3000 shots, only 1500-2000 shots are possible, after which re-shooting is necessary. (See appendices No. 25, 26, 27, 28.)

\*\*\* On the instructions of a foreign specialist KIRMZE \*\*\*, they delayed the development of heavy engineering at the plant (high-pressure boilers, rotors, turbine shafts, chemical equipment), facilitating the transfer of these orders abroad to the Krupp company. (Orders of Soyuzverf and VEO were disrupted.) (See appendix No. 29.) As a result of these methods of sabotage, the program

water is broken:

In 1932, 208 systems were to be manufactured.

Manufactured and presented for delivery - 50

Accepted by the Military Veterinarian - 0

For 1 quarter [artal] 1933 to be manufactured - 60 Manufactured and presented for delivery -31

Accepted by the Military Veterinarian - 7

At the same time, in the warehouses of the plant lies in the unfinished production of incomplete parts in the amount of 13 million rubles, which in the 1932 program in

in monetary terms is 105%. (See Appendices Nos. 17 and 19.)

Wrecking at the Bolshevik plant

\* For the reconstruction and construction of new workshops in 1931-32, 30 million rubles were allocated, 22 million rubles were spent, or 74%, 6 million were spent - or 35% \*.

Of this amount, 10 million rubles were allocated to hot shops, 5,800,000 rubles, or 57%, were spent, and only 3,000,000 rubles, or 55%, were spent.

The construction of a new open-hearth, rolling, shaped-casting and repair-mechanical shops was disrupted. (See Appendices No. 9 and 30.)

KRAVS-TARNAVSKY, PARIYSKY, who previously worked at the Bolshevik plant, and ZAKRZHEVSKY - former. technical] director of the plant, now an engineer of the Optical Association, who headed the cell at the Bolshevik plant, set themselves the task, on special instructions from the engineer KIRMZE, a representative of the Krupp company, to prevent the plant from mastering the production of large-caliber armor-piercing shells for the Maritime Department, which they did.

The presses necessary for organizing the production of large shells were not installed. Meanwhile, the presses (vertical 2000 tons and horizontal 500 tons) have been idle for 15 years at the Izhora plant in the open, rusting, and some parts have already been lost.

The Bolshevik plant had permission to receive them back in 1931.

Due to the lack of presses, the work proceeded in an artisanal way.

For shell melting, a deliberately poor-quality charge was used with an admixture of a large amount of phosphorus (no more than 0.02 was needed, but it was 0.035, i.e. almost twice as much as allowed).

As a result of these actions, shell production was not mastered for 5 years, and those manufactured during this period of time went into continuous rejection. (See appendices No. 18, 31, 32, 33.)

On the instructions of the same KIRMSE, heavy engineering was sabotaged and did not develop, which KIRMSE had in mind to achieve an increase in our orders to the Krupp company (orders for turbine disks and high-pressure boilers were disrupted). (See appendices No. 34, 35.)

DOCUMENTATION

459

The reconstruction of the old open-hearth shop, with the participation of the German specialist RESGEN, was carried out with the calculation of a decrease in throughput

property and increase marriage. (See appendix No. 30).

Wrecking at plant number 8

The counter-revolutionary cell headed by MIKHAILOV, ex. tech. director of the plant and BERING - beg. The design bureau of the plant, having received direct instructions from the German specialists PANTEN, WARNEKE, LANDEN and others, carried out wrecking in the area of \u200b\u200bdisrupting small-caliber and anti-aircraft artillery.

Disruption of production and release of unusable systems was carried out as follows:

1. Drawings were made and put into operation with deliberately incorrectly applied measurement bases and with incorrectly affixed dimensions (casing, inertial fuse, lifting mechanism, compressor, etc.), which led to a complete disorganization of production, marriage increased, interchangeability was violated, and assembled systems were married as unfit. (See appendices No. 37, 38, 39.)

2. The participants of the organizational committee SHIRINKIN, ZABELIN, VLASOV, GNEDIN and MIKHAILOV, on the direct instructions of foreign specialists PANTEN, LANDEN and others, systematically hampered the introduction of the technological process into production, did not control the compliance of the workshops with the designed mode of operation, Incorrect drawings received from the design bureau were passed into production. It is allowed to use uncorrected patterns and devices in the workshops. The development of the technological process does not provide the possibility of preserving the brand on the workpieces.

According to the direct directives of PANTEN, LANDEN and SCHUBERT, obviously unusable and poor-quality parts were manufactured and put into assembly. (See appendix nos. 40, 41, 42 and 43.)

By such methods of wrecking, a complete disruption was achieved not only of the plant's readiness to fulfill the government task, but also of current programs.

In 1932, the program task was 4915 systems.

Manufactured and presented for delivery - 1220

Accepted by the Military Veterinarian - 339

For 1 quarter [artal] 1933 program task - 310

Manufactured and presented for delivery - 185

Accepted by the Military Veterinarian - 0

(See appendix no. 17.)

The investigation in this case is over.

At the same time, a spy group was uncovered at plant No. 8, working on the instructions and under the direction of the intelligence agencies of Poland, about which a separate certificate is sent to you\*.

ZAM. PRED OGPU YAGODA  
BEGINNING. ECU OGPU MIRONOV

APRf. f. h. Op. 58. D. 341. L. 1-11. Script. Typescript.

f \* Published without appendices.

Underlined in pencil.

~~ \*      The sign "N13 XX" is put on the margins.  
\*\*\*\*\*      There is a "XX" sign in the margins.

~~ \*\*      In the margins put "?".

460

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 382

NOTE V.A. Balitsky I.V. TO STALIN ON THE PROGRESS  
OF THE INVESTIGATION IN THE  
CASE OF THE POLISH MILITARY ORGANIZATION (POV)

August 8, 1933

\* In the process of further investigation into the case of the Polish Military Organization (POV), the role of the head. polsection of the Chernigov regional committee of the CP(b)U Skarbek as one of the main oldest members of this organization in Ukraine\*.

The arrested agents of the 2nd department of the Polglavshstab, a former member of the Central Committee of the PPS of Levitsy, a graduate student of the Research Institute of Polish Proletarian Culture, a member of the CP (b) U, Lapinsky testify that even \* in Warsaw, before being sent to Ukraine, he was a member of the main administration of the POV, pilsudchik, telegraph minister, ex. the Polish military attache in Moscow (until 1925), Colonel Berner, informed him that SKARBEK was one of the main leaders of the POV in Ukraine\*. Subsequently, while working in Kyiv, Lapinsky maintained the closest contact with Skarbek, devoting him to all his work and entrusting him with the appropriate instructions.

Arrested on the testimony of Lapinsky ex. member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia, recently head. With the Kiev regional, a member of the CP (b) U Pushkar shows that, being seconded after the Peel Sudsky coup to Ukraine through the POV, he received from Colonel Vencek a presence and a password to Skarbek, \* as the commandant of the POV \*.

Appearing to Skarbek and informing him of the purpose of his visit, Push



The caretaker received instructions from him and subsequently continued to work closely with him. The role of Skarbek in POV is also shown by the former arrested by us. Polish legionary, ex. member of the CP(b)U Khrustsel.

I think it is necessary to arrest Skarbek. Attached are the interrogation protocols.

Chairman of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR V. Balitsky

APRF. F. 3. Op. 5. D. 240. L. 105, 106. Original. Typescript.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 383

NOTE G.E. PROKOFIEVA I.V. TO STALIN ON THE  
RESULTS OF THE OPERATION  
TO CLEAR THE WESTERN BORDER

August 8, 1933

No. 50551

Top secret

\*In March of this year, the OGPU carried out an operation to clear our western border strip.

As a result of the operation along the borders of Ukraine, Belarus, Western and Leningrad regions, 18,802 people were arrested.\* Of this number, 14,391 people were members of sabotage and rebel organizations and groups and 4,441 people were spies with their connections revealed.

DOCUMENTATION

461

The real possibilities for carrying out the tasks set by the enemy were based on the use of a significant number of the Polish petty gentry, anti-Soviet and mainly kulak elements, who infiltrated beyond the cordon in the period 1930-1932.

D iversi onary activity.

Trained in sabotage and reconnaissance, they were concentrated at the appropriate reconnaissance apparatus located along our entire western border, constituting their active personnel and reserve.

These figures are typical in the sense that 18 large organizations planted by the Polish headquarters around the Mozyr, Minsk and Polotsk fortified regions, on the main strategic directions of Slutsk-Bobruisk, Pletennitsy -Borisov, Lepel - Orsha, on the railway

road junctions Zhlobin, Gomel, Orsha, Osipovich, Vitebsk, Novosokolniki-Sebezh and in places where artillery powder stores are located.

By the spring of 1931, a reserve of 375 people, carefully prepared and trained in special reconnaissance and sabotage schools, was concentrated in certain sections of the border, such as, for example, on the Belorussian one. For example, the organization in the Mozyr fortified area was divided into cells encircling firing points and separate defense structures. Its tasks for wartime consisted in capturing and destroying the firing points of the fortified area and in blowing up the group of Zlodinsky bridges connecting the Mozyr-Lelchitsy highway.

Other organizations in the Minsk and Polotsk fortified regions, planted both within the fortifications and in the settlements adjacent to them, acted with similar tasks.

Implanted on the railway junctions of Gomel-Kalinkovichi, the sabotage organization was supposed to blow up the depot of st. Kalinkovichi, st. Nakhov and Vasilevichi, to destroy the railway bridges near the village. Dozonka and Art. Vasilevichi.

An organization of the same type with cells at the Gomel, Zhlobin and Osipovich railway junctions was supposed to blow up the strategic bridge across the Dnieper, the Gomel power plant and the Bykhov artillery town with the start of the opening of hostilities.

The sabotage organization on the Vasilevichi-Khoiniki railway line with branches in Gomel, Zhidovichi and Lelchitsy had the task in wartime by mass train wrecks, explosions of water pumps, damage to tracks, disrupting the movement of military streams to the corresponding sections of the Front and completely stop moving along the Vasilevichi-Khoiniki line.

DURING THE LIQUIDATION OF THE DISCOVERED ORGANIZATIONS,  
18 EMISSARIES OF POLISH INTELLIGENCE WERE DETAINED,  
TRANSFERRED TO OUR TERRITORY FROM THE CORDON TO MANAGE  
THE SUBVERSION WORK.

Intelligence work.

During the operation, 65 spy stations of the Polish P4), Latvian (5), Romanian (4), Finnish (1) and Estonian (1) intelligence services were liquidated, covering the Polotsk, Minsk, Mozyr, Kiev fortified areas, a number of defensive constructions in Ukraine (Korostenskoye, Shepetovskoye) and in the LVO, Vitebsk and Gomel railway junctions, air bases, military factories, gunpowder and artillery depots.

462

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

The nature of their reconnaissance missions intercepted and the materials collected testified to the fact that the enemy was striving to obtain drawings of defense construction, our mobilization assumptions on transport, data on aviation, the military industry and information on

technical re-equipment of the army.

DURING THE LIQUIDATION OF RESIDENCES, 55 EMISSARIES  
OF THE POLISH (49), ROMANIAN (2), FINNISH (1), LATVIAN (3)  
INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WAS DETAINED IN Illegal Status.

Rebel k.-r. organizations

The vast insurgent underground liquidated by the operation in Transnistria, on the Right-Bank Ukraine and in Karelia was closely connected with the out-of-band Petliura and White Finnish centers and was inspired by Polish and Finnish intelligence.

The use of this underground went in the direction of creating a c.-r. organizations through emissaries from out-of-band White émigré centers transferred for this purpose, or the activities of already established organizations were managed after the latter had established contact with out-of-cord CCs. centers, and through them with enemy reconnaissance.

The activities of the insurgent organizations covered 140 districts of the border strip and the border regions of Kyiv and Vinnitsa. Odessa and Moldavian regions of Ukraine, led by the Polish-Petliura intelligence. In Karelia and the LVO, 23 districts were covered by the activities of insurgent organizations (15 districts in Karelia and 8 in the LVO).

The total number of k.-r. The kulak-Petliura asset arrested for liquidated insurgent organizations in Ukraine reaches 7,758 people. In the LVO and Karelia, the number of people involved in active insurgent activity was 1641 people.

During the operation in Ukraine, 7 emissaries of the Petliura emigration centers, who were transferred to our territory with special assignments, were detained in an illegal position; 101 people were arrested in Karelia - agents transferred from Finland and attached to insurgent cells, which they should lead at the time of the uprising.

The operation to clear the western borders disorganized the activities of the enemy on our territory. In connection with the failure of the intelligence network and the defeat of sabotage and rebel organizations, the Polish main headquarters is checking the activities of its intelligence apparatus and changing the leading officers of the intelligence dances located on the Belarusian border.

The elimination of numerous reconnaissance stations, crossings, sabotage and insurgent plantings by us caused the enemy to restore lost positions. The entire period of time immediately following the end of the operation was characterized by a mass transfer to our territory of personnel of new agents, leaders of sabotage gangs, who were in the position of conserving personnel of especially valuable intelligence agents for recruiting, creating residencies and restoring surviving ties.

Detained enemy agents for the period from 15 IV to 1.VIII

Taking advantage of the interception of intelligence ties, enemy crossings, only from April 15 to August 1, 163 agents of the Polish, Lati, Finnish, Romanian, Estonian intelligence were again detained, then

DOCUMENTATION

463

THERE IS A NUMBER WHICH IS 126% EXCEEDING THE NUMBER OF INTELLIGENCE EMISSIONS DETAINED DURING THE ALL TIME OF THE OPERATION.

During the same period, 12 residencies were liquidated (8 Polish in the Eastern Military District and BVO, 1 Latvian in the Western Region and 2 Finnish in the LVO) and 7 sabotage organizations (in the BSSR - 4 and in the LVO - 3).

The liquidation of centers of sabotage, rebellion and espionage has undoubtedly improved the situation in the border zone.

ZAM. CHAIRMAN OF THE OGPU PROKOFIEV  
APRF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 171. L. 112-115. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there are handwritten notes by Poskrebyshev: "From Comrade. Prokofiev"; Stalin: "My archive. I. Stalin.

No. 384

NOTE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN ON  
THE TEXT FOR PRESS ON THE DETENTION  
OF RUSSIAN WHITE GUARDS SENT FROM THE DVK

August 8, 1933

No. 50545

Forwarding the proposed Comrade. Deribas the text of the publication, I would consider it necessary to use the words "associated with some Japanese military  
gami" exclude

Deputy Chairman of the OGPU Yagoda

Message No. 22163 From Khabarovsk

August 7, 1933

We send the text for printing for approval:

The investigating authorities in Khabarovsk report that the investigation into ten armed Russian White Guards detained on Soviet territory from the steamer "Tun-San" (Ukhtomsky and others) is coming to an end.

The investigation established that all the detainees belonged to a 'spy\* organization in Harbin, 'acting against the Soviet Union\*\* and associated with some\* military circles in Manchuria.

The said "spy group\*\*\*, as established, since October 1931 has developed vigorous activity in the direction of the formation of spy-sabotage groups and bandit detachments \*\*\*" in the border zone of the Far Eastern Territory \*\*\*\*, setting as its task an active armed intervention against the USSR.

The case at the end of the investigation will be transferred to the Far Eastern Territorial Department of the UD \*\*. Deribas\*\*\*.

APRF. f. Z.Op. 58. D. 283. L. 51-53. Script. Typescript.

\*\* 1 text contains Stalin's handwritten notes:

\*\* "ÿ\*" written in pencil instead of the crossed out "White Guard".

Pa Rtii" ® was written by Ran Dash instead of the crossed out "so-called Russian fascist

\*\*\* \*\*\* The word "Japanese" has been crossed out.

\*\*\*\* 'i\*\*\* Inscribed in pencil instead of crossed out "organization".

\* Inscribed in pencil.

Crossed out "September 25 for special open trial hearing", in vip

On the last sheet there is a resolution: "T. Kaganovich. Should be published  
"De telegrams from Khabarovsk. I. Stalin".

464

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 385

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE REPRESENTATION OF METRO-VICKERS IN THE USSR"

August 15, 1933

No. 143, p. 2. - On the representative office of Metro-Vickers in the USSR (comrade Rosen

Golts, Ordzhonikidze).

a) Accept the proposal of Comrade Rozengolts to leave in Moscow until April 1, 1934, one or two engineers from the Metro-Vickers firm.

b) Oblige the OGPU to establish surveillance over them.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 23. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Rosen char, Yagoda.

No. 386

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT PASSPORTIZATION IN SAKHALIN

August 15, 1933

No. 143 p. 91/77. - About Sakhalin (PB of 31.V 11.33, pr. No. 142, p. 79).

In the development of the resolution of the PB of 23.IV of this year. "On Strengthening Supervision of Japanese Concessions on Sakhalin" the Central Committee decides:

1. Propose to the OGPU to carry out passportization throughout Sakhalin within a month, paying special attention to taking decisive measures to evict politically unreliable and criminal elements from areas close to Japanese concessions.

To send for this purpose the authorized OGPU Comrade E.G. Kravchenko. Establish the start of passportization no later than September 1 of this year.

<...>

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 26. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 10.VIII.33.

No. 387

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE TEMPORARY EXPANSION OF THE RIGHTS OF JUDICIAL TROIKAS  
OF THE PP OGPU (119)

August 15, 1933

N° 143, item 116/102 - Question from Comrade Yagoda.

Temporarily allow, in cases of armed banditry, to grant the right to judicial troikas of the PGPU of the OGPU of Ukraine, the SKK, NVK, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Urals and the West Siberian Territory to apply the ULTIMATE PENALTY to the organizers and bandit activists.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 27. Original. Typescript.

Published: Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. Collection of documents. S. 64.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 11.VIII.33.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "The extracts were sent to: comrade Yagoda;

to the indicated regional committees - in code \* \*\* .

DOCUMENTATION

465

No. 388

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE DELEGATION FOR THE  
ITALIAN MANEUVERS

August 15, 1933

No. 143, p. 171/157 - Question of Comrade Voroshilov.

Accept Comrade Voroshilov's proposal to be sent to the Italian maneuvers. Kazansky E.S., Klein-Burzi V.A. and Pomerantseva Z.I.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 30. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 15.VIII.33.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Voroshilov, Artuzov.

No. 389

CIPPHROTELEGRAM I.V. STALIN V.M. MOLOTOV,

L.M. KAGANOVICH AND G.G. YAGODA  
ON PREVENTIVE MEASURES IN CONNECTION  
WITH A POSSIBLE TERROR ACT AGAINST E. ERRIO

August 25, 1933

No. 1420

According to Yevdokimov, the White Guards are preparing a terrorist act against Herriot in Odessa or other parts of the USSR. In my opinion, Evdokimov's assumption has a basis. Balitsky must immediately be instructed to visit Herriot's places of residence himself and take all preventive measures against possible excesses. There will be a scandal if the White Guards manage to carry out even this unsuccessful assassination attempt on Soviet territory.

Stalin

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 24. Original. Typescript.

Published: Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 S. 311.

No. 390

CIPPHROTELEGRAM V.M. MOLOTOVA  
and L.M. Kaganovich I.V. TO STALIN ON MEASURES FOR THE  
PROTECTION OF E. ERRIO

August 27, 1933

Top secret Cipher

Yagoda took measures to protect Herriot. In Ukraine, personally supervises Balitsky No. 5 1621 Sh

27. VIII.ZZ Molotov, Kaganovich

RGASPI. F. 558. Op.11. D. 80. L. 41. Copy. Typescript.

Published: Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 S. 317.

466

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 391

FROM THE DECISION OF THE CC AUCP(b) "ON  
DIPAGENTS AND THE AUTHORIZED NKID IN THE FAR EAST"

August 29, 1933

No. 144, p. 158/137 - On diplomatic agents and authorized NKID in the Far East (PB dated  
11.UP.ZZ, pr. No. 143, p. 119/105-11).

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) decides:

III. To propose to the OGPU ... to categorically oblige the bodies under their jurisdiction in the Far East  
to precisely coordinate with the representatives or agents in the Far East all their activities, without  
exception, affecting the interests of foreign citizens and enterprises ...

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 49, 51. Original. Typescript.

No. 392

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT PROTECTION OF BREAD" (120)

September 15, 1933

No. 145, p. 42/25 - On the protection of bread (PB of 29.USh.ZZ, pr. No. 144, p. 7).



3. In places where the largest amount of grain is accumulated, especially outside warehouses, within five days, Zagotzerno increase the guard guard, and the OGPU appoint temporary commandants (up to 500 people) for the protection of grain from among the workers of the OGPU or from among the workers mobilized at the disposal of the OGPU .

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 930. L. 15. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on September 2, 1933.

No. 393

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE MEASURES OF THE OGPU

ON PROTECTION AND TRANSPORTATION OF GRAIN"

September 15, 1933

N ° 145, p. 44/27 - On the measures of the OGPU for the protection and transportation of grain.

Approve the measures taken by the OGPU to organize assistance to the KomzagSNK for the protection and transportation of grain.

Propose to Comrade Yagoda to continue to take the necessary measures to ensure the complete safety of grain at the procurement points.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 930. L. 17. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 2. IX.

467

DOCUMENTATION \_

No. 394

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT RAILROAD WORKERS SUITABLE FOR DECLINES,

BUT CONTINUE TO WORK IN POSITIONS RELATED TO TRAFFIC  
SAFETY»

September 15, 1933

No. 145, p. 182/166 - About railway workers who were sued for derailments, but continue to work in positions related to traffic safety.

2. To propose to the NKPS, on the basis of the materials available in the OGPU, within a month, to review both all those who have been sued for the crash, and all those who have

who are subject to two or more disciplinary sanctions for crashes, but continue to work in positions related to traffic safety - for the purpose of either complete removal from these positions, or transfer to non-responsible areas.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 930. L. 47, 48. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 15.IX.33.

ÿ395

TELEGRAPH MESSAGE L.M. ZAKOVSKY I.V. TO  
STALIN ON THE POLISH MILITARY ORGANIZATION

October 4, 1933

No. 50665

TOP SECRET

OSHU received a telegraph message from the PGPU of Belarus with the following content:

"I. \*In Mogilev, a branch of the Polish Military Organization (POV) is opened and liquidated\*. The consciousness of the members of the organization: the mechanic of the depot, expelled from the party in 1931, REUTA, the sister of the famous Ph.D. BELOGOLOVOY-SKOPOVSKAYA, more than 30 members of the organization recruited by priest YAROSHEVICH have been identified so far.

I. \* In Zhlobin, a branch of the POV \*, created by priest YAROSHEVICH, is also opened. The arrested members of the organization BATURO and KUCHINSKAYA confessed to giving YAROSHEVICH information about the Zhlobin junction and  
military units.

Sh. The consciousness of the arrested ROZH NOVSKY and BARTASHKEVICH \*\* establishes the emergence of the organization in 1924, there are indications of the presence of POV cells in the Osipovich Railway junction.

GV. Arrested in Gomel in the case of POV SESKEVICH\*\* Anton confirmed his involvement in the organization. He confessed that in 1929 - 1932 he visited Poland on the instructions of priest ANDREKUS, in 1932, while in Bialystok, he completed 3-month reconnaissance and sabotage courses.

V. On October 1, 1933, Ivan SUCHKOV, who had fled to Poland in early 1933 on early demobilization from the army, was detained in Minsk. SUCHKOV's consciousness establishes him with

468

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

work in the Luninets reconnaissance square and the creation of a reserve in Minsk

denture in the face of the decoration committee of the 2nd artillery regiment TROFIMOV Georgy, instructor of the military construction site Ivan KULINICH. Arrested TROFIMOV confessed to espionage.

VI. A relative of the famous Polish saboteur KHOLYAVO-YANKOVSKY Adam Iosifovich, who is being developed by us, was arrested; confessed to collaborating with the Vileika reconnaissance party. The consciousness of YANKOVSKY also establishes a large espionage and sabotage residency in Minsk, in the Logoisk region. Shimchenok, who was brought to the investigation, confirmed Yankovsky's testimony.

VII. At the site of the 17th border detachment, an old Polish agent of the Stolpetskaya reconnaissance party Frants Broneslavovich was detained with a weapon in his hands. VOINICH in 1932 was convicted of espionage, fled from a concentration camp to Poland. Arrived on a mission to the Smolensk garrison to rob a courier plying Minsk-Moscow.

VIII. On October 1, 1933, a former Red Army soldier of the 13th border detachment, who had fled to Poland in September and settled in the border zone after demobilization in 1932, Andrey Petrovich LOSHKOV, was detained at the site of the 13th border detachment. LOSHKOV's consciousness establishes his cooperation with the Glubok reconnaissance party, the creation of a residency in Polotsk and the collection of information in the Polotsk garrison.

IX. On September 29, 1933, an agent of the Stolpetskaya reconnaissance party KAZAK Franz Antonovich, who fled from exile in July to Poland, was detained at the site of the 16th border detachment. Arrived with an assignment to settle in Slutsk as a resident. Fictitious Soviet documents with the name of Nikolai Antonovich KRUK were found in the possession of KAZAK.

X. On October 1, 1933, at the site of the 15th border detachment, a Polish agent of the Vileika reconnaissance camp was detained LOGUNOV Savely Prokopyevich, a resident of the owls. side, who fled to Poland in the month of July. At LOGUNOV, 500 rubles were found. October 4, 1933 ZAKOVSKY.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 243. L. 86-88. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "Stalin. Ya. Agranov. 4.X-33.

\* Underlined in pencil.

Ÿ\* The last name is ticked with a pencil.

No. 396

MEMORY YA.S. AGRANOVA I.V. TO STALIN IN THE CASE  
OF THE LIQUIDATED GPU OF THE Ukrainian  
SSR ORGANIZATION "MARIUPOL-NIKOLAEV"

October 15, 1933

No. 50699

Top secret

The GPU of the Ukrainian SSR was opened and partially liquidated in the city. Mariupol and Nikolaev, a sabotage and reconnaissance organization of the German National Socialist Party, which worked under the guise of the Control-K 0 company. Cells

ki residencies of this organization were opened in the defense workshops of the factories - "Named Ilyich" and "Azovstal" (Mariupol), "Named Marty" and "61", "Plug

## DOCUMENTS \_469

and hammer "(Nikolaev), in Mariupol, Berdyansk, Nikolaev, Kherson and Odessa ports and in parts of the XV division (44-str. regiment, 15 artillery regiment).

ŸThe organization was headed by a representative of the firm "Control-K0" in Ukraine Weinzel \* Joseph (former Austrian officer, Austrian citizen). The main residents of Weinzel for sabotage and reconnaissance work were: 1. Grishay Richard, a member of the Austrian organization nat. party, engineer of the Plow and Molot design plant; 2. Carl Gustav, b. officer of the German army, design engineer of the plant named after Marty, German citizen; 3. Igturm Alfred, Baltic German, c. USSR, representative of the Control-K 0 office in Nikolaev (arrested and confessed).

ŸAmong the most important secret materials obtained by the Germans, attention is drawn to the data on the defense workshops of Mariupol and Nikolaev factories \* ("A. Marty", "Plow and Hammer", "Them. 61", "Them. Ilyich", "Azovstal" ), the construction of submarines and special ships, recipes for special tank steel grades "MM" and "MI", data on the state of the XV division and the Mariupol garrison, etc.

It has been established that extensive intelligence work \* was accompanied by the preparation of sabotage \* at a number of enterprises, the partial implementation of acts of sabotage at the plant "Im. Marty." At the same time, it was established that a number of recruited German colonists were used to create a c.r. grassroots rebel cells. Weinzel recruited priests Wagner, Zisko and Gatenbeller into the organization, with the participation of which K.R.-po rebel cells were created in the German colonies of the Donbass, Odessa and Dnepropetrovsk regions. When creating these cells, the organization used the old cadres that existed in 1920-1924. in the city of Mariupol "Union of the Germans of the Aryan race" (liquidated in 1924).

28 people have been arrested in the case. Most of those arrested confessed, including Weinzel's immediate assistants, Igturm Alfred and Father Wagner.

In order to fully open the sabotage cells of the organization, we consider it necessary to arrest Austrian subjects - Weinzel Joseph and Grishay Richard, the German citizen Karl Gustav.

ZAM. CHAIRMAN OF THE OGPU Y. AGRANOV

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 243. L. 89-91. Script. Typescript.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 397

TELEGRAM S.S. MAZO FROM KHARKOV  
ABOUT THE FIRE AT THE FACTORY "im. MARTY",

DIRECTIONAL G.E. Prokofiev I.V. STALIN

October 24, 1933

We inform

On October 22, at 9 pm in Nikolaev, a fire broke out in the hull shop of the covered boathouse of the Marty plant, where 11-12 submarines are located. The fire that broke out from under the wooden flooring quickly engulfed a significant part of the workshop building, destroying part of the scaffolding stacks, electrical wiring, and the electrical winding of an electric crane, which was temporarily out of order. Fire damaged two submarines located near the fire. Incomplete

470

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

According to the data, one boat is significantly damaged, the other is slightly damaged, and no alterations are required. By the measures taken to mobilize all fire departments of the city, the fire was localized. The wooden flooring of the workshop was charred from below by 30 percent] of the area occupied by it.

Approximately the workshop will be able to continue work except for the place where the fire started, it will take 5 days to restore. An instruction was given to conduct the most thorough investigation, to identify the causes and source of the fire. In Nikolaev, the apparatus of the city department of mobilization

van.

We will inform you about the results of the investigation later. NG 61644 Mazo

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 243. L. 92. Original. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "Comrade. Stalin. Prokofiev. 25.X.ZZ, "; "Message of the OGPU".

No. 398

SPBTsSOOBShCHBNIIE G.E. PROKOFIEVA I.V. STALIN,

V.M. MOLOTOV and L.M. KAGANOVICH  
ON THE NECESSITY OF ARRESTS OF AUSTRIAN  
AND GERMAN SUBJECTS (121)

November 3, 1933

No. 50762

Owls. secret

As a result of the further development of the investigation into the case of the German subversive and insurgent organization, which worked under the guise of the firm "Control-K 0", an extremely wide scope of the subversive and insurgent work of the organization was revealed.

It has been established that the fire that took place in the closed boathouse of submarines of the plant "im. Marty" (Nikolaev), produced by an uncovered organization headed by Weinzel (representative of the company "Control-K 0" in Ukraine,

Austrian subject). The arrested engineer Gummert confessed that he set fire to the boathouse on behalf of Ing. Karl (factory engineer Marty, a German citizen) through the head of the planning bureau of the hull shop of the Golovenko plant and the foreman of the same shop Plokhoy.

The testimony of the same Gummert establishes that the following acts of sabotage were planned on the orders of Karl in the coming days: a) the flooding of a powerful floating crane from the plant named after. Marty" (immediate implementation entrusted to the delivery captain Kozhushenko - arrested); b) arson of the tank-building shop of the plant "im. Marty" (implementation was entrusted to the NKPS engineer, party member Belyaev).

Thus, the further investigation fully confirms the primary materials that the main organizer of the sabotage is the engineer Karl, who is closely associated with the Austrian citizen Grishay (engineer of the factory "named after Marty"),

At the same time, the testimony of engineers Becker and Meshcheryakov established the extensive systematic work of German intelligence to prepare acts of sabotage at Krashmashstroy and the Kramatorsk hydroelectric power station, accompanied by the formation of sabotage cells from Germans, kulaks who settled in enterprises.

#### DOCUMENTS \_471

In parallel with the existence of sabotage cells, the testimony of those arrested in the Donbass, Dnepropetrovsk region and Odessa established the existence of an extensive insurgent organization that engulfed the Dnepropetrovsk region, Odessa region, Donbass, Kiev region and the SKK, and the presence of an extensive spy network in the Red Army units in Ukraine.

Measures have been taken to strengthen the protection of the plant "im. Marty" and Krammashstroy.

Widespread sabotage and espionage work in Ukraine under the cover of the firm "Control-K 0" has been established as a cover for the sabotage work of the German General Staff during the imperialist war. From the materials of the tsarist counterintelligence available to us, the presence of active espionage activity on the part of the then representative of Control-K 0 in Rostov, a Belgian citizen Bernhard Sylvain, was established. (at present the chief representative of Control-K 0 in Moscow), connected in this work with the German citizen Shenge (at present he works in the Moscow office of Control-K 0). In the course of the investigation, the testimonies of engineers Stavrovsky (plant "named after Ilyich" in Mariupol), Gummert (plant "named after Marty" in Nikolaev), Schaeffer (plant "named after Marty") and employees of the company "Control-K 0" Shturma (Nikolaev), Garsher (from Odessa), and others found that all sabotage work, including the arson of the boathouse of submarines in the city of Nikolaev, was led by Weinzel, an Austrian citizen, manager of the conto - Roy "Control-K 0" in Mariupol, Karl, German citizen, engineer of the plant "im. Marty" and Grishay, an Austrian engineer from the same factory.

For the purpose of full recovery and suppression of sabotage work, we consider it necessary to arrest Weinzel Joseph, Carl Gustav and Grishai Richard\*\*.

Deputy Chairman of the OGPU PROKOFIEV

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 243. L. 95-97. Script. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Sent to: Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks  
^ ^ STALIN, Prev. Council of People's Commissars, comrade MOLOTOV, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b), comrade KAGANO-

\*\*

On the last sheet there is a handwritten note: "For. Molotov. Kaganovich.

No. 399

NOTE A.P. ROZENGOLTS I.V. STALIN AND V.M.  
MOLOTOV ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMPANY "CONTROL-K 0"

November 10, 1933

No. 696

OWL. SECRET

According to the materials of the OGPU, the employees of the Control-K 0 company (for the maintenance of our grain exports) were German intelligence agents, and almost all Soviet citizens of the firm's employees were involved in this work.

So far, 10 people of Soviet citizens have been arrested - employees of this company in ports.

After the arrests, the general representative of the company in Moscow, BERNGARD, turned to the Chairman of Exportkhleb, comrade KISSIN, with a request to accept

472

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

on the arrest of their employees, indicating that these arrests have disrupted the work of the company in the ports and it will be deprived of the opportunity to perform its functions ("Control-K 0" certifies the amount of goods loaded onto ships, guarantees the unloading of the same amount at ports of destination, on behalf of foreign firms accept oil, pitch and other goods in our ports, and also guarantee the safety of goods in the USSR under warrant transactions with foreign firms - against these guarantees, foreign banks pay us the cost of the goods in advance).

Tov. KISSIN stated that he would apply to the prosecutor's office with a request and only after that would be able to inform BERNHARD about this case.

BERNHARD is in contact with his general office in Geneva on this matter, and the possibility of further pressure from the firm by delaying the issuance of guarantee certificates is not ruled out, which may create some difficulties for us.

In agreement with the OGPU (comrade Prokofiev), I consider it expedient to instruct Kissin to call BERNGARD and tell him that, according to the information he received from the prosecutor's office, it was established that some employees of the company were engaged in "counter-revolutionary" and anti-state activities. This is proved by their own testimony and confession. Consequence of showing

vaet that this case is also related to individual employees - foreigners. The prosecutor's office does not bring charges against the firm as such, but believes that there was a use of the firm's name and apparatus. BERNHARD must draw the necessary conclusions from this regarding the assembly of the apparatus.

Further, KISSIN will have to recommend to BERNHARD immediately to restore the apparatus and not to interrupt operational functions.

I ask for your consent.

A. Rozengolts

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 243. L.98, 99. Original. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there is Stalin's handwritten note: "Archive".

\*—\* Handwritten in ink above the sentence.

No. 400

SPECIAL MESSAGE G.G. BERRIES AND L.G. MIRONOVA  
I.V. TO STALIN ON THE LOST SECRET DRAWING

November 23, 1933

No. 50822

Owls. secret Urgent

October 12 this year At the plant of "electrical appliances" in Leningrad, a secret drawing was discovered missing - a scheme for controlling coastal defense artillery fire. A covert investigation of this fact by the OGPU found that the drawing was appropriated by the factory engineer Zilberberg Lev Nikolayevich.

On November 1, the latter was arrested; three secret drawings of military orders were found in his apartment, which are in production at the Elektropribor plant.

DOCUMENTATION

473

The investigation established: engineer Zilberberg, living in 1921-23. in the city of Ankerman (Bessarabia), was recruited by the Romanian intelligence service (siguranci) in the person of an intelligence officer Nerler with the assistance of a certain c. jÿÿpe lyushnik, also a secret intelligence agent.

In 1923, Zilberberg was illegally transferred to the territory of the USSR to conduct espionage work on the instructions of intelligence, where he posed as



Litemigrant.

In December of the same year, Zilberberg, on assignment from intelligence, voluntarily joined the Red Army, was enrolled in the 6th communications regiment in Kiev, then, being demobilized, made his way to the VTUZ and, after graduating in 1931, moved to Leningrad, where he entered the Elektropribor plant as an engineer.

At the end of 1931, Zilberberg established contact with the aforementioned secret agent of the Romanian intelligence, Kapelyushnik, who also moved to the USSR and got a job as an engineer at the Comintern military radio plant in Leningrad.

To carry out intelligence work on military orders at the Elektropribor plant, Zilberberg recruited engineer. the naval part of the plant Dmitriev B.M., who for over a year supplied Zilberberg with secret drawings, diagrams, detailed information about the number and purpose of orders for the naval part of the Elektropribor plant.

Spy information and materials were passed on by Zilberberg to Cape Lushnik, who paid money for this.

Eng. Kapelyushnik Yu.I. - head. special, design radio factory bureau Comintern and engineer.  
Dmitriev B.M. - an employee of the naval part of the Elektropribor plant was arrested.

The investigation into the case is ongoing.

Deputy Chairman of the OGPU Yagoda  
Beg. ECO OGPU MIRONOV

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 243. L. 201, 202. Original. Typescript.

\*

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "Report the results. I. St.

No. 401

MEMORIAL G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN ON THE  
"DIVERSION" ACTIVITIES OF THE  
EMPLOYEES OF THE OFFICE "CONTROL-K 0"

Ju December 1933

No. 50 898

TOP SECRET

Investigation into the case of the fire on October 22 this year, which occurred in the covered boathouse of the plant named after. Marty in the mountains Nikolaev, which disabled two submarines, revealed that the fire followed as a result of arson committed by a sabotage group consisting of owls. citizens of GUMMERT (engineer of the Marty factory), GOROVENKO (engineer of the same factory), PLOCHOY (master of the assembly shop of the Marty factory), IVANOVSKY (electric welding master of that va 2, factory) on the instructions of a German citizen factory engineer. Marty \*^ARL G. (arrested, did not confess). \* GUMMERT and GOROVENKO confessed that they had organized the arson, acting on the instructions of engineer. CARL, BAD AND IVANOVSKY. KARL, BAD and IVANOVSKY testified that they were

474

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

direct perpetrators of the act of sabotage, which was carried out by setting fire to the wooden shelving of the slipway (preliminarily doused with flammable "kuzbaslak") by short circuiting the lighting wires lowered under the slipway. Both the fact of arson and the technique of its implementation are confirmed by an act of technical expertise. Further investigation showed that the sabotage group led by the KARL engineer, who carried out the arson, is part of a sabotage network led by a German intelligence agent who has been working since 1908, German, subject, b. engineer Marty Berman V.E. (arrested, confessed to sabotage and reconnaissance work). BERMAN testified that in the summer of 1933, through the secretary of the German consulate in Odessa, GANA, he was given a directive from German intelligence on the deployment of sabotage work, for the implementation of which the GAN suggested that he contact the KARL engineer, who was entrusted with direct sabotage work. by the plant. Marty.

On the basis of the same directive, BERMAN switched to sabotage work his agent, who had been working since 1911, engineer. yes to them. Marty owl. Citizen SCHEFFER (arrested, confessed to sabotage and reconnaissance work). \* The sabotage and reconnaissance work carried out by BERMAN through the KARL engineer was linked to the manager of the Control-K ° office in Mariupol, WEINZETEL \* - an Austrian citizen (arrested, confessed to sabotage and reconnaissance activities), who showed that he contacted CARL in the summer of 1933 and gave him a reconnaissance assignment in the line of military shipbuilding. WEINZETEL's work in Mariupol was directly part of the system of sabotage and reconnaissance activities under the guise of branches of Control-KO.

ÿ "At the same time, WEINZETEL created sabotage groups in Mariupol at the plant named after Ilyich and in the port. \* Saboteurs recruited by WEINZETEL, STAVROVSKY (engineer, head of the chemical laboratory of the plant named after Ilyich, fellow citizen), TANKU E. (head of the steam the farm of the same plant, a Romanian citizen) and MILLER (an employee of the Mariup. port, a fellow citizen), who were arrested in October of this year, confessed to sabotage work.

In order to expand sabotage espionage work, in the spring of 1933, WEINZETEL contacted the head of the nationalist pan-German organization of German colonists in the Odessa region, a Catholic priest of owls, a citizen of ZISKO (arrested, confessed to sabotage and intelligence work), who was instructed to expand the preparatory work on sabotage. Performing this work, ZISKO organized in Nikolaev; sabotage groups at the plant "61", in fire and mine depots, outlined the explosion of a railway bridge located east of Nikolaev. The heads of sabotage groups allocated by ZISKO BOLDESKUL L. (master of plant "61") SHAAF F.F. Their testimonies are confirmed by the consciousness of the liquidated sabotage ranks.

ÿEven earlier, WEINZETEL contacted the Catholic Father in Mariupol of the Soviet Union. WAGNER\* (confessed to intelligence work), also located

who formed a certain cadre of non-colonists, indoctrinated in a pan-German and nationalist spirit. Directly to WAGNER for the purposes of fascist propaganda, WEINZETEL transferred money from the organizations "helping the starving" existing in Germany.

#### DOCUMENTATION

475

In order to systematically use "Control-K 0" as a cover for sabotage and reconnaissance work, German intelligence in Hamburg was attracted in 1929 by the chief manager of the office "Control-K 0" Bela, citizen Bernhardt - arrested, confessed to participation in intelligence work. (Known from archival materials of the tsarist counterintelligence as a German spy in Russia during the imperialist war.)

One of the tasks set by intelligence for Bernhardt, according to his testimony, boiled down to the fact that the latter had to ensure the legalization of the German intelligence agents sent through him. Bernhardt testifies that in this way the following intelligence agents\* were sent through him to work in the USSR:

1. SHEINAND - German, subject, deputy. main manager of "Kontrol-K 0" (currently in Germany).
2. WEINZETEL - Austrian citizen, manager of Control-K 0 in Mariupol (arrested).
3. WEINZETEL K. - Austrian citizen, manager. "Control-K 0" in Novorossiysk (arrested, did not confess).
4. RODIN R.R. - German citizen, manager of the office "Kontrol-K 0" in Batumi, not arrested.
5. SLAISHE - German citizen, deputy. manager of "Kontrol-K 0" in Leningrad (not arrested).
6. LARSEN - Danish citizen, manager of Control-K 0 in Arkhangelsk (not arrested).
7. GAMAN - owls. a citizen working for Control-K 0 in Moscow (arrested, confessed to intelligence work).

The investigation proved that, along with active sabotage work, the German intelligence agency, working under the cover of "Control-K 0", developed extensive intelligence activities, as a result of which the following most important military materials fell into the hands of the German intelligence agencies:

1. Detailed data on the construction of submarines at the plant. Marty.
2. Recipes for special tank steel, made at the plant. Ilyich in Mariupol.

3. Data on the mobile plan of the plant. Marty.
4. Plan of air defense of Moscow.
5. Topographic survey data of the Far Eastern border area in the area of st. Borderline, etc.

'Arrested in Moscow gr. USSR correspondent-translator of the main office "Control-K 0"  
GAMAN confessed to intelligence work in favor of Germany since 1914 and betrayed a network of his agents in the amount of 7 people \*. The arrested agents GAMAN BORMS (a fellow citizen, an engineer at Stalmost), VICKE (a fellow citizen, an engineer at the Bashzoloto trust), PETROSEVICH (a citizen of the USSR, a former colonel, a teacher at the Mining Institute in Moscow) confessed to intelligence activities.

Of those arrested in the GAMAN group, the following did not confess: BUBNOV (gr. 'SSR, head of the topographic bureau "Intageologia") and POCHKIN (gr. USSR, cameraman of Mezhrabfilm), who were part of the GAMAN intelligence network.

KRAMER I.V. (citizen of the USSR, teacher of the German language in the city of Gorky), V-TEFANOVSKY (citizen of the USSR, former employee of the "Druzag" concession), who are not currently in Moscow, are being identified and will be arrested.

476

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

I ask for instructions on the further direction of the investigation and the possibility of a public trial.

\*In order to fully reveal the sabotage work carried out under the cover of "Control-K 0", I ask you to authorize the arrest.\*

\*\*1. RODIN R.R. - German citizen, deputy. manager of the office "Control-K 0" in Batumi.

2. SLAISHE - German citizen, deputy. manager of the office "Control-K 0" in Leningrad.

3. LARSEN - Danish subject, management. Control-K 0 in Arkhangelsk.\*\*

Deputy Chairman of the OGPU G. Yagoda

APRF. F. 3. Op.58. D. 243. L. 210-215. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "To Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich (in person). Will discuss after reading. I. Stalin. "Read. V. Molotov"; "TO. Voroshilov"; "L. Kaganovich.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

ÿÿ^ ÿ Underlined in the margins with two lines.

No. 402

SPECIAL MESSAGE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN ON THE  
HUNGER STRIKE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

December 14, 1933

No. 50913

Top secret

In addition to No. 50879 dated December 2 of this year. I inform you about the Golodovka prepared by the Trotskyists of the political isolators that on December 13 of this year. 100 prisoners of the Trotskyists of the Upper Urals political isolator began a hunger strike.

I am carrying out the previously planned measures for the transfer to concentration camps of the main organizers of the hunger strike in the amount of 24 people. \* (122)

APRF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 140. L. 55. Original. Typescript.

\* There are handwritten notes in the text: "T.t. Molotov. Kaganovich. I. Stalin", "Chital. Molotov, Kaganovich.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 403

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE BURNING OF THE SHELLING AT THE PLANT "MARTY""

December 20, 1933

No. 151, p. 6. - About the arson of the boathouse at the Marty factory (comrade Yagoda).  
Postpone.

Allow the OGPU to arrest the Germans.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 151.

\*There is a typewritten note about the distribution in the text: "T. Yagoda.

DOCUMENTATION

477

No. 404

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION S.F. Redensa I.V. TO STALIN ON  
THE ARREST OF TROTSKYIST

January 14, 1934

Top secret

PGPU of the Moscow Region \*arrested for active subversive k.r. Trotskyist activity of the manager of the trust "Sovkhozzapchast" People's Commissar of State Farms of the USSR, member. VKP(b) since 1917. Levin Konstantin Nikolaevich. \* Levin admitted that he was the head of the Trotskyist group of the c.r. Narkomsovkhoz.

Further investigation is underway on both Trotskyist and his subversive activities.

Appendix: Protocol of interrogation of Levin Konstantin Nikolaevich dated 11.1.34\*\* (123)

APRF. F. 3. Op. 24. D., 140. L. 58. Original. Typescript.

\* There are handwritten notes in the text: "T.t. Molotov. Kaganovich. I. Stalin"; "We should be sent to the camp for 5 years. Molotov"; "Right. Kaganovich"; "Communicated to Redens 15.1."

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

\*\* Published without attachment.

No. 405

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE FIGHT AGAINST  
CRIMINAL AND DECLASSIFIED ELEMENTS IN  
THE CITY OF MOSCOW"

January 20, 1934

No. 152, p. 45/26 - On the fight against criminal and declassified elements in Moscow.

1) To apply capital punishment to all participants in armed robberies  
punishment.

2) Persons who have been sued twice or more over the past year for theft, and also subjected to arrests for hooliganism 2 or more times during the past year, should be expelled from Moscow and the region, at the direction of the Collegium of the OGPU, to remote places.

3) In relation to a begging and declassified element, apply expulsion to the place of residence, to special settlements of the OGPU and concentration camps.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 161. Original. Typescript.

^ The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 23.X11.33. Yagoda, Ge Dens, Kaganovich (MK), Akulov.

478

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 406

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON UNLOADING THE PORT OF VLADIVOSTOK"

January 20, 1934

No. 152, p. 54/35 - On unloading the port of Vladivostok.

1. Appoint Comrade Deribas as a special representative of the Central Committee and Council of People's Commissars for unloading the port of Vladivostok, suggesting that he immediately leave for Vladivostok to take all necessary measures on the spot for the urgent unloading of all steamers in the port, and also develop specific measures to ensure in the future normal loading and unloading operations in the port of Vladivostok and submit their proposals on this issue by telegraph for approval by the Central Committee. Oblige Comrade Deribas to submit to the Central Committee every 5 days reports on the progress of unloading at the port of Vladivostok.

2. To oblige the newly appointed Commissioner of Water Comrade Rosenthal to immediately leave for the Far East and begin his work in Vladivostok, remaining there until normal work in the port of Vladivostok is fully ensured.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 161. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 23.XI.33.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "Extracts sent by: Dalkraykom; t.t. Deribas (in cipher), Rosenthal, Janson, Voroshilov, Gamarnik, Molotov.

No. 407

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE AGREEMENT OF THE RKKA WITH JAPAN  
ON THE EXCHANGE OF INTERNES

January 20, 1934

N9 152, p. 57/38 - Question of Comrade Voroshilov.

Accept Comrade Voroshilov's proposals:

a) On the extension of the agreement between the Red Army and Japan on the exchange of trainees for one year.

b) On the admission of 2 Japanese officers for probation to the Red Army and on sending Comrade A.D. Ivanov to Japan for probation in the air regiment. and in kav-

Regiment Comrade Fedorova A.F.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 161. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 26.XII.33.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Voroshi  
lovu — everything; Artuzov - 6".

DOCUMENTATION

479

No. 408

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE EXPLOITATION OF THE DECLASSED  
ELEMENT FROM THE KHARKOV REGION"

January 20, 1934

No. 152, p. 136/117 - On the expulsion of a declassified element from the Kharkov region.

a) Permit the Kharkov regional committee to send 2,000 people of a declassified element from the Kharkov region to labor colonies and camps.

b) The expulsion should be carried out through the OGPU gradually, in small parties of 80-100 people, during the months of January, February and March.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 164. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 7.1.34.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Posts

sheva; Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine (in cipher); Yagoda.

409

NOTE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN WITH  
A NOTE APPENDIXED BY A.Ya. VYSHINSKY ABOUT  
THE BURNING OF SUBMARINES

January 29, 1934

No.

50125 Sov. secret

I am forwarding a note to Comrade. VYSHINSKY in the case of arson



boats, with which I fully agree.

APPENDIX: mentioned.

- ZAM. PREV. OGPU YAGODA

OWL. SECRET

TO THE COMMISSION OF THE CC comrade YAGODA, comrade LITVINOV

During the 25th, 26th and 28th of January I, through interrogation and face-to-face confrontations, checked the case of the German espionage and sabotage group.

I interrogated 17 people, all the main defendants in the filed Case. The data obtained, confirming the reports presented earlier by the OGPU comrade. STALIN in this case, allow me to come to the following conclusions:

1. The existence of the spy-saboteur Puppa, which worked in favor of Germany for a number of years after the revolution (in any case, since 1923) and for a number of years before the revolution, and mainly during the period of the imperialist war, must be considered established. This is confirmed by the testimony of those involved in the case as defendants themselves: BERNGARD (Belgian citizen, chief director of "Control-K 0"), BERMAN (Germany # "OD" <sup>TM</sup> \*, authorized by the firm "Control-K 0 "in the city of Nikolaev), OAINZETEL Joseph (Austrian citizen, authorized by the company "Control K 0 ", Novorossiysk), TANKU (Romanian citizen, employee of the Marti plant in Nikolaev) - and a number of Soviet employees and specialists

480

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

comrade - GUMMERT, IVANOVSKY, STAVROVSKY, BAD, priest VAGNER and priest ZISKO (both Soviet subjects).

This must be considered established, despite the fact that some of the persons involved, namely WEINZETEL Karl (Austrian citizen) and engineer KARL (German citizen) did not plead guilty, and engineer GRISHAI (German citizen) pleaded guilty only

partly in espionage.

It should be noted, however, that the file contains a handwritten statement by engineer KARL in German, in which he admits his espionage work, and at the confrontation of the accused SCHEFERT, GUMMERT and BERMAN conducted by me, engineer KARL stated that he sees a very difficult his position that he considers the statement of the accused incriminating him to be the result, as he put it, of an order from the German consul who wants to destroy him for his work in favor of the Soviet Union.

2. It must be considered established that a number of the accused (priests ZISKO, WAGNER, etc.) for a long time conducted among the Germans, and in particular, the colonial population, anti-Soviet propaganda and propaganda in favor of tearing Ukraine away from the Union and joining it to Germany. -

mania.

3. It must be considered as established that the fire of slipway No. 2 of the Marty plant in Nikolaev occurred as a result of an arson organized on the instructions of the secretary of the German consulate in Odessa GANA, which was transferred through VERMAN to KARL, who was working at that time at the Marti plant, which, in turn, attracted GUMMERT and GOROVENKO to this case. The arson itself was carried out by the factory workers PLOKHIM and IVANOVSKII. This fact is established by the testimony of all the persons listed above, except for KARL, and was verified by me through cross-examinations and face-to-face confrontations.

To draw BAD and IVANOVSKY GOROVENKO into this act of sabotage, he very skillfully used the mood that had been created in them in connection with the expulsion of both of them by the purge commission from the party and the dismissal of Ivanovsky from the factory.

4. The fact of the murder of an employee of the firm "Control-K0" by MIKHELSON GAMAN must also be considered as established, although this should be specially verified by an additional investigation.

This murder took place due to GAMAN's fear that MIKHELSON, who was also a member of the spy group working under the leadership of BERNGARD, in connection with the arrests of some employees of Control-K 0, began to show nervousness and instability, directly expressing uncertainty about himself in case of his arrest by the GPU.

The murder of MIKHELSON turned out to be revealed thanks to HAMANN's own consciousness, and a number of circumstances indirectly confirming his confession were established from the interrogation of BERNHARD, which I conducted on January 28.

5. I also consider it necessary to note that at the end of the interrogation of BERNHARD, the latter received a statement, recorded in the minutes, with a request, if possible, not to make public the fact of his espionage work in favor of Germany during the imperialist war. As a Belgian citizen, BERNHARD considers the disclosure of such a fact inconvenient.

DOCUMENTATION

481

In view of the foregoing, I consider, according to the procedural data, the organization of a public process is quite possible and sufficiently substantiated by the materials available in the case. In the case of a decision to send the case to court, it takes 15-20 days to complete all the traces and actions.

ZAM. PROSECUTOR OF THE UNION OF THE SSR A. Vyshinsky

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 244. L. 2-Zob. Script. Typescript

No. 410

NOTE I.A. AKULOVA

ON THE NEED TO CHECK THE  
CORRECTNESS OF THE SENTENCE IN THE CASE

ABOUT "wrecking" IN WORK SUPPLY (124)

February 13, 1934

No. 6-201

\*January 7 this year The NKJU of the RSFSR made a proposal to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to sanction the sentence to the highest measure of social protection in relation to \* KHALTURIN, FUKALOV, YASHKIN, KURLOV, NOZDRACHEV AND MIKHAILCHIK, convicted by the exit session of the West Siberian Regional Court on November 12-16, 1933 years to death for sabotage in the work supply.

\*January 26 this year An additional communication was submitted to the Politburo by Comrade. KRYLENKO that after the approval of this verdict by the Supreme Court, the convicts filed a statement in which they assert their innocence and report that they took the blame for the alleged sabotage they had committed as a result of the persuasion of the head of the Barnaul operational sector CHISTOV and authorized TOLMACHEV, who presented the accused are required to prove their loyalty to the party and the Soviet authorities, in view of the alleged need to create a political trial on sabotage in order to eliminate laxity, mismanagement, etc., by the example of this trial. phenomena among trade and cooperative workers\*.

January 29 this year the Prosecutor's Office of the Union received from the secretariat of comrade. KALININ, an application for pardon filed in his name by the same convicts.

In connection with these statements, the Prosecutor's Office of the Union demanded that the whole case be brought before its proceedings, at the same time summoning from Barnaul the convicts in this case, who are currently sent with a special escort.

In the meantime, according to the first submission of the NKJ (dated January 7 of this year), a sanction has already been received in relation to all convicts.

\*\* I consider it necessary to subject this whole matter, as out of the ordinary, to the most thorough scrutiny. \*I ask for permission to suspend the execution of the sentence in respect of all convicts until the verification and additional report on this issue to the Politburo.\*\*

Sharks

RGASGI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1013. L. 32, 32v. Script. Typescript.

On the first page there is a resolution: "To the members of the PB. You need to allow verification. I. Sta

Underlined in pencil.

-- Crossed out in the margins with a single line.

482

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 411

NOTE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN WITH A PROPOSAL FOR THE  
RELEASE OF V.V. SMAGINA FROM THE POSITION OF THE  
HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE RKKA

February 17, 1934

No. 50182

Top secret

Forwarding herewith the telegram of the Japanese military attache in Moscow, Colonel Kawabe, deciphered and sent to you earlier by the special department of the OGPU, to the Japanese General Staff dated February 13 of this year. No. 20/a\*, I draw your attention to the following passage in the telegram:

"... This assumption is based on my conversations with the head of the department of external relations, with whom I have a direct relationship through the official line."

ŸWe attached serious importance to this report by KAVABE in view of the presence of the following verified data about Smagin\*:

SMAGIN V.V., member of the CPSU (b) since 1920, former. ensign who voluntarily joined the Red Army in 1918 in the Far East.

Prior to that, \*SMAGIN served in the tsarist army in Manchuria, and then during the civil war, while in command positions in the Red Army, he was twice captured by the Japanese, and was also in an illegal position in the territory occupied by the gang of ataman SEMENOV\*, from where he was able to escape.

From 1926 to 1931, Smagin was first an assistant, and then a military attache in Japan, and during this time his excessive closeness with the Japanese officers of the General Staff was noted.

\*During the period of SMAGIN's stay in Japan as an assistant to the military attaché, there was a personally appointed military attaché. PRIMAKOV the following case\*:

The captain of the Japanese General Staff UNAI, being in a state of extreme intoxication, called in a conversation with comrade. PRIMAKOV is a specially conspiratorial pseudonym of the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army headquarters, comrade. BERZIN ("VORONOV"), to which the top secret correspondence of our military attache was addressed from Tokyo. ŸAt the same time, the same UNAI captain blurted out the contents of one of Comrade's secret reports. Primakov to the headquarters of the Red Army \*.

The pseudonym "VORONOV" was known in our military attache only to comrade. Primakov and his assistant Smagin. Tov. Primakov reported this case to the headquarters of the Red Army as extremely suspicious, but in essence this phenomenon was not investigated.

In July 1933, Smagin was appointed head of the foreign relations department of the Red Army headquarters.

ŸWe have established for certain that in January 1934, SMAGIN, using his personal service capabilities, took 57 cards of secret intelligence material to his house for 3 days from an ordinary employee of the IVth Directorate.

rial about Japan and 29 cards about China, which has nothing to do with his current official duties\*.

During the work of SMAGIN in the position of early. department of foreign relations, associated with constant communication with the corps of military attachés, ÿ there is a clearly expressed personal closeness and sympathy shown by him from

DOCUMENTATION

483

carried to representatives of the Japanese military attache, and in particular, to Colonel Kawabe \*. This was expressed, among other things, in the repeated facts of SMAGIN's solitary conversations with Japanese officers, contrary to the existing custom, and in the fact that SMAGIN provided the Japanese with all sorts of advantages over the rest of the military attaches.

For their part, the composition of the Japanese military attache gives the SMA GIN exceptional attention and signs of personal friendship.

In view of the foregoing, \* I would consider it expedient to dismiss VV SMAGINA. from his position, department of foreign relations of the headquarters of the Red Army and the beginning. 4th division GV Directorate, in order to be able in the near future to check on the merits of the behavior and role of Smagin in relation to the Japanese\*.

Leaving Smagin at his job, which completely legalizes his contact with the Japanese military attachat and other foreigners, would have made it extremely difficult to monitor him if all these data were available.

ZAM. CHAIRMAN OF THE OGPU YAGODA

February 13, 1934

FROM MOSCOW - FROM THE JAPANESE MILITARY  
ATTACHE 13/11-34, 20/a, b

IN TOKYO - POM. BEGINNING GENERAL STAFF

With regard to your request for No. 14, I believe that most of my reports, sent so far, just dealt with the issues mentioned in your telegram. I regret that, due to my inability, I cannot form an idea of the so-called real state of affairs, my ability to give categorical conclusions. I will make every effort to achieve this goal in the future. Below I would like to give some facts related to your questions:

1) \*There is no doubt that both military and civilian representatives of the Soviet government are unanimously disposed in favor of avoiding war. Of the prominent military men who spoke to me personally, I can cite Egorov, Chief of Staff of the Red Army, Budyonny, Inspector of the Cavalry, Alksnis, Chief of the Air Force, and others who definitely spoke of the need to establish Japanese-Soviet friendship. Only one Tukhachevsky,

appears to oppose this view. This assumption is based on my conversations with the head of the foreign relations department, Smagin, with whom I have a direct relationship through my official line\*.

2) Blucher's speech shows that there is the following assumption: Japan, due to external and internal circumstances and in view of the need to keep possessions in her hands, will be forced to go to war with America because of her hegemony in the Pacific Ocean. But before waging this war, Japan will need to seize Primorye and create a raw material base there and in Manchuria. The main goal of all military measures carried out by the Japanese in Manchuria is to prepare for the possibility of throwing troops into Soviet territory at any moment. From the speeches of Stalin and Molotov it is clear that there is the following assumption: it is necessary to strengthen the armament in the Far East due to the above circumstances. Despite the fact that the USSR does not want war, it is obvious that Japan will provoke it. Japan is convinced of the success of its tried and tested tactic: a surprise attack on the enemy.

MILITARY ATTASHE

484

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

FROM MOSCOW - FROM THE JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHE  
dated 13/11-34, No. 21/a, b C  
TOKYO - POM. BEGINNING GENERAL STAFF

3) In the USSR, many are of the opinion that anti-Soviet measures on the CER are a certain insult to the Soviet side (according to Smagin). The USSR, which considers itself one of the major powers of the world and cannot expose its prestige before foreign states and before its people to various blows. The Soviet government could not but oppose and launch grandiose propaganda inside and outside the country. As a result of this propaganda, most of the population of the USSR came to the conclusion that Japan intended to seize the CER without any compensation, so a war between Japan and the USSR was inevitable. Preparations for a war with Japan were very clearly outlined: the strengthening of weapons and the transfer of troops to the Far East, the mobilization of public opinion, etc. Advocacy is carried out on the following issues:

- a) about the peace-loving policy of the USSR;
- b) the striving of Soviet diplomacy to develop peaceful relations, the existing achievements along this line;
- c) preparing Japan for war;
- d) creating confidence among the population of the USSR regarding the armaments of the Red Army in connection with the development of industry;
- e) mitigation of domestic policy (an increase in goods put on the market, permission for a number of regions to carry out free trade in grain, exemption from duties for the population of the Far East and Transbaikalia, etc.);

f) exposing the internal situation of Japan (pauperization of the population, unrest in the colonies, disagreements between the military and the government, internal strife among representatives of the army and navy, lack of order in Manchuria, successful underground activities of the communists).

Further, the following measures are being taken: the suppression of nationalist deviations in Ukraine and Belarus, the reorganization of the military-administrative apparatus of the troops in the Far East (last year, the head of the GAMARNIK went to the Far East), an increase in the number of factories in accordance with the mobilization plan, the militarization of civilian factories, an increase in horse train, laying of new lines and repair of old ones. All these events testify to the solidarity of the Soviet Union and ideological readiness for war (the speeches of Voroshilov, Tukhachevsky and Kalinin).

MILITARY ATTACHE

FROM MOSCOW - FROM THE JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHE

13/11-34, No. 22/a, b C TOKYO  
- POM. BEGINNING GENERAL STAFF

One gets the impression that foreign states, considering statements in the Japanese press, in the aspect that is beneficial to them, give tendentious reports and thereby contribute to the growth of anxiety in the Soviet Union. One day Karl RADEK said to me: "Do you know how stubbornly the Americans warn us of the threat from Japan." Some of the Soviet representatives declare: "According to the information received by the American General Staff, Japan decided in May 1934 to declare war on the USSR." Some of the local foreign attachés, confident that Japan will soon go to war, are of the opinion that

DOCUMENTATION

485

the advantage will be on the side of the Soviet Union (1 gr. Ner.). The French military attaché asked me in all seriousness about the intentions of the Japanese high military command, and pointing out that the Red Army was very strong, he made a friendly warning that, until order was established in Manchukuo, it would be a big deal to start a war. risk.

Some of the local foreigners, in response to my questions, as well as on their own initiative, make the following statements, for example:

a) a Japanese-Soviet war is hardly possible. Most likely, Japan, having carried out the second stage of preparations over the next few years, will begin to resolve the Far East problem (English correspondent, Hindu). The USSR, bearing in mind major events in Europe, is preparing for this moment (statement by an Italian diplomat); b) the smart Japanese should solve the Manchurian problem in the way (three words su.).

MILITARY ATTACHE

FROM MOSCOW FROM THE JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHE

14/11-34, No. 23 a, b C TOKYO  
- POM. BEGINNING GENERAL STAFF

c) War is not a sport, but is an extremely responsible matter for the state, we know this from experience. The thoughtful Japanese government and the reasonable part of the Japanese people are unlikely to take frivolous steps. I don't think that Japan and the USSR will both go to war within the next few years. However, the fact that Japan and the USSR are constantly shouting about war creates a very dangerous atmosphere. This is the cause of my anxiety (statement by the German military attaché);

d) Japanese history shows us an example of how the Japanese people skillfully avoided external threats. I think that Japan is unlikely to go to war with the Soviet Union - in particular, I consider it completely impossible for Japan to declare this war itself (statement by a Russian acquaintance).

Based on all my observations in Moscow, I come to the following conclusion:

a) almost without exception, Russians have a negative attitude towards the war. At the same time, most believe that the war will start at the initiative of Japan;

b) preparations for a possible war are carried out steadily under the conditions of a dictatorship (3 words are illegible.);

c) there is an assumption that in the event of a war, fermentation will begin among the population of the Soviet Union in the near future, but I believe that here we need to refrain from too easy conclusions.

As for the information about a further increase in troops in the Far East, foreign military attachés in Moscow consider these data to be false. Captain HARADA stated that he did not notice these military movements on the way.

## MILITARY ATTACHE

That's right: ZAM. BEGINNING SPECIAL DEPARTMENT OF THE OGPU SOSNOVSKY

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 186. L. 79-87. Script. Typescript.

\*\* On the first sheet there is Stalin's handwritten note: "Talk to Klim. IN archive".

" Underlined in pencil.

486

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 412

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNION PEOPLE'S  
COMMISSION FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS "